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BISMA 




BISMARCK. 

FROM A PAINTING BY F. VON LENBAOH. 



Iberoes of tbe IRattous 

EDITED BY 

Evelyn Hbbott, m.U. 

FELLOW OF BALI.IOL COLLEGE, OXFORD 



FACTA DUCIS VIVENT OPEROSAQUE 
GLORIA RERUM. — OVID, IN LIVIAM 2G5. 
THE HERO'S DEEDS AND HARD-WON 
PAME SHALL LIVE. 



BISMARCK 



BISMARCK 

AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
GERMAN EMPIRE 



JAMES WYCLIFFE HEADLAM 



G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

NEW YORK LONDON 

27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET 24 BEDFORD STREBT, STRAND 

Stl^E 'flnukcrbnclur ^kss 
1899 



TWO 



Copies 



RECEIVED 



^^W I 3 1909 

^«ff^«ter Of CopyH,.,,^ 



Copyright, i8gg 

BY 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
Entered at Stationers' Hall, London 



SECOND COPY, 



(=.'1 fi U 



'5:fje TRnicftcibpcftcr ipiess, IHew Jt^orft 



TO 
MY WIFE 



PREFACE. 



THE greater portion of the following pages were 
completed before the death of Prince Bis- 
marck; I take this opportunity of apologising 
to the publishers and the editor of the series, for the 
unavoidable delay which has caused publication to 
be postponed for a year. 

During this period, two works have appeared to 
which some reference is necessary. The value of 
Busch' s Mejnozrs has been much exaggerated; ex- 
cept for quite the last years of Bismarck's life they 
contain little new information which is of any im- 
portance. Not only had a large portion of the book 
already been published in Busch's two earlier books, 
but many of the anecdotes and documents in those 
parts which were new had also been published 
elsewhere. 

Bismarck's own Memoirs have a very different 
value: not so much because of the new facts which 
they record, but because of the light they throw on 
Bismarck's character and on the attitude he adopted 
towards men and political problems. With his 
letters and speeches, they will always remain the 
chief source for our knowledge of his inner life. 



vi Preface. 

The other authorities are so numerous that it is 
impossible here to enumerate even the more import- 
ant. I must, however, express the gratitude which 
all students of Bismarck's career owe to Horst Kohl ; 
in his Bismarck-Regesten he has collected and ar- 
ranged the material so as infinitely to lighten the 
labours of all others who work in the same field. 
His Bismarck-JalirbiicJi is equally indispensable; 
without this it would be impossible for anyone 
living in England to use the innumerable letters, 
documents, and anecdotes which each year appear 
in German periodicals. Of collections of documents 
and letters, the most important are those by Herr v. 
Poschinger, especially the volumes containing the 
despatches written from Frankfort and those deal- 
ing with Bismarck's economic and financial policy, 
A full collection of Bismarck's correspondence is 
much wanted; there is now a good edition of the 
private letters, edited by Kohl, but no satisfactory 
collection of the political letters. 

For diplomatic history between i860 and 1870, I 
have, of course, chiefly depended on Sybel ; but those 
who are acquainted with the recent course of criti- 
cism in Germany will not be surprised if, while ac- 
cepting his facts, I have sometimes ventured to differ 
from his conclusions. 

September, 1899. J. W. H. 



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CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 
BIRTH AND PARENTAGE . ... . . I 

CHAPTER II. 
EARLY LIFE, 1821-1847 . . . . .14 

CHAPTER III. 
THE REVOLUTION, 1847-1852 . . . -34 

CHAPTER IV. 
THE GERMAN PROBLEM, 1849-1852 ... 7© 

CHAPTER V. 
FRANKFORT, 1851-1857 . . , . . 86 

CHAPTER VI. 
ST. PETERSBURG AND PARIS, 1858-1862 . . I27 

CHAPTER VII. 
THE CONFLICT, 1862-1863 ..... 162 

CHAPTER VIII. 
X SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, 1863-1864 , , , , 19-2 



vili Contents. 

CHAPTER IX. 



PAGE 



+ THE TREATY OF GASTEIN, 1864-1865 . . . 226 

CHAPTER X. 
-V OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH AUSTRIA, 1865-1866 . 240 

CHAPTER XL 
V THE CONQUEST OF GERMANY, 1866 . , . 259 

CHAPTER XII. 

^THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH GERMAN CON- 
FEDERATION, 1866-1867 .... 291 

CHAPTER XIII. 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH FRANCE, 1867- 

1870 315 

" ■< CHAPTER XIV. 

THE WAR WITH FRANCE AND FOUNDATION OF 

THE EMPIRE, 1870-1871 .... 346 

^ CHAPTER XV. 

^HE NEW EMPIRE, l87l\,l878 .... 377 

CHAPTER XVI. 

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND ECO NOMIC _ R]EFORM, 

1878-1887" . . . ^. \ '. ' . 405 

CHAPTER XVII. 

RETIREMENT AND DEATH, 1887-1898 . . . 440 

INDEX , 465 



ILLUSTRATIONS. 



BISMARCK ..... Frontispiece 

[From a painting by F. Von Lenbach.] 

Bismarck's coat of arms ..... 2 

schonhausen church interior . . • ^ 

luise wilhelmine von bismarck . . . lo 

Bismarck's Mother. 

KARL WILHELM FERD. VON BISMARCK . , ,12 

Bismarck's Father. 

BISMARCK IN 1834 . . . . . , 18 

SCHONHAUSEN CASTLE ...... 26 

BISMARCK IN 1848 ...... (i^ 

PRINCESS BISMARCK ...... 88 

BISMARCK IN 1860 ...... I30 

GENERAL VON ROON ...... I40 

EMPEROR WILLIAM 1. ..... . 162 

EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH ..... T94 

BISMARCK . . . . . . . .214 

[From a painting by F. Von Lenbach.] 

GENERAL VON MOLTKE ...... 248 

250 



THE CAPITULATION OF SEDAN 

[From a painting by Anton Von Werner 

BISMARCK AND HIS DOGS 



X 



Ilhistrations, 



NAPOLEON III. AND BISMARCK ON THE MORNING 
AFTER THE BATTLE OF SEDAN 

[From a painting by Wilhelm Camphausen.] 

KING WILLIAM OF PRUSSIA PROCLAIMED EMPEROR 
OF GERMANY, VERSAILLES, JANUARY l8, 1871. 
[From a painting by Anton Von Werner.] 

LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS ..... 

OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF BISMARCK IN BERLIN 

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 .... 
[P'rom a painting by Anton Von Werner.] 

FRIEDRICHSRUHE ....... 

[From a photograph by Strumper & Co., Ham- 
burg.] 

EMPEROR FREDERICK ...... 

SARCOPHAGUS OF EMPEROR WILLIAM I., CHARLOT- 

TENBURG ....... 

SCHUECKENBERGE ....... 

[Where Bismarck's Mausoleum will be erected.] 
MAP OF GERMANY SHOWING CHANGES MADE IN 

1866 



372 
388 
406 

430 
446 

454 
462 

464 




BISMARCK 




BISMARCK. 



CHAPTER I. 

BIRTH AND PARENTAGE. 

OTTO EDUARD LEOPOLD von BIS- 
MARCK was born at the manor-house of 
Schoenhausen, in the Mark of Brandenburg, 
on April i, 1815. Just a month before, Napoleon 
had escaped from Elba ; and, as the child lay in his 
cradle, the peasants of the village, who but half a 
year ago had returned from the great campaign in 
France, were once more called to arms. A few 
months passed by ; again the King of Prussia re- 
turned at the head of his army ; in the village 
churches the medals won at Waterloo were hung up 
by those of Grossbehren and Leipzig. One more 
victory had been added to the Prussian flags, and 
then a profound peace fell upon Europe; fifty years 
were to go by before a Prussian army again marched 
out to meet a foreign foe. 

The name and family of Bismarck were among the 
oldest in the land. Many of the great Prussian states- 



2 Bismarck. 

men have come from other countries : Stein was 
from Nassau, and Hardenberg was a subject of the 
Elector of Hanover; even Bliicher and Schwerin 
were Mecklenburgers, and the Moltkes belong to 
Holstein. The Bismarcks are pure Brandenburgers; 
they belong to the old Mark, the district ruled over 
by the first Margraves who were sent by the Em- 
peror to keep order on the northern frontier ; they 
were there two hundred years before the first Hohen- 
zollern came to the north. 

The first of the name of whom we hear was Her- 
bort von Bismarck, who, in 1270, was Master of the 
Guild of the Clothiers in the city of Stendal. The 
town had been founded about one hundred years 
before by Albert the Bear, and men had come in 
from the country around to enjoy the privileges and 
security of city life. Doubtless Herbort or his father 
had come from Bismarck, a village about twenty 
miles to the west, which takes its name either from 
the little stream, the Biese, which runs near it, or from 
the bishop in whose domain it lay. He was prob- 
ably the first to bear the name, which would have no 
meaning so long as he remained in his native place, 
for the iwn was still a mark of origin and had not 
yet become the sign of nobility. Other emigrants 
from Bismarck seem also to have assumed it ; in the 
neighbouring town of Prenzlau the name occurs, and 
it is still found among the peasants of the Mark ; as 
the Wends were driven back and the German in- 
vasion spread, more adventurous colonists migrated 
beyond the Oder and founded a new Bismarck in 
Pomerania. 




BISMARCK'S COAT OF ARMS. 



Birth and Parentage. 



Of the lineage of Herbert we know nothing ^ ; his 
ancestors must have been among the colonists who 
had been planted by the Emperors on the northern 
frontier to occupy the land conquered from the 
heathen. He seems himself to have been a man of 
substance and position ; he already used the arms, 
the double trefoil, which are still borne by all the 
branches of his family. His descendants are often 
mentioned in the records of the Guild ; his son or 
grandson, Rudolph or Rule, represented the town in 
a conflict with the neighbouring Dukes of Brunswick. 
It was his son Nicolas, or Claus as he is generally 
called, who founded the fortunes of the family; he 
attached himself closely to the cause of the Mar- 
grave, whom he supported in his troubles with the 
Duke of Brunswick, and whose interests he repre- 
sented in the Town Council. He was amply re- 
warded for his fidelity. After a quarrel between the 
city and the Prince', Bismarck left his native home 
and permanently entered the service of the Mar- 
grave. Though probably hitherto only a simple 
citizen, he was enfiefed with the castle of Burgstall, 
an important post, for it was situated on the 
borders of the Mark and the bishopric of Magde- 
burg; he was thereby admitted into the privileged 
class of the ScJilosszesessenen, under the Margrave, 
the highest order in the feudal hierarchy. From 
that day the Bismarcks have held their own among 
the nobility of Brandenburg. Claus eventually be- 
came Hofmeister of Brandenburg, the chief officer 

* There seems no authority for the statement that the Bismarcks 
had sprung from a noble Bohemian family. 



Bisma7^ck. 



at the Court ; he had his quarrels with the Church, 
or rather with the spiritual lords, the bishops of 
Havelburg and Magdeburg, and was once excom- 
municated, as his father had been before him, and as 
two of his sons were after him. 

Claus died about the year 1385. For two hundred 
years the Bismarcks continued to live at Burgstall, 
to which they added many other estates. When 
Conrad of Hohenzollern was appointed Margrave and 
Elector, he found sturdy supporters in the lords of 
Burgstall ; he and his successors often came there to 
hunt the deer and wild boars, perhaps also the wolves 
and bears, with which the forests around the castle 
abounded ; for the Hohenzollerns were keen sports- 
men then as now, as their vassals found to their 
cost. In 1555, Hans George, son of the reigning 
Elector, Albert Achilles, bought the neighbouring 
estate of Letzlingen from the Alvenslebens ; there he 
built a house which is still the chief hunting-lodge of 
the Kings of Prussia. Soon he cast envious eyes on 
the great woods and preserves which belong to Burg- 
stall, and intimated that he wished to possess them. 
The Bismarcks resisted long. First they were com- 
pelled to surrender their hunting rights; this was 
not sufficient; the appetite of the Prince grew; in 
his own words he wished " to be rid of the Bismarcks 
from the moor and the Tanger altogether." He of- 
fered in exchange some of the monasteries which 
had lately been suppressed ; the Bismarcks (the fam- 
ily was represented by two pairs of brothers, who all 
lived together in the great castle) long refused ; they 
represented that their ancestors had been faithful 



Birth and Parentage. 



vassals ; they had served the Electors with blood and 
treasure ; they wished " to remain in the pleasant 
place to which they had been assigned by God Al- 
mighty." It was all of no use ; the Prince insisted, 
and his wrath was dangerous. The Bismarcks gave 
in ; they surrendered Burgstall and received in ex- 
change Schoenhausen and Crevisse, a confiscated nun- 
nery, on condition that as long as the ejected nuns 
lived the new lords should support them ; for which 
purpose the Bismarcks had annually to supply a cer- 
tain quantity of food and eighteen barrels of beer. 

Of the four co-proprietors, all died without issue, 
except Friedrich, called the Permutator, in v/hose 
hands the whole of the family property was again 
collected ; he went to live at Schoenhausen, which 
since then has been the home of the family. No re- 
mains of the old castle exist, but the church, built 
in the thirteenth century, is one of the oldest and 
most beautiful in the land between the Havel and 
the Elbe. House and church stand side by side on 
a small rising overlooking the Elbe. Here they 
took up their abode ; the family to some extent had 
come down in the world. The change had been a dis- 
advantageous one ; they had lost in wealth and import- 
ance. For two hundred years they played no very 
prominent part ; they married with the neighbouring 
country gentry and fought in all the wars. Rudolph, 
Friedrich's son, fought in France in behalf of the 
Huguenots, and then under the Emperor against the 
Turks. His grandson, August, enlisted under Bern- 
hard of Saxe- Weimar; afterwards he fought in the 
religious wars in France and Germany, always on 



6 Bismarck. 

the Protestant side ; lastly, he took service under 
the Elector of Brandenburg. 

It was in his lifetime that a great change began 
to take place which was to alter the whole life 
of his descendants. In 1640, Frederick William, 
known as the great Elector, succeeded his father. 
He it was who laid the foundations for that system 
of government by which a small German principal- 
ity has grown to be the most powerful military 
monarchy in modern Europe. He held his own 
against the Emperor ; he fought with the Poles and 
compelled their King to grant him East Prussia ; 
he drove the Swedes out of the land. More than 
this, he enforced order in his own dominions ; he 
laid the foundation for the prosperity of Berlin ; he 
organised the administration and got together a 
small but efficient military force. The growing 
power of the Elector was gained to a great extent 
at the expense of the nobles ; he took from them 
many of the privileges they had before enjoyed. 
The work he began was continued by his son, who 
took the title of King; and by his grandson, who 
invented the Prussian system of administration, and 
created the army with which Frederick the Great 
fought his battles. 

The result of the growth of the strong, organised 
monarchy was indeed completely to alter the posi- 
tion of the nobles. The German barons in the south 
had succeeded in throwing off the control of their 
territorial lords ; they owned no authority but the 
vague control of the distant Emperor, and ruled 
their little estates with an almost royal independ- 



Birth and Parentage. 7 

ence; they had their own laws, their own coinage, 
their own army. In the north, the nobles of Meck- 
lenburg, Holstein, and Hanover formed a dominant 
class, and the whole government of the State was in 
their hands ; but those barons whose homes fell 
within the dominion of the Kings of Prussia found 
themselves face to face with a will and a power 
stronger than their ov/n ; they lost in independence, 
but they gained far more than they lost. They were 
the basis on which the State was built up ; they no 
longer wasted their military prowess in purposeless 
feuds or in mercenary service ; in the Prussian army 
and administration they found full scope for their 
ambition, and when the victories of Frederick the 
Great had raised Prussia to the rank of a European 
Power, the nobles of Brandenburg were the most 
loyal of his subjects. They formed an exclusive 
caste ; they seldom left their homes ; they were little 
known in the south of Germany or in foreign coun- 
tries ; they seldom married outside their own ranks. 
Their chief amusement was the chase, and their 
chief occupation was war. And no king has ever 
had under his orders so fine a race of soldiers ; they 
commanded the armies of Frederick and won his 
battles. Dearly did they pay for the greatness of 
Prussia ; of one family alone, the Kleists, sixty-four 
fell on the field of battle during the Seven Years' 
War. 

They might well consider that the State which 
they had helped to make, and which they had saved 
by their blood, belonged to them. But if they had 
become Prussians, they did not cease to be Branden- 



8 Bismarck. 

burgers ; their loyalty to their king never swerved, 
for they knew that he belonged to them as he did 
to no other of his subjects. He might go to distant 
Konigsberg to assume the crown, but his home was 
amongst them ; other provinces might be gained or 
lost with the chances of war, but while a single 
HohenzoUern lived he could not desert his subjects 
of the Mark. They had the intense local patriotism 
so characteristic of the German nation, which is the 
surest foundation for political greatness; but while 
in other parts the Particularists, as the Germans 
called them, aimed only at independence, the Bran- 
denburger who had become a Prussian desired 
domination. 

Among them the Bismarcks lived. The family 
again divided into two branches: one, which became 
extinct about 1780, dwelling at Crevisse, gave several 
high officials to the Prussian Civil Service ; the other 
branch, which continued at Schoenhausen, generally 
chose a military career. August's son, who had the 
same name as his father, rebuilt the house, which 
had been entirely destroyed by the Swedes during 
the Thirty Years' War; he held the position of 
Landrath, that is, he was the head of the adminis- 
tration of the district in which he lived. He married 
a Fraulein von Katte, of a well-known family whose 
estates adjoined those of the Bismarcks. Frau von 
Bismarck was the aunt of the unfortunate young man 
who was put to death for helping Frederick the Great 
in his attempt to escape. His tomb is still to be 
seen at Wust, which lies across the river a few miles 
from Schoenhausen ; and at the new house, which 



Birth and Parentage. 



arose at Schoenhausen and still stands, the arms of the 
Kattes are joined to the Bismarck trefoil. The suc- 
cessor to the estates, August Friedrich, was a thor- 
ough soldier ; he married a Fraulein von Diebwitz 
and acquired fresh estates in Pomerania, where he 
generally lived. 

He rose to the rank of colonel, and fell fighting 
against the Austrians at Chotusitz in 1742. " Ein 
ganzer Kerl " (a fine fellow), said the King, as he 
stood by the dying of^cer. His son, Carl Alexander, 
succeeded to Schoenhausen ; the next generation kept 
up the military traditions of the family ; of four 
brothers, all but one became professional officers and 
fought against France in the wars of liberation. One 
fell at Mockern in 1813 ; another rose to the rank of 
lieutenant-general; the third also fought in the war; 
his son, the later Count Bismarck-Bohlen, was 
wounded at Grossbehren, and the father at once 
came to take his place during his convalescence, in 
order that the Prussian army might not have fewer 
Bismarcks. When the young Otto was born two 
years later, he would often hear of the adventures 
of his three uncles and his cousin in the great 
war. The latter, Bismarck-Bohlen, rose to very- 
high honours and was to die when over eighty years 
of age, after he had witnessed the next great war with 
France. It is a curious instance of the divisions of 
Germany in those days that there were Bismarcks 
fighting on the French side throughout the war. 
One branch of the family had settled in South Ger- 
many ; the head of it, Friedrich Wilhelm, had taken 
service in the Wurtemburg army ; he had become a 



lo Bismarck. 

celebrated leader of cavalry and was passionately 
devoted to Napoleon. He served with distinction 
in the Russian campaign and was eventually taken 
prisoner by the Germans in the battle of Leipzig. 

The youngest of the four brothers, Karl Wilhelm 
Friedrich v. Bismarck, had retired from the army at 
an early age : he was a quiet, kindly man of domestic 
tastes ; on the division of the estates, Schoenhausen 
fell to his lot, and he settled down there to a quiet 
country life. He took a step which must have caused 
m.uch discussion among all his friends and relations, for 
he chose as wife not one of his own rank, not a Kleist, 
or a Katte, or a Bredow, or an Arnim, or an Alvens- 
leben, or any other of the neighbouring nobility ; he 
married a simple Fraulein Mencken. She was, how- 
ever, of no undistinguished origin. Her father, the 
son of a professor at the University of Leipzig, had 
entered the Prussian Civil Service ; there he had risen 
to the highest rank and had been Cabinet Secretary 
to both Frederick William H. and Frederick HL He 
was a man of high character and of considerable 
ability ; as was not uncommon among the ofificials of 
those days, he was strongly affected by the liberal and 
even revolutionary doctrines of France. 

Fraulein Mencken, who was married at the age of 
sixteen, was a clever and ambitious woman. From 
her her son inherited his intellect ; from his father he 
derived what the Germans call Gemiith, geniality, 
kindliness, humour. By his two parents he was thus 
connected with the double foundation on which 
Prussia had been built: on his father's side he had 
sprung from the fighting nobles ; on his mother's, 




LUISE WILHELMINE VON BISMARCK. 

BISMARCK'S MOTHER. 



Birth a7id Parentage. 1 1 

from the scholars and officials. In later life we shall 
find that while his prejudices and affections are all en- 
listed on the side of the noble, the keen and critical 
intellect he had inherited from his mother enabled 
him to overcome the prejudices of his order. 

The early life of the young pair was not altogether 
fortunate. Several children died at a very early age ; 
the defeat of Prussia brought foreign occupation ; 
Schoenhausen was seized by French troopers ; the 
marks of their swords are still to be seen in a beam 
over one of the doors, and Rittmeister v. Bismarck 
had to take his wife away into the woods in order 
to escape their violence. 

Of all the children of the marriage only three 
lived: Bernhard, who was born in i8iO, Otto, and 
one sister, Malvina, born in 1827. 

Otto did not live at Schoenhausen long ; when he 
was only a year old, his father moved to Pomerania 
and settled on the estates Kniephof and Kulz, which 
had come into the family on his grandfather's mar- 
riage. Pomerania was at that time a favourite resid- 
ence among the Prussian nobility ; the country was 
better wooded than the Mark, and game more plen- 
tiful ; the rich meadows, the wide heaths and for- 
ests were more attractive than the heavy corn-lands 
and the sandy wastes of the older province. Here, in 
the deep seclusion of country life, the boy passed 
his first years ; it was far removed from the bustle and 
turmoil of civilisation. Naugard, the nearest town, 
was five miles distant ; communication was bad, for 
it was not till after 1815 that the Prussian Govern- 
ment began to construct highroads. In this distant 



1 2 Bismarck. 

province, life went on as in the olden days, little 
altered by the changes which had transformed the 
State. The greater portion of the land belonged to 
large proprietors ; the noble as in old days was still 
all-powerful on his own estate; in his hands was the 
administration of the law, and it was at his manorial 
court that men had to seek for justice, a court where 
justice was dealt not in the name of the King but of 
the Lord of the Manor. He lived among his people 
and generally he farmed his own lands. There was 
little of the luxury of an English country-house or 
the refinement of the French noblesse ; he would be 
up at daybreak to superintend the work in the 
fields, his wife and daughters that of the household, 
talking to the peasants the pleasant Piatt Deutsch of 
the countryside. Then there would be long rides or 
drives to the neighbours' houses ; shooting, for there 
was plenty of deer and hares ; and occasionally in 
the winter a visit to Berlin ; farther away, few of 
them went. Most of the country gentlemen had 
been to Paris, but only as conquerors at the end of 
the great war. 

They were little disturbed by modern political 
theories, but were contented, as in old days, to be 
governed by the King. It was a religious society ; 
among the peasants and the nobles, if not among the 
clergy, there still lingered something of the simple 
but profound faith of German Protestantism ; they 
*■ were scarcely touched by the rationalism of the 
eighteenth or by the liberalism of the nineteenth 
century ; there was little pomp and ceremony of 
worship in the village church, but the natural periods 



jl',s;i t'',]A 




KARL WILHELM FERD. VON BISMARCK. 

BISMARCK'S FATHER. 



Birth and Parentage. 1 3 

of human life — birth, marriage, death — called for the 
blessing of the Church, and once or twice a year 
came the solemn confession and the sacrament. 
Religious belief and political faith were closely 
joined, for the Church was but a department of the 
State ; the King was chief bishop, as he was general 
of the army, and the sanctity of the Church was 
transferred to the Crown ; to the nobles and peasants, 
criticism of, or opposition to, the King had in it 
something of sacrilege ; the words " by the Grace of 
God " added to the royal title were more than an 
empty phrase. Society was still organised on the 
old patriarchal basis : at the bottom was the peasant ; 
above him was \.\\& gnddiger Herr ; above him, Unser 
alter gnddigste Herr, the King, who lived in Berlin ; 
and above him, the Herr Gott in Heaven. 

To the inhabitants of South Germany, and the 
men of the towns, these nobles of Further Pomerania, 
the Junker as they were called, with their feudal 
life, their medieval beliefs, their simple monarchism, 
were the incarnation of political folly ; to them lib- 
eralism seemed another form of atheism, but in this 
solitude and fresh air of the great plain was reared a 
race of men who would always be ready, as their 
fathers had been, to draw their sword and go out to 
conquer new provinces for their King to govern. 




CHAPTER II. 

EARLY LIFE. 
1821-1847. 

OF the boy's early life we know little. His 
mother was ambitious for her sons ; Otto 
from his early years she designed for the 
Diplomatic Service ; she seems to have been one of 
those women who was willing to sacrifice the present 
happiness of her children for their future advance- 
ment. When only six years old the boy was sent 
away from home to a school in Berlin. He was nat 
happy there; he pined for the free life of the coun- 
try, the fields and woods and animals; when he saw 
a plough he would burst into tears, for it reminded 
him of his home. The discipline of the school was 
hard, not with the healthy and natural hardships of 
life in the open air, but with an artificial Spartanism, 
for it was the time when the Germans, who had sud- 
denly awoke to feelings of patriotism and a love of 
war to which they had long been strangers, under 
the influence of a few writers, were throwing all their 
energies into the cultivation of physical endurance. 
It was probably at this time that there was laid 

14 



1821] Early Life. 1 5 

the foundation of that dislike for the city of Beriln 
which Bismarck never quite overcame ; and from his 
earliest years he was prejudiced against the exagger- 
ated and affected Teutonism which was the fashion 
after the great war. A few years later his parents 
came to live altogether in the town ; then the boy 
passed on to the Gymnasium, boarding in the house 
of one of the masters. The teaching in this school 
was supplemented by private tutors, and he learned 
at this time the facility in the use of the English and 
French languages which in after years was to be of 
great service to him. The education at school was 
of course chiefly in the classical languages ; he ac- 
quired a sufficient mastery of Latin. There is no 
evidence that in later life he continued the study of 
classical literature. In his seventeenth year he passed 
the Abiturienten examination, which admitted him 
as a student to the university and entitled him to 
the privilege of serving in the army for one instead 
of three years. His leaving certificate tells us that 
his conduct and demeanour towards his comrades 
and teachers were admirable, his abilities consider- 
able, and his diligence fair. 

The next year he passed in the ordinary course to 
the university, entering at Gottingen ; the choice 
was probably made because of the celebrity which 
that university had acquired in law and history. It 
is said that he desired to enter at Heidelberg, but 
his mother refused her permission, because she 
feared that he would learn those habits of beer- 
drinking in which the students of that ancient seat 
of learning have gained so great a proficiency ; it was. 



1 6 Bismarck. [1821- 

however, an art which, as he found, was to be ac- 
quired with equal ease at Gottingen. The young- 
Bismarck was at this time over six feet high, sHm and 
well built, of great physical strength and agility, a 
good fencer, a bold rider, an admirable swimmer and 
runner, a very agreeable companion ; frank, cheerful, 
and open-hearted, without fear either of his comrades 
or of his teachers. He devoted his time at Gottin- 
gen less to learning than to social life ; in his second 
term he entered the Corps of the Hanoverians and 
was quickly noted for his power of drinking and 
fighting ; he is reported to have fought twenty-six 
duels and was only wounded once, and that wound 
was caused by the breaking of his opponent's foil. 
He was full of wild escapades, for which he was 
often subjected to the ordinary punishments of the 
university. 

To many Germans, their years at the university 
have been the turning-point of their life ; but it was 
not so with Bismarck. To those who have been 
brought up in the narrow surroundings of civic life, 
student days form the single breath of freedom 
between the discipline of a school and the drudgery 
of an of^ce. To a man who, like Bismarck, was ac- 
customed to the truer freedom of the country, it 
was only a passing phase ; as we shall see, it was not 
easy to tie him down to the drudgery of an office. 
He did not even form many friendships which he 
continued in later years ; his associates in his corps 
must have been chiefly young Hanoverians ; few of 
his comrades in Prussia were to be found at Got- 
tingen ; his knowledge of English enabled him to 



1847] 



Early Life. IJ 



make the acquaintance of the Americans and Eng- 
hsh with whom Gottingen has always been a favour- 
ite university ; among his fellow-students almost the 
only one with whom in after life he continued the 
/ intimacy of younger days was Motley. We hear 
little of his work; none of the professors seem to 
have left any marked influence on his mind or char- 
acter; indeed they had little opportunity for doing 
so, for after the first term his attendance at lectures 
almost entirely ceased. Though never a student, he 
must have been at all times a considerable reader ; 
he had a retentive memory and quick understanding ; 
he read what interested him ; absorbed, understood, 
and retained it. He left the university with his 
mind disciplined indeed but not drilled ; he had a 
considerable knowledge of languages, law, literature, 
and history ; he had not subjected his mind to the 
dominion of the dominant Hegelian philosophy, and 
to this we must attribute that freshness and en- 
ergy which distinguishes him from so many of his 
ablest contemporaries ; his brain was strong, and it 
worked as easily and as naturally as his body ; his 
knowledge was more that of a man of the world than 
of a student, but in later life he was always able to 
understand the methods and to acquire the know- 
ledge of the subjects he required in his official ca- 
reer. History was his favourite study ; he never 
attempted, like some statesmen, to write; but if his 
knowledge of history was not as profound as that of 
a professed historian, he was afterwards to shew as a 
parliamentary debater that he had a truer perception 
of the importance of events than many great scholars 



1 8 Bismarck. [1821- 

who have devoted their lives to historical research, 
and he was never at a loss for an illustration to ex- 
plain and justify the policy he had assumed. For 
natural science he shewed little interest, and indeed 
at that time it scarcely could be reckoned among the 
ordinary subjects of education ; philosophy he pur- 
sued rather as a man than as a student, and we are 
not surprised to find that it was Spinoza rather than 
Kant or Fichte or Hegel to whom he devoted most 
attention, for he cared more for principles of belief 
and the conduct of life than the analysis of the 
intellect. 

His university career does not seem to have left 
any mark on his political principles ; during just those 
years, the agitation of which the universities had 
long been the scene had been forcibly repressed ; 
it was the time of deep depression which followed 
the revolution of 1830, and the members of the 
aristocratic corps to which he belonged looked with 
something approaching contempt on this Burschen- 
schaft, as the union was called, which propagated 
among the students the national enthusiasm. 

After spending little more than a year at Got- 
tingen, he left in September, 1833 ; in May of the fol- 
lowing year he entered as a student at Berlin, where 
he completed his university course ; we have no 
record as to the manner in which he spent the winter 
and early spring, but we find that when he applied 
to Gottingen for permission to enter at Berlin, it was 
accorded on condition that he sat out a term of im- 
prisonment which he still owed to the university 
authorities. During part of his time in Berlin he 




BISMARCK IN 1834. 



1847] Early Life. 19 

shared a room with Motley. In order to prepare for 
the final examination he engaged the services of a 
crammer, and with his assistance, in 1835, took the 
degree of Doctor of Law and at once passed on to 
the public service. 

He had, as we have seen, been destined for the 
Diplomatic Service from early life; he was well con- 
nected ; his cousin Count Bismarck-Bohlen stood in 
high favour at Court. He was related to or ac- 
quainted with all the families who held the chief 
posts both in the military and civil service ; with his 
great talents and social gifts he might therefore look 
forward to a brilliant career. Any hopes, however, 
that his mother might have had were destined to be 
disappointed ; his early official life was varied but 
short. He began in the judicial department and was 
appointed to the office of Auscultator at Berlin, for in 
the German system the judicature is one department 
of the Civil Service. After a year he was at his own 
request transferred to the administrative side and to 
Aix-la-Chapelle ; it is said that he had been extremely 
pained and shocked by the manner in which the offi- 
cials transacted the duties of their office and espe- 
cially by their management of the divorce matters 
which came before the court. The choice of Aix-la- 
Chapelle was probably owing to the fact that the 
president of that province was Count Arnim of 
Boytzenburg, the head of one of the most numerous 
and distinguished families of the Mark, with so 
many members of which Bismarck was in later years 
to be connected both for good and evil. Count 
Arnim was a man of considerable ability and moderate 



20 Bismarck. [1821- 

liberal opinions, who a few years later rose to be the 
first Minister-President in Prussia. Under him Bis- 
marck was sure to receive every assistance. He had 
to pass a fresh examination, which he did with great 
success. His certificate states that he shewed thor- 
oughly good school studies, and was well grounded 
in law ; he had thought over what he had learnt and 
already had acquired independent opinions. He had 
admirable judgment, quickness in understanding, and 
a readiness in giving verbal answers to the questions 
laid before him ; we see all the qualities by which he 
was to be distinguished in after life. He entered on 
his duties at Aix-la-Chapelle at the beginning of 
June ; at his own request Count Arnim wrote to the 
heads of the department that as young Bismarck 
was destined for a diplomatic career they were to 
afford him every opportunity of becoming acquainted 
with all the different sides of the administrative work 
and give him more work than they otherwise would 
have done ; he was to be constantly occupied. His 
good resolutions did not, however, continue long; he 
found himself in a fashionable watering-place, his 
knowledge of languages enabled him to associate 
with the French and English visitors, he made ex- 
cursions to Belgium and the Rhine, and hunting 
expeditions to the Ardennes, and gave up to society 
the time he ought to have spent in the ofifice. The 
life at Aix was not strict and perhaps his amuse- 
ments were not always edifying, but he acquired 
that complete ease in cosmopolitan society which he 
could not learn at Gottingen or Berlin, and his ex- 
periences during this year were not without use to 



18471 Early Life. 21 

him when he was afterwards placed in the somewhat 
similar society of Frankfort. This period in his career 
did not last long ; in June, 1837, we find him applying 
for leave of absence on account of ill-health. He re- 
ceived leave for eight days, but he seems to have 
exceeded this, for four months afterwards he writes 
from Berne asking that his leave may be prolonged ; 
he had apparently gone ofT for a long tour in Switzer- 
land and the Rhine. His request was refused ; he 
received a severe reprimand, and Count Arnim ap- 
proved his resolution to return to one of the older 
Prussian provinces, " where he might shew an activity 
in the duties of his ofifice which he had in vain at- 
tempted to attain in the social conditions of Aachen." 
He was transferred to Potsdam, but he remained 
here only a few weeks ; he had not as yet served in 
the army, and he now began the year as a private 
soldier which was required from him ; he entered 
the Jaeger or Rifles in the Garde Corps which was 
stationed at Potsdam, but after a few weeks was 
transferred to the Jaeger at Stettin. The cause seems 
to have been partly the ill-health of his mother; she 
was dying, and he wished to be near her ; in those 
days the journey from Berlin to Pomerania took 
more than a day ; besides this there were pecuniary 
reasons. His father's administration of the family 
estates had not been successful ; it is said that his 
mother had constantly pressed her husband to intro- 
duce innovations, but had not consistently carried 
them out ; this was a not unnatural characteristic in 
the clever and ambitious woman who wished to in- 
troduce into agricultural afTairs those habits which 



22 Bismarck. 



[1821- 



she had learnt from the bureaucrats in Berlin. How- 
ever this may be, matters had now reached a crisis ; 
it became necessary to sell the larger part of the 
land attached to the house at Schoenhausen, and in 
the next year, after the death of Frau von Bis- 
marck, which took place on January i, 1839, i*^ ^^^s 
decided that Herr von Bismarck should in future 
live at Schoenhausen with his only daughter, now a 
girl of twelve years of age, while the two brothers 
should undertake the management of the Pomeranian 
estates. 

So it came about that at the age of twenty-four 
all prospect of an of^cial career had for the time 
to be abandoned, and Otto settled down with his 
brother to the life of a country squire. It is curious 
to notice that the greatest of his contemporaries, 
Cavour, went through a similar training. There 
was, however, a great difference between the two 
men : Cavour was in this as in all else a pioneer; 
when he retired to his estate he was opening out new 
forms of activity and enterprise for his countrymen ; 
Bismarck after the few wild years away from home 
was to go back to the life which all his ancestors had 
lived for five hundred years, to become steeped in the 
traditions of his country and his caste. Cavour al- 
ways points the way to what is new, Bismarck again 
brings into honour what men had hastily thought was 
antiquated. He had to some extent prepared him- 
self for the work by attending lectures at a newly 
founded agricultural college in the outskirts of Greifs- 
wald. The management of the estate seems to have 
been successful ; the two brothers started on their 



1847] Early Life. " 23 

work with no capital and no experience, but after 
three or four years by constant attention and hard 
work they had put the affairs in a satisfactory state. 
In 1841, a division was made ; Otto had wished this 
to be done before, as he found that he spent a good 
deal more money than his brother and was gaining 
an unfair advantage in the common household ; from 
this time he took over Kniephof, and there he lived for 
the next four years, while his brother took up his 
abode four miles off at Kulz, where he lived till his 
death in 1895. Otto had not indeed given up the 
habits he had learnt at Gottingen ; his wild freaks, 
his noisy entertainments, were the talk of the country- 
side ; the beverage which he has made classical, a 
mixture of beer and champagne, was the common 
drink, and he was known far and wide as the mad 
Bismarck. These acts. of wildness were, however, only 
a small part of his life ; he entered as a lieutenant of 
Landwehr in the cavalry and thereby became ac- 
quainted with another form of military service. 
It was while he was at the annual training that he 
had an opportunity of shewing his physical strength 
and courage. A groom, who was watering horses in 
the river, was swept away by the current ; Bismarck, 
who was standing on a bridge watching them, at 
once leaped into the river, in full uniform as he was, 
and with great danger to himself saved the drown- 
ing man. For this he received a medal for saving 
life. He astonished his friends by the amount and 
variety of his reading ; it was at this time that he 
studied Spinoza. It is said that he had among his 
friends the reputation of being a liberal ; it is prob- 



24 Bismai^ck. 



tl82t- 



able enough that he said and did many things which 
they did not understand ; and anything they did 
not understand would be attributed to Hberalism 
by the country gentlemen of Pomerania ; partly no 
doubt it was due to the fact that in 1843 1^^ came 
back from Paris wearing a beard. We can see, how- 
ever, that he was restless and discontented ; he felt 
in himself the possession of powers which were not 
being used ; there was in his nature also a morbid 
restlessness, a dissatisfaction with himself which he 
tried to still but only increased by his wild excesses. 
As his affairs became more settled he travelled ; one 
year he went to London, another to Paris ; of his 
visit to England we have an interesting account in a 
letter to his father. He landed in Hul^' thence he 
went to Scarborough and York, where he was hos- 
pitably received by the officers of the Hussars ; " al- 
though I did not know any of them, they asked me 
to dinner and shewed me everything " ; from York 
he went to Manchester, where he saw some of the 
factories. 

" Generally speaking I cannot praise too highly the 
extraordinary courtesy and kindness of English people, 
which far surpass what I had expected ; even the poor 
people are pleasant, very unassuming, and easy to get on 
with when one talks to them. Those who come much 
into intercourse with strangers — -cab-drivers, porters, etc. 

* It is to this visit that a well-known anecdote refers ; having 
landed at Hull one Sunday morning, he was walking along the streets 
whistling, when a chance acquaintance of the voyage asked him to 
desist. Disgusted, he left the town. The story, as generally told, 
says that he went to Edinburgh ; we can have no doubt that Scar- 
borough was meant, 



1847] Early Life. 25 

— naturally have a tendency to extortion, but soon give in 
when they see that one understands the language and 
customs and is determined not to be put upon. Gener- 
ally I find the life much cheaper than I expected." 

In 1844, his sister, to whom he was passionately 
devoted, was married to an old friend, Oscar von 
Arnim. Never did an elder brother write to his 
young sister more delightful letters than those which 
she received from him ; from them we get a pleasant 
picture of his life at this time. Directly after the 
wedding, when he was staying with his father at 
Schoenhausen, he writes: 

" Just now I am living here with my father, reading, 
smoking, and walking ; I help him to eat lamperns and 
sometimes play a comedy with him which it pleases him 
to call fox-hunting. We start out in heavy rain, or per- 
haps with 10 degrees of frost, with Ihle, Ellin, and Karl ; 
then in perfect silence we surround a clump of firs with 
the most sportsmanlike precautions, carefully observing 
the wind, although we all, and probably father as well, 
are absolutely convinced that there is not a living creat- 
ure in it except one or two old women gathering fire- 
wood. Then Ihle, Karl, and the two dogs make their 
way through the cover, emitting the most strange and 
horrible sounds, especially Ihle ; father stands there mo- 
tionless and on the alert with his gun cocked, just as 
though he really expected to see something. Ihle comes 
out just in front of him, shouting ' Hoo lala, hey heay, 
hold him, hie, hie,' in the strangest and most astonishing 
manner. Then father asks me if I have seen nothing, 
and I with the most natural tone of astonishment that I 
can command, answer ' No, nothing at all' Then after 



26 Bismarck. [1821- 

abusing the weather we start off to another wood, while 
Ihle with a confidence that he assumes in the most nat- 
ural manner praises its wealth in game, and there we 
play over the game again dal segno. So it goes on for 
three or four hours ; father's, Ihle's, and Fingal's passion 
does not seem to cool for a moment. Besides that, we 
look at the orange house twice a day and the sheep once 
a day, observe the four thermometers in the room once 
every hour, set the weather-glass, and, since the weather 
-has been fine, have set all the clocks by the sun and ad- 
justed them so closely that the clock in the dining-room 
is the only one which ever gives a sound after the others 
have struck. Charles V. was a stupid fellow. You will 
understand that with so multifarious an occupation I 
have little time left to call on the clergymen ; as they 
have no vote for the election it was quite impossible. 

" The Elbe is full of ice, the wind E. S. E., the latest 
thermometer from Berlin shews 8 degrees, the barometer 
is rising and at 8.28. I tell you this as an example how 
in your letters you might write to father more the small 
events of your life ; they amuse him immensely ; tell him 
who has been to see you, whom you have been calling on, 
what you had for dinner, how the horses are, how the 
servants behave, if the doors creak and the windows are 
firm — in short, facts and events. Besides this, he does not 
like to be called papa, he dislikes the expression. Avis au 
lecteur." 

On another occasion he says : 

"Only with difficulty can I resist the temptation of filling 
a whole letter with agricultural lamentations over frosts, 
sick cattle, bad rape, bad roads, dead lambs, hungry 
sheep, want of straw, fodder, money, potatoes, and ma- 
nure ; outside Johann is persistently whistling a wretched 



1847] Early Life. 27 

schottische out of tune, and I have not the cruelty to 
interrupt it, for he seeks to still by music his violent 
love-sickness." 

Then we have long letters from Nordeney, where 
he delighted in the sea, but space will not allow us 
to quote more. It is only in these letters, and in 
those which he wrote in later years to his wife, that 
we see the natural kindliness and simplicity of his 
disposition, his love of nature, and his great power 
of description. There have been few better letter- 
writers in Germany or any other country. 

His ability and success as an agriculturist made 
a deep impression on his neighbours. As years went 
on he became much occupied in local business; he 
was appointed as the representative of his brother, 
who was Landrath for the district ; in 1845 he was 
elected one of the members for the Provincial Diet 
of Pomerania. He also had a seat in the Diet for the 
Saxon province in which Schoenhausen was situated. 
These local Diets were the only form of representa- 
tive government which existed in the rural districts ; 
they had little power, but their opinion was asked 
on new projects of law, and they were ofificially re- 
garded as an efficient substitute for a common Prus- 
sian Parliament. Many of his friends, including his 
brother, urged him again to enter the public service, 
for which they considered he was especially adapted ; 
he might have had the post of Royal Commissioner 
for Improvements in East Prussia. 

He did make one attempt to resume his ofificial 
career. At the beginning of 1844 he returned to 



V 



28 Bismarck. [1821- 

Potsdam and took up his duties as Referendar, but 
not for long; he seems to have quarrelled with his 
superior. The story is that he called one day to ask 
for leave of absence ; his chief kept him waiting an 
hour in the anteroom, and when he was admitted 
asked him curtly, " What do you want ? " Bismarck 
at once ansv/ered, " I came to ask for leave of 
absence, but now I wish for permission to send in 
my resignation." He was clearly deficient in that 
subservience and ready obedience to authority which 
was the best passport to promotion in the Civil Serv- 
ice ; there was in his disposition already a certain 
truculence and impatience. From this time he nour- 
ished a bitter hatred of the Prussian bureaucracy. 

This did not, however, prevent him carrying out 
his public duties as a landed proprietor. In 1846 
we find him taking much interest in proposals for 
improving the management of the manorial courts; 
he wished to see them altered so as to give some- 
thing of the advantages of the English system ; he 
regrets the " want of corporate spirit and public 
feeling in our corn-growing aristocracy " ; " it is 
unfortunately difficult among most of the gentle- 
men to awake any other idea under the words ' patri- 
monial power ' but the calculation whether the fee 
will cover the expenses." We can easily understand 
that the man who wrote this would be called a lib- 
eral by many of his neighbours ; what he wanted, 
however, was a reform which would give life, per- 
manency, and independence to an institution which 
like everything else was gradually falling before the 
inroads of the dominant bureaucracy. The same 



1847] 



Early Life. 29 



year he was appointed to the position of Inspector 
of Dykes for Jerichow. The duties of this office 
were of considerable importance for Schoenhausen 
and the neighbouring estate ; as he writes, " it de- 
pends on the managers of this office whether from 
time to time we come under water or not." He 
often refers to the great damages caused by the 
floods ; he had lost many of his fruit-trees, and 
many of the finest elms in the park had been de- 
stroyed by the overflowing of the Elbe. 

As Bismarck grew in age and experience he asso- 
ciated more with the neighbouring families. Pome- 
rania was at this time the centre of a curious religious 
movement ; the leader was Herr von Thadden, who 
lived at Triglaff, not many miles from Kniephof. 
He was associated with Herr von Semft and three 
brothers of the family of Below. They were all pro- 
foundly dissatisfied with the rationalistic religion 
preached by the clergy at that time, and aimed at 
greater inwardness and depth of religious feeling. 
Herr von Thadden started religious exercises in his 
own house, which were attended not only by the 
peasants from the village but by many of the coun- 
try gentry ; they desired the strictest enforcement of 
Lutheran doctrine, and wished the State directly to 
support the Church. This tendency of thought ac- 
quired greater importance when, in 1840, Frederick 
William IV. succeeded to the throne ; he was also 
a man of deep religious feeling, and under his reign 
the extreme Lutheran party became influential at 
Court. Among the ablest of these were the three 
brothers von Gerlach, One of them, Otto, was a 



30 Bismarck. [1821- 

theologian ; another, Ludwig, was Over-President of 
the Saxon province, and with him Bismarck had 
much official correspondence ; the third, Leopold, 
who had adopted a military career, was attached 
to the person of the King and was in later years 
to have more influence upon him than anyone ex- 
cept perhaps Bunsen. The real intellectual leader 
of the party was Stahl, a theologian. 

From about the year 1844 Bismarck seems to have 
become very intimate with this religious coterie; 
his friend Moritz v. Blankenburg had married 
Thadden's daughter and Bismarck was constantly a 
visitor at Triglaff. It was at Blankenburg's wed- 
ding that he first met Hans v. Kleist, who was in 
later years to be one of his most intimate friends. 
He was, we are told, the most delightful and cheer- 
ful of companions ; in his tact and refinement he 
shewed an agreeable contrast to the ordinary man- 
ners of Pomerania. He often rode over to take 
part in Shakespeare evenings, and amused them by 
accounts of his visit to England.* He was present 
occasionally at the religious meetings at Triglaff, and 
though he never quite adopted all the customs of 
the set the influence on him of these older men was 
for the next ten years to govern all his political ac- 
tion. That he was not altogether at one with them 
we can understand, when we are told that at Herr 
von Thadden's house it would never have occurred 
to anyone even to think of smoking. Bismarck 
was then, as in later life, a constant smoker. 



* Life of Herr v. Thadden- Triglaff, by Eleanor, Princess of Reuss. 



Y 



1847] Early Life. 31 

The men who met in these family parties in dis- 
tant Pomerania were in a few years to change the 
whole of European history. Here Bismarck for 
the first time saw Albrecht von Roon, a cousin of 
the Blankenburgs, then a rising young officer in the 
artillery ; they often went out shooting together. 
The Belows, Blankenburgs, and Kleists were to be 
the founders and leaders of the Prussian Conserv- 
ative party, which was Bismarck's only support in 
his great struggle with the Parliament ; and here, 
too, came the men v/ho were afterwards to be editors 
and writers of the Kreiiz Zeitwig. 

The religious convictions which Bismarck learnt 
from them were to be lasting, and they profoundly 
influenced his character. He had probably received 
little religious training from his mother, who be- 
longed to the rationalistic school of thought. It was 
by them that his monarchical feeling was strength- 
ened. It is not at first apparent what necessary 
connection there is between monarchical government 
and Christian faith. For Bismarck they were ever 
inseparably bound together ; nothing but religious 
belief would have reconciled him to a form of gov- 
ernment so repugnant to natural human reason. 
"If I were not a Christian, I would be a Republi- 
can," he said many years later ; in Christianity he 
found the only support against revolution and social- 
ism. He was not the man to be beguiled by roman- 
tic sentiment ; he was not a courtier to be blinded 
by the pomp and ceremony of royalty ; he was too 
stubborn and independent to acquiesce in the arbi- 
trary rule of a single man. He could only obey the 



32 Bismarck. [1821- 

king if the king himself held his authority as the 
representative of a higher power. Bismarck was 
accustomed to follow out his thought to its conclu- 
sions. To whom did the king owe his power ? 
There was only one alternative : to the people or to 
God. If to the people, then it was a mere question 
of convenience whether the monarchy were contin- 
ued in form ; there was little to choose between a 
constitutional monarchy where the king was ap- 
pointed by the people and controlled by Parliament, 
and an avowed republic. This was the principle 
held by nearly all his contemporaries. He deliber- 
ately rejected it. He did not hold that the voice of 
the people was the voice of God. This belief did 
not satisfy his moral sense ; it seemed in public life 
to leave all to interest and ambition and nothing to 
duty. It did not satisfy his critical intellect; the 
word " people " was to him a vague idea. The serv- 
ice of the People or of the King by the Grace of 
God, this was the struggle which was soon to be 
fought out. 

Bismarck's connection with his neighbours was 
cemented by his marriage. At the beginning of 
1847, he was engaged to a Fraulein von Puttkammer, 
whom he had first met at the Blankenburgs' house ; 
she belonged to a quiet and religious family, and it is 
said that her mother was at first filled with dismay 
when she heard that Johanna proposed to marry the 
mad Bismarck. He announced the engagement to 
his sister in a letter containing the two words, " All 
right," written in English. Before the wedding 
could take place, a new impulse in his life was to 



1847] 



Early Life. 



33 



begin. As representative of the lower nobility he had 
to attend the meeting of the Estates General which 
had been summoned in Berlin. From this time the 
story of his life is interwoven with the history of 
his country. 



V 




CHAPTER III. 

THE REVOLUTION. 
1847-1852. 

BISMARCK was a subject of the King of Prus- 
sia, but Prussia was after all only one part of 
a larger unit ; it was a part of Germany. At 
this time, however, Germany was little more than a 
geographical expression. The medieval emperors 
had never succeeded in establishing permanent 
authority over the whole nation ; what unity there 
had been was completely broken down at the Re- 
formation, and at the Revolution the Empire itself, 
the symbol of a union which no longer existed, had 
been swept away. At the restoration in 181 5 the 
reorganisation of Germany was one of the chief 
tasks before the Congress of Vienna. It was a task 
in which the statesmen failed. All proposals to re- 
store the Empire were rejected, chiefly because 
Francis, who had taken the style of Emperor of 
Austria, did not desire to resume his old title. Ger- 
many emerged from the Revolution divided into 
thirty-nine different States ; Austria was one of the 
largest and most populous monarchies in Europe, 
but more than half the Austrian Empire consisted of 

34 



1847] The Revolution. 35 

Italian, Slavonic, and Hungarian provinces. The 
Emperor of Austria ruled over about 20,000,000 
Germans. The next State in size and importance 
was Prussia. Then came four States, the Kingdoms 
of Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, and Wiirtemberg, vary- 
ing in size from five to two million inhabitants ; below 
them were some thirty principalities of which the 
smallest contained only a few thousand inhabitants. 
By the principles adopted in the negotiations which 
preceded the Congress of Vienna, every one of these 
States was recognised as a complete independent 
. monarchy, with its own laws and constitutions. The 
iirecognition of this independence made any common 
\ government impossible. Neither Austria nor Prus- 
sia would submit to any external authority, or to 
one another ; the Kings of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg 
^were equally jealous of their independence. All 
that could be done was to establish a permanent 
offensive and defensive alliance between these States. 
For the management of common concerns, a Diet 
was appointed to meet at Frankfort ; the Diet, how- 
ever, was only a union of diplomatists ; they had to 
act in accordance with instructions from their govern- 
ments and they had no direct authority over the 
Germans ; each German was officially regarded as a 
subject, as the case might be, of the King of Prussia, 
the Prince of Reuss, the Grand Duke of Weimar. 
There was no German army, no German law, no 
German church. No development of common in- 
stitutions was possible, for no change could be in- 
troduced without the universal consent of every 
member of the Confederation. 



36 Bismarck. [1847- 

This lamentable result of the Congress of Vienna 
caused much dissatisfaction among the thinking 
classes in Germany. A very strong national feeling 
had been aroused by the war against Napoleon. 
This found no satisfaction in the new political insti- 
tutions. The discontent was increased when it was 
discovered that the Diet, so useless for all else, was 
active only against liberty. Prince Metternich, a 
very able diplomatist, knew that the Liberal and 
National ideas, which were so generally held at that 
time, would be fatal to the existence of the Austrian 
Empire ; he therefore attempted to suppress them, 
not only in Austria, but also in Germany, as he did 
in Italy. Unfortunately the King of Prussia, Fred- 
erick William III., whose interests were really en- 
tirely opposed to those of Austria, was persuaded by 
Metternich to adopt a repressive policy. The two 
great powers when combined could impose their will 
on Germany ; they forced through the Diet a series 
of measures devoted to the restriction of the liberty 
of the press, the control of the universities, and the 
suppression of democratic opinion. 

The result of this was great discontent in Germany, 
which was especially directed against Prussia ; in 
1830 the outbreak of revolution in Paris had been 
followed by disturbances in many German States ; 
Austria and Prussia, however, were still strong enough 
to maintain the old system. The whole intellect of 
the country was diverted to a policy of opposition ; in 
the smaller States of the south, Parliamentary govern- 
ment had been introduced ; and the great aim of the 
Liberals was to establish a Parliament in Prussia also. 



1852] The Revolution. 2>1 

In 1840 the old King died; the son, Frederick 
William IV., was a man of great learning, noble char- 
acter, high aspirations ; he was, however, entirely 
without sympathy or understanding for the modern 
desires of his countrymen ; he was a child of the 
Romantic movement ; at the head of the youngest 
of European monarchies, he felt himself more at 
home in the Middle Ages than in his own time. 
There could be no sympathy between him and the 
men who took their politics from Rousseau and Louis 
Blanc, and their religion from Strauss. It had been 
hoped that he would at once introduce into Prussia 
representative institutions. He long delayed, and 
the delay took away any graciousness from the act 
when at last it was committed. By a royal decree 
published in 1822 it had been determined that no 
new loan could be made without the assent of an 
assembly of elected representatives ; the introduc- 
tion of railways made a loan necessary, and at the 
beginning of 1847 Frederick William summoned for 
the first time the States General. 

The King of Prussia had thereby stirred up a 
power which he was unable to control ; he had hoped 
that he would be able to gather round him the repre- 
sentatives of the nobles, the towns, and the peasants ; 
that this new assembly, collecting about him in re- 
spectful homage, would add lustre to his throne ; that 
they would vote the money which was required and 
then separate. How much was he mistaken ! The 
nation had watched for years Parliamentary govern- 
ment in England and France ; this was what they 
wished to have, and now they were offered a mod- 



38 Bismarck. [1847- 

ern imitation of medieval estates. They felt them- 
selves as grown men able and justified in governing 
their own country ; the King treated them as child- 
ren. The opening ceremony completed the bad 
' impression which the previous acts of the King had 
/made. While the majority of the nation desired a 
\ formal and written Constitution, the King in his 
S opening speech with great emphasis declared that 
/ he would never allow a sheet of paper to come be- 
\ tween him and God in heaven. 

Bismarck was not present at the opening cere- 
mony ; it was, in fact, owing to an accident that he 
was able to take his seat at all ; he was there as 
substitute for the member for the Ritterschaft of 
Jerichow, who had fallen ill. He entered on his Par- 
liamentary duties as a young and almost unknown 
man ; he did not belong to any party, but his politi- 
cal principles were strongly influenced by the friends 
he had found in Pomerania. They were soon to be 
hardened by conflict and confirmed by experience ; 
during the first debates he sat silent, but his indig- 
nation rose as he listened to the speeches of the 
Liberal majority. Nothing pleased them ; instead 
of actively co-operating with the Government in the 
consideration of financial measures, they began to 
discuss and criticise the proclamation by which they 
had been summoned. There was indeed ample 
scope for criticism ; the Estates were so arranged 
that the representatives of the towns could always 
be outvoted by the landed proprietors ; they had 
not even the right of periodical meetings ; the King 
was not compelled to call them together again until 



1852] The Revolution. 39 

he required more money. They not only petitioned 
for increased powers, they demanded them as a 
right ; they maintained that an assembly summoned 
in this form did not meet the intentions of previous 
laws ; when they were asked to allow a loan for a 
railway in East Prussia, they refused on the ground 
that they were not a properly qualified assembly. 

This was too much for Bismarck : the action of 
the King might have been inconclusive ; much that 
he said was indiscreet ; but it remained true that he 
had taken the decisive step ; no one really doubted 
that Prussia would never again be without a Parlia- 
ment. It would be much wiser, as it would be more 
chivalrous, to adopt a friendly tone and not to at- 
tempt to force concessions from him. He was es- 
pecially indignant at the statement made that the 
Prussian people had earned constitutional govern- 
ment by the part they took in the war of liberation ; 
against this he protested : 

" In my opinion it is a bad service to the national 
honour to assume that the ill-treatment and degradation 
that the Prussians suffered from a foreign ruler were not 
enough to make our blood boil, and to deaden all other 
feelings but that of hatred for the foreigners." 

When told that he was not alive at the time, he 
answered : 

"I cannot dispute that I was not living then, and I 
have been genuinely sorry that I was not born in time to 
take part in that movement ; a regret which is dimin- 
ished by what I have just heard. I had always believed 
that the slavery against which we fought lay abroad ; \ 



40 Bismarck. [1847- 

have just learned that it lay at home, and I am not 
grateful for the explanation." 

The ablest of the Liberal leaders was George v. 
Vincke ; a member of an old Westphalian family, 
the son of a high official, he was a man of honesty 
and independence, but both virtues were carried to 
excess ; a born leader of opposition, domineering, 
quarrelsome, ill to please, his short, sturdy figure, 
his red face and red hair were rather those of a peas- 
ant than a nobleman, but his eloquence, his bitter 
invective, earned the respect and even fear of his op- 
ponents. Among these Bismarck was to be ranged ; 
in these days began a rivalry which was not to cease 
till nearly twenty years later, when Vincke retired 
from the field and Bismarck stood triumphant, the 
recognised ruler of the State. At this time it re- 
quired courage in the younger man to cross swords 
with the experienced and powerful leader. 

Vincke was a strong Liberal, but in the English 
rather than the Prussian sense; his constant theme 
was the rule of law; he had studied English history, 
for at that time all Liberals prepared themselves for 
their part by reading Hallam or Guizot and Dahl- 
mann ; he knevv^ all about Pym and Hampden, and 
wished to imitate them. The English Parliament 
had won its power by means of a Petition of Right 
and a Bill of Rights ; he wished they should do the 
same in Prussia ; it escaped him that the English 
could appeal to charters and ancient privileges, but 
that in Prussia the absolute power of the King was 
the undisputed basis on which the whole State had 



1852] The Revohttio7i. 41 

been built up, and that every law to which they 
owed their liberty or their property derived its 
validity from the simple proclamation of the King. 

Bismarck, if he had read less, understood better 
the characteristics of England, probably because he 
knew better the conditions of his own country. He 
rose to protest against these parallels with England ; 
Prussia had its own problems which must be settled 
in its own way. 

" Parallels with foreign countries have always some- 
thing disagreeable. ... At the Revolution, the 
English people were in a very different condition from 
that of Prussia to-day ; after a century of revolution and 
civil war, it was in a position to be able to give away a 
crown and add conditions which William of Orange ac- 
cepted. On the other hand, we are in possession of a 
crown whose rights were actually unlimited, a crown held 
by the grace not of the people but of God, and which 
of its own free-will has given away to the people a por- 
tion of its rights — an example rare in history." 

It shows how strong upon him was the influence 
of his friends in Pomerania that his longest and most 
important speech was in defence of the Christian 
monarchy. The occasion was a proposal to increase 
the privileges of the Jews. He said : 

" I am no enemy of the Jews ; if they become my ene- 
mies I will forgive them. Under certain circumstances 
I love them ; I am ready to grant them all rights but 
that of holding the magisterial office in a Christian State. 
This they now claim ; they demand to become Landrath, 
General, Ministerj yes even, under circumstances, Min- 



42 Bismarck. [1847- 

ister of Religion and Education. I allow that I am full of 
prejudices, which, as I have said, I have sucked in with 
my mother's milk ; I cannot argue them away ; for if I 
think of a Jew face to face with me as a representative 
of the King's sacred Majesty, and I have to obey him, I 
must confess that I should feel myself deeply broken 
and depressed ; the sincere self-respect with which I now 
attempt to fulfil my duties towards the State would leave 
me. I share these feelings with the mass of the lower 
strata of the people, and I am not ashamed of their 
society." 

And then bespoke of the Christian State: 

" It is as old as every European State ; it is the ground 
in which they have taken root ; no State has a secure ex- 
istence unless it has a religious foundation. For me, the 
words, ' by the Grace of God,' which Christian rulers add 
to their name, are no empty phrase ; I see in them a 
confession that the Princes desire to wield the sceptre 
which God has given them according to the will of God 
on earth. As the will of God I can only recognise that 
which has been revealed in the Christian Gospel — I 
believe that the realisation of Christian teaching is the 
end of the State; I do not believe that we shall more 
nearly approach this end by the help of the Jews. . . . 
If we withdraw this foundation, we retain in a State 
nothing but an accidental aggregate of rights, a kind of 
bulwark against the war of all against all, which ancient 
philosophy has assumed. Therefore, gentlemen, do not 
let us spoil the people of their Christianity ; do not let 
us take from them the belief that our legislation is drawn 
from the well of Christianity, and that the State aims at 
the realisation of Christianity even if it does not attain 
it? end." 



1852] The Revolution. 43 

We can well understand how delighted Herr von 
Thadden was with his pupil. " With Bismarck I 
naturally will not attempt to measure myself," he 
writes ; " in the last debates he has again said many 
admirable things " ; and in another letter, " I am 
quite enthusiastic for Otto Bismarck." It was more 
important that the King felt as if these words had 
been spoken out of his own heart. 

Among his opponents, too, he had made his mark ; 
they were never tired of repeating well-worn jests 
about the medieval opinions which he had sucked 
in with his mother's milk. ! 

At the close of the session, he returned to Pome- 
rania with fresh laurels ; he was now looked upon as 
the rising hope of the stern and unbending Tories. 
His marriage took place in August, and the young 
Hans Kleist, a cousin of the bride, as he proposed 
the bridegroom's health, foretold that in their friend 
had arisen a new Otto of Saxony who would do for his 
country all that his namesake had done eight hun- 
dred years before. Careless words spoken half in jest, 
which thirty years later Kleist, then Over-President 
of the province, recalled when he proposed the 
bridegroom's health at the marriage of Bismarck's 
eldest daughter. The forecast had been more than 
fulfilled, but fulfilled at the cost of many an early 
friendship ; and all the glory of later years could 
never quite repay the happy confidence and inti- 
macy of those younger days. 

Followed by the good wishes of all their friends, 
Bismarck and his young wife started on their wed- 
ding tour, which took them through Austria to Italy. 



44 Bismarck. [1847- 

At Venice he came across the King of Prussia, who 
took the opportunity to have more than one conver- 
sation with the man who had distinguished himself 
in the States General. At the beginning of the 
winter they returned to Schoenhausen to settle 
down to a quiet country life. Fate was to will it 
otherwise. The storm which had long been gather-" 
ing burst over Europe. Bismarck was carried away 
by it ; from henceforth his life was entirely devoted 
to public duties, and we can count by months the 
time he was able to spend with his wife at the old 
family house ; more than forty years were to pass 
before he was able again to enjoy the leisure of his 
early years. 

The revolution which at the end of February 
broke out in Paris quickly spread to Germany ; the 
ground was prepared and the news quickly came to 
him, first of disorder in South Germany, then of 
the fall of the Ministry in Dresden and Munich ; 
after a few days it was told that a revolution had 
taken place in Vienna itself. The rising in Austria 
was the signal for Berlin, and on the i8th of March 
the revolution broke out there also. The King had 
promised to grant a Constitution ; a fierce fight had 
taken place in the streets of the city between the 
soldiers and the people ; the King had surrendered 
to the mob, and had ordered the troops to withdraw 
from the city. He was himself almost a prisoner in 
his castle protected only by a civilian National Guard. 
He was exposed to the insults of the crowd ; his 
brother had had to leave the city and the country. It 
is impossible to describe the enthusiasm and wild 



J852] The Revolution. 45 

delight with which the people of Germany heard of 
these events. Now the press was free, now they 
also were going to be free and great and strong. All 
the resistance of authority was overthrown ; nothing, 
it seemed, stood between them and the attainment 
of their ideal of a united and free Germany. They 
had achieved a revolution ; they had become a po- 
litical people ; they had shewn themselves the equals 
of England and of France. They had liberty, and 
they would soon have a Constitution. Bismarck did 
not share this feeling ; he saw only that the monar- 
chy which he respected, and the King whom, with 
all his faults, he loved and honoured, were humiliated 
and disgraced. This was worse than Jena. A de- 
feat on the field of battle can be avenged ; here the 
enemies were his own countrymen ; it was Prussian 
subjects who had made the King the laughing-stock 
of Europe. Only a few months ago he had pleaded 
that they should not lose that confidence between 
King and people which was the finest tradition of 
the Prussian State ; could this confidence ever be 
restored when the blood of so many soldiers and 
citizens had been shed ? He felt as though some- 
one had struck him in the face, for his country's dis- 
honour was to him as his own ; he became ill with 
gall and anger. He had only two thoughts: first to 
restore to the King courage and confidence, and then 
— revenge on the men who had done this thing. He 
at least was not going to play with the revolution. 
He at once sat down and wrote to the King a letter 
full of ardent expressions of loyalty and affection, 
that he might know there still were men on whom 



46 Bismarck. [1847- 

he could rely. It is said that for months after, 
through all this terrible year, the King kept it open 
by him on his writing-table. Then he hurried to 
Berlin, if necessary to defend him with the sword. 
This was not necessary, but the situation was almost 
worse than he feared ; the King was safe, but he was 
safe because he had surrendered to the revolution ; 
he had proclaimed the fatal words that Prussia was 
to be dissolved in Germany. 

At Potsdam Bismarck found his old friends of the 
Guard and the Court ; they were all in silent de- 
spair. What could they do to save the monarchy 
when the King himself had deserted their cause? 
Some there were who even talked of seeking help 
from the Czar of Russia, who had offered to come 
to the help of the monarchy in Prussia and place 
himself at the head of the Prussian army, even if 
necessary against their own King. There was al- 
ready a Liberal Ministry under Count Arnim, Bis- 
marck's old chief at Aachen ; the Prussian troops 
were being sent to support the people of Schleswig- 
Holstein in their rebellion against the Danes; the 
Ministers favoured the aspirations of Poland for self- 
government ; in Prussia there was to be a Constitu- 
ent Assembly and a new Constitution drawn up by 
it. Bismarck did what he could ; he went down to 
Schoenhausen and began to collect signatures for an 
address of loyalty to the King; he wished to instil 
into him confidence by appealing to the loyalty of 
the country against the radicalism of the town. 
Then he hurried back to Berlin for the meeting of 
the Estates General, which had been hastily sum- 



1952] The Revohttion. 47 

moned to prepare for the new elections. An address 
was proposed thanking the King for the concessions 
he had made ; Bismarck opposed it, but he stood 
almost alone. 

"I have not changed my opinion," he said, "in the last 
six months ; the past is buried, and I regret more bit- 
terly than any of you that no human power can re- 
awaken it, now that the Crown itself has cast the earth 
on its coffin." 

Two men alone voted against the address — Bis- 
marck and Herr von Thadden, " It is easy to get 
fame nowadays," said the latter; " a little courage is 
all one requires." 

Courage it did require ; Berlin was terrorised ; the 
new National Guard was unable to maintain order; 
men scarcely dared to appear in the streets in the 
ordinary dress of a gentleman. The city was full of 
Polish insurgents, many of whom had only just been 
released from prison. When the National Assembly 
came together, it became the organ of the extreme 
Republican party; all the more moderate men and 
more distinguished had preferred to be elected for 
that general German Assembly which at the same 
time was sitting at Frankfort to create a new Consti- 
tution for the whole Confederation. How quickly 
had the balance of parties altered : Vincke, until a. 
few months ago the leader of the Liberals, found 
himself at Frankfort regarded as an extreme Con- 
servative ; and Frankfort was moderate compared 
to Berlin. At this time an ordinary English Radical 
would have been looked upon in Germany as almost 



48 Bismarck. [1847- 

reactionary. Bismarck did not seek election for 
either of the Assemblies ; he felt that he could do 
no good by taking part in the deliberations of a 
Parliament, the very meeting of which seemed to 
him an oiTence against the laws and welfare of the 
State. He would indeed have had no logical posi- 
tion ; both Parliaments were Constituent Assemblies ; 
it was the duty of the one to build up a new Ger- 
many, of the other a new Prussia ; their avowed ob- 
ject was the regeneration of their country. Bismarck 
did not believe that Prussia wanted regenerating ; 
he held that the roots for the future greatness of the 
State must be found in the past. What happened 
to Germany he did not much care; all he saw was 
that every proposal for the regeneration of Germany 
implied either a dissolution of Prussia, or the subjec- 
tion of the Prussian King to the orders of an alien 
Parliament. 

During the summer he did what he could ; he 
contributed articles to the newspapers attacking the 
Polish policy of the Government, and defending the 
landlords and country gentry against the attacks 
made on them. As the months went by, as the an- 
archy in Berlin increased, and the violence of the 
Assembly as well as the helplessness of the Govern- 
ment became more manifest, he and some of his 
friends determined to make their voices heard in a 
more organised way. It was at the house of his 
father-in-law at Rheinfeld that he, Hans Kleist, and 
Herr von Below determined to call together a meet- 
ing of well-known men in Berlin, who should discuss 
the situation and be a moral counterpoise to the 



1852] The Revolution. 49 

meetings of the National Assembly ; for in that the 
Conservative party and even the Moderate Liberals 
were scarcely represented ; if they did speak they 
were threatened by the mob which encumbered the 
approaches to the House. Of more permanent im- 
portance was the foundation of a newspaper which 
should represent the principles of the Christian mon- 
archy, and in July appeared the first number of the 
New Prussian Gazette, or, as it was to be more gen- 
erally known, the Kreuz Zeitung, which was to give 
its name to the party of which it was the organ. 
Bismarck was among the founders, among whom 
were also numbered Stahl, the Gerlachs, and others 
of his older friends; he was a frequent contributor, 
and when he was at Berlin was almost daily at the 
oflfice ; when he was in the country he contributed 
articles on the rural afTairs with which he was more 
specially qualified to deal. 

These steps, of course, attracted the attention and 
the hostility of the dominant Liberal and Revolu- 
tionary parties ; the Junker, as they were called, 
were accused of aiming at reaction and the restora- 
tion of the absolute monarchy. As a matter of fact, 
this is what many of them desired; they were, how- 
ever, only doing their duty as members of society; 
it would have been mere cowardice and indolence 
had they remained inactive and seen all the institu- 
tions they valued overthrown without attempting to 
defend them. It required considerable courage in 
the middle of so violent a crisis to come forward and 
attempt to stop the revolution ; it was a good exam- 
ple that they began to do so by constitutional and 



50 Bismarck. [1847- 

legal means. They shewed that Prussia had an aris- 
tocracy, and an aristocracy which was not frightened ; 
deserted by the King they acted alone ; in the hour 
of greatest danger they founded a Conservative 
party, and matters had come to this position that 
an organised Conservative party was the chief neces- 
sity of the time. 

At first, however, their influence was small, for a 
monarchical party must depend for its success on 
the adhesion of the King, and the King had not yet 
resolved to separate himself from his Liberal advisers, 
Bismarck was often at Court and seems to have had 
much influence ; both to his other companions and 
to the King himself he preached always courage and 
resolution ; he spoke often to the King with great 
openness ; he was supported by Leopold von Gerlach, 
with whom at this time he contracted a close inti- 
macy. For long their advice was in vain, but in the 
autumn events occurred which shewed that some 
decision must be taken : the mob of Berlin stormed 
the Zcughaiis where the arms were kept ; the Con- 
stitution of the Assembly was being drawn up so as 
to leave the King scarcely any influence in the State ; 
a resolution was passed calling on the Ministers to 
request all officers to leave the army who disliked 
the new order of things. The crisis was brought 
about by events in Vienna ; in October the Austrian 
army under Jellachich and Windischgratz stormed 
the city, proclaimed martial law, and forcibly over- 
threw the Revolutionary Government ; the King of 
Prussia now summoned resolution to adopt a similar 
course. It is said that Bismarck suggested to him 



1852] The Revohition. 51 

the names of the Ministers to whom the task should 
be entrusted. The most important were Count 
Brandenburg, an uncle of the King's, and Otto v. 
ManteufTel, a member of the Prussian aristocracy, 
who with Bismarck had distinguished himself in the 
Estates General. He seems to have been constantly 
going about among the more influential men, en- 
couraging them as he encouraged the King, and help- 
ing behind the scenes to prepare for the momentous 
step. Gerlach had suggested Bismarck's name as 
one of the Ministers, but the King rejected it, writ- 
ing on the side of the paper the characteristic words, 
" Red reactionary ; smells of blood ; will be useful 
later." Bismarck's language was of such a nature 
as to alarm even many of those who associated with 
him. Count Beust, the Saxon Minister, was at this 
time in Berlin and met Bismarck for the first time ; 
they were discussing the conduct of the Austrian 
Government in shooting Robert Blum, a leading 
demagogue who had been in Vienna during the 
siege. Beust condemned it as a political blunder. 
" No, you are wrong," said Bismarck ; " when I have 
my enemy in my power I must destroy him," 

The event fully justified Bismarck's forecast that 
nothing was required but courage and resolution. 
After Brandenburg had been appointed Minister, the 
. Prussian troops under Wrangel again entered Berlin, 
a state of siege was proclaimed, the Assembly was 
ordered to adjourn to Brandenburg ; they refused 
and were at once ejected from their meeting-place, 
and as a quorum was not found at Brandenburg, 
were dissolved. The Crown then of its own author- 



52 Bisniai'-ck. [1847- 

ity published a new Constitution and summoned a 
new Assembly to discuss and ratify it. Based on 
the discipline of the army the King had regained 
his authority without the loss of a single life. 

Bismarck stood for election in this new Assembly, 
for he could accept the basis on which it had been 
summoned ; he took his seat for the district of the 
West Havel in which the old city of Brandenburg, 
the original capital of the Mark, was situated. He 
had come forward as an opponent of the Revolution. 
" Everyone," he said in his election address, " must 
support the Government in the course they have 
taken of combating the Revolution which threat- 
ens us all." " No transaction with the Revolution," 
was the watchword proposed in the manifesto of 
his party. He appealed to the electors as one who 
would direct all his efforts to restore the old bond of 
confidence between Crown and people. He kept his 
promise. In this Assembly the Extreme Left was 
still the predominant party ; in an address to the 
Crown they asked that the state of siege at Berlin 
should be raised, and that an amnesty to those who 
had fought on the i8th of March should be pro- 
claimed. Bismarck did not yet think that the time 
for forgiveness had come ; the struggle was indeed 
not yet over. He opposed the first demand because, 
as he said, there was more danger to liberty of de- 
bate from the armed mob than there was from the 
Prussian soldiers. In one of the most careful of his 
speeches he opposed the amnesty. " Amnesty," he 
said, " was a right of the Crown, not of the Assem- 
bly " ; moreover the repeated amnesties were un- 



1852] The Revolution. 53 

dermining in the people the feehng of law ; the 
opinion was being spread about that the law of the 
State rested on the barricades, that everyone who 
disliked a law or considered it unjust had the right 
to consider it as non-existent. Who that has read 
the history of Europe during this year can doubt 
the justice of the remark? Then he continues: 

" My third reason for voting against the amnesty is 
humanity. The strife of principles which during this 
year has shattered Europe to its foundations is one in 
which no compromise is possible. They rest on opposite 
bases. The one draws its law from what is called the 
will of the people, in truth, however, from the law of the 
strongest on the barricades. The other rests on author- 
ity created by God, an authority by the grace of God, 
and seeks its development in organic connection with 
the existing and constitutional legal status . . . the 
decision on these principles will come not by Parliament- 
ary debate, not by majorities of eleven votes ; sooner or 
later the God who directs the battle will cast his iron 
dice." 

These words were greeted with applause, not only 
by the men who sat on his side of the House, but by 
those opposite to him. The truth of them was to 
be shewn by the events which were taking place at 
that very time. They were spoken on the 22d of 
March. The next day was fought the battle of No- 
vara and it seemed that the last hopes of the Italian 
patriots were shattered. Within a few months the 
Austrian army subdued with terrible vengeance the 
rising in Lombardy and Venetia ; Hungary was 
prostrate before the troops whom the Czar sent to 



54 Bismarck. ti847- 

help the young Austrian Emperor, and the last 
despairing outbreak of rebellion in Saxony and in 
Baden was to be subdued by the Prussian arn:iy. 
The Revolution had failed and it had raised up, as 
will always happen, a military power, harder, crueller, 
and more resolute than that it had overthrown. 
The control over Europe had passed out of the 
hands of Metternich and Louis Philippe to fall into 
those of Nicholas, Schwarzenberg, and Napoleon III. 

In Prussia the King used his power with modera- 
tion, the conflict of parties was continued within 
legal limits and under constitutional forms. 

The Parliament which still claimed that control 
over the executive government which all Parlia- 
ments of the Revolution had exercised, was dis- 
solved. A new Assembly met in August ; the King 
had of his own authority altered the electoral law 
and the new Parliament showed a considerable 
majority belonging to the more moderate Liberal 
party. Bismarck retained his old seat. He still 
found much to do ; his influence was increasing; he 
opposed the doctrines of the more moderate Liberal- 
ism with the same energy with which he had attacked 
the extreme Revolution. The most important de- 
bates were those concerning the Constitution ; he 
took part in them, especially opposing the claim of 
the Parliament to refuse taxes. He saw that if the 
right was given to the Lower House of voting the 
taxes afresh every year they would be able to estab- 
lish a complete control over the executive govern- 
ment; this he did not wish. He was willing that 
they should have the right of discussing and reject- 



1852] The Revolution. 55 

ing any new taxes and also, in agreement with the 
Crown and the Upper House, of determining the 
annual Budget. It was maintained by the Liberals 
that the right to reject supplies every year was an 
essential part of a constitutional system ; they ap- 
pealed to the practice in England and to the 
principles adopted in tHe French and Belgian Con- 
stitutions. Their argument was that this practice 
which had been introduced in other countries must 
be adopted also in Prussia. It was just one of those 
argurnents which above all offended Bismarck's Prus- 
sian patriotism. Why should Prussia imitate other 
countries? Why should it not have its own Consti- 
tution in its own way ? Constitution, as he said, was 
the mot d'ordre of the day, the word which men 
used when they were in want of an argument. " In 
Prussia that only is constitutional which arises from 
the Prussian Constitution ; whatever be constitu- 
tional in Belgium, or in France, in Anhalt Dessau, 
or there where the morning red of Mecklenburg- free- 
dom shines, here that alone is constitutional which 
rests on the Prussian Constitution." If he defended 
the prerogative of the Crown he defended the Con- 
stitution of his country. A constitution is the col- 
lection of rules and laws by which the action of the 
king is governed ; a state without a constitution is 
a mere Oriental despotism where each arbitrary 
whim of the king is transmuted into action ; this 
was not what Bismarck desired or defended ; there 
was no danger of this in Prussia. He did not even 
oppose changes in the law and practice of the Con- 
gtitution ; what he did oppose was the particular 



56 Bismarck. [1847- 

change which would transfer the sovereignty to an 
elected House of Parliament. " It has been main- 
tained," he once said, "that a constitutional king 
cannot be a king by the Grace of God ; on the con- 
trary he is it above all others." 

The references to foreign customs were indeed 
one of the most curious practices of the time ; the 
matter was once being discussed whether the Crown 
had the power to declare a state of siege without the 
assent of the Chambers ; most speakers attempted to 
interpret the text of the Prussian Constitution by 
precedents derived from the practice in France and 
England ; we find the Minister of Justice defending 
his action on the ground of an event in the French 
Revolution, and Lothar Bucher, one of the ablest of 
the Opposition, complained that not enough attention 
had been paid to the procedure adopted in England 
for repealing the Habeas Corpus Act, entirely ignoring 
the fact that there was no Habeas Corpus Act in 
Prussia. We can easily understand how repulsive 
this was to a man who, like Bismarck, wished no- 
thing more than that his countrymen should copy, 
not the details of the English Constitution, but the 
proud self-reliance which would regard as imperti- 
nent an application of foreign notions. 

The chief cause for this peculiarity was the desire 
of the Liberal party to attain that degree of inde- 
pendence and personal liberty which was enjoyed in 
England or France ; the easiest way to do this 
seemed to be to copy their institutions. There was, 
however, another reason : the study of Roman law 
in Germany in which they had been educated had 



1852} The Revohition. 57 

accustomed them to look for absolute principles of 
jurisprudence which might be applied to the legisla- 
tion of all countries ; when, therefore, they turned 
their minds to questions of politics, they looked for 
absolute principles of constitutional government, on 
which, as on a law of nature, their own institutions 
might be built up. To find these they analysed the 
English Constitution, for England was the classical 
land of representative government ; they read its 
rules as they would the institutions of a Roman 
Jurisconsult and used them to cast light on the dark 
places of their own law. Bismarck did not share 
this type of thought ; his mind was rather of the 
English cast ; he believed the old Prussian Constitu- 
tion was as much a natural growth as that of Eng- 
land, and decided dark points by reference to older 
practice as an Englishman would search for preced- 
ents in the history of his own country. 

At that time the absolute excellence of a demo- 
cratic constitution was a dogma which few cared to 
dispute ; it appeared to his hearers as a mere paradox 
when Bismarck pointed out how little evidence there 
was that a great country could prosper under the 
government of a Parliament elected by an extended 
franchise. Strictly speaking, there was no evidence 
from experience; France, as he said, was the parent 
of all these theories, but the example of France was 
certainly not seductive. " I see in the present cir- 
cumstances of France nothing to encourage us to 
put the Nessus robe of French political teaching 
over our healthy body." (This was in September, 
1849, when the struggle between the Prince Presi- 



58 Bismarck. [1847- 

dent and the Assembly was already impending.) 
The Liberals appealed to Belgium ; it had, at least, 
stood the storm of the last year, but so had Russia, 
and, after all, the Belgian Constitution was only 
eighteen years old, "an admirable age for ladies but 
not for constitutions." And then there was England. 

" England governs itself, although the Lower House 
has the right of refusing taxes. The references to Eng- 
land are our misfortune ; give us all that is English 
which we have not, give us English fear of God and 
English reverence before the law, the whole English 
Constitution, but above all the complete independence of 
English landed property, English wealth and English 
common-sense, especially an English Lower House, in 
short everything which we have not got, then I will say, 
you can govern us after the English fashion." 

But this was not all. How could they appeal to 
England as a proof that a democratic Parliament 
was desirable? England had not grown great under 
a democratic but under an aristocratic constitution. 

" English reform is younger than the Belgian Constitu- 
tion ; we have still to wait and see whether this reformed 
Constitution will maintain itself for centuries as did the 
earlier rule of the English aristocracy." 

That, in Bismarck's opinion, it was not likely to do 
so, we see a few years later; with most Continental 
critics of English institutions, he believed that the 
Reform Bill had destroyed the backbone of the 
English Constitution. In 1857 he wrote: 

*' They have lost the ' inherited wisdom ' since the Re- 



1852] The Revolution. 59 

form Bill ; they maintain a coarse and violent selfishness 
and the ignorance of Continental relations." 

It was not merely aristocratic prejudice; it was a 
wise caution to bid his countrymen pause before 
they adopted from foreign theorists a form of gov- 
ernment so new and untried, and risked for the sake 
of an experiment the whole future of Prussia. 

In later years Bismarck apologised for many of the 
speeches which he made at this period : " I was a 
terrible Junker in those days," he said ; and biograph- 
ers generally speak of them as though they required 
justification or apology. There seems no reason for 
this. It would have been impossible for him, had he 
at that time been entrusted with the government of 
the State, entirely to put into practice what he had 
said from his place in the Chamber. But he was 
not minister ; he was only a party leader ; his 
speeches were, as they were intended to be, party 
speeches ; they had something of the exaggeration 
which conflict always produces. They were, more- 
over, opposition speeches, for he was addressing not 
so much the Government as the Chamber and the 
country, and in them the party to which he belonged 
was a very small minority. But why was there not 
to be a Conservative party in Prussia? 

It was necessary for the proper development of con- 
stitutional life that the dominant Liberal doctrines 
should be opposed by this bold criticism. Bismarck 
was only doing what in England was done by the 
young Disraeli, by Carlyle, and by Ruskin ; the 
world would not be saved by constitutional formulae. 



6o Bismarck. 



[1847- 



There were some of his party whose aims went 
indeed beyond what may be considered morally 
legitimate and politically practicable. The Gerlachs 
and many of their friends, and the purely military 
party which was headed by Prince Charles Frederick, 
the King's youngest brother, desired to do away with 
the Constitution, to dismiss the Parliament, and to 
restore the absolute monarchy in a form which would 
have been more extreme than that which it had had 
since 1815. The King himself sympathised with 
their wishes and he probably would have acted 
according to them were it not that he had sworn to 
maintain the Constitution. He was a religious man 
and he respected his oath. There does not appear 
any evidence that Bismarck wished for extreme action 
of this kind. Even in his private correspondence, 
at least in that part of it which has been published, 
one finds no desire to see Prussia entirely without a 
Parliament. It was a very different thing to wish as 
he did that the duties of the Parliament should be 
strictly limited and that they should not be allowed 
completely to govern the State. We must always 
remember how much he owed to representative 
assemblies. Had the Estates General never been 
summoned, had the Revolution never taken place, he 
would probably have passed his life as a country gen- 
tleman, often discontented with the Government of 
the country but entirely without influence. He owed 
to Parliament his personal reputation, but he owed 
to it something more than that. Up to 1847 ^^e 
only public career open to a Prussian subject was 
the Civil Service ; it was from them that not only the 



t852] 



The Revolution. 6i 



subordinate officials but the Ministers of the State 
were selected. Now we have seen that Bismarck 
had tried the Civil Service and deliberately retired 
from it. The hatred of bureaucracy he never over- 
came, even when he was at the head of the Prussian 
State. It arose partly from the natural opposition 
between the nobleman and the clerk. Bismarck felt 
in this like Stein, the greatest of his predecessors, 
who though he had taken service under the Prussian 
Crown never overcame his hatred of " the animal with 
a pen,'' as he called Prussian Civil Servants, and shed 
tears of indignation when he was first offered a 
salary. Bismarck was never a great nobleman like 
Stein and he did not dislike receiving a salary ; but 
he felt that the Civil Servants were the enemies of 
the order to which he belonged. He speaks a few 
years later of " the biting acid of Prussian legisla- 
tion which in a single generation can reduce a 
mediatised Prince to an ordinary voter." He is 
never tired of saying that it was the bureaucracy 
which was the real introducer of the Revolution into 
Prussia. In one of his speeches he defends himself 
and his friends against the charge of being enemies 
to freedom ; " that they were not," he says ; 

" Absolutism with us is closely connected with the 
omnipotence of the Gehei}?irath and the conceited omni- 
science of the Professors who sit behind the green table, 
a product, and I venture to maintain a necessary product, 
of the Prussian method of education. This product, the 
bureaucracy, I have never loved." 

When, as he often does, he maintains that the Prus- 



62 Bismarck. 



[1847- 



sian Parliament does not represent the people, he is 
thinking of the predominance among them of 
ofificials, for we must always remember that many of 
the extreme Liberal party and some of their most 
active leaders were men who were actually at that 
time in the service of the Crown. 

It was the introduction of a Representative As- 
sembly that for the first time in Prussian history 
made possible a Conservative opposition against 
the Liberalism of the Prussian Government. There 
are two kinds of Liberalism. In one sense of 
the word it means freedom of debate, freedom of the 
press, the power of the individual as against the 
Government, independence of character, and personal 
freedom. Of Liberalism in this sense of the word 
there was indeed little in the Prussian Government. 
But Liberalism also meant the overthrow of the old 
established institutions inherited from the Middle 
Ages, especially the destruction of all privileges held 
by the nobility ; it meant on the Continent opposi- 
tion to all form of dogmatic religious teaching; it 
meant the complete subjection of the Church to the 
State ; it meant the abolition of all local distinctions 
and the introduction of a uniform system of govern- 
ment chiefly imitated from French institutions. It 
was in this sense of the word that, with the exception 
of the first few years of the reign of Frederick 
William IV., the Prussian Government had been 
Liberal, and it was this Liberalism which Bismarck 
and his friends hated almost as much as they did 
the Liberalism of the Revolution. 

The clearest instance of his attitude on such mat- 



18521 The Revohition. 63 

ters is to be found in his opposition to the Bill 
introduced for making civil marriage compulsory. 
He opposed it in a speech which was many years 
later to be quoted against him when he himself 
introduced a measure almost identical with that 
which he now opposed. Civil marriage, he said, was 
a foreign institution, an imitation of French legisla- 
tion ; it would simply serve to undermine the belief 
in Christianity among the people, "and" he said, 
"I have seen many friends of the illumination during 
the last year or two come to recognise that a certain 
degree of positive Christianity is necessary for the 
common man, if he is not to become dangerous to 
human society." The desire for introducing this 
custom was merely an instance of the constant wish 
to imitate what is foreign. 

" It would be amusing," he said, " if it were not just our 
own country which was subjected to these experiments of 
French charlatanism. In the course of the discussion it 
has often been said by gentlemen standing in this place 
that Europe holds us for a people of thinkers. Gentle- 
men, that was in old days. The popular representation 
of the last two years has deprived us of this reputation. 
They have shown to a disappointed Europe only trans- 
lators of French stucco but no original thinkers. It 
may be that when civil marriage also rejoices in its 
majority, the people will have their eyes opened to 
the swindle to which they have been sacrificed ; when 
one after another the old Christian fundamental rights 
have been taken from them : the right to be governed by 
Christian magistrates ; the right to know that they have 
secured to their children a Christian education in schools 



64 Bismarck. [1847- 

which Christian parents are compelled to maintain and 
to use; the right of being married in the Christian fashion 
which his faith requires from everyone, without being 
dependent on constitutional ceremonies. If we go on in 
this way I hope still to see the day when the fool's ship 
of the time will be wrecked on the rock of the Christian 
Church ; for the belief in the revealed Word of God 
still stands firmer among the people than the belief in 
the saving power of any article of the Constitution." 

In the same way he was able from his place in 
Parliament to criticise the proposals of the Govern- 
ment for freeing the peasants from those payments 
in kind, and personal service which in some of the 
provinces still adhered to their property ; he attacked 
their financial proposals; he exposed the injustice 
of the land tax; he defended the manorial jurisdic- 
tion of the country gentlemen. Especially he de- 
fended the nobles of Prussia themselves, a class 
against whom so many attacks had been made. He 
pointed out that by them and by their blood the 
Prussian State had been built up ; the Prussian 
nobles were, he maintained, not, as so often was said, 
unpopular ; a third of the House belonged to them ; 
they were not necessarily opposed to freedom ; they 
were, at least, the truest defenders of the State, 
Let people not confuse patriotism and Liberalism. 
Who had done more for the true political inde- 
pendence of the State, that independence without 
which all freedom was impossible, than the Prussian 
nobles ? At the end of the Seven Years' War boys 
had stood at the head of the army, the only surviv- 
ors of their families. The privileges of the nobles 



1852] The Revolution. 65 

had been taken from them, but they had not be- 
haved like the democrats ; their loyalty to the State 
had never wavered ; they had not even formed a 
Fronde. He was not ashamed of the name of 
Junker: "We will bring the name to glory and 
honour," were almost the last words he spoke in 
Parliament. 

Bismarck soon became completely at home in the 
House. Notwithstanding the strength of his opin- 
ions and the vigour with which he gave expression 
to them, he was not unpopular, even among his op- 
ponents. He was always a gentleman and a man of 
the world ; he did not dislike mixing with men of all 
classes and all parties ; he had none of that stiffness 
and hauteur which many of his friends had acquired 
from their military pursuits. His relations with his 
opponents are illustrated by an anecdote of which 
there are many versions. He found himself one day 
while in the refreshment room standing side by side 
with d'Ester, one of the most extreme of the Repub- 
lican party. They fell into conversation, and d'Es- 
ter suggested that they should make a compact and, 
whichever party succeeded in the struggle for power, 
they should each agree to spare the other. If the 
Republicans won, Bismarck should not be guillo- 
tined ; if the monarchists, d'Ester should not be hung. 
" No," answered Bismarck, " that is no use ; if you 
come into power, life would not be worth living. 
There must be hanging, but courtesy to the foot of 
the gallows." 

If he was in after years to become known as the 
great adversary of Parliamentary government, this 



66 Bisnia^^ck. [1847- 

did not arise from any incapacity to hold his own in 
Parhamentary debate. He did not indeed aim at 
oratory; then, as in later years, he always spoke 
with great contempt of men who depended for 
power on their rhetorical ability. He was himself 
deficient in the physical gifts of a great speaker ; pow- 
erful as was his frame, his voice was thin and weak. 
He had nothing of the actor in him ; he could not 
command the deep voice, the solemn tones, the im- 
posing gestures, the Olympian mien by which men 
like Waldeck and Radowitz and Gagern dominated 
and controlled their audience. His own mind was 
essentially critical ; he appealed more to the intellect 
than the emotions. His speeches were always con- 
troversial, but he was an admirable debater. It is 
curious to see how quickly he adopts the natural 
Parliamentary tone. His speeches are all subdued 
in tone and conversational in manner. Many of 
them were very carefully prepared, for though he 
did not generally write them out, he said them over 
and over again to himself or to Kleist, with whom he 
lived in Berlin. They are entirely unlike any other 
speeches — he has, in fact, in them, as in his letters, 
added a new chapter to the literature of his country, 
hitherto so poor in prose. 

They shew a vivid imagination and an almost un- 
equalled power of illustration. The thought is 
always concrete, and he is never satisfied with the 
vague ideas and abstract conceptions which so easily 
moved his contemporaries. No speeches, either in 
English or in German, preserve so much of their 
freshness. He is almost the only Parliamentary 







BISMARCK IN 1848. 



1852] The Revohition. 67 

orator whose speeches have become to some extent 
a popular book ; no other orator has enriched the 
language as he has done with new phrases and im- 
ages. The great characteristic of his speeches, as of 
his letters, is the complete absence of affectation and 
the very remarkable intellectual honesty. They are 
often deficient in order and arrangement ; he did not 
excel in the logical exposition of a connected argu- 
ment, but he never was satisfied till he had presented 
the idea which influenced him in words so forcible 
and original that it was impressed on the minds of 
his audience, and he was often able to find expres- 
sions which will not be forgotten so long as the 
German language is spoken. 

We can easily imagine that under other circum- 
stances, or in another country, he would have risen 
to power and held office as a Parliamentary Minister. 
He often appeals to the practice and traditions of 
the English Parliament, and there are few Conti- 
nental statesmen Avho would have been so com- 
pletely at home in the English House of Commons; 
he belonged to the class of men from whom so many 
of the great English statesmen had come and whom 
he himself describes : 

" What with us is lacking is the whole class which in 
England carries on poUtics, the class of gentlemen who 
are well-to-do and therefore Conservative, who are inde- 
pendent of material interests and whose whole education 
is directed towards making them English statesmen, and 
the object of whose life is to take part in the Common- 
wealth of England." 



68 Bismarck. [1847- 

They were the class to whom he belonged, and he 
would gladly have taken part in a Parliamentary 
government of this kind. 

The weakness of his position arose from the fact 
that he was really acquainted with and represented 
the inhabitants of only one-half of the monarchy. So 
long as he is dealing with questions of landed-prop- 
erty, or of the condition of the peasants, he has a 
minute and thorough knowledge. He did not al- 
ways, however, avoid the danger of speaking as 
though Prussia consisted entirely of agriculturists. 
The great difificulty then as now of governing the 
State, was that it consisted of two parts : the older 
provinces, almost entirely agricultural, where the 
land was held chiefly by the great nobles, and the 
new provinces, the Rhine and Westphalia, where 
there was a large and growing industrial population. 
To the inhabitants of these provinces Bismarck's 
constant appeal to the old Prussian traditions and 
to the achievements of the Prussian nobility could 
have little meaning. What did the citizens of Co- 
logne and Aachen care about the Seven Years' War? 
If their ancestors took part in the war, it would be 
as enemies of the Kings of Prussia. When Bismarck 
said that they were Prussians, and would remain 
Prussian, he undoubtedly spoke the opinion of the 
Mark and of Pomerania. But the inhabitants of the 
Western Provinces still felt and thought rather as 
Germans than as Prussians ; they had scarcely been 
united with the monarchy thirty years ; they were 
not disloyal, but they were quite prepared — nay, they 
wished to see Prussia dissolved in Germany. No 



1852] 



The Revolution. 



69 



one can govern Prussia unless he is able to reconcile 
to his policy these two different classes in the State. 
It was this which the Prussian Conservatives, to 
which Bismarck at that time belonged, have always 
failed to do. The Liberals whom he opposed failed 
equally. In later years he was very nearly to suc- 
ceed in a task which might appear almost impos- 
sible. 




CHAPTER IV. 

THE GERMAN PROBLEM. 
1849-1852. 

BISMARCK, however, did not confine himself 
to questions of constitutional reform and in- 
ternal government. He often spoke on the 
foreign policy of the Government, and it is in these 
speeches that he shews most originality. 
/" The Revolution in Germany, as in Italy, had two 
\ sides ; it was Liberal, but it was also National. The 
i National element was the stronger and more deep- 
Lseated. The Germans felt deeply the humiliation 
to which they were exposed owing to the fact that 
they did not enjoy the protection of a powerful 
Government ; they wished to belong to a national 
State, as Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Russians 
did. It was the general hope that the period of 
revolution might be used for establishing a gov- 
ernment to which the whole of Germany would 
pay obedience. This was the task of the Constitu- 
ent Assembly, which since the spring of 1848 had 
with the permission of the Governments been sit- 
ting at Frankfort. Would they be able to suc- 

70 



1849] 



TJie German Problem. Ji 



ceed where the diplomatists of Vienna had failed ? 
They had at least good-will, but it was to be shewn 
that something more than honest endeavour was 
necessary. There were three great difificulties with 
which they had to contend. The first was the Re- 
publican party, the men who would accept no gov- 
ernment but a Republic, and who wished to found 
the new state by insurrection. They were a small 
minority of the German people ; several attempts at 
insurrection organised by them were suppressed, and 
they were outvoted in the Assembly. The second 
difficulty was Austria. A considerable portion of 
Germany was included in the Austrian Empire. If 
the whole of Germany were to be included in the 
new State which they hoped to found, then part of 
the Austrian Empire would have to be separated 
from the rest, subjected to different laws and a 
different government ; nothing would remain but a 
personal union between the German and Slavonic 
provinces. The Government of Austria, after it had 
recovered its authority at the end of 1848, refused 
to accept this position, and published a new Consti- 
tution, binding all the provinces together in a closer 
union. The Assembly at Frankfort had no power 
to coerce the Emperor of Austria ; they therefore 
adopted the other solution, viz. : that the rest of 
Germany was to be reconstituted, and the Austrian 
provinces left out. The question, however, then 
arose : Would Austria accept this- — would she allow 
a new Germany to be created in which she had no 
part? Surely not, if she was able to prevent it. The 
third difficultv was the relation between the indi- 



']2 Bismarck. [1849- 

vidual States and the new central authority. It is 
obvious that whatever powers were given to the new 
Government would be taken away from the Princes 
of the individual States, who hitherto had enjoyed 
complete sovereignty. Those people who in Ger- 
many were much influenced by attachment to the 
existing governments, and who wished to maintain 
the full authority of the Princes and the local Parlia- 
ments, were called Particularists. During the ex- 
citement of the Revolution they had been almost 
entirely silenced. With the restoration of order and 
authority they had regained their influence. It was 
probable that many of the States would refuse to 
accept the new Constitution unless they were com- 
pelled to do so. Where was the power to do this ? 
There were many in the National Assembly who 
wished to appeal to the power of the people, and by 
insurrection and barricades compel all the Princes to 
accept the new Constitution. There was only one 
other power in Germany which could do the work, 
and that was the Prussian army. Would the King 
of Prussia accept this task ? 

The German Constitution was completed in March, 
1849. -^y ^^^ exercise of much tact and great per- 
sonal influence, Heinrich von Gagern, the President 
of the Assembly and the leader of the Moderate 
party in it, had procured a majority in favour of an 
hereditar}^ monarchy, and the King of Prussia was 
elected to the post of first German Emperor. At the 
beginning of April there arrived in Berlin the deputa- 
tion which was to offer to him the crown, and on his 
answer depended the future of Germany. Were he 



1852] The Gei'-man Problem. 73 

to accept, he would then have undertaken to put him- 
self at the head of the revolutionary movement ; it 
would be his duty to compel all the other States to 
accept the new Constitution, and, if necessary, to 
defend it on the field of battle against Austria. Be- 
sides this he would have to govern not only Prussia 
but Germany; to govern it under a Constitution which 
gave almost all the power to a Parliament elected by 
universal suffrage, and in which he had only a sus- 
pensive veto. Can we be surprised that he refused 
the offer ? He refused it on the ground that he could 
not accept universal suffrage, and also because the 
title and power of German Emperor could not be 
conferred on him by a popular assembly; he could 
only accept it from his equals, the German Princes. 

The decision of the King was discussed in the 
Prussian Assembly, and an address moved declaring 
that the Frankfort Constitution was in legal existence, 
and requesting the King to accept the offer. It was 
on this occasion that Bismarck for the first time came 
forward as the leader of a small party on the Extreme 
Right. He at once rose to move the previous ques- 
tion. He denied to the Assembly even the right of 
discussing this matter which belonged to the preroga- 
tive of the King. 

He was still more strongly opposed to the accept- 
ance of the offered crown. He saw only that the 
King of Prussia would be subjected to a Parliament- 
ary Assembly, that his power of action would be 
limited. The motto of his speech was that Prussia 
must remain Prussia. " The crown of Frankfort," 
he said, " may be very bright, but the gold which gives 



74 Bismarck. 



11849 



truth to its brilliance has first to be won by melting 
down the Prussian crown." His speech caused great 
indignation ; ten thousand copies of it were printed to 
be distributed among the electors so as to show them 
the real principles and objects of the reactionary 
party. 

His opposition to any identification of Prussia and 
Germany was maintained when the Prussian Govern- 
ment itself took the initiative and proposed its own 
solution. During the summer of 1849, ^^^ Prussian 
programme was published. The Government invited 
the other States of Germany to enter into a fresh 
union ; the basis of the new Constitution was to be 
that of Frankfort, but altered so far as might be 
found necessary, and the union was to be a voluntary 
one. The King in order to carry out this policy ap- 
pointed as one of his Ministers Herr von Radowitz. 
He was a man of the highest character and extreme 
ability. An officer by profession, he was distin- 
guished by the versatility of his interests and his 
great learning. The King found in him a man who 
shared his own enthusiasm for letters. He had been 
a member of the Parliament at Frankfort, and had 
taken a leading part am.ong the extreme Conserva- 
tives ; a Roman Catholic, he had come forward in 
defence of religion and order against the Liberals 
and Republicans ; a very eloquent speaker, by his 
earnestness and eloquence he was able for a short 
time to give new life to the failing hopes of the 
German patriots. 

Bismarck always looked on the new Minister with 
great dislike. Radowitz, indeed, hated the Revolu- 



1852] The German Problem. 75 

tion as much as he did ; he was a zealous and patri- 
otic Prussian ; but there was a fundamental difference 
in the nature of the two men. Radowitz wished to 
reform Germany by moral influence. Bismarck did 
not believe in the possibility of this. To this per- 
haps we must add some personal feeling. The Min- 
istry had hitherto consisted almost entirely of men 
who were either personal friends of Bismarck, or 
whom he had recommended to the King. With 
Radowitz there entered into it a man who was su- 
perior to all of them in ability, and over whom 
Bismarck could not hope to have any influence. 
Bismarck's distrust, which amounted almost to 
hatred, depended, however, on his feai that the new 
policy would bring about the ruin of Prussia. He 
took the extreme Particularist view ; he had no in- 
terest in Germany outside Prussia ; Wiirtemberg 
and Bavaria were to him foreign States, [in all 
these proposals for a new Constitution he saw only 
that Prussia would be required to sacrifice its com- 
plete independence ; that the King of Prussia would 
become executor for the decrees of a popular and 
alien Parliament] They were asked to cease to be 
Prussians in order that they might become Germans. 
This Bismarck refused to do. " Prussians we are," 
he said, " and Prussians we will remain." He had 
no sympathy with this idea of a United Germany 
which was so powerful at the time ; there was only 
one way in which he was willing that Germany 
should be united, and that was according to the ex- 
ample which Frederick the Great had set. The 
ideals of the German nation were represented by 



76 Bismarck. [1849- 

Arndt's famous song, " Was ist des Deutschen 
Vaterland ? " The fatherland of the Germans was 
not Suabia or Prussia, not Austria or Bavaria, it was 
the whole of Germany wherever the German tongue 
was spoken. From this Bismarck deliberately dis- 
sociated himself. " I have never heard," he said, " a 
Prussian soldier singing, ' Was ist des Deutschen 
Vaterland ? ' " The new flag of Germany was to be 
the German tricolour, black and white and gold. 

" The Prussian soldiers," cried Bismarck, " have no 
tricoloured enthusiasm ; among them you will find, as 
little as in the rest of the Prussian people, the desire for 
a national regeneration ; they are contented with the 
name of Prussia, and proud of the name of Prussia. 
These troops follow the black and white flag, not the tri- 
colour ; under the black and white they die with joy for 
their country. The tricolour they have learnt since the 
18th of March to look on as the colours of their foes." 

These words aroused intense indignation. One of 
the speakers who followed referred to him as the 
Prodigal Son of the German Fatherland, who had 
deserted his father's house. Bismarck repudiated 
the epithet. " I am not a prodigal son," he said ; 
" my father's house is Prussia and I have never left 
it." He could not more clearly repudiate the title 
German. The others were moved by enthusiasm 
for an idea, he by loyalty to an existing State, 

Nothing was sound, he said, in Germany, except 
the old Prussian institutions. 

" What has preserved us is that which is specifically 
Prussian. It was the remnant of the Stock- Preiissenthmn 



1852] The German Problem. jj 

which has survived the Revolution, the Prussian army, 
the Prussian treasure, the fruits of many years of intelli- 
gent Prussian administration, and the living co-operation 
between King and people. It was the attachment of the 
Prussian people to their hereditary dynasty, the old 
Prussian virtues of honour, loyalty, obedience, and the 
courage which, emanating from the officers who form its 
bone and marrow, permeates the army down to the 
youngest recruit." 

He reminded the House how the Assembly at 
Frankfort had only been saved from the insurgent 
mob by a Prussian regiment, and now it was pro- 
posed to weaken and destroy all these Prussian in- 
stitutions in order to change them into a democratic 
Germany. He was asked to assent to a Constitution 
in which the Prussian Government would sink to the 
level of a provincial council, under the guidance of 
an Imperial Ministry which itself would be depend- 
ent on a Parliament in which the Prussian interests 
would be in a minority. The most important and 
honourable duties of the Prussian Parliament would 
be transferred to a general Parliament ; the King 
would lose his veto ; he would be compelled against 
his will to assent to laws he disliked ; even the Prus- 
sian army would be no longer under his sole com- 
mand. What recompense were they to gain for 
this? 

" The pleasant consciousness of having followed an 
unselfish and noble policy ; of having satisfied the re- 
quirements of a national regeneration ; of having carried 
out the historical task of Prussia, or some such vague 
expression." 



78 Bismarck. [1849- 

With this he contrasted what would have been a 
true Prussian pohcy, a poHcy which Frederick the 
Great might have followed. 

" He would have known that now as in the day of our 
fathers the sound of the trumpets which summoned 
them to their sovereign's flag has not lost its power for 
Prussian ears ; he would have had the choice either of 
joining our old comrade Austria, and undertaking the 
brilliant part which the Emperor of Russia has played, 
and destroying the cause of the Revolution, or by the 
same right by which he took Silesia, he might, after re- 
fusing to accept the crown, have ordered the Germans 
what constitution they should have, and thrown the 
sword into the scale ; then Prussia would have been in 
the position to win for Germany its place in the Council 
of Europe. 

" We all wish the same. We all wish that the Prussian 
eagle should spread out his wings as guardian and ruler 
from the Memel to the Donnersberg, but free will we 
have him, not bound by a new Regensburg Diet. Prus- 
sians we are and Prussians will we remain ; I know that 
in these words I speak the confession of the Prussian 
army and the majority of my fellow-countrymen, and I 
hope to God that we will still long remain Prussian when 
this sheet of paper is forgotten like a withered autumn 
leaf." 

The policy of Radowitz was doomed to failure, 
not so much because of any inherent weakness in it, 
but because Prussia was not strong enough to de- 
fend herself against all the enemies she had called 
up. The other Courts of Germany were lukewarm, 
Austria was extremely hostile. The Kings of Han- 



1852] The German Problem. 79 

over and Saxony retreated from the alliance on the 
ground that they would enter the union only if the 
whole of Germany joined ; Bavaria had refused to 
do so ; in fact the two other Kings had privately 
used all their influence to prevent Bavaria from join- 
ing, in order that they might always have an excuse 
for seceding, Prussia was, therefore, left surrounded 
by twenty-eight of the smaller States. A Parlia- 
ment from them was summoned to meet at Erfurt 
in order to discuss the new Constitution. Bismarck 
was elected a member of it ; he went there avowedly 
to protect the Prussian interests. He had de- 
manded from the Government that at least the 
Constitution agreed on in Erfurt should again be 
submitted to the Prussian Chamber ; he feared that 
many of the most important Prussian rights might 
be sacrificed. His request was refused, for it was 
obvious that if, after the Parliament of Erfurt had 
come to some conclusion, the new Constitution was 
to be referred back again to the twenty-eight Parlia- 
ments of the allied States, the new union would 
never come into effect at all. It is curious here to 
find Bismarck using the rights of the Prussian Par- 
liament as a weapon to maintain the complete inde- 
pendence of Prussia. Sixteen years later, when he 
was doing the work in which Radowitz failed, one 
of his chief difficulties arose from the conduct of 
men who came forward with just the same demand 
which he now made, and he had to refuse their 
demands as Radowitz now refused his. 

He did not take much part in the debates at 
Erfurt ; as he was one of the youngest of the mem- 



8o Bismarck. [1849- 

bers, he held the position of Secretary ; the President 
of the Assembly was Simpson, a very distinguished 
public man, but a converted Jew. " What would my 
father have said," observed Bismarck, " if he had 
lived to see me become clerk to a Jewish scholar? " 
On one occasion he became involved in what might 
have been a very serious dispute, when he used his 
power as Secretary to exclude from the reporters' 
gallery two journalists whose reports of the meeting 
were very partial and strongly opposed to Austria. 
His attitude towards the Assembly is shewn by the 
words : 

" I know that what I have said to you will have no 
influence on your votes, but I am equally convinced that 
your votes will be as completely without influence on 
the course of events." 

The whole union was, as a matter of fact, broken 
down by the opposition of Austria. Bismarck had, 
in one of his first speeches, warned against a 
policy which would bring Prussia into the position 
which Piedmont had held before the battle of 
Novara, when they embarked on a war in which 
victory would have brought about the overthrow of 
the monarchy, and defeat a disgraceful peace. It 
was his way of saying that he hoped the King would 
not eventually draw the sword in order to defend 
the new Liberal Constitution against the opposition 
of Austria. The day came when the King was 
placed in this position. Austria had summoned the 
old Diet to meet at Frankfort ; Prussia denied that 
the Diet still legally existed ; the two policies were 



1852] The German Problem. 8i 

clearly opposed to one another: Austria desiring 
the restoration of the old Constitution, Prussia, at 
the head of Liberal Germany, summoning the States 
round her in a new union. There were other dis- 
putes about Schlesv/ig-Holstein and the affairs of 
Hesse, but this was the real point at issue. The 
Austrians were armed, and were supported by the 
Czar and many of the German States ; shots were 
actually exchanged between the Prussian and Bava- 
rian outposts in Hesse. The Austrian ambassador 
had orders to leave Berlin ; had he done so, war 
could not have been avoided. He disobeyed his 
orders, remained in Berlin, asked for an interview 
with the King, and used all his influence to persuade 
him to surrender. The Ministry was divided ; Rado- 
witz stood almost alone ; the other Ministers, Bis- 
marck's friends, had always distrusted his policy. 
They wished to renew the old alliance with Austria; 
the Minister of War said they could not risk the 
struggle ; it was rumoured that he had deliberately 
avoided making preparations in order to prevent the 
King putting himself at the head of the Liberal 
party. During the crisis, Bismarck was summoned 
to the King at Letzlingen ; there can be no doubt 
what his advice was; eventually the party of peace 
prevailed, and Radowitz resigned. Bismarck on 
hearing the news danced three times round the 
table with delight. Brandenburg died almost im- 
mediately after ; ManteufTel became Minister-Presi- 
dent ; he asked Schwarzenberg for an interview, 
travelled to Olmutz to meet him, and an agreement 
was come to by which practically Prussia surren- 

6 



82 Bismarck. 



[1849- 



dered every object of dispute between the two great 
Powers. 

The convention of Olmutz was the most complete 
humihation to which any European State has ever 
been subjected. Prussia had undertaken a policy, 
and with the strong approval of the great majority 
of the nation had consistently maintained it for over 
a year ; Austria had required that this policy should 
be surrendered ; the two States had armed ; the ulti- 
matum had been sent, everything was prepared for 
war, and then Prussia surrendered. The cause for 
this was a double one. It was partly that Prussia 
was really not strong enough to meet the coalition 
of Austria and Russia, but it was also that the King 
was really of two minds; he was constitutionally un- 
able to maintain against danger a consistent course 
of policy. 

Bismarck was one of the few men who defended 
the action of the Ministry. In the ablest of all his 
speeches he took up the gauntlet, and exposed all 
the weakness and the dangers of Radowitz's policy. 
This was not a cause in which Prussia should risk 
its existence. Why should they go to war in order to 
subject Prussia not to the Princes but to the Chambers 
of the smaller States ? A war for the Union would, 
he said, remind him of the Englishman who had a 
fight with the sentry in order that he might hang 
himself in the sentry-box, a right which he claimed 
for himself and every free Briton. It was the duty 
of the councillors of the King to warn him from a 
policy which would bring the State to destruction. 

" Still I would not shrink from the war ; I would ad- 



1852] The German Problem. 83 



vise it, were anyone able to prove to me the necessity for 
it, or to point out a worthy end which could be attained 
by it and in no other way. Why do great States wage war 
nowadays? The only sound principle of action for a 
great State is political egoism and not Romanticism, and 
it is unworthy of a great State to fight for any matter 
which does not concern its own interests. Shew us, 
gentlemen, an object worthy of war and you have my 
vote. It is easy for a statesman in his office or his 
chamber to blow the trumpet with the breath of popu- 
larity and all the time to sit warming himself by his 
fireside, while he leaves it to the rifleman, who lies 
bleeding on the snow, whether his system attains victory 
and glory. Nothing is easier ; but woe to the statesman 
who at such a time does not look about for a reason for 
the war which will be valid when the war is over. I am 
convinced you will see the questions which now occupy 
us in a different light a year hence, when you look back 
upon them through a long perspective of battle-fields and 
conflagrations, misery and wretchedness. Will you then 
have the courage to go to the peasant by the ashes of 
his cottage, to the cripple, to the childless father, and 
say : 'You have suffered much, but rejoice with us, the 
Union is saved. Rejoice with us, Hassenpflug is no 
longer Minister, Bayernhofer rules in Hesse.' " 

Eloquent words ; but what a strange comment on 
them his own acts were to afford. In 1850 Prussia 
had a clearer and juster cause of war than in 1866; 
every word of his speech might have been used with 
equal effect sixteen years later; the Constitution of 
1850 was little different from that which Bismarck 
himself was to give to Germany. The policy of 
Radowitz was the only true policy for Prussia ; if 



84 Bismarck. [1849- 

he failed, it was because Prussia's army was not 
strong enough ; war would have been followed by 
defeat and disaster. There was one man who saw 
the evils as they really were ; the Prince of Prussia 
determined that if ever he became King the army 
of Prussia should be again made strong and ef^cient. 

It was probably this speech which determined 
Bismarck's future career. He had defended the 
agreement with Austria and identified himself with 
the policy of the Government ; what more natural 
than that they should use him to help to carry out 
the policy he had upheld. Prussia consented to 
recognise the restoration of the Diet ; it would be 
necessary, therefore, to send an envoy. Now that 
she had submitted to Austria the only wise policy 
was to cultivate her friendship. Who could do this 
better than Bismarck? Who had more boldly sup- 
ported and praised the new rulers of Austria? 
When the Gotha party, as they were called, had 
wished to exclude Austria from Germany, he it was 
who said that Austria was no more a foreign State 
than Wiirtemberg or Bavaria. The appointment of 
Bismarck would be the best proof of the loyal inten- 
tions of the Prussian Government. 

A few years later he himself gave to Motley the 
following account of his appointment : 

" In the summer of 1851," Motley writes, " he told me 
that the Minister, Manteuffel, asked him one day ab- 
ruptly, if he would accept the post of Ambassador at 
Frankfort, to which (although the proposition was as un- 
expected a one to him as if I should hear by the next 
mail that I had been chosen Governor of Massachusetts) 



1852] The German Problem. 85 

he answered, after a moment's deliberation, ' yes,' with- 
out another word. The King, the same day, sent for 
him, and asked him if he would accept the place, to 
which he made the same brief answer, * Ja.' His Majesty 
expressed a little surprise that he made no inquiries or 
conditions, when Bismarck replied that anything which 
the King felt strong enough to propose to him, he felt 
strong enough to accept. I only write these details, 
that you may have an idea of the man. Strict integrity 
and courage of character, a high sense of honour, a firm 
religious belief, united with remarkable talents, make up 
necessarily a combination which cannot be found any 
day in any Court ; and I have no doubt that he is de- 
stined to be Prime Minister, unless his obstinate truthful- 
ness, which is apt to be a stumbling-block for politicians, 
stands in his way." 







CHAPTER V. 

FRANKFORT. 
1851-1857. 

BISMARCK when he went to Frankfort was 
thirty-six years of age ; he had had no experi- 
ence in diplomacy and had long been un- 
accustomed to the routine of official life. He had 
distinguished himself by qualities which might seem 
very undiplomatic; as a Parliamentary debater he 
had been outspoken in a degree remarkable even 
during a revolution ; he had a habit of tearing away 
the veil from those facts which everyone knows and 
which all wish to ignore ; a careless good-fellowship 
which promised little of that reserve and discretion 
so necessary in a confidential agent ; a personal and 
wilful independence which might easily lead him 
into disagreement with the Ministers and the King. 
He had not even the advantage of learning his work 
by apprenticeship under a more experienced official ; 
during the first two months at Frankfort he held the 
position of First Secretary, but his chief did not at- 
tempt to introduce him to the more important nego- 
tiations and when, at the end of July, he received his 

86 



1851] Frankfort. 87 

definite appointment as envoy, he knew as little of 
the work as when he arrived at Frankfort. 

He had, however, occupied his time in becoming 
acquainted with the social conditions. His first im- 
pressions were very unfavourable. Frankfort held 
a peculiar position. Though the centre of the Ger- 
man political system it was less German than any 
other town in the country. The society was very 
cosmopolitan. There were the envoys of the German 
States and the foreign Powers, but the diplomatic 
circle was not graced by the dignity of a Court nor 
by the neighbourhood of any great administrative 
Power. Side by side with the diplomatists were the 
citizens of Frankfort ; but here again we find indeed 
a great money-market, the centre of the finance of 
the Continent, dissociated from any great productive 
activity. In the neighbourhood were the watering- 
places and gambling-tables ; Homburg and Wies- 
baden, Soden and Baden-Baden, were within an easy 
ride or short railway journey, and Frankfort was 
constantly visited by all the idle Princes of Germany. 
It was a city in which intrigue took the place of 
statesmanship, and never has intrigue played so large 
a part in the history of Europe as during the years 
1 850-1 870. Half the small States who were repre- 
sented at Frankfort had ambitions beyond their 
powers ; they liked to play their part in the politics 
of Europe, Too weak to stand alone, they were also 
too weak to be quite honest, and attempted to gain 
by cunning a position which they could not main- 
tain by other means. This was the city in which Bis- 
marck was to serve his diplomatic apprenticeship. 



88 Bismarck. 



[1851- 



Two extracts from letters to his wife give the best 
picture of his personal character at this time: 

" On Saturday I drove with Rochow to Riidesheim ; 
there I took a boat and rowed out on the Rhine, and 
bathed in the moonlight — only nose and eyes above the 
water, and floated down to the Rat Tower at Bingen, 
where the wicked Bishop met his end. It is something 
strangely dreamlike to lie in the water in the quiet, 
warm light, gently carried along by the stream ; to look 
at the sky with the moon and stars above one, and, on 
either side, to see the wooded mountain-tops and castle 
parapets in the moonlight, and to hear nothing but the 
gentle rippling of one's own motion. I should like a 
swim like this every evening. Then I drank some very 
good wine, and sat long talking with Lynar on the bal- 
cony, with the Rhine beneath us. My little Testament 
and the starry heavens brought us on Christian topics, 
and I long shook at the Rousseau-like virtue of his soul." 

" Yesterday I was at Wiesbaden, and with a feeling of 
melancholy revisited the scenes of former folly. May it 
please God to fill with His clear and strong wine this 
vessel in which the champagne of twenty-one years 
foamed so uselessly. ... I do not understand how 
a man who reflects on himself, and still knows, and will 
know, nothing of God, can endure his life for contempt 
and weariness. I do not know how I endured this in 
old days ; if, as then, I were to live without God, thee, 
and the children, I do not know why I should not put 
life aside like a dirty shirt ; and yet most of my acquaint- 
ances live thus." 

Now let us see what he thinks of his new duties: 
" Our intercourse here is at best nothing but a n^utual 



1857] Frankfort. 89 

suspicion and espionage ; if only there was anything to 
spy out and to hide ! It is pure trifles with which they 
worry themselves, and I find these diplomatists with their 
airs of confidence and their petty fussiness much more 
absurd than the member of the Second Chamber in his 
conscious dignity. Unless some external events take 
place, and we clever men of the Diet can neither direct 
nor foresee them, I know already what we shall bring 
about in one or two or three years, and will do it in 
twenty-four hours if the others will only be reasonable 
and truthful for a single day. I am making tremendous 
progress in the art of saying nothing in many words ; I 
write reports many pages long, which are smooth and 
finished like leading articles, and if Manteuffel after 
reading them can say what they contain, he can do more 
than I. We all do as though we believed of each other 
that we are full of thoughts and plans, if only we would 
express them, and all the time we none of us know a 
hair's breadth more what will become of Germany." 

Of the Austrian Envoy who was President of the 
Diet he writes : 

" Thun in his outward appearance has something of a 
hearty good fellow mixed with a touch of the Vienna 
roue. Underneath this he hides, I will not say great 
political power and intellectual gifts, but an uncommon 
cleverness and cunning, which with great presence of 
mind appears from underneath the mask of harmless 
good-humour as soon as politics are concerned. I con- 
sider him as an opponent who is dangerous to anyone 
who honestly trusts him, instead of paying back in his 
own coin." 

His judgment on his other colleagues is equally 
decisive ; of the Austrian diplomatists 



90 Bismarck. [I85ir 

" one must never expect that they will make what is 
right the foundation of their policy for the simple reason 
that it is the right. Cautious dishonesty is the charac- 
teristic of their association with us. They have nothing 
which awakens confidence. They intrigue under the 
mask of good-fellowship." 

It was impossible to look for open co-operation from 
them ; 

" their mouths are full of the necessity for common ac- 
tion, but when it is a question of furthering our wishes, 
then ofificially it is, ' We will not oppose,' and a secret 
pleasure in preparing obstacles." 

It was just the same with the envoys of the other 
countries: with few exceptions there is none for 
whom right has any value in itself. 

" They are caricatures of diplomatists who put on their 
official physiognomy if I ask them for a light, and select 
gestures and words with a truly Regensburg caution, if 
they ask for the key of the water-closet." Writing to 
Gerlach he speaks of " the lying, double-tongued policy 
of the Austrians. Of all the lies and intrigues that go 
on up and down the Rhine an honest man from the old 
Mark has no conception. These South German child- 
ren of nature are very corrupt." 

His opinion of the diplomatists does not seem to 
have improved as he knew them better. Years later 
he wrote : 

" There are few diplomatists who in the long run do 
not prefer to capitulate with their conscience and their 
patriotism, and to guard the interests of their country and 
their sovereign with somewhat less decision, rather than, 



1857] Frankfort. 91 

incessantly and with danger to their personal position, 
to contend with the difificulties which are prepared for 
them by a powerful and unscrupulous enemy." 

He does not think much better of his own Prus- 
sian colleagues ; he often complains of the want of 
support which he received. " With us the ofificial 
diplomacy," he writes, " is capable of playing under 
the same roof with strangers against their own coun- 
trymen." 

These letters are chiefly interesting because of the 
light they throw on his own character at the begin- 
ning of his diplomatic career ; we must not take 
them all too seriously. He was too good a racon- 
teur not to make a good story better, and too good 
a letter-writer not to add something to the effect of 
his descriptions ; besides, as he says elsewhere, he 
did not easily see the good side of people ; his eyes 
were sharper for their faults than their good quali- 
ties.* After the first few passages of arms he got on 
well enough with Thun ; when he was recalled two 
years later Bismarck spoke of him with much 
warmth. " I like him personall}^ and should be 
glad to have him for a neighbour at Schonhausen." 

It is however important to notice that the first 
impression made on him by diplomatic work was 
that of wanton and ineffective deceit. Those who 
accuse him, as is so often done, of lowering the stand- 
ard of political morality which prevails in Europe, 

* This trait is confirmed by Busch, wiio in his record of the conver- 
sations of Bismarck observes that with one or two exceptions he 
seldom had a good word to say for his colleagues. 



92 Bismarck. [1851- 

know little of politics as they were at the time when 
Schwarzenberg was the leading statesman. 

It was his fate at once to be brought in close con-- 
tact with the most disagreeable side of political life. 
In all diplomatic work there must be a good deal of 
espionage and underhand dealing. This was a part 
of his duties which Bismarck had soon to learn. He 
was entrusted with the management of the Press. 
This consisted of two parts : first of all, he had to 
procure the insertion of articles in influential papers 
in a sense agreeable to the plans of the Prussian 
Government ; secondly, when hostile articles ap- 
peared, or inconvenient information was published, 
he had to trace the authors of it, — find out by whom 
the obnoxious paper had been inspired, or who had 
conveyed the secret information. This is a form of 
activity of which it is of course not possible to give 
any full account ; it seems, however, clear that in 
a remarkably short time Bismarck shewed great apti- 
tude for his new duties. His letters to Manteuffel 
are full of curious information as to the intrigues of 
those who are hostile to Prussia. He soon learns to 
distrust the information supplied by the police ; all 
through his life he had little respect for this depart- 
ment of the Prussian State. He soon had agents of 
his own. We find him gaining secret information as 
to the plans of the Ultramontane party in Baden from 
a compositor at Freiburg who was in his pay. On 
other occasions, when a Court official at Berlin had 
conveyed to the newspapers private information, Bis- 
marck was soon able to trace him out. We get the 
impression, both from his letters and from what 



1857] Frankfort. 93 

other information we possess, that all the diplomat- 
ists of Germany were constantly occupied in calumni- 
ating one another through anonymous contributions 
to a venal Press. 

It is characteristic of the customs of the time that 
he had to warn his wife that all her letters to him 
would be read in the post-ofifice before he received 
them. It was not only the Austrians who used 
these methods ; each of the Prussian Ministers would 
have his own organ which he would use for his own 
purposes, and only too probably to attack his own col- 
leagues. It was at this time that a curious fact came 
to light with regard to Herr von Prokesch-Osten, 
the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin. He had been 
transferred from Berlin to Frankfort, and on leaving 
his house sold some of his furniture. In a chest of 
drawers was found a large bundle of papers consist- 
ing of newspaper articles in his handwriting, which 
had been communicated to different papers, attack- 
ing the Prussian Government, to which he at the 
time was accredited. Of Prokesch it is that Bis- 
marck once writes : " As to his statements I do not 
know how much you will find to be Prokesch, and 
how much to be true." On another occasion, before 
many witnesses, Bismarck had disputed some state- 
ment he made. ** If it is not true," cried Prokesch, 
" then I should have lied in the name of the Royal 
and Imperial Government." " Certainly," answered 
Bismarck. There was a dead pause in the conversa- 
tion. Prokesch afterwards of^cially admitted that 
the statement had been incorrect. 

This association with the Press formed in him a 



94 Bismarck. [1851- 

habit of mind which he never lost: the proper use 
of newspapers seemed to him, as to most German 
statesmen, to be not the expression of pubHc opinion 
but the support of the Government ; if a paper is 
opposed to the Government, the assumption seems 
to be that it is bribed by some other State. 

" The whole country would rejoice if some of the 
papers which are supported by foreign sources were 
suppressed, with the express recognition of their unpa- 
triotic attitude. There may be opposition in the inter- 
nal affairs, but a paper which in Prussia takes part 
against the policy of the King on behalf of foreign 
countries, must be regarded as dishonoured and treated 
as such." 

Politically his position was very difficult ; the 
Diet had been restored by Austria against the will 
of Prussia ; the very presence of a Prussian Envoy 
in Frankfort was a sign of her humiliation. He had 
indeed gone there full of friendly dispositions to- 
wards Austria ; he was instructed to take up again the 
policy which had been pursued before 1848, when 
all questions of importance had been discussed by 
the two great Powers before they were laid before 
the Diet. Bismarck, however, quickly found that 
this was no longer the intention of Austria ; the 
Austria which he had so chivalrously defended at 
Berlin did not exist ; he had expected to find a 
warm and faithful friend — he found a cunning and 
arrogant enemy. Schwarzenberg had spared Prus- 
sia but he intended to humble her; he wished to 
use the Diet as a means of permanently asserting 



1857] Frankfort. 95 

the supremacy of Austria, and he would not be con- 
tent until Prussia had been forced like Saxony or 
Bavaria to acquiesce in the position of a vassal 
State. The task might not seem impossible, for 
Prussia appeared to be on the downward path. 

Of course the Diet of Frankfort was the place 
where the plan had to be carried out ; it seemed an 
admirable opportunity that Prussia was represented 
there by a young and untried man. Count Thun 
and his successors used every means to make it 
appear as though Prussia was a State not of equal 
rank with Austria. They carried the war into soci- 
ety and, as diplomatists always will, used the out- 
ward forms of social intercourse as a means for 
obtaining political ends. On this field, Bismarck 
was quite capable of meeting them. He has told 
many stories of their conflicts. 

As President of the Diet, Thun claimed privileges 
for himself which others did not dare to dispute. 

*' In the sittings of the military commission when 
Rochow was Prussian envoy, Austria alone smoked. 
Rochow, who was a passionate smoker, would also have 
gladly done so, but did not venture. When I came I 
did not see any reason against it ; and asked for a light 
from the Presiding State ; this seemed to be noticed 
with astonishment and displeasure by him and the other 
gentlemen ; it was obviously an event for them. This 
time only Austria and Prussia smoked. But the others 
obviously held it so important that they sent home a 
report on it. Someone must have written about it to 
Berlin, as a question from the late King arrived ; he 
did not smoke himself and probably did not find the 



96 Bismarck. [1851- 

affair to his taste. It required much consideration at 
the smaller Courts, and for quite half a year only the 
two great Powers smoked. Then Schrenk, the Bavarian 
envoy, began to maintain the dignity of his position by 
smoking. The Saxon Nostitz would doubtless have 
liked to begin too, but I suppose he had not yet received 
permission from his Minister. But when next time he 
saw that Bothmer, the Hanoverian, allowed himself a 
cigar, he must have come to an understanding with his 
neighbour (he was a good Austrian, and had sons in 
the Austrian army), for he brought out his pouch and lit 
up. There remained only the Wiirtemberger and the 
Darmstadter, and they did not smoke at all, but the 
honour and the importance of their States required it, 
and so on the following day the Wiirtemberger really 
brought out his cigar. I can see him with it now, a long, 
thin, yellow thing, the colour of rye-straw, — and with 
sulky determination, as a sacrifice for his Swabian 
fatherland, he smoked at least half of it. Hesse-Darm- 
stadt alone refrained." 

On another occasion Thun received Bismarck in 
his shirt sleeves: "You are quite right," said Bis- 
marck, " it is very hot," and took off his own coat. 

In the transaction of business he found the same 
thing. The plan seemed to be deliberately to adopt 
a policy disadvantageous to Prussia, to procure the 
votes of a majority of the States, thereby to cause 
Prussia to be outvoted, and to leave her in the di- 
lemma of accepting a decision which was harmful to 
herself or of openly breaking with the Federation. 
On every matter which came up the same scenes re- 
peated themselves; now it was the disposal of the 



1857] Frankfort. 97 

fleet, which had to a great extent been provided for 
and maintained by Prussian money ; Austria de- 
manded that it should be regarded as the property 
of the Confederation even though most of the States 
had never paid their contribution. Then it was the 
question of the Customs' Union ; a strong effort was 
made by the anti-Prussian party to overthrow the 
union which Prussia had estabHshed and thereby 
ruin the one great work which she had achieved. 
Against these and similar attempts Bismarck had con- 
stantly to be on the defensive. Another time it was 
the publication of the proceedings of the Diet which 
the Austrians tried to make a weapon against Prus- 
sia. The. whole intercourse became nothing but a 
series of disputes, sometimes serious, sometimes 
trivial. 

Bismarck was soon able to hold his own ; poor 
Count Thun, whose nerves were not strong, after a 
serious discussion with him used to go to bed at iive 
o'clock in the afternoon ; he complained that his 
health would not allow him to hold his post if there 
were to be continuous quarrels. When his successor, 
Herr v. Prokesch, left Frankfort for Constantinople, 
he said that " it would be like an Eastern dream of 
the blessed to converse with the wise Ali instead of 
Bismarck." 

As soon as the first strangeness had passed off 
Bismarck became reconciled to his position. His 
wife and children joined him, he made himself a com- 
fortable home, and his house soon became one of the 
most popular in the town ; he and his wife were 
genial and hospitable and he used his position to ex- 



98 Bismarck. [1851- 

tend his own influence and that of his country. His 
old friend, Motley, visited him there in 1855 ^"d 
wrote to his wife: 

" Frankfort, 
"Monday, July 30, 1855. 

". . . The Bismarcks are as kind as ever — nothing 
can be more frank and cordial than her manners. I am 
there all day long. It is one of those houses where every- 
one does what he likes. The show apartments where 
they receive formal company are on the front of the 
house. Their living rooms, however, are a salon and 
dining-room at the back, opening upon the garden. Here 
there are young and old, grandparents and children and 
dogs all at once, eating, drinking, smoking, piano-play- 
ing, and pistol-firing (in the garden), all going on at the 
same time. It is one of those establishments where every 
earthly thing that can be eaten or drunk is offered you ; 
porter, soda water, small beer, champagne, burgundy, or 
claret are about all the time, and everybody is smoking 
the best Havana cigars every minute." 

He had plenty of society, much of it congenial to 
him. He had given up playing since his marriage, 
and was one of the few diplomatists who was not 
found at the Homburg gaming-tables, but he had a 
sufficiency of sport and joined with the British envoy, 
Sir Alexander Malet, in taking some shooting. A 
couple of years later in contradicting one of the fre- 
quent newspaper reports, that he aimed at supplant- 
ing the Minister, he says: 

" My castle in the air is to spend three to five years 
longer at Frankfort, then perhaps the same time in 



1857] Frankfort. 99 

Vienna or Paris, then ten years with glory as Minister, 
then die as a country gentleman." 

A prospect which has been more nearly fulfilled than 
such wishes generally are. 

He was for the first year still a member of the 
Second Chamber and occasionally appeared in it ; his 
interest in his diplomatic work had, however, begun 
to overshadow his pleasure in Parliamentary debate. 

" I am thoroughly tired of my life here," he writes in 
May, 1853, to his wife from Berlin, " and long for the day 
of my departure. I find the intrigues of the House im- 
measurably shallow and undignified ; if one always lives 
among them, one deceives oneself and considers them 
something wonderful. When I come here from Frank- 
fort and see them as they really are, I feel like a sober 
man who has fallen among drunkards. There is some- 
thing very demoralising in the air of the Chambers ; it 
makes the best people vain without their knowing it." 

So quickly has he outgrown his feelings of a year 
ago : then it was the intrigues of diplomatists that 
had seemed to him useless and demoralising. Now 
it was Parliamentary debates ; in the opinion he 
formed at this time he never wavered. 

His distaste for Parliamentary life was probably 
increased by an event which took place about this 
time. As so often before in the course of debate he 
had a sharp passage of words with Vincke ; the latter 
referred contemptuously to Bismarck's diplomatic 
achievements. "All I know of them is the famous 
lighted cigar." 

Bismarck answered with some angry words and 



TOO Bismarck. [1851- 

at the close of the sitting sent a challenge. Four 
days later a duel with pistols took place — the only- 
one he ever fought. Neither was injured. It seems 
that Vincke, who had the first shot, seeing that Bis- 
marck (who had received the sacrament the night 
before) was praying, missed on purpose ; Bismarck 
then shot into the air. 

For these reasons he did not stand for re-election 
when the Chamber was dissolved in 1852, although 
the King was very much displeased with his deter- 
mination. He was shortly afterwards appointed 
member of the newly constituted House of Lords, 
but though he occasionally voted, as in duty bound, 
for Government measures, he never spoke ; he was 
not to be heard again in the Parliament until he ap- 
peared there as President of the Ministry. He was 
glad to be freed from a tie which had interfered with 
his duties at Frankfort ; to these he devoted himself 
with an extraordinary energy ; all his old repugnance 
to of^cial life had disappeared ; he did not confine 
himself to the mere routine of his duties, or to carry- 
ing out the instructions sent to him from Berlin. 

His power of work was marvellous: there passed 
through his hands a constant series of most import- 
ant and complicated negotiations ; up to this time 
he had no experience or practice in sedentary literary 
work, now he seems to go out of the way to make 
fresh labours for himself. He writes long and care- 
ful despatches to his Minister on matters of general 
policy ; some of them so carefully thought out and 
so clearly expressed that they may still be looked 
on as models. He is entirely free from that circum- 



1857] Frankfort. loi 

locution and involved style which makes so much 
diplomatic correspondence almost worthless. His 
arguments are always clear, complete, concise. He 
used to work long into the night, and then, when 
in the early morning the post to Berlin had gone, he 
would mount his horse and ride out into the country. 
It was in these years that he formed those habits 
to which the breakdown of his health in later years 
was due ; but now his physical and intellectual vigour 
seemed inexhaustible. 

He never feared to press his own views as to the 
policy which should be pursued. He also kept up 
a constant correspondence with Gerlach, and many 
of these letters were laid before the King, so that 
even when absent he continued as before to influence 
both the ofificial and unofficial advisers. He soon 
became the chief adviser on German affairs and was 
often summoned to Berlin that his advice might be 
taken ; within two years after his appointment he 
was sent on a special mission to Vienna to try and 
bring about an agreement as to the rivalry concern- 
ing the Customs' Union. He failed, but he had 
gained a knowledge of persons and opinions at the 
Austrian Court which was to be of much use to him. 

During these years, indeed, he acquired a most 
remarkable knowledge of Germany ; before, he had 
lived entirely in Prussia, now he was at the centre of 
the German political system, continually engaged in 
important negotiations with the other Courts ; after 
a few years there was not a man of importance in 
German public life whose character and opinions he 
had not gauged. 



I02 Bismarck. 



[1851- 



Further experience only confirmed in him the ob- 
servations he had made at the beginning, that it was 
impossible to maintain a good understanding with 
Austria. The tone of his letters soon changes from 
doubt and disappointment to settled and determined 
hostility. In other matters also he found that the 
world was not the same place it had seemed to him ; 
he had been accustomed to regard the Revolution 
as the chief danger to be met ; at Frankfort he was 
in the home of it ; here for nearly a year the German 
Assembly had held its meetings ; in the neighbour- 
ing States of Baden, Hesse, and in the Palatinate, 
the Republican element was strong ; he found them 
as revolutionary as ever, but he soon learnt to despise 
rather than fear them : 

" The population here would be a political volcano if 
revolutions were made with the mouth ; so long as it 
requires blood and strength they will obe)^ anyone who 
has courage to command and, if necessary, to draw the 
sword ; they would be dangerous only under cowardly 
governments. 

" I have never seen two men fighting in all the two years 
I have been here. This cowardice does not prevent the 
people, who are completely devoid of all inner Christian- 
ity and all respect for authority, from sympathising with 
the Revolution." 

His observations on the character of the South 
Germans only increased his admiration for the Prus- 
sian people and his confidence in the Prussian State. 

He had not been at Frankfort a year before he 
had learnt to look on this hostility of Austria as 
unsurmountable. As soon as he had convinced him- 



1857] 



Frankfort. 103 



self of this, he did not bewail and bemoan the de- 
sertion of their ally ; he at once accustomed himself 
to the new position and considered in what way the 
Government ought to act. His argument was simple. 
Austria is now our enemy ; we must be prepared to 
meet this enmity either by diplomacy or war ; we 
are not strong enough to do so alone ; therefore we 
must have allies. There was no sure alliance to be 
had in Germany ; he despised the other German 
States. If there were to be a war he would rather 
have them against him than on his side. He must 
find help abroad ; Austria had overcome Prussia by 
the alliance with Russia. Surely the only thing to 
be done was to seek support where it could be got, 
either with Russia or with France, if possible with 
both. In this he was only reverting to the old 
policy of Prussia ; the alliance with Austria had only 
begun in 18 13. From now until 1866 his whole 
policy was ceaselessly devoted to bringing about 
such a disposition of the forces of Europe that 
Austria might be left without allies and Prussia be 
able to regain the upper hand in German affairs. 

The change was in his circumstances, not in his 
character; as before he was moved by a consuming 
passion of patriotism ; something there was too of 
personal feeling, — his own pride, his own ambitions 
were engaged, though this was as nothing compared 
to love of his country and loyalty to the King. He 
was a soldier of the Prussian Crown : at Berlin he 
had to defend it against internal enemies ; now the 
danger had shifted, the power of the Government 
was established, why waste time in fighting with 



I04 Bismarck. [1851- 

Liberalism? Other enemies were pressing on. When 
Jellachich and Windischgratz had stood victorious 
by the blood-stained altar of St. Stephen's, the Aus- 
trian army had destroyed the common foe ; now it 
was the same Austrian army and Austrian statesmen 
who desired to put a limit to Prussian ambition. 
Bismarck threw himself into the conflict of diplomacy 
with the same courage and relentless persistence 
that he had shewn in Parliamentary debates. He 
had already begun to divine that the time might 
come when the Prussian Crown would find an ally in 
Italian patriots and Hungarian rebels. 

It was the Eastern complications which first en- 
abled him to shew his diplomatic abilities in the 
larger field of European politics. The plans for the 
dismemberment of the Turkish Empire which were 
entertained by the Czar were opposed by England, 
France, and Austria; Prussia, though not immedi- 
ately concerned, also at first gave her assent to the 
various notes and protests of the Powers ; so that 
the ambition of the Czar was confronted by the 
unanimous voice of Europe. 

Bismarck from the beginning regarded the situa- 
tion with apprehension ; he saw that Prussia was 
being entangled in a struggle in which she had much 
to lose and nothing to gain. If she continued to 
support the Western Powers she would incur the 
hatred of Russia ; then, perhaps, by a sudden change 
of policy on the part of Napoleon, she would be left 
helpless and exposed to Russian vengeance. If war 
were to break out, and Prussia took part in the war, 
then the struggle between France and Russia would 



1857] Frankfort. 105 

be fought out on German soil, and, whoever was 
victorious, Germany would be the loser. What in- 
terests of theirs were at stake that they should incur 
this danger? why should Prussia sacrifice herself to 
preserve English influence in the Mediterranean, or 
the interests of Austria on the Danube ? He wished 
for exactly the opposite policy ; the embarrassment 
of Austria must be the opportunity of Prussia; now 
was the time to recover the lost position in Germany. 
The dangerous friendship of Austria and Russia was 
dissolved ; if Prussia came to an understanding with 
the Czar, it was now Austria that would be isolated. 
The other German States would not desire to be 
dragged into a war to support Austrian dominion in 
the East. Let Prussia be firm and they would turn 
to her for support, and she would once more be able 
to command a majority of the Diet. 

For these reasons he recommended his Govern- 
ment to preserve an armed neutrality, in union, if 
possible, with the other German States. If they 
were to take sides, he preferred it should not be with 
the Western Powers, for, as he said, — 

" We must look abroad for allies, and among the 
European Powers Russia is to be had on the cheapest 
terms ; it wishes only to grow in the East, the two others 
at our expense." 

It shews the advance he had made in diplomacy 
that throughout his correspondence he never refers 
to the actual cause of dispute ; others might dis- 
cuss the condition of the Christians in Turkey or 
the Holy Places of Jerusalem ; he thinks only of the 



io6 Bisinarck. 



[1851- 



strength and weakness of his own State. The open- 
ing of the Black Sea, the dismemberment of Turkey, 
the control of the Mediterranean, the fate of the 
Danubian Principalities — for all this he cared nothing, 
for in them Prussia had no interests ; they only ex- 
isted for him so far as the new combinations among 
the Powers might for good or evil affect Prusfeia. 

The crisis came in 1854 : a Russian army occupied 
Moldavia and Wallachia ; England and France sent 
their fleets to the Black Sea; they determined on 
war and they wished for the alliance of Austria. 
Austria was inclined to join, for the presence of 
Russian troops on the Danube was a menace to her ; 
she did not dare to move unless supported by Prussia 
and Germany ; she appealed to the Confederacy and 
urged that her demands might be supported by the 
armies of her allies ; but the German States were lit- 
tle inclined to send the levies of their men for the 
Eastern interests of the Emperor. If they were en- 
couraged by Prussia, they would refuse ; the result 
in Germany, as in Europe, depended on the action 
of Prussia, and the decision lay with the King. 

Was Prussia to take part with Russia or the 
Western Powers? That was the question which for 
many months was debated at Berlin. 

The public opinion of the nation was strong for 
the Western Powers ; they feared the influence of 
Russia on the internal affairs of Germany ; they had 
not forgotten or forgiven the part which the Czar 
had taken in 1849 > ^^ choice seemed to lie between 
Russia and England, between liberty and despotism, 
between civilisation and barbarism. On this side 



1857] Frankfort. 107 

also were those who wished to mahitain the alHance 
with Austria. Russia had few friends except at the 
Court and in the army, but the party of the Kreuz 
Zeitung, the Court Camarilla, the princes and nobles 
who commanded the Garde Corps, wished for nothing 
better than a close alliance with the great Emperor 
who had saved Europe from the Revolution. " Let 
us draw our sword openly in defence of Russia," they 
said, " then we may bring Austria with us; the old 
alliance of the three monarchies will be restored, and 
then will be the time for a new crusade against 
France, the natural enemy of Germany, and the 
upstart Emperor." 

The conflict of parties was keenest in the precincts 
of the Court; society in Berlin was divided between 
the Russian and the English ; the Queen was hot for 
Russia, but the English party rallied round the 
Prince of Prussia and met in the salons of his wife. 
Between the two the King wavered ; he was, as al- 
ways, more influenced by feeling than by calculation, 
but his feelings were divided. How could he decide 
between Austria and Russia, the two ancient allies 
of his house? He loved and reverenced the Czar; 
he feared and distrusted Napoleon ; alliance with 
infidels against Christians was to him a horrible 
thought, but he knew how violent were the actions 
and lawless the desires of Nicholas. He could not 
ignore the opinions of Western Europe and he 
wished to stand well with England. The men by 
whose advice he was guided stood on opposite sides : 
Bunsen was for England, Gerlach for Russia ; the 
Ministry also was divided. No efforts were spared 



io8 Bismarck. 



[1851- 



to influence him ; the Czar and Napoleon each sent 
special envoys to his Court ; the Queen of England 
and her husband warned him not to forget his duty 
to Europe and humanity ; if he would join the allies 
there would be no war. Still he wavered ; " he 
goes to bed an Englishman and gets up a Russian," 
said the Czar, who despised his brother-in-law as 
much as he was honoured by him. 

While the struggle was at its height, Bismarck was 
summoned to Berlin, that his opinion might also be 
heard. At Berlin and at Letzlingen he had frequent 
interviews with the King. In later years he de- 
scribed the situation he found there : 

" It was nothing strange, according to the custom of 
those days, that half a dozen ambassadors should be 
living in hotels intriguing against the policy of the 
Minister." 

He found Berlin divided into two parties : the one 
looked to the Czar as their patron and protector, the 
other wished to win the approval of England ; he 
missed a reasonable conviction as to what was the 
interest of Prussia. His own advice was against 
alliance with the Western Powers or Austria ; better 
join Russia than England ; better still, preserve neu- 
trality and hold the balance of Europe. He had the 
reputation of being very Russian, but he protested 
against the term. " I am not Russian," he said, 
" but Prussian." He spoke with great decision 
against the personal adherents of the King, men 
who looked to the Czar rather than to their own 
sovereign, and carried their subservience even to 



1857] Fra 71 kfort. 1 09 

treason. As in former days, courage he preached 
and resolution. Some talked of the danger of isola- 
tion ; " With 400,000 men we cannot be isolated," he 
said. The French envoy warned him that his policy 
might lead to another Jena ; " Why not to Water- 
loo ? " he answered. Others talked of the danger of 
an English blockade of their coasts ; he pointed out 
that this would injure England more than Prussia. 

" Let us be bold and depend on our own strength ; let 
us frighten Austria by threatening an alliance with 
Russia, frighten Russia by letting her think we may join 
the Western Powers ; if it were true that we could never 
side with Russia, at least we must retain the possibility 
of threatening to do so." 

The result was what we might expect from the 
character of the King ; unable to decide for either of 
the contending factors, he alternated between the 
two, and gave his support now to one, now to 
the other. In March, when Bismarck was still in 
Berlin, sudden disgrace fell upon the English party; 
Bunsen was recalled from London, Bonin, their chief 
advocate in the Ministry, was dismissed ; when the 
Prince of Prussia, the chief patron of the Western 
alliance, protested, he was included in the act of dis- 
favour, and had to leave Berlin, threatened with the 
loss of his offices and even with arrest. All danger 
of war with Russia seemed to have passed ; Bismarck 
returned content to Frankfort. Scarcely had he 
gone when the old affection for Austria gained the 
upper hand, and by a separate treaty Prussia bound 
herself to support the Austrian demands, if necessary 



no Bismarck. [I85i- 

by arms. Bismarck heard nothing of the treaty till 
it was completed ; the Ministers had purposely re. 
frained from asking his advice on a policy which 
they knew he would disapprove. He overcame his 
feelings of disgust so far as to send a cold letter of 
congratulation to Manteuffel ; to Gerlach he wrote: 

" His Majesty should really see to it that his Ministers 
should drink more champagne ; none of the gentry 
ought to enter his Council without half a bottle under his 
belt. Our policy would soon get a respectable colour." 

The real weakness lay, as he well knew, in the 
character of the King. " If here I say to one of my 
colleagues, ' We remain firm even if Austria drives 
matters to a breach,' he laughs in my face and says, 
' As long as the King lives it will not come to a war 
between Austria and Prussia.' " And again, " The 
King has as much leniency for the sins of Austria a^^ 
I hope to have from the Lord in Heaven." 

It was a severe strain on his loyalty, but he with- 
stood it ; he has, I believe, never expressed his 
opinion about the King; we can guess what it must 
have been. It was a melancholy picture : a King 
violent and timid, obstinate and irresolute ; his will 
dragged now this way, now that, by his favourites, 
his wife and his brother ; his own Ministers intrigu- 
ing against each other ; ambassadors recommending 
a policy instead of carrying out their instructions ; 
and the Minister-President standing calmly by, as 
best he could, patching up the appearance of a 
consistent policy. 

It was probably the experience which he gained at 



1857] Frankfort. 1 1 1 

this time which in later years, when he himself had 
become Minister, made Bismarck so jealous of out- 
side and irresponsible advisers ; he did not choose 
to occupy the position of Manteuffel, he laid down 
the rule that none of his own subordinates should 
communicate with the King except through himself; 
a Bismarck as Foreign Minister would not allow a 
Gerlach at Court, nor a Bismarck among his envoys. 
He had indeed been careful not to intrigue against 
his chief, but it was impossible to observe that com- 
plete appearance of acquiescence which a strong and 
efificient Minister must demand. Bismarck was often 
asked his opinion by the King directly ; he was 
obliged to say what he believed to be the truth, and 
he often disapproved of that which Manteuffel ad- 
vised. In order to avoid the appearance of dis- 
loyalty, he asked Gerlach that his letters should 
•^ ""shewn to Manteuffel ; not all of them could be 
snewn, still less would it be possible to repeat all he 
said. If they were in conflict, his duty to the King 
must override his loyalty to the Minister, and the 
two could not always be reconciled. To English- 
men indeed it appears most improper that the King 
should continually call for the advice of other poli- 
ticians without the intervention or the knowledge of 
his Ministers, but this is just one of those points on 
which it is impossible to apply to Prussian practice 
English constitutional theory. In England it is a 
maxim of the Constitution that the sovereign should 
never consult anyone on political matters except the 
responsible Ministry ; this is possible only because 
the final decision rests with Parliament and the Cabi- 



112 Bismarck. 



[1851- 



net and not with the sovereign. It was, however, 
always the contention of Bismarck that the effective 
decision in Prussia was with the King. This was 
undoubtedly the true interpretation of the Prussian 
Constitution ; but it followed from this that the 
King must have absolute freedom to ask the advice 
of everyone whose opinions would be of help to him ; 
he must be able to command the envoys to foreign 
countries to communicate with him directly, and if 
occasion required it, to consult with the political op- 
ponents of his own Ministers. To forbid this and 
to require that all requests should come to him by 
the hands of the Ministers would be in truth to 
substitute ministerial autocracy for monarchical 
government. 

Something of this kind did happen in later years 
when the German Emperor had grown old, and when 
Bismarck, supported by his immense experience and 
success, guided the policy of the country alone, inde- 
pendent of Parliament, and scarcely allowing any in- 
dependent adviser to approach the Emperor. This 
was exceptional; normally a Prussian Minister had 
to meet his opponents and critics not so much in pub- 
lic debate as in private discussion. Under a weak 
sovereign the policy of the country must always 
be distracted by palace intrigue, just as in England 
under a weak Cabinet it will be distracted by party 
faction. The Ministers must always be prepared to 
find their best-laid schemes overthrown by the influ- 
ence exerted upon the royal mind by his private 
friends or even by his family. It may be said that 
tenure of ofifice under these conditions would be im- 



1857] Frankfort. 113 

possible to a man of spirit ; it was certainly very 
difficult; an able and determined Minister was as 
much hampered by this private opposition as by 
Parliamentary discussion. It is often the fashion 
to say that Parliamentary government is difficult to 
reconcile with a strong foreign policy ; the experi- 
ences of Prussia from the year 1815 to 1863 seem 
to shew that under monarchical government it is 
equally difficult. 

Meanwhile he had been maturing in his mind a 
bolder plan : Why should not Prussia gain the sup- 
port she required by alliance with Napoleon ? 

The Germans had watched the rise of Napoleon 
with suspicion and alarm ; they had long been taught 
that France was their natural enemy. When Na- 
poleon seized the power and assumed the name of 
Emperor, the old distrust was revived ; his very 
name recalled memories of hostility ; they feared he 
would pursue an ambitious and warlike policy ; that 
he would withdraw the agreements on which the 
peace of Europe and the security of the weaker 
States depended, and that he would extend to the 
Rhine the borders of France. He was the first ruler 
of France whose internal policy awoke no sympathy 
in Germany ; his natural allies, the Liberals, he had 
alienated by the overthrow of the Republic, and he 
gained no credit for it in the eyes of the Conserva- 
tives. The monarchical party in Prussia could only 
have admiration for the man who had imprisoned a 
Parliament and restored absolute government ; they 
could not repudiate an act which they would gladly 
imitate, but they could not forgive him that he was 



114 Bismarck. [1851- 

an usurper. According to their creed the suppres- 
sion of liberty was the privilege of the legitimate 
King. 

It was the last remnant of the doctrine of legiti- 
macy, the belief that it was the duty of the Euro- 
pean monarchs that no State should change its form 
of government or the dynasty by which it was ruled ; 
the doctrine of the Holy Alliance that kings must 
make common cause against the Revolution. How 
changed were the times from the days when Metter- 
nich had used this as a strong support for the as- 
cendancy of the House of Austria! Austria herself 
was no longer sound; the old faith lingered only in 
St. Petersburg and Berlin ; but how weak and in- 
effective it had become ! There was no talk now of 
interference, there would not be another campaign 
of Waterloo or of Valmy ; there was only a prudish 
reserve; they could not, they did not dare, refuse 
diplomatic dealings with the new Emperor, but they 
were determined there should be no cordiality ; the 
virgin purity of the Prussian Court should not be 
deflowered by intimacy with the man of sin.* If 
there could not be a fresh crusade against Buona- 
partism, at least, there should be no alliance with it. 

From the beginning Bismarck had little sympathy 
with this point of view ; he regarded the coup d'etat 
as necessary in a nation which had left the firm 
ground of legitimacy ; France could not be governed 
except by an iron hand. As a Prussian, however, he 
could not be pleased, for he saw an enemy who had 

* I take the metaphor from Gerlach, but the English language 
does not allow me to adopt the whole. 



1857] Frankfort. 115 

been weak strengthened, but he did not believe in 
Napoleon's warlike desires. In one way it was an ad- 
vantage, — the overthrow of the Republic had broken 
the bond which joined the German revolutionists to 
France. He did not much mind what happened in 
other countries so long as Prussia was safe. 

There is no ground for surprise that he soon began 
to go farther ; he warned his friends not to irritate 
the Emperor; on the occasion of the Emperor's 
marriage the Kreiiz Zeitiuig published a violent art- 
icle, speaking of it as an insult and threat to Prussia. 
Bismarck's feelings as a gentleman were offended by 
this useless scolding ; it seemed, moreover, danger- 
ous. If Prussia were to quarrel with France, they 
would be obliged to seek the support of the Eastern 
Powers: if Russia and Austria should know this, 
Prussia would be in their hands. The only effect 
of this attitude would be to cut off the possibility of 
a useful move in the game of diplomacy: 

" There is no good in giving our opposition to France 
the stamp of irrevocability ; it would be no doubt a 
great misfortune if we were to unite ourselves with 
France, but why proclaim this to all the world ? We 
should do wiser to act so that Austria and Russia would 
have to court our friendship against France than treat 
us as an ally who is presented to them." 

It is a topic to which he often refers : 

" We cannot make an alliance with France without a 
certain degree of meanness, but very admirable people, 
even German princes, in the Middle Ages have used a 
sewer to make their escape, rather than be beaten or 
throttled." 



1 1 6 Bismarck. 



[1851- 



An alliance with Napoleon was, however, accord- 
ing to the code of honour professed, if not followed, 
in every German State, the sin for which there was 
no forgiveness. It was but a generation ago that 
half the German princes had hurried to the Court of 
the first Napoleon to receive at his hands the es- 
tates of their neighbours and the liberties of their 
subjects. No one doubted that the new Napoleon 
would be willing to use similar means to ensure 
the power of France ; would he meet with willing 
confederates ? The Germans, at least, do not seem 
to have trusted one another ; no prince dared show 
ordinary courtesy to the ruling family of France, no 
statesman could visit Paris but voices would be 
heard crying that he had sold himself and his coun- 
try. An accusation of this kind was the stock-in- 
trade which the Nationalist press was always ready 
to bring against every ruler who was obnoxious to 
them. It required moral courage, if it also shewed 
political astuteness, when Bismarck proposed delib- 
erately to encourage a suspicion from which most 
men were anxious that their country should be free. 
He had already plenty of enemies, and reports were 
soon heard that he was in favour of a French alli- 
ance ; they did not cease for ten years ; he often 
protests in his private letters against these unworthy 
accusations; the protests seem rather absurd, for if 
he did not really wish for an alliance between Prus- 
sia and France, he at least wished that people should 
dread such an alliance. A man cannot frighten his 
friends by the fear he will rob them, and at the same 
time enjoy the reputation for strict probity. 



1857] Frankfort. 1 1 7 

He explains with absolute clearness the benefits 
which will come from a French alliance : 

" The German States are attentive and attracted to us 
in the same degree in which they believe we are be- 
friended by France. Confidence in us they will never 
have, every glance at the map prevents that ; and they 
know that their separate interests and the misuse of 
their sovereignty always stand in the way of the whole 
tendency of Prussian policy. They clearly recognise 
the danger which lies in this ; it is one against which 
the unselfishness of our Most Gracious Master alone 
gives them a temporary security. The opinions of the 
King, which ought at least for a time to weaken their 
mistrust, will gain his Majesty no thanks ; they will only 
be used and exploited. In the hour of necessity grati- 
tude and confidence will not bring a single man into the 
field. Fear, if it is used with foresight and clearness, 
can place the whole Confederacy at our feet, and in 
order to instil fear into them we must give clear signs 
of our good relations with France." 

He objected to Prussia following what was called 
a German policy, for, as he said, by a national and 
patriotic policy is meant that Prussia should do what 
was for the interest, not of herself, but of the smaller 
States. 

It was not till after the Crimean War that he was 
able to press this policy. Napoleon had now won 
his position in Europe ; Gerlach had seen with pain 
and disgust that the Queen of England had visited 
his Court. The Emperor himself desired a union 
with Prussia. In this, sympathy and interest com- 
bined : he had much affection for Germany ; his 



ii8 Bismarck. [1851- 

mind, as his education, was more German than 
French ; he was a man of ideas ; he was the only 
ruler of France who has sincerely desired and de- 
liberately furthered the interests of other countries ; 
he believed that the nation should be the basis of 
the State ; his revolutionary antecedents made him 
naturally opposed to the House of Austria; and he 
was ready to help Prussia in resuming her old am- 
bitious policy. 

The affair of Neuchatel gave him an opportunity 
of earning the personal gratitude of the King, and 
he did not neglect it, for he knew that in the 
royal prejudice was the strongest impediment to 
an alliance. In 1857 Bismarck was sent to Paris 
to discuss this and other matters. Two years be- 
fore he had been presented to the Emperor, but it 
had been at the time when he was opposed to the 
French policy. Now for the first time the two men 
who were for ten years to be the leaders, now 
friends, then rivals, in the realm of diplomacy, were 
brought into close connection. Bismarck was not 
impressed by the Emperor's ability. He wrote : 

"People exaggerate his intellect, but underrate his 
heart." Napoleon was very friendly ; his wish to help 
the King went farther than his duty to follow French 
policy. He said : " Why should we not be friends ; let 
us forget the past ; if everyone were to attach himself to 
a policy of memories, two nations that have once been 
at war must be at war to all eternity ; statesmen must 
occupy themselves with the future." 

This was just Bismarck's opinion ; he wrote home 
suggesting that he might prepare the v/ay for a 



1857] F7^ankfort. 1 1 9 

visit of the Emperor to Prussia ; he would Hke to 
come and it would have a good effect. This was 
going farther than the King, grateful though he 
was, would allow ; he told Gerlach not to answer 
this part of the letter at all while Bismarck was in 
Paris. Bismarck, however, continued in his official 
reports and private letters to urge again and again 
the political advantages of an understanding with 
France ; it is Austria that is the natural enemy, for 
it is Austria whose interests are opposed to Prussia. 
If they repel the advance of Napoleon, they will 
oblige him to seek an alliance with Russia, and this 
was a danger which even in those days Bismarck 
never ceased to fear. Prince Napoleon, cousin of 
the Emperor, was at that time on a visit to Berlin ; 
on his way through Frankfort he had singled out 
Bismarck, and (no doubt under instructions) had 
shown great friendliness to him ; the Kreiiz Zeitiuig 
again took the opportunity of insulting the ruler of 
France ; Bismarck again remonstrated against the 
danger of provoking hostility by these acts of petty 
rancour, disguised though they might be under the 
name of principle. He did not succeed in persuad- 
ing the King or his confidant ; he was always met by 
the same answer: "France is the natural enemy of 
Germany ; Napoleon is the representative of the 
Revolution ; there can be no union between the 
King of Prussia and the Revolution." " How can a 
man of your intelligence sacrifice your principles to 
a single individual?" asks Gerlach, who aimed not 
at shewing that an alliance with France would be 
foolish, but that it would be wrong. 



I20 Bismarck. [I85i~ 

Five years before, Bismarck would have spoken as 
Gerlach did ; but in these years he had seen and 
learnt much ; he had freed himself from the influ- 
ence of his early friends ; he had outgrown their 
theoretic formalism ; he had learned to look at the 
world with his own eyes, and to him, defending his 
country against the intrigues of weaker and the 
pressure of more powerful States, the world was a 
different place from what it was to those who passed 
their time in the shadow of the Court. He remem- 
bered that it was not by strict obedience to general 
principles that Prussia had grown great. Frederick 
the Second had not allowed himself to be stopped 
by these narrow searchings of heart ; his successor 
had not scrupled to ally himself with revolutionary 
France. This rigid insistence on a rule of right, 
this nice determining of questions of conscience, 
seemed better suited to the confessor's chair than to 
the advisers of a great monarch. And the principle 
to which he was asked to sacrifice the future of his 
country, — was it after all a true principle? Why 
should Prussia trouble herself about the internal 
constitution of other States, what did it concern her 
whether France was ruled by a Bourbon or an Or- 
leans or a Bonaparte? How could Prussia con- 
tinue the policy of the Holy Alliance when the close 
union of the three Eastern monarchies no longer 
existed ? If France were to attack Germany, Prussia 
could not expect the support of Russia, she could 
not even be sure of that of Austria. An under- 
standing with France was required, not by ambition, 
but by the simplest grounds of self-preservation. 



1857] Frankfort. 121 

These and other considerations he advanced in a 
long and elaborate memorandum addressed to Man- 
teuffel, which was supplemented by letters to the 
Minister and Gerlach. For closeness of reasoning, 
for clearness of expression, for the wealth of know- 
ledge and cogency of argument these are the most 
remarkable of his political writings. In them he 
sums up the results of his apprenticeship to political 
life, he lays down the principles on which the policy 
of the State ought to be conducted, the principles 
on which in future years he was himself to act. 

" What," he asks, " are the reasons against an alli- 
ance with France ? The chief ground is the belief 
that the Emperor is the chief representative of the 
Revolution and identical with it, and that a com- 
promise with the Revolution is as inadmissible in 
internal as in external policy." Both statements he 
triumphantly overthrows. " Why should we look 
at Napoleon as the representative of the Revolution ? 
there is scarcely a government in Europe which has 
not a revolutionary origin." 

" What is there now existing in the world of politics 
which has a complete legal basis ? Spain, Portugal, 
Brazil, all the American Republics, Belgium, Holland, 
Switzerland, Greece, Sweden, England, which State 
with full consciousness is based on the Revolution of 
1688, are all unable to trace back their legal systems to 
a legitimate origin. Even as to the German princes we 
cannot find any completely legitimate title for the 
ground which they have won partly from the Emperor 
and the Empire, partly from their fellow-princes, partly 
from the Estates." 



122 Bismarck. [1851- 

He goes farther: the Revolution is not peculiar 
to France; it did not even originate there : 

" It is much older than the historical appearance of 
Napoleon's family and far wider in its extent than 
France. If we are to assign it an origin in this world, 
we must look for it, not in France, but in England, or go 
back even earlier, even to Germany or Rome, according 
as we regard the exaggerations of the Reformation or of 
the Roman Church as responsible." 

But if Napoleon is not the sole representative of 
revolutions, why make opposition to him a matter 
of principle ? He shews no desire of propagandism. 

" To threaten other States by means of the Revolution 
has been for years the trade of England, and this princi- 
ple of not associating with a revolutionary power is itself 
quite modern : it is not to be found in the last century. 
Cromwell was addressed as Brother by European potent- 
ates and they sought his friendship when it appeared 
useful. The most honourable Princes joined in alliance 
with the States-General before they were recognised by 
Spain. Why should Prussia now alone, to its own in- 
jury, adopt this excessive caution ? " 

He goes farther : not only does he reject the 
principle of legitimacy, — he refuses to be bound by 
any principles ; he did not free himself from one party 
to bind himself to another; his profession was di- 
plomacy and in diplomacy there was no place for 
feelings of affection and antipathy. 

What is the proper use of principles in diplomacy ? 
It is to persuade others to adopt a policy which is 
convenient to oneself. 



1857] F7^ankfort. 123 

" My attitude towards Foreign Governments springs 
not from any antipathy, but from the good or evil they 
may do to Prussia." " A policy of sentiment is dangerous, 
for it is one-sided ; it is an exclusively Prussian pe- 
culiarity." " Every other Government makes its own 
interests the sole criterion of its actions, however much 
it may drape them in phrases about justice and sympathy." 
" My ideal for foreign policy is freedom from prejudice ; 
that our decisions should be independent of all impres- 
sions of dislike or affection for Foreign States and their 
governments." 

This was the canon by which he directed his own 
actions, and he expected obedience to it from others. 

" So far as foreigners go I have never in my life had 
sympathy for anyone but England and its inhabitants, 
and I am even now not free from it ; but they will not 
let us love them, and as soon as it was proved to me 
that it was in the interest of a sound and well- 
matured Prussian policy, I would let our troops fire on 
French, English, Russian, or Austrian, with the same 
satisfaction." 

" I cannot justify sympathies and antipathies as regards 
Foreign Powers and persons before my feeling of duty 
in the foreign service of my country, either in myself or 
another ; therein lies the embryo of disloyalty against 
my master or my country. In my opinion not even the 
King himself has the right to subordinate the interests of 
his country to his own feelings of love or hatred towards 
strangers ; he is, however, responsible towards God and 
not to me if he does so, and therefore on this point I am 
silent." 

This reference to the King is very characteristic. 



124 Bismarck. [1851- 

Holding, as he did, so high an ideal of public duty 
himself, he naturally regarded with great dislike the 
influence which, too often, family ties and domestic 
affection exercised over the mind of the sovereign. 
The German Princes had so long pursued a purely 
domestic policy that they forgot to distinguish be- 
tween the interests of their families and their land. 
They were, moreover, naturally much influenced in 
their public decisions, not only by their personal 
sympathies, but also by the sympathies and opinions 
of their nearest relations. To a man like Bismarck, 
who regarded duty to the State as above everything, 
nothing could be more disagreeable than to see the 
plans of professional statesmen criticised by irrespon- 
sible people and perhaps overthrown through some 
woman's whim. He was a confirmed monarchist but 
he was no courtier. In his letters at this period he 
sometimes refers to the strong influence which the 
Princess of Prussia exercised over her husband, who 
was heir to the throne. He regarded with appre- 
hension the possible effects which the proposed 
marriage of the Prince of Prussia's son to the 
Princess Royal of England might have on Prussian 
policy. He feared it would introduced English in- 
fluence and Anglomania without their gaining any 
similar influence in England. " If our future Queen 
remains in any degree English, I see our Court sur- 
rounded by English influence." He was not in- 
fluenced in this by any hostility to England ; almost 
at the same time he had written that England was the 
only foreign country for which he had any sympathy. 
He was only (as so often) contending for that inde- 



1857] Frankfort. 125 

pendence and self-reliance which he so admired in 
the English. For two hundred years English tradi- 
tions had absolutely forbidden the sovereign to allow 
his personal and family sympathies to interfere with 
the interests of the country. If the House of Hohen- 
zollern were to aspire to the position of a national 
monarch it must act in the same way. At this very 
time the Emperor Napoleon was discussing the 
Prussian marriage with Lord Clarendon. " It will 
much influence the policy of the Queen in favour of 
Prussia," he said. " No, your Majesty," answered 
the English Ambassador. " The private feelings of 
the Queen can never have any influence on that which 
she believes to be for the honour and welfare of Eng- 
land." This was the feeling by which Bismarck was 
influenced ; he was trying to educate his King, and 
this was the task to which for many years he was 
devoted. What he thought of the duties of princes 
we see from an expression he uses in a letter to 
Manteuffel : " Only Christianity can make princes 
what they ought to be, and free them from that 
conception of life which causes many of them to 
seek in the position given them by God nothing but 
the means to a life of pleasure and irresponsibility." 
All his attempts to win over the King and Gerlach 
to his point of view failed ; the only result was that 
his old friends began to look on him askance ; his 
new opinions were regarded with suspicion. He was 
no longer sure of his position in Court ; his outspok- 
enness had caused offence ; after reading his last 
letter, Gerlach answered : " Your explanation only 
shews me that we are now far asunder " ; the corre- 



126 Bismarck. [1857 

spondence, which had continued for almost seven 
years, stopped. Bismarck felt that he was growing 
lonely ; he had to accustom himself to the thought 
that the men who had formerly been both politically 
and personally his close friends, and who had once 
welcomed him whenever he returned to Berlin, now 
desired to see him kept at a distance. In one of 
his last letters to Gerlach, he writes : " I used to be 
a favourite ; now all that is changed. His Majesty 
has less often the wish to see me ; the ladies of the 
Court have a cooler smile than formerly ; the gentle- 
men press my hand less warmly. The high opinion 
of my usefulness is sunk, only the Minister [Man- 
teuffel] is warmer and more friendly." Something 
of this was perhaps exaggerated, but there was no 
doubt that a breach had begun which was to widen 
and widen: Bismarck was no longer a member of 
the party of the Krcuz Zeitung. It was fortunate 
that a change was imminent in the direction of the 
Prussian Government ; the old figures who had 
played their part were to pass away and a new era 
was to begin. 




CHAPTER VI. 

ST. PETERSBURG AND PARIS. 
1858-1862. 

IN the autumn of 1857 the health of the King of 
Prussia broke down ; he was unable to conduct 
the affairs of State and in the month of Septem- 
ber was obliged to appoint his brother as his repre- 
sentative to carry on the Government. There was 
from the first no hope for his recovery ; the com- 
mission was three times renewed and, after a long 
delay, in October of the following year, the King 
signed a decree appointing his brother Regent. At 
one time, in the spring of 1858, the Prince had, it is 
said, thought of calling on Bismarck to form a Min- 
istry. This, however, was not done. It was, how- 
ever, one of the first actions of the Prince Regent 
to request Manteuffel's resignation ; he formed a 
Ministry of moderate Liberals, choosing as President 
the Prince of HohenzoUern, head of the Catholic 
branch of his own family. 

The neiv era, as it was called, was welcomed with 
delight by all parties except the most extreme Con- 
servatives. No Ministry had been so unpopular as 

127 



128 Bismarck. 



[1858- 



that of Manteuffel. At the elections which took 
place immediately, the Government secured a large 
majority. The Prince and his Ministers were able 
to begin their work with the full support of Parlia- 
ment and country. 

Bismarck did not altogether regret the change ; 
his differences with the dominant faction at Court 
had extended to the management of home as well 
as of foreign affairs ; for the last two years he had 
been falling out of favour. He desired, moreover, 
to see fresh blood in the Chamber. 

" The disease to which our Parliamentary life has suc- 
cumbed, is, besides the incapacity of the individual, the 
servility of the Lower House. The majority has no in- 
dependent convictions, it is the tool of ministerial om- 
nipotence. If our Chambers do not succeed in binding 
the public interest to themselves and drawing the atten- 
tion of the country, they will sooner or later go to their 
grave without sympathy." 

Curious it is to see how his opinion as to the duties 
and relations of the House towards the Govern- 
ment were to alter when he himself became Minis- 
ter. He regarded it as an advantage" that the 
Ministry would have the power which comes from 
popularity ; his only fear was that they might draw 
the Regent too much to the left ; but he hoped that 
in German and foreign affairs they would act with 
more decision, that the Prince would be free from 
the scruples which had so much influenced his 
brother, and that he would not fear to rely on the 
military strength of Prussia. 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 129 

One of their first acts was to recall Bismarck from 
Frankfort ; the change was inevitable, and he had 
foreseen it. The new Government naturally wished 
to be able to start clear in their relations to Austria ; 
the Prince Regent did not wish to commit himself 
from the beginning to a policy of hostility. It was, 
however, impossible for a cordial co-operation be- 
tween the two States to be established in German 
affairs so long as Bismarck remained at Frankfort ; 
the opinions which he had formed during the last 
eight years were too well known. It was, moreover, 
evident that a crisis in the relations with Austria was 
approaching ; war between France and Austria 
was imminent ; a new factor and a new man had 
appeared in Europe, — Piedmont and Cavour. 

In August, 1858, Cavour had had a secret and 
decisive interview with Napoleon at Plombieres ; 
the two statesmen had come to an agreement by 
which France engaged to help the Piedmontese to 
expel the Austrians from Italy. Bismarck would 
have desired to seize this opportunity, and use the 
embarrassment of Austria as the occasion for taking 
a stronger position in Germany ; if it were necessary 
he was prepared to go as far as an alliance with 
France. He was influenced not so much by sympa- 
thy with Piedmont, for, as we have seen, he held 
that those who were responsible for foreign policy 
should never give way to sympathy, but by the 
simple calculation that Austria was the common 
enemy of Prussia and Piedmont, and where there 
were common interests an alliance might be formed. 

The Government were, however, not prepared to 
9 



130 Bismarck. ti858- 

adopt this policy. It might have been supposed 
that a Liberal Ministry would have shewn more 
sympathy with the Italian aspirations than the Con- 
servatives whom they had succeeded. This was not 
the case, as Cavour himself soon found out. 

After his visit to Plombieres, Cavour had hurried 
across the frontier and spent two days at Baden- 
Baden, where he met the Prince of Prussia, Man- 
teuffel, who was still Minister, and other German 
statesmen. Bismarck had been at Baden-Baden in 
the previous week and returned a few days later ; 
he happened, however, on the two days when Cavour 
was there, to be occupied with his duties at Frank- 
fort ; the two great statesmen therefore never met. 
Cavour after his visit wrote to La Marmora saying 
that he had been extremely pleased with the sympa- 
thy which had been displayed to him, both by the 
Prince and the other Prussians. So far as he could 
foresee, the attitude of Prussia would not be hostile 
to Italian aspirations. In December, however, after 
the change of Ministry, he writes to the Italian 
Envoy at Frankfort that the language of Schleinitz, 
the new Foreign Minister, is less favourable than 
that of his predecessor. The Cabinet do not feel 
the same antipathy to Austria as that of Manteuf- 
fel did ; German ideas have brought about a rap- 
prochement. 

" I do not trust their apparently Liberal tendencies. It 
is possible that your colleague, Herr von Bismarck, will 
support us more closely, but I fear that even if he is 
kept at Frankfort he will not exercise so much influence 
as under the former Ministry." 




BISMARCK IN 1860. 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 131 

Cavour's insight did not deceive him. The ItaHan 
question had for the moment re-awakened the old 
sympathy for Austria ; Austria, it seemed, was now 
the champion of German nationahty against the 
unscrupulous aggression of France. There were few 
men who, like Bismarck, were willing to disregard 
this national feeling and support the Italians. To 
have deliberately joined Napoleon in what after all 
was an unprovoked attack on a friendly prince of 
the same nation, was an act which could have been 
undertaken only by a man of the calibre of Freder- 
ick the Great. After all, Austria was German ; the 
Austrian provinces in Italy had been assigned to 
the Emperor by the same authority as the Polish 
provinces to Prussia. We can imagine how great 
would have been the outcry had Austria joined with 
the French to set up a united Poland, taking Posen 
and West Prussia for the purpose ; and yet this 
act would have been just of the same kind as that 
which would have been committed had Prussia at 
this time joined or even lent diplomatic support to 
the French-Italian alliance. It is very improbable 
that even if Bismarck had been Minister at this 
period he would have been able to carry out this 
policy. 

The Prussian Government acted on the whole cor- 
rectly. As the war became more imminent the 
Prince Regent prepared the Prussian army and event- 
ually the whole was placed on a war footing. He 
offered to the Emperor of Austria his armed neutral- 
ity and a guarantee of the Austrian possessions in 
Italy, In return he required that he himself should 



132 Bismarck. [1858- 

have the command of all the forces of the German 
Diet. Had Austria accepted these terms, either the 
war would have been stopped or the whole force of 
Germany under the King of Prussia would have at- 
tacked France on the Rhine. The Emperor how- 
ever refused to accept them ; he required a guarantee 
not only of his possessions in Italy but also of his 
treaties with the other Italian princes. Moreover, 
he would accept the assistance of Prussia only on 
condition that the Prussian army was placed under 
the orders of the general appointed by the Diet. It 
was absurd to suppose that any Prussian statesman 
would allow this. The action of Austria shewed in 
fact a distrust and hatred of Prussia which more than 
justified all that Bismarck had written during his 
tenure of office at Frankfort. In the end, rather than 
accept Prussian assistance on the terms on which it 
was offered, the Emperor of Austria made peace with 
France ; he preferred to surrender Lombardy rather 
than save it by Prussian help. " Thank God," said 
Cavour, " Austria by her arrogance has succeeded in 
uniting all the world against her." 

The spring of the year was spent by Bismarck at 
St. Petersburg. He had been appointed Prussian 
Minister to that capital — put out in the cold, as he 
expressed it. From the point of dignity and posi- 
tion it was an advance, but at St. Petersburg he was 
away from the centre of political affairs. Russia had 
not yet recovered from the effects of the Crimean 
War ; the Czar was chiefly occupied with internal 
reforms and the emanicipation of the serfs. The 
Eastern Question was dormant, and Russia did not 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 133 

aim at keeping a leading part in the settlement of 
Italian affairs. Bismarck's immediate duties were 
not therefore important and he no longer had the 
opportunity of giving his advice to the Government 
upon the general practice. It is improbable that 
Herr von Schleinitz would have welcomed advice. 
He was one of the weakest of the Ministry ; an ami- 
able man of no very marked ability, who owed his 
position to the personal friendship of the Prince Re- 
gent and his wife. The position which Bismarck had 
occupied during the last few years could not but be 
embarrassing to any Minister ; this man still young, 
so full of self-confidence, so unremitting in his labours, 
v/ho, while other diplomatists thought only of getting 
through their routine work, spent the long hours of 
the night in writing despatches, discussing the whole 
foreign policy of the country, might well cause appre- 
hension even to the strongest Minister. 

From the time of Bismarck's departure from Frank- 
fort our knowledge of his ofificial despatches ceases ; 
we lose the invaluable assistance of his letters to 
Manteuffel and Gerlach. For some time he stood so 
much alone that there was no one to whom he could 
write unreservedly on political matters. 

He watched with great anxiety the progress of 
affairs with regard to Italy. At the beginning of 
May he wrote a long letter to Schleinitz, as he had 
done to Manteuffel, urging him to bold action ; he 
recounted his experiences at the Diet, he reiterated 
his conviction that no good would come to Prussia 
from the federal tie— the sooner it was broken the 
better; nothing was so much to be desired as that 



134 Bismarck. [1858- 

the Diet should overstep its powers, and pass some 
resolution which Prussia could not accept, so that 
Prussia could take up the glove and force a breach. 
The opportunity was favourable for a revision of the 
Constitution. "I see," he wrote "in our Federal 
connection only a weakness of Prussia which sooner 
or later must be cured, ferro et igni'' Probably 
Schleinitz's answer was not of such a kind as to 
tempt him to write again. In his private letters he 
harps on the same string ; he spent June in a visit to 
Moscow but he hurried back at the end of the 
month to St. Petersburg to receive news of the war. 
Before news had come of the peace of Villafranca he 
was constantly in dread that Prussia would go to 
war on behalf of Austria : 

" We have prepared too soon and too thoroughly, the 
the weight of the burden we have taken on ourselves is 
drawing us down the incline. We shall not be even an 
Austrian reserve ; we shall simply sacrifice ourselves for 
Austria and take away the war from her." 

How disturbed he was, we can see by the tone of 
religious resignation which he assumes — no doubt 
a sign that he fears his advice has not yet been acted 
upon. 

''As God will. Everything here is only a question of 
time ; peoples and men, wisdom and folly, war and peace, 
they come and go like rain and water, and the sea alone 
remains. There is nothing on earth but hypocrisy and 
deceit." 

The language of this and other letters was partly 



1862] St. Petersbitrg a7td Paris. 135 

due to the state of his health ; the continual anxiety 
and work of his life at Frankfort, joined to irregular 
hours and careless habits, had told upon his consti- 
tution. He fell seriously ill in St. Petersburg with a 
gastric and rheumatic affection ; an injury to the leg 
received while shooting in Sweden, became painful ; 
the treatment adopted by the doctor, bleeding and 
iodine, seems to have made him worse. At the be- 
ginning of July, i860, he returned on leave to Berlin ; 
there he was laid up for ten days ; his wife was sum- 
moned and under her care he began to improve. 
August he spent at Wiesbaden and Nauheim, taking 
the waters, the greater part of the autumn in Berlin ; 
in October he had to go Warsaw officially to receive 
and accompany the Czar, who came to Breslau for 
an interview with the Prince Regent. From Bres- 
lau he hurried back to Berlin, from Berlin down to 
Pomerania, where his wife was staying with her 
father ; then the same week back to Berlin, and 
started for St. Petersburg. The result of these long 
journeys when his health was not completely re- 
established was very serious. He was to spend a 
night on the journey to St. Petersburg with his old 
friend, Herr von Below, at Hohendorf, in East Prus- 
sia ; he had scarcely reached the house when he fell 
dangerously ill of inflammation of the lungs and rheu- 
matic fever. He remained here all the winter, and 
it was not until the beginning of March, i860, that 
he was well enough to return to Berlin. Leopold von 
Gerlach, who met him shortly afterwards, speaks of 
him as still looking wretchedly ill. This prolonged 
illness forms an epoch in his life. He never regoy- 



136 Bismarck. [1858- 

ered the freshness and strength of his youth. It left 
a nervous irritation and restlessness which often 
greatly interfered with his political Avork and made 
the immense labour which came upon him doubly 
distasteful. He loses the good humour which had 
been characteristic of him in early life ; he became 
irritable and more exacting. He spent the next three 
months in Berlin attending the meetings of the Her- 
renhaus, and giving a silent vote in favour of the Gov- 
ernment measures ; he considered it was his duty as 
a servant of the State to support the Government, 
though he did not agree with the Liberal policy 
which in internal affairs they adopted. At this time 
he stood almost completely alone. His opinions on 
the Italian question had brought about a complete 
breach with his old friends. Since the conclusion 
of the war, public opinion in Germany, as in England, 
had veered round. The success of Cavour had 
raised a desire to imitate him ; a strong impulse had 
been given to the national feeling, and a society, the 
National Verein, had been founded to further the 
cause of United Germany under Prussian leadership. 
The question of the recognition of the new King- 
dom of Italy was becoming prominent ; all the Lib- 
eral party laid much stress on this. The Prince 
Regent, however, was averse to an act by which 
he might seem to express his approval of the forcible 
expulsion of princes from their thrones. As the 
national and liberal feeling in the country grew, his 
monarchical principles seemed to be strengthened. 
The opinions which Bismarck was known to hold on 
the French alliance had got into the papers and were 



1862] St. Peter shirg and Paris. 137 

much exaggerated ; he had plenty of enemies to 
take care that it should be said that he wished Prus- 
sia to join with France ; to do as Piedmont had 
done, and by the cession of the left bank of the 
Rhine to France to receive the assistance of Na- 
poleon in annexing the smaller states. In his let- 
ters of this period Bismarck constantly protests 
against the truth of these accusations. " If I am 
to go to the devil," he writes, " it will at least not be 
a French one. Do not take me for a Bonapartist, 
only for a very ambitious Prussian." It is at this 
time that his last letter to Gerlach was written. 
They had met at the end of April, and Gerlach 
wrote to protest against the opinion to which Bis- 
marck had given expression : 

" After the conversation which I have had with you I 
was particularly distressed that, by your bitterness against 
Austria, you had allowed yourself to be diverted from 
the simple attitude towards law and the Revolution. 
For you an alliance with France and Piedmont is a pos- 
sibility, a thought which is far from me and, dear Bis- 
marck, ought to be far from you. For me Louis Napoleon 
is even more than his uncle the incarnation of the Revo- 
lution, and Cavour is a Rheinbund Minister like Montgel- 
las. You cannot and ought not to deny the principles 
of the Holy Alliance ; they are no other than that au- 
thority comes from God, and that the Princes must 
govern as servants appointed by God." 

Bismarck answers the letter the next day : 

" I am a child of other times than you. No one loses 
the mark impressed on him in the period of his youth, 



138 Bismarck. 



[1858- 



In you the victorious hatred of Bonaparte is indelible ; 
you call him the incarnation of the Revolution and if you 
knew of any worse name you would bestow it upon him. 
I have lived in the country from my twenty-third to my 
thirty-second year and will never be rid of the longing 
to be back again ; I am in politics with only half my 
heart ; what dislike I have of France is based rather on 
the Orleans than the Bonapartist regime. It is opposed 
to bureaucratic corruption under the mask of constitu- 
tional government. I should be glad to fight against 
Bonaparte till the dogs lick up the blood but with no 
more malice than against Croats, Bohemians, and Bam- 
berger fellow-countrymen." 

The two friends were never to meet again. The 
old King of Prussia died at the beginning of the next 
year, and Gerlach, who had served him so faithfully, 
though perhaps not always wisely, survived his mas- 
ter scarcely a week. 

In the summer of i860 Bismarck returned to his 
duties in Russia; and this time, with the exception 
of a fortnight in October, he spent a whole year in 
St. Petersburg. He had still not recovered from the 
effects of his illness and could not, therefore, go out 
much in society, but he was much liked at Court and 
succeeded in winning the confidence both of the 
Emperor and his family. His wife and children were 
now with him, and after the uncertainty of his last 
two years he settled down with pleasure to a quieter 
mode of life. He enjoyed the sport which he had in 
the Russian forests; he studied Russian and made 
himself completely at home. Political work he had 
little to do, except what arose from the charge of 



1862] St. Peter sbtL7'g and Paris. 139 

"some 200,000 vagabond Prussians" who lived in 
Russia. Of home affairs he had h"ttle knowledge : 

" I am quite separated from home politics, as be- 
sides the newspapers I receive scarcely anything but 
official news which does not expose the foundation of 
affairs." 

For the time the reports of his entering the Min- 
istry had ceased ; he professed to be, and perhaps was, 
quite satisfied. 

" I am quite contented with my existence here ; I ask 
for no change in my position until it be God's will I settle 
down quietly at Schonhausen or Reinfeld and can leis- 
urely set about having my coffin made." 

In October he had to attend the Czar on a journey 
to Warsaw where he had an interview with the Prince 
Regent. The Prince was accompanied by his Min- 
ister-President, the Prince of Hohenzollern, who took 
the opportunity of having long conversations with 
the Ambassador to St. Petersburg. It is said that as 
a result of this the Minister, who wished to be re- 
lieved from a post which was daily becoming more 
burdensome, advised the Prince Regent to appoint 
Bisuiarck Minister-President. The advice, however, 
was not taken. 

Meanwhile events were taking place in Prussia 
which were to bring about important constitutional 
changes. The success of the Ministry of the 7iezv 
era had not answered the expectations of the coun- 
try. Their foreign policy had been correct, but they 
had shewn no more spirit than their predecessors, 
and the country was in that excited state in which 



140 Bismarck. [1858- 

people wanted to see some brilliant and exciting 
stroke of policy, though they were not at all clear 
what it was they desired. Then a rift had begun to 
grow between the Regent and his Ministers. The 
Liberalism of the Prince had never been very deep ; 
it owed its origin in fact chiefly to his opposition to 
the reactionary government of his brother. As an 
honest man he intended to govern strictly in accord- 
ance with the Constitution. He had, however, from 
the beginning no intention of allowing the Chambers 
to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Crown. 
The Ministers on the other hand regarded themselves 
to some extent as a Parliamentary Ministry ; they 
had a majority in the House and they were inclined 
to defer to it. The latent causes of difference were 
brought into activity by the question of army 
reform. 

The Prince Regent was chiefly and primarily a 
soldier. As a second son it had been doubtful 
whether he would ever succeed to the throne. He 
had an intimate acquaintance with the whole condi- 
tion of the army, and he had long known that in 
many points reform was necessary. His first action 
on succeeding his brother was to appoint a Commis- 
sion of the War Office to prepare a scheme of re- 
organisation. A memorandum had been drawn up 
for him by Albert von Roon, and with some altera- 
tions it was accepted by the Commission. The 
Minister of War, Bonin (the same who had been 
dismissed in 1854 at the crisis of the Eastern compli- 
cations), seems to have been indifferent in the mat- 
ter; he did not feel in himself the energy for carrying 




GENERAL VON ROON. 



w 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 141 

through an important reform which he had not him- 
self originated, and of which perhaps he did not 
altogether approve. The Prince Regent had set 
his mind upon the matter ; the experience gained 
during the mobilisation of 1859 ^^'^ shewn how seri- 
ous the defects were ; the army was still on a war 
footing and it was a good opportunity for at once 
carrying through the proposed changes. Bonin 
therefore resigned his oflfice and Roon, in December, 
1859, w^s appointed in his place. 

This appointment was to have far-reaching results ; 
it at once destroyed all harmony in the Ministry 
itself. Tfie rest of the Ministers were Liberals. 
Roon was a strong Conservative. He was appointed 
professedly merely as a departmental Minister, but 
he soon won more confidence with the Regent than 
all the others. He was a man of great energy of 
character and decision in action. The best type of 
Prussian ofificer, to considerable learning he joined 
a high sense of duty founded on deep-rooted and 
simple religious faith. The President of the Ministry 
had practically retired from political life and the Gov- 
ernment had no longer a leader. Roon's introduction 
was in fact the beginning of all the momentous 
events which were to follow. But for him there 
would have been no conflict in the Parliament and 
Bismarck would never have become Minister. 

At the beginning of i860 the project of law em- 
bodying the proposals for army reform was laid be- 
fore the Lower House. It was ordered by them in 
accordance with the practice to be referred to a 
small Committee. 



142 Bismarck. [1858- 

The proposals consisted of (a) an increase in the 
number of recruits to be raised each year, (b) a 
lengthening of the term of service with the colours, 
(c) an alteration in the relations of the Landwehr to 
the rest of the army. 

The Committee appointed to consider these re- 
forms accepted the first, but rejected the second and 
third. They asserted that the three years' service 
with the colours was not necessary, and they strongly 
disliked any proposal for interfering with the Land- 
wehr. The report of the Committee was accepted 
by the House. It was in vain that the more far- 
seeing members of the Liberal party tried to persuade 
their leaders to support the Government ; it was in 
vain that the Ministers pointed out that the Liberal 
majority had been elected as a Government majority, 
and it was their duty to support Ministers taken from 
their own party. The law had to be withdrawn and 
the Government, instead, asked for a vote of nine 
million thalers, provisionally, for that year only, as a 
means of maintaining the army in the state to which 
it had been raised. In asking for this vote it was 
expressly stated that the principles of the organisa- 
tion should be in no wise prejudiced. 

" The question whether in future a two or three years' 
service shall be required ; whether the period with the 
Reserve shall be extended ; in what position the Land- 
wehr shall be placed — all this is not touched by the 
present proposal." 

On this condition the House voted the money re- 
quired, but for one year only. The Government, 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 143 



however, did not keep this pledge ; the Minister of 
War simply continued to carry out the reorganisa- 
tion in accordance with the plan which had been 
rejected ; new regiments were formed, and by the 
end of the year the whole army had been reor- 
o-anised. This action was one for which the Prince 
and Roon were personally responsible ; it was done 
while the other Ministers were away from Berlin, 
and without their knowledge. 

When the House met at the beginning of the next 
year they felt that they had been deceived ; they 
were still more indignant when Roon informed them 
that he had discovered that the whole of the re- 
organisation could be legally carried through in 
virtue of the prerogative of the Crown, and that a 
fresh law was not required ; that therefore the con- 
sideration of the changes was not before the House, 
and that all they would have to do would be to vote 
the money to pay for them. Of course the House 
refused to vote the money; after long debates the 
final settlement of the question was postponed for 
another year; the House, though this time by a 
majority of only eleven votes, granting with a few 
modifications the required money, but again for one 
year only. 

All this time Bismarck was living quietly at St. 
Petersburg; he had no influence on affairs, for the mili- 
tary law had nothing to do with him, and the Regent 
did not consult him on foreign policy. No one, how- 
ever, profited by Roon's appointment so much as he ; 
he had once more a friend and supporter at Court, 
who replaced the loss of Gerlach. Roon and he had 



144 Bis ma rck. t1 858- 

known one another in the old Pomeranian days. 
There was a Hnk in Moritz Blankenburg, who was a 
" Dutz " friend of Bismarck's and Roon's cousin. 
We can understand how untenable Roon's position 
was when we find the Minister of War choosing as 
his political confidants two of the leaders of the party 
opposed to the Ministry to which he belonged. 

Ever since Roon had entered the Government 
there had been indeed a perpetual crisis. 

The Liberal Ministers were lukewarm in their 
support of the military bill ; they only consented to 
adopt it on condition that the King would give his 
assent to those measures which they proposed to 
introduce, in order to maintain their positions as 
leaders of the party ; they proposed to bring in bills 
for the reform of the House of Lords, for the re- 
sponsibility of Ministers, for local government. 
These were opposed to the personal opinions of the 
King; he was supported in his opposition by Roon 
and refused his assent, but he neither dismissed the 
Ministers nor did they resign. So long as they 
were willing to hold office on the terms he required, 
there was indeed no reason why he should dismiss 
them ; to do so would be to give up the last hope of 
getting the military Bill passed. All through i86i 
the same uncertainty continued ; Roon indeed again 
and again wrote to his master, pointing out the 
necessity for getting rid of his colleagues ; he wished 
for a Conservative Ministry with Bismarck as Presi- 
dent. Here, he thought, was the only man who had 
the courage to carry through the army reform. 
Others thought as he did. Who so fitted to come 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 145 

to the help of the Crown as this man who, ten years 
before, had shewn such ability in Parliamentary de- 
bate? And whenever the crisis became more acute, 
all the Quidnuncs of Berlin shook their heads and 
said, " Now we shall have a Bismarck Ministry, 
and that will be a coup d' e'tat and the overthrow of 
the Constitution." 

Bismarck meanwhile was living quietly at St. Peters- 
burg, awaiting events. At last the summons came; 
on June 28, 1861, Roon telegraphed to him that the 
pear was ripe ; he must come at once ; there was 
danger in delay. His telegram was followed by a 
letter, in which he more fully explained the situa- 
tion. The immediate cause of the crisis was that 
the King desired to celebrate his accession, as his 
brother had done, by receiving the solemn homage of 
all his people ; the Ministry refused their assent 
to an act which would appear to the country as 
" feudal " and reactionary. A solemn pledge of 
obedience to the King was the last thing the Liber- 
als wanted to give, just for the same reasons that 
the King made a point of receiving it ; his feelings 
were deeply engaged, and Roon doubtless hoped 
that his colleagues would at last be compelled to 
resign ; he wished, therefore, to have Bismarck on 
the spot. 

Bismarck could not leave St, Petersburg for some 
days ; he, however, answered by a telegram and a 
long letter; he begins in a manner characteristic of 
all his letters at this period : 

"Your letter disturbed me in my comfortable medita- 



146 Bismarck. [1858- 

tions on the quiet time which I was going to enjoy at 
Reinfeld. Your cry ' to horse ' came with a shrill dis- 
cord. I have grown ill in mind, tired out, and spiritless 
since I lost the foundation of my health." 

And at the end : 

" Moving, quarrelling, annoyance, the whole slavery 
day and night form a perspective, which already makes 
me homesick for Reinfeld or St. Petersburg. I cannot 
enter the swindle in better company than yours ; but 
both of us were happier on the Sadower Heath behind 
the partridges." 

So he wrote late at night, but the next morning in 
a postscript he added : " If the King will to some ex- 
tent meet my views, then I will set to the work with 
pleasure." In the letter he discusses at length the 
programme; he does not attach much importance 
to the homage ; it would be much better to come to 
terms on the military question, break with the 
Chamber, and dissolve. The real difficulty he sees, 
however, is foreign policy ; only by a change in the 
management of foreign affairs can the Crown be 
relieved from a pressure to vfhich it must ultimately 
give way ; he would not himself be inclined to 
accept the Ministry of the Interior, because no good 
could be done unless the foreign policy was changed, 
and that the King himself would probably not wish 

" The chief fault of our policy is that we have been 
Liberal at home and Conservative abroad ; we hold the 
rights of our own King too cheap, and those of foreign 
princes too high ; a natural consequence of the differ- 
ence between the constitutional tendency of the Minis- 



18621 St. Petersburg and Paris. 147 

ters and the legitimist direction which the will of his 
Majest}^ gives to our foreign policy. Of the princely 
houses from Naples to Hanover none will be grateful 
for our love, and we practise towards them a truly evan- 
gelical love of our enemies at the cost of the safety of 
our own throne. I am true to the sole of my foot to my 
own princes, but towards all others I do not feel in a 
single drop of blood the slightest obligation to raise up 
a little finger to help them. In this attitude I fear that 
1 am so far removed from our Most Gracious Master, 
that he will scarcely find me fitted to be a Councillor of 
his Crown. For this reason he will anyhow prefer to 
use me at the Home-Office. In my opinion, however, 
that makes no difference, for I promise myself no useful 
results from the whole Government unless our attitude 
abroad is more vigorous and less dependent on dynastic 
sympathies." 

Bismarck arrived in Berlin on July 9th. When 
he got there the crisis was over ; Berlin was nearly 
empty ; Roon was away in Pomerania, the King in 
Baden-Baden ; a compromise had been arranged ; 
there was not to be an act of homage but a corona- 
tion. There was, therefore, no more talk of his en- 
tering the Ministry ; Schleinitz, however, told him 
that he was to be transferred from Russia, but did 
not say what post he was to have. The next day, in 
obedience to a command, he hurried off to Baden- 
Baden ; the King wished to have his advice on many 
matters of policy, and instructed him to draw up a 
memorandum on the German question. He used 
the opportunity of trying to influence the King to 
adopt a bolder policy. At the same time he at- 



148 Bismarck. [1858- 

tempted to win over the leaders of the Conservative 
party. A general election was about to take place ; 
the manifesto of the Conservative party was so 
worded that we can hardly believe it was not an ex- 
press and intentional repudiation of the language 
which Bismarck was in the habit of using ; they 
desired 

" the unity of our German fatherland, though not like 
the Kingdom of Italy through ' blood and fire ' \^Blut 
und Brand J almost the words which Bismarck had used 
to describe the policy which must be followed], but in 
the unity of its princes and peoples holding firm to 
authority and law." 

Bismarck, on hearing this, sent to his old friend 
Herr von Below, one of the leaders of the party, a 
memorandum on German affairs, and accompanied 
it by a letter. He repeated his old point that Prus- 
sia was sacrificing the authority of the Crown at 
home to support that of other princes in whose safety 
she had not the slightest interest. The solidarity of 
Conservative interests was a dangerous fiction, un- 
less it was carried out with the fullest reciprocity ; 
carried out by Prussia alone it was Quixotry ; it pre- 
vented King and Government from executing their 
true task, the protection of Prussia from all injustice, 
whether it came from home or abroad ; this was the 
task given to the King by God. 

" We make the unhistorical, the jealous, and lawless 
mania for sovereignty of the German Princes the bosom 
child of the Conservative party in Prussia, we are en- 
thusiastic for the petty sovereignties which were created 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 149 

by Napoleon and protected by Metternich, and are blind 
to the dangers which threaten Prussia and the independ- 
ence of Germany." 

He wishes for a clear statement of their policy ; a 
stricter concentration of the German military forces, 
reform of the Customs' Unions, and a number of 
common institutions to protect material interests 
against the disadvantages which arise from the un- 
natural configuration of the different states. 

" Besides all this I do not see why we should shrink 
back so bashfully from the idea of a representation of 
the people. We cannot fight as revolutionary an institu- 
tion which we Conservatives cannot do without even in 
Prussia, and is recognised as legitimate in every German 
State."* 

This letter is interesting as shewing how nearly his 
wishes on German affairs coincided with those of the 
Liberal party and of the National Verein : he was 
asking the Conservatives to adopt the chief points in 
their opponents' programme. Of course they would 
not do so, and the King himself was more likely to 
be alarmed than attracted by the bold and adven- 
turous policy that was recommended to him. Bis- 

* Kohl prints a memorandum of this year (1861) which probably is 
that sent to Herr von Below ; in it the ideas of the letter are devel- 
oped at greater length and the language is more cautious ; Bismarck 
recommends in it a representation of the people at the Diet, but 
points out that under present circumstances the consent of the Diet 
could not be attained ; the plan to which he seems to incline is that 
of a separate union between some of the States ; exactly the plan 
which Radowitz had followed and Bismarck had ten years before 
so bitterly opposed. 



1 50 Bismarck. tl858- 

marck's anticipation was justified ; the King was not 
prepared to appoint him Foreign Minister. Herr von 
Schleinitz indeed resigned, but his place was taken 
by Bernstorff, Minister at London ; he had so Httle 
confidence in the success of his ofifice that he did not 
even give up his old post, and occupied the two 
positions, one of which Bismarck much desired to 
have. 

After attending the coronation at Konigsberg, 
Bismarck, therefore, returned to his old post at St. 
Petersburg; his future was still quite uncertain; he 
was troubled by his own health and that of his child- 
ren ; for the first time he begins to complain of the 
cold. 

" Since my illness I am so exhausted that I have lost 
all my energy for excitement. Three years ago I would 
have made a serviceable Minister ; when I think of such 
a thing now I feel like a broken-down acrobat. I would 
gladly go to London, Paris, or remain here, as it pleases 
God and his Majesty. I shudder at the prospect of the 
Ministry as at a cold bath." 

In March he is still in ignorance; his household is 
in a bad state. 

" Johanna has a cough, which quite exhausts her ; Bill 
is in bed with fever, the doctor does not yet know what 
is the matter with him ; the governess has no hope of 
ever seeing Germany again." 

He does not feel up to taking the Ministry; even 
Paris would be too noisy for him. 

" London is quieter ; but for the climate and the child- 



1862] St Peter sbui^g and Paris. 1 5 1 

ren's health, I would prefer to stay here. Berne is an 
old idea of mine ; dull places with pretty neighbourhoods 
suit old people ; only there is no sport there, as I do not 
like climbing after chamois." 

The decision depended on the events at home ; the 
position of the Government was becoming untenable. 
The elections had been most unfavourable ; the Radi- 
cals had ceased to efface themselves, the old leaders 
of 1848 had appeared again ; they had formed a new 
party of " Progressives," and had won over a hun- 
dred seats at the expense of the Conservatives and 
the moderate Liberals ; they were pledged not to 
carry out the military reforms and to insist on the 
two years' service. They intended to make the dif- 
ference of opinion on this point the occasion of a - 
decisive struggle to secure and extend the control of 
the House over the administration, and for this pur- 
pose to bring into prominence constitutional ques- 
tions which both Crown and Parliament had hitherto 
avoided. From the day the session opened it was 
clear that there M^as now no chance of the money 
being voted for the army. Before the decisive de- 
bate came on, the majority had taken the offensive 
and passed what was a direct vote of want of confid- 
ence in the Ministry. On this the Ministry handed 
in their resignations to the King ; their place was 
taken by members of the Conservative party and 
Parliament again dissolved after sitting only six 
weeks. It was the end of the 7iezv era. \( 

It was doubtful whether the new Ministers would 
have the skill and resolution to meet the crisis ; they 
still were without a leader; Prince von Hohenlohe, 



152 Bisma7'-ck. 



[1858- 



a member of the Protestant branch of the family to 
which the present Chancellor of the Empire belongs, 
was appointed provisional President. The opinions 
of the country was clear enough ; the elections re- 
sulted in the complete defeat not only of the Con- 
servatives but of the moderate Liberals ; not a single 
one of the Ministers was returned. There was, there- 
fore, no doubt that the King would either have to 
give in on the question of the army or to govern 
against the will of the majority of the Chamber. 
The struggle was no longer confined to the question 
of the army ; it was a formal conflict for power be- 
tween the House and the Crown. The attempt to 
introduce a Parliamentary government which had 
been thwarted ten years before was now revived. 
Who could say what the end would be ? All pre- 
cedent seemed to shew that in a struggle between 
Crown and Parliament sooner or later the King must 
be beaten, unless, indeed, he was prepared to adopt 
the means which Napoleon used. The King would 
not give in ; he believed that the army reform was 
necessary to the safety of his country ; on the other 
hand, he was a man of too loyal a character to have 
recourse to violence and a breach of the Constitu- 
tion. If, however, the Constitution proved to be of 
such a kind that it made it impossible for him to 
govern the country, he was prepared to retire from 
his post ; the position would indeed be untenable if 
on his shoulders lay the responsibility of guiding the 
policy and defending the interests of Prussia, and at 
the same time the country refused to grant him the 
means of doing so, 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 153 

The elections had taken place on May 6th ; four 
days later Bismarck arrived in Berlin ; he had at 
last received his recall. As soon as he was seen 
in Berlin his appointment as Minister-President was 
expected ; all those who wished to maintain the au- 
thority of the Crown, looked on him as the only man 
who could face the danger. Roon was active, as 
usual, on his side and was now supported by some 
of his colleagues, but Schleinitz, who had the sup- 
port of the Queen, wished to be President himself ; 
there were long meetings of the Council and audi- 
ences of the King ; but the old influences were still 
at work ; Bismarck did not wish to enter the Ministry 
except as Foreign Minister, and the King still feared 
and distrusted him. An incident which occurred 
during these critical days will explain to some extent 
the apprehensions which Bismarck so easily awoke. 
The chronic difficulties with the Elector of Hesse 
had culminated in an act of great discourtesy ; the 
King of Prussia had sent an autograph letter to the 
Elector by General Willisen ; the Elector on receiv- 
ing it threw it unopened on the table ; as the letter 
contained the final demands of Prussia, the only 
answer was to put some of the neighbouring regi- 
ments on a war footing. Bernstorff took the oppor- 
tunity of Bismarck's presence in Berlin to ask his 
advice ; the answer was : " The circumstance that 
the Elector has thrown a royal letter on the table is 
not a clever casus belli ; if you want war, make me 
your Under Secretary ; I will engage to provide you 
a German civil war of the best quality in a few 
weeks," The King might naturally fear that if he 



154 Bismarck. [1858- 

appointed Bismarck, not Under Secretary, but Min- 
ister, he would in a few weeks, whether he hked it or 
not, find himself involved in a German civil war of 
the best quality. He wanted a man who would de- 
fend the Government before the Chambers with 
courage and ability; Bismarck, who had gained his 
reputation as a debater, was the only man for the 
post. He could have had the post of Minister of 
the Interior; he was offered that of Minister-Presi- 
dent without a Portfolio ; but if he did not actually 
refuse, he strongly disapproved of the plan ; he 
would not be able to get on with Bernstorff, and 
Schleinitz would probably interfere. " I have no 
confidence in Bernstorff's eye for political matters ; 
he probably has none in mine." Bernstorff was " too 
stiff," "his collars were too high." During these 
long discussions he wrote to his wife : 

" Our future is obscure as in Petersburg. Berlin is 
now to the front ; 1 do nothing one way or another ; as 
soon as I have my credentials for Paris in my pocket I 
will dance and sing. At present there is no talk of 
London, but all may change again. I scarcely get free 
of the discussions all day long ; I do not find the Minis- 
ters more united than their predecessors were." 

Disgusted with the long waiting and uncertainty 
he pressed for a decision ; after a fortnight's delay he 
was appointed Minister at Paris, but this was in 
reality only a fresh postponement ; nothing had 
really been decided ; the King expressly told him 
not to establish himself there, To his wife he wrote 
from Berlin; 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 155 

" I am very much pleased, but the shadow remains in 
the background. I was already as good as caught for 
the Ministry. Perhaps when I am out of their sight 
they will discover another Minister-President. I expect 
to start for Paris to-morrow ; whether for long, God 
knows ; perhaps only for a few months or even weeks. 
They are all conspired together that I should stay here. 
I have had to be very firm to get away from this hotel 
life even for a time." 

He did not really expect to be away more than 
ten days or a fortnight. At a farewell audience just 
before he started, the King seems to have led him 
to expect that he would in a very few days be ap- 
pointed as he wished, Foreign Minister. 

He arrived in Paris on the 30th, to take up his 
quarters in the empty Embassy. He did not wait 
even to see his wife before starting and he wrote to 
her that she was not to take any steps towards 
joining him. 

" It is not decided that I am to stay here ; I am in the 
middle of Paris lonelier than you are in Reinfeld and sit 
here like a rat in a deserted house. How long it will 
last God knows. Probably in eight or ten days I shall 
receive a telegraphic summons to Berlin and then game 
and dance is over. If my enemies knew what a benefit 
they would confer on me by their victory and how sin- 
cerely I wish it for them, Schleinitz out of pure malice 
would probably do his best to bring me to Berlin." 

Day after day, however, went by and the summons 
did not come ; on the contrary Bernstorff wrote as 
though he were proposing to stay on ; he did not 



156 Bismarck. [1858- 

however, suggest giving up his post in London. 
Roon wrote that he had raised the question in con- 
versation with the King ; that he had found the old 
leaning towards Bismarck, and the old irresolution. 
The Chamber had met, but the first few weeks of 
the session passed off with unexpected quiet and it 
was not till the autumn that the question of the Bud- 
get would come up. Bismarck wrote to Bernstorff 
to try and find out what was to happen to him, but 
the King, before whom the letter was laid, was quite 
unable to come to any decision. 

Bismarck therefore determined to use his enforced 
leisure in order to go across to London for a few 
days. He had only visited England once as a young 
man, and, expecting as he did soon to be responsible 
for the conduct of foreign affairs, it was desirable 
that he should make the personal acquaintance of 
the leading English statesmen. Undoubtedly, one 
of the reasons why he had been sent to Paris was 
that he might renew his acquaintance with the Em- 
peror. There was also a second International Exhi- 
bition and everyone was going to London. We 
have, unfortunately, no letters written from Eng- 
land ; after his return he writes to Roon : 

" I have just come back from London ; people there 
are much better informed about China and Turkey than 
about Prussia. Loftus must write more nonsense to his 
Ministers than I thought." 

The only event of which we have any information 
was his meeting with Mr. Disraeli, who at that time 
was leader of the Opposition in the House of Com- 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 157 

mons ; it took place at a dinner given by the Russian 
Ambassador to the Grand Duchess of Saxe-Weimar. 
Among the guests was Count Vitzthum, Saxon 
Envoy ; he saw Bismarck and Disraeli engaged in 
a long conversation after dinner ; afterwards the 
Enghsh statesman told him the substance of it. 
Bismarck had spoken as follows : 

" I shall soon be compelled to undertake the leader- 
ship of the Prussian Government. My first care will be, 
with or without the help of Parliament, to reorganise the 
army. The King has rightly set himself this task ; he 
cannot however carry it through with his present coun- 
cillors. When the army has been brought to such a state 
as to command respect, then I will take the first oppor- 
tunity to declare war with Austria, burst asunder the 
German Confederation, bring the middle and smaller 
States into subjection, and give Germany a' national 
union under the leadership of Prussia. I have come 
here to tell this to the Queen's Ministers." 

Disraeli added to Vitzthum, who, of course, as 
Saxon Envoy was much interested : " Take care of 
that man ; he means what he says." It does not ap- 
pear that Bismarck had an opportunity of explaining 
his project either to Lord Palmerston or to Lord 
Russell. 

All through July he remained in Paris, to wliich 
he was called back in order to receive some des- 
patches which after all never arrived ; the same un- 
certainty continued ; there was no work to be done 
there, Emperor and Ministers were going away ; he 
was still all alone in the Embassy without servants, 



158 Bismarck. [less- 

or furniture. As he wrote to his wife, he did not 
know what to have for dinner or what to eat it on. 
He therefore appHed for leave ; he was himself of 
opinion that as the King would not immediately 
give him the Foreign Office it was not yet time for 
him to enter the Ministry. Writing to Roon he 
advised that the Government should prolong the 
conflict, draw the Chamber into disputes on small 
matters which would weary the country ; then when 
they were getting worn out and hoped that the 
Government would meet them half-way so as to end 
the conflict, then would be the time to summon him, 

" as a sign that we are far from giving up the battle. 
The appearance of a new battalion in the Ministerial 
array would then perhaps make an impression that 
would be wanting now, especially if beforehand a com- 
motion was created by expressions about a coup d' etat 
and a new Constitution ; then my own reputation for 
careless violence would help me and people would think, 
' now it is coming ! ' Then, all the half-hearted would be 
inclined to negotiation. I am astonished at the political 
incapacity of our Chambers and yet we are an educated 
country. Undoubtedly too much so ; others are not 
cleverer but they have not the childish self-confidence 
with which our political leaders publish their incapacity 
in its complete nakedness as a model and pattern. 
How have we Germans got the reputation of retiring 
modesty ? There is not a single one of us who does not 
think that he understands everything, from strategy to 
picking the fleas off a dog, better than professionals who 
have devoted their lives to it." 

It was only with difficulty he could even get leave 



1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 159 

of absence, for the King was as irresolute as ever ; 
as to the cause of the difficulty we get some hint in 
Roon's letters. There was a party which was push- 
ing Schleinitz, the only member of the Liberal 
Ministry who remained in office ; he had very influ- 
ential support. 

"Her Majesty the Queen returns to Babelsburg on 
Sunday ; she is much agitated, there will be scenes ; 
the temperature towards the Ministry will fall to zero 
or below." 

He eventually got away at the end of July with 
six weeks' leave of absence ; he travelled down to 
Bordeaux and Bayonne and across the Pyrenees to 
San Sebastian ; he was away from all news of the 
world ; for weeks he scarcely saw even a German 
paper. 

On the r4th of September he was at Toulouse ; 
the sea-bathing, the mountain air, the freedom from 
work and anxiety, and the warmth had completely 
restored his health ; for the first time since he went 
to St. Petersburg he had recovered his old spirit, his 
decision, and directness of action. He wrote that 
he must have some definite decision ; otherwise he 
would send in his resignation. " My furniture is at 
St. Petersburg and will be frozen up, my carriages 
are at Stettin, my horses at Berlin, my family in 
Pomerania, and I on the highroad." He was pre- 
pared to be his Majesty's Envoy at Paris but he 
was also ready at once to enter the Ministry. " Only 
get me certainty, one way or another," he writes to 
Roon, " and I will paint angels' wings on your 



1 60 Bismarck. 



[1858- 



photograph." Two days later, just as a year before, 
he received a telegram from Roon telling him to 
come at once. On the 17th he was in Paris and on 
the morning of the 20th he arrived in Berlin. 

The long-delayed crisis had at last come ; the de- 
bates on the Budget and the vote for. the army 
reform began on September iith; it was continued 
for five days, and at the end the House, by a 
majority of 273 to 62, refused the money required 
for the increased establishment. The result of this 
vote would be that if the wishes of the House were 
carried out, the whole of the expenditure which had 
already been made for eight months of the current 
year was illegal ; moreover, the regiments which had 
already existed for two years must be disbanded. 
It was a vote which could not possibly be carried 
into effect, as the money had already been spent. 
At a meeting of the Ministry which was held the 
next morning, the majority, including this time even 
Roon, seemed to have been inclined to attempt a 
compromise. The King alone remained firm. When 
he had heard the opinion of all the Ministers, he rose 
and said that in that case it would be impossible for 
him to carry on the Government any longer ; it would 
only remain for him to summon the Crown Prince. 
As he said this he put his hand on the bell to call 
a messenger. The Ministers all sprang from their 
chairs and assured him that he might depend upon 
them, and they would support him to the end. 
Such were the circumstances in which Roon sum- 
moned Bismarck. None the less the influence of 
the Queen and the Crown Prince were so strong 



1862] 



S^. Pete^'sbui^o- and Paris. 



i6i 



that the King still doubted whether he ought to 
continue the struggle ; on one thing he was deter- 
mined, that if he had to give way he would abdicate. 
Two days later he again asked Roon his advice. 
"Appoint Bismarck Minister-President," was the 
answer. " But he is not here, he will not accept," 
objected the King, referring doubtless to the dif^- 
culties which Bismarck had raised formerly. *' He 
is in Berlin at this moment," said Roon. The King 
ordered him to come to Potsdam. When Bismarck 
arrived there he found the King sitting at his table, 
and in front of him the act of abdication, already 
signed. The King asked him whether he was will- 
ing to undertake the Government, even against the 
majority of the Parliament and without a Budget. 
Bismarck said he would do so. It was one last 
chance, and the King tore up the act of abdication. 
Two days later Bismarck was appointed provisional 
Minister-President, and, at the beginning of October, 
received his definite appointment as President and 
Foreign Minister. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE CONFLICT. 
1 862-1 863. 

THE circumstances under which Bisnriarck ac- 
cepted office were such as to try the nerves 
of the strongest man. The King had not 
appealed to him so long as there was anyone else 
who would carry on the Government ; he was the 
last resource, and had taken up a burden from which 
all others shrunk. He had pledged himself to sup- 
port the King in a conflict against the whole nation ; 
with the exception of the Upper House he had no 
friends or supporters. The opinion in Europe was 
as decisively against him as that in Prussia ; he was 
scarcely looked on as a serious politician ; every- 
one believed that in a few weeks he would have to 
retire, and the King to give up the useless conflict 
on which he was staking his throne. Bismarck was 
under no illusion as to his position ; he had been 
summoned by the King, he depended for his office 
entirely on the King, but would the King have the 
strength of will and courage to resist ? Only a few 
days after his appointment, the King had gone to 

162 



1862] The Co7ifiict. 163 

Baden-Baden for a week, where he met the Queen. 
When he came back, he was completely disheart- 
ened. Bismarck, who had travelled part of the way 
to meet him, got into the train at a small roadside 
station. He found that the King, who was sitting 
alone in an ordinary first-class carriage, was prepared 
to surrender. "What will come of it?" he said. 
" Already I see the place before my castle on which 
your head will fall, and then mine will fall too." 
" Well, as far as I am concerned," answered Bis- 
marck, " I cannot think of a finer death than one on 
the field of battle or the scaffold. I would fall like 
Lord Strafford ; and your Majesty, not as Louis 
XVL, but as Charles L That is a quite respectable 
historical figure." 

For the moment the centre of interest lay in the 
House. The new Minister began by what he in- 
tended as an attempt at reconciliation : he announced 
that the Budget for 1863 would be withdrawn; the 
object of this was to limit as much as possible the 
immediate scope of difference ; a fresh Budget for 
the next year would be laid before them as soon as 
possible. There would remain only the settlement 
of the Budget for the current year. This announce- 
ment was badly received ; the House was distrustful, 
and they interpreted it as an attempt to return to the 
old practice of deferring consideration of the Budget 
until the beginning of the year to which it applied. 
The first discussion in which Bismarck took part was 
not in the House itself, but in the Budget Commit- 
tee. The Committee proposed a resolution requiring 
the Government at once to lay before the House the 



1 64 Bismarck. 



[1862- 



Budget for 1863, and declaring that it was uncon- 
stitutional to spend any money which had been 
expressly and definitely refused by the House of 
Representatives, On this there took place a long 
discussion, in which Bismarck spoke repeatedly ; for 
the discussions in Committee, which consisted only 
of about thirty members, were conversational in their 
nature. There was no verbatim report, but the room 
was crowded with members who had come to hear 
the new Minister. They were not disappointed. 
He spoke with a wit, incisiveness, and versatility to 
which, as one observer remarked, they were not ac- 
customed from Prussian Ministers. He warned them 
not to exaggerate their powers. The Prussian Con- 
stitution did not give the House of Representatives 
the sole power of settling the Budget ; it must be 
settled by arrangement with the other House and 
the Crown. There was a difference of opinion in 
the interpretation of the Constitution ; all constitu- 
tional government required compromise ; a consti- 
tution was not something dead, it must be enlivened ; 
it was interpreted by custom and practice ; it would 
be wiser not to hasten this practice too quickly; then 
the question of law might easily become one of 
power. It was not the fault of the Government that 
they had got into this position ; people took the 
situation too tragically, especially in the press ; they 
spoke as though the end of all things was come ; 
" but," he added, "a constitutional struggle is not a 
disgrace, it is rather an honour; after ail we are all 
children of the same country." A true note, but 
one which he was not always able to maintain in the 



1863] The Conflict. 165 

struggle of the coming years. Then he expounded 
the view of the German character which we have 
learnt from his letters : it was customary to speak of 
the sobriety of the Prussian people ; yes, but the 
great independence of the individual made it difificult 
in Prussia to govern with the Constitution ; in France 
it was different; there this individual independence 
Avas wanting; "we are perhaps too educated to en- 
dure a constitution ; we are too critical " ; the capacity 
for judging measures of the Government and acts of 
the Representatives was too universal ; there were 
in the country too many Catilinarian existences, 
which had an interest in revolutions. He reminded 
them that Germany did not care for the Liberalism 
of Prussia, but for its power; Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, 
Baden, might indulge in Liberalism ; Prussia must 
concentrate its power and hold itself ready for the 
favourable moment which had already been passed 
over more than once ; Prussia's boundaries, as fixed 
by the Congress of Vienna, were not favourable to a 
sound political life ; " not by speeches and majority- 
votes are the great questions of the time decided — 
that was the great blunder of 1848 and 1849- — but 
by blood and iron." He appealed for confidence: 
" Do not force a quarrel ; we are honest people and 
you can trust us." 

The effect of these speeches was very unfavour- 
able ; the very quickness of thought and originality 
of expression produced a bad impression; even the 
free indulgence in long foreign words offended 
patriotic journalists. They seemed to his audience 
reckless ; what was this reference to the Treaties of 



1 66 Bismarck. 



[1862- 



Vlenna but an imitation of Napoleonic statesman- 
ship ? They had the consciousness that they were 
making history, that they were involved in a great 
and tragic conflict, and they expected the Minister 
to play his part seriously and solemnly; instead of 
that they had listened to a series of epigrams with 
no apparent logical connection. We know how 
dangerous it is, even in England, for a responsible 
statesman to allow himself to be epigrammatic in 
dealing with serious affairs. Much more was it 
in Germany, where the Ministers were nearly always 
officials by training. Bismarck had the dangerous 
gift of framing pregnant and pithy sentences which 
would give a ready handle to his opponents: 
Macht geJit vor Recht ; he had not said these words, 
but he had said something very much like them, and 
they undoubtedly represented what seemed to his 
audience the pith of his speeches. And then these 
words, blood and ir 071. He has told us in later years 
what he really meant : 

" Put the strongest possible military power, in other 
words, as much blood and iron as you can, into the hands 
of the King of Prussia, then he will be able to carry out 
the policy you wish ; it cannot be done with speeches 
and celebrations and songs, it can only be done by 
blood and iron." * 

What everyone thought he meant was that blood 
must be shed and iron used ; and perhaps they were 
not so far wrong. 



♦Speech of January 28, \i 



1863] The Conflict. 167 

The attempt at conciliation failed ; the report of 
the Committee was adopted, and an amendment pro- 
posed by Vincke, which Bismarck was prepared to 
accept, was rejected. Bismarck warned the House 
not to push the conflict too far ; the time would come 
when the prospect of a peaceful solution would have 
disappeared ; then the Government too would be 
prepared to oppose theory to theory and interpreta- 
tion to interpretation. 

He showed to the President of the House a twig 
of olive. " I gathered this in Avignon to bring it to 
the House ; it does not seem to be time yet." 

The Budget was sent up to the House of Lords in 
the amended form in which the House of Representa- 
tives had passed it ; the Lords unanimously threw it 
out, as they were legally justified in doing ; not con- 
tent with that, they altered it to the original form in 
which it had been proposed by the Government and 
sent it down again to the Lower House. This was 
clearly illegal. Their action, however, was most use- 
ful to the Government. A conflict had now arisen 
between the two Houses, and technically the 
responsibility for the failure to bring the conciliation 
about was taken away from the Government ; they 
could entrench themselves behind the impregnable 
position that the law required the Budget to be 
passed by both Houses; until this was done they 
could do nothing. The Houses would not agree ; the 
Government was helpless. The House of Repre- 
sentatives at once passed "a motion declaring the 
vote of the Upper House for altering the Budget 
null and void, as indeed it was; in the middle of the 



1 68 Bisfnarck. 



[1862- 



discussion a message was brought down by the Presi- 
dent announcing that the House was to be prorogued 
that afternoon ; they had just time to pass the resolu- 
tion and to send it in a cab which was waiting at the 
door to the Upper House, where it was read out 
amidst the boisterous laughter of the Peers; then 
both Chambers were summoned to the Palace, and 
the session closed. The first round in the conflict 
was over. 

The recess was short ; the next session was by 
the Constitution obliged to begin not later than Janu- 
ary 15th; there were many who expected that the 
Constitution would be ignored and the Parliament 
not summoned. This was not Bismarck's plan ; he 
fulfilled all the technical requirements in the strictest 
way ; he carefully abstained from any action which 
he could not justify by an appeal to the letter of the 
Constitution ; the government of the country was 
carried on with vigour and success ; he allowed no 
loophole by which his opponents might injure his 
influence with the King. It is true that they were 
spending money which had not been voted, but then, 
as he explained, that was not his fault ; the pro- 
visions of the law were quite clear. 

It was the duty of the Government to submit the 
Budget to the Lower House, who could amend it ; 
it had then to be passed in the form of a law, and 
for this the assent of both Houses of Parliament and 
of the Crown was required. The Upper House had 
not the right of proposing amendments, but they 
had the right of rejecting them. In this case they 
had made use of their right ; no law had been passed ; 



1863] The Conflict. 169 

the two Houses had not agreed. What was to hap- 
pen? The Constitution gave no help; there was a 
gap in it. The Government therefore had to act as 
best they could. They could not be expected to 
close the Government offices, cease to pay the 
troops, and let the government of the country come 
to an end ; they must go on as best they could, tak- 
ing all the responsibility until they could come to 
some agreement. 

As soon as the House met it began to vote an 
address to the King. They adopted the obvious fic- 
tion, which, in fact, they could not well avoid, that 
he was being misled by his Ministers, and the atti- 
tude of the country misrepresented to him ; even 
had they known as well as we do that the Ministers 
were only carrying out the orders of the King, they 
could not well have said so. Bismarck, however, did 
not attempt to conceal the truth ; the address, he 
said, touched the King ; the acts complained of were 
done in the name of the King ; they were setting 
themselves against him. The contest was, who was 
to rule in Prussia, the House of Hohenzollern or the 
House of Parliament. He was at once accused of 
disloyalty ; he was, they said, protecting himself be- 
hind the person of the sovereign, but, of course, it 
was impossible for him not to do so. The whole 
justification for his action was that he was carrying 
out the King's orders. What was at the root of the 
conflict but the question, whether in the last resort 
the will of the King or the majority of the House 
should prevail? To have adopted the English prac- 
tice, to have refrained from mentioning the King's 



1 70 Bismarck. [1862- 

name, would have been to adopt the very theory of 
the Constitution for which the House was contend- 
ing, the English theory that the sovereign has 
neither the right of deciding nor responsibility; it 
would have been to undermine the monarchical side 
of the Constitution which Bismarck was expressly 
defending. The King himself never attempted to 
avoid the responsibility ; in a public speech he had 
already said that the army organisation was his own 
work: " It is my own and I am proud of it ; I will 
hold firmly to it and carry it through with all my 
energy." In his answer to the address from tlie 
House, both on this and on later occasions, he ex- 
pressly withdrew the assumption that he was not 
well informed or that he did not approve of his 
Ministers' action. 

The address was carried by a majority of 255 to 
68 ; the King refused to receive it in person. The 
House then proceeded to throw out a Bill for mili- 
tary reorganisation which was laid before them ; 
they adopted a resolution that they reserved for 
later discussion the question, for what part of the 
money illegally spent in 1862 they would hold the 
Ministry personally responsible. They then pro- 
ceeded to the Budget of 1863, and again rejected 
the army estimates ; they refused the money asked 
for raising the salaries of the ambassadors (Bis- 
marck himself, while at St. Petersburg, had suffered 
much owing to the insufificiency of his salary, and he 
wished to spare his successors a similar inconven- 
ience) ; and they brought in Bills for the responsibil- 
ity of Ministers, The public attention, however, 



1863] The Confiid. 171 

was soon directed from these internal matters to 
even more serious questions of foreign policy. 

At the beginning of February the Poles had once 
more risen in revolt against the Russian Govern- 
ment. Much sympathy was felt for them in West- 
ern Europe. England, France, and Austria joined 
in representations and remonstrances to the Czar ; 
they expected that Prussia would join them. 

Nothing could have been more inconvenient to 
Bismarck ; he was at the time fully occupied in ne- 
gotiations about German affairs, and he was proba- 
bly anxious to bring to a speedy issue the questions 
between Prussia and Austria ; it was therefore most 
important to him to be on good terms with France 
and England, for he would not challenge Austria 
unless he was sure that Austria would have no allies ; 
now he must quarrel with either Russia or with 
France. An insurrection in Poland was, however, a 
danger to which everything else must be postponed; 
on this his opinion never varied, here there could be 
no compromise. He was perfectly open : " The Pol- 
ish question is to us a question of life and death," 
he said to Sir Andrew Buchanan. There were two 
parties among the Poles ; the one, the extreme 
Republican, wished for the institution of an inde- 
pendent republic ; the other would be content with 
self-government and national institutions under the 
Russian Crown ; they were supported by a considera- 
ble party in Russia itself. Either party if successful 
would not be content with Russian Poland ; they 
would demand Posen, they would never rest until 
they had gained again the coast of the Baltic and 



172 Bisniai^ck. [1862- 

deprived Prussia of her eastern provinces. The dan- 
ger to Prussia would be greatest, as Bismarck well 
knew, if the Poles became reconciled to the . Rus- 
sians ; an independent republic on their eastern 
frontier would have been dangerous, but Polish 
aspirations supported by the Panslavonic party and 
the Russian army would have been fatal. Russia 
and Poland might be reconciled, Prussia and Poland 
never can be. Prussia therefore was obliged to 
separate itself from the other Powers ; instead of 
sending remonstrances to the Czar, the King wrote 
an autograph letter proposing that the two Govern- 
ments should take common steps to meet the com- 
mon danger ; General von Alvensleben, who took 
the letter, at once concluded a convention in which 
it was agreed that Prussian and Russian troops 
should be allowed to cross the frontier in pursuit of 
the insurgents ; at the same time two of the Prus- 
sian army corps were mobilised and drawn up along 
the Polish frontier. 

The convention soon became known and it is easy 
to imagine the indignation with which the Prussian 
people and the House of Representatives heard of 
what their Government had done. The feeling was 
akin to that which would have prevailed in America 
had the President offered his help to the Spanish 
Government to suppress the insurrection in Cuba. 
The answers to questions were unsatisfactory, and 
on February 26th Heinrich von Sybel rose to move 
that the interests of Prussia required absolute neu- 
trality. It was indeed evident that Bismarck's ac- 
tion had completely isolated Prussia ; except the 



1863] The Conflict. 1 73 

Czar, she had now not a single friend in Europe and 
scarcely a friend in Germany, Bismarck began his 
answer by the taunt that the tendency to enthusi- 
asm for foreign nationalities, even when their ob- 
jects could only be realised at the cost of one's own 
country, was a political disease unfortunately limited 
to Germany. It was, however, an unjust taunt, for 
no one had done more than Sybel himself in his his- 
torical work to point out the necessity, though he 
recognised the injustice, of the part Prussia had 
taken in the partition of Poland ; nobody had 
painted so convincingly as he had, the political and 
social demoralisation of Poland. Bismarck then 
dwelt on the want of patriotism in the House, which 
in the middle of complicated negotiations did not 
scruple to embarrass their own Government. " No 
English House of Commons," he said, "would have 
acted as they did," a statement to which we cannot 
assent ; an English Opposition would have acted ex- 
actly as the majority of the Prussian Parliament did. 
When a Minister is in agreement with the House on 
the general principles of policy, then indeed there 
rests on them the obligation not to embarrass the 
Government by constant interpolation with regard 
to each diplomatic step ; self-restraint must be exer- 
cised, confidence shewn. This was not the case here ; 
the House had every reason to believe that the ob- 
jects of Bismarck were completely opposed to what 
they wished ; they could not be expected to repose 
confidence in him. They used this, as every other 
opportunity, to attempt to get rid of him. 

The question of Poland is one on which Bismarck 



1 74 Bismarck. [1862- 

never altered his attitude. His first public expression 
of opinion on foreign affairs was an attack on the 
Polish policy of the Prussian Government in 1848. 

" No one then," he wrote, " could doubt that an independ- 
ent Poland would be the irreconcilable enemy of Prussia 
and would remain so till they had conquered the mouth 
of the Vistula and every Polish-speaking village in West 
and East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia." 

Forty years later one of the last of his great speeches 
in the Reichstag was devoted to attacking the Polish 
sympathies of the Catholic party in Prussia. He 
was never tired of laughing at the characteristic 
German romanticism which was so enthusiastic for 
the welfare of other nations. He recalled the memo- 
ries of his boyhood when, after the rebellion of 1831, 
Polish refugees were received in every German town 
with honours and enthusiasm greater than those paid 
to the men who had fought for Germany, when 
German children would sing Polish national airs as 
though they were their own. 

Nothing shews the change which he has been able 
to bring about in German thought better than the 
attitude of the nation towards Poland. In the old 
days the Germans recollected only that the partition 
of Poland had been a great crime ; it was their hope 
and determination that they might be able to make 
amends for it. In those days the Poles were to be 
found in every country in Europe, foremost in fight- 
ing on the barricades ; they helped the Germans to 
fight for their liberty, and the Germans were to help 
them to recover independence. In 1848, Mieroslawski 



1863] 



The Conflict. 175 



had been carried like a triumphant hero through the 
streets of Berlin ; the Baden rebels put themselves 
under the leadership of a Pole, and it was a Pole 
who commanded the Viennese in their resistance to 
the Austrian army ; a Pole led the Italians to dis- 
aster on the field of Novara. At a time when poets 
still were political leaders, and the memory and in- 
fluence of Byron had not been effaced, there was 
scarcely a German poet, Platen, Uhland, Heine, who 
had not stirred up the enthusiasm for Poland. It 
was against this attitude of mind that Bismarck had 
to struggle and he has done so successfully. He has 
taught that it is the duty of Germany to use all the 
power of the State for crushing and destroying the 
Polish language and nationality ; the Poles in Prussia 
are to become Prussian, as those in Russia have to 
become Russian. A hundred years ago the Polish 
State was destroyed ; now the language and the 
nation must cease to exist. 

It is a natural result of the predominance of 
Prussia in Germany. The enthusiasm for Poland 
was not unnatural when the centre of gravity of 
Germany was still far towards the West. Germany 
could be great, prosperous, and happy, even if a re- 
vived Poland spread to the shores of the Baltic, but 
Prussia would then cease to exist and Bismarck has 
taught the Germans to feel as Prussians. 

The danger during these weeks was real ; Napo- 
leon proposed that Austria, England, and France 
should present identical notes to Prussia remonstrat- 
ing with and threatening her. Lord Russell refused ; 
it was, as Bismarck said in later years, only the 



1 76 Bismarck. [1862- 

friendly disposition of Lord Russell to Germany 
which saved Prussia from this danger. Bismarck's 
own position was very insecure ; but he withstood 
this attack as he did all others, though few knew at 
what expense to his nerves and health ; he used to 
attribute the frequent illnesses of his later years to 
the constant anxiety of these months ; he had a 
very nervous temperament, self-control was difificult 
to him, and we must remember that all the time 
when he was defending the King's Government 
against this public criticism he had to maintain him- 
self against those who at Court were attempting to 
undermine his influence with the King. 

He had, however, secured the firm friendship 
of Russia. When he was in St. Petersburg he had 
gained the regard of the Czar ; now to this personal 
feeling was added a great debt of gratitude. What 
a contrast between the action of Austria and Prus- 
sia ! The late Czar had saved Austria from dissolu- 
tion, and what had been the reward ? Opposition in 
the East, and now Austria in the Polish affair was 
again supporting the Western Powers. On the other 
hand Prussia, and Prussia alone, it was which had 
saved Russia from the active intervention of France 
and England. Napoleon had proposed that a land- 
ing should he made in Lithuania in order to effect 
a junction with the Poles; Bismarck had immedi- 
ately declared that if this were done he should re- 
gard it as a declaration of war against Prussia. So 
deep was the indignation of Alexander that he wrote 
himself to the King of Prussia, proposing an alliance 
and a joint attack on France and Austria. It must 



1863] The Conflict. 177 

have been a great temptation to Bismarck, but he 
now shewed the prudence which was his great char- 
acteristic as a diplomatist ; he feared that in a war of 
this kind the brunt would fall upon Prussia, and that 
when peace was made the control of negotiations 
would be with the Czar. He wished for war with 
Austria, but he was determined that when war came 
he should have the arrangement of the terms of 
peace. On his advice the King refused the offer. 

The bitterness of the feeling created by these de- 
bates on Poland threatened to make it impossible 
for Ministers any longer to attend in the House ; 
Bismarck did his part in increasing it. 

You ask me," he said, " why, if we disagree with you, 
we do not dissolve ; it is that we wish the country to 
have an opportunity of becoming thoroughly acquainted 
with you." 

He was tired and angry when during one of these 
sittings he writes to Motley : 

" I am obliged to listen to particularly tasteless speeches 
out of the mouths of uncommonly childish and excited 
politicians, and I have therefore a moment of unwilling 
leisure which I cannot use better than in giving you. news 
of my welfare. I never thought that in my riper years I 
should be obliged to carry on such an unworthy trade as 
that of a Parliamentary Minister. As envoy, although 
an official, I still had the feeling of being a gentleman ; 
as [Parliamentary] Minister one is a helot. I have come 
down in the world, and hardly know how. 

" April 1 8th. I wrote as far as this yesterday, then 
the sitting came to an end ; five hours' Chamber until 
three o'clock ; one hour's report to his Majesty ; three 



1 78 Bismarck. [1865- 

hours at an incredibly dull dinner, old important Whigs ; 
then two hours' work ; finally, a supper with a colleague, 
who would have been hurt if I had slighted his fish. 
This morning, I had hardly breakfasted, before Karolyi 
was sitting opposite to me ; he was followed without in- 
terruption by Denmark, England, Portugal, Russia, 
France, whose Ambassador I was obliged to remind at 
one o'clock that it was time for me to go to the House 
of phrases. I am sitting again in the latter ; hear people 
talk nonsense, and end my letter. All these people have 
agreed to approve our treaties with Belgium, in spite of 
which twenty speakers scold each other with the greatest 
vehemence, as if each wished to make an end of the 
other ; they are not agreed about the motives which 
make them unanimous, hence, alas ! a regular German 
squabble about the Emperor's beard ; querelle d' Alle- 
ma7id. You Anglo-Saxon Yankees have something of 
the same kind also. . . . Your battles are bloody ; 
ours wordy ; these chatterers really cannot govern Prus- 
sia. I must bring some opposition to bear against them ; 
they have too little wit and too much self-complacency — 
stupid and audacious. Stupid, in all its meanings, is not 
the right word ; considered individually, these people 
are sometimes very clever, generally educated — the regu- 
lation German university culture ; but of politics, be- 
yond the interests of their own church tower, they know 
as little as we knew as students, and even less ; as far as 
external politics go, they are also, taken separately, like 
children. In all other questions they become childish 
as soon as they stand together in corpore. In the mass 
stupid, individually intelligent." 

Recalling these days, Bismarck .said in later years: 
" I shall never forget how I had every morning to 



1863] 



The Conflict. 179 



receive the visit of Sir Andrew Buchanan, the English 
Ambassador, and Talleyrand, the representative of 
France, who made hell hot for me over the inexcusable 
leanings of Prussian policy towards Russia, and held 
threatening language towards us, and then at midday I 
had the pleasure of hearing in the Prussian Parliament 
pretty much the same arguments and attacks which in 
the morning the foreign Ambassadors had made against 
me." 

Of course the language used in the House weak- 
ened his influence abroad, and the foreign Govern- 
ments shewed more insistence when they found out 
that the Prussian Parliament supported their de- 
mands. It was noticed with satisfaction in the 
English Parliament that the nation had dissociated 
itself from the mean and disgraceful policy of the 
Government. 

At last personal friction reached such a point that 
the session had to be closed. In order to under- 
stand the cause of this we must remember that in 
Prussia the Ministers are not necessarily members of 
either House ; they enjoy, however, by the Consti- 
tution, the right of attending the debates and may 
at any time demand to be heard ; they do not sit in 
the House among the other members, but on a 
raised bench to the right of the President, facing the 
members. They have not, therefore, any feeling of 
esprit de corps as members of the assembly ; Bis- 
marck and his colleagues when they addressed the 
House spoke not as members, not as the representa- 
tives of even a small minority, but as strangers, as 
the representatives of a rival and hostile authority ; 



1 80 Bismarck. 



[1862- 



it is this which alone explains the almost unanimous 
opposition to him ; he was the opponent not of one 
party in the House but of the Parliament itself and 
of every other Parliament. In the course of a debate 
he came into conflict with the Chair ; the President 
pointed out that some of his remarks had nothing 
to do with the subject ; Bismarck at once protested : 
" I cannot allow the President the right to a discip- 
linary interruption in my speech. I have not the 
honour of being a member of this assembly ; I have 
not helped to vote your standing orders; I have not 
joined in electing the President ; I am not subject 
to the disciplinary power of the Chamber. The 
authority of the President ends at this barrier. I 
have one superior only, his Majesty the King." 
This led to a sharp passage with the President, who 
maintained that his power extended as far as the 
four walls ; he could not indeed withdraw the right 
of speech from a Minister, but could interrupt him. 
Bismarck at once repeated word for word the ob- 
noxious passage of his speech. The President 
threatened, if he did so again, to close the sitting; 
Bismarck practically gave way ; " I cannot," he said, 
" prevent the President adjourning the House ; what 
I have said twice I need not repeat a third time " ; 
and the debate continued without further interrup- 
tion. A few weeks later a similar scene occurred, 
but this time it was not Bismarck but Roon, and 
Roon had not the same quick feeling for Parlia- 
mentary form ; Bismarck had defied the President 
up to the extreme point where his legal powers 
went, Roon passed beyond them. The President 



1863] The Confiict. i8i 

wished to interrupt the Minister; Roon refused to 
stop speaking ; the President rang his belL " When 
I interrupt the Minister," he said, " he must be 
silent. For that purpose I use my bell, and, if the 
Minister does not obey, I must have my hat brought 
me." When the Chairman put on his hat the House 
would be adjourned. Roon answered, " I do not 
mind if the President has his hat brought ; accord- 
ing to the Constitution I can speak if I wish, and no 
one has the right to interrupt me." After a few 
more angry words on either side, as Roon continued 
to dispute the right of the President, the latter rose 
from his seat and asked for his hat, which he placed 
on his head. All the members rose and the House 
was adjourned. Unfortunately the hat handed to 
him was not his own ; it was much too large and 
completely covered his head and face, so that the 
strain of the situation was relieved by loud laughter. 
After this the Ministers refused to attend the House 
unless they received an assurance that the President 
no longer claimed disciplinary authority over them ; 
a series of memoranda were exchanged between the 
House and the Ministry ; the actual point in dispute 
was really a very small one ; it is not even clear that 
there was any difference of opinion ; everyone ac- 
knowledged that the Ministers might make as many 
speeches as they liked, and that the Chairman could 
not require them to stop speaking. The only 
question was whether he might interrupt them in 
order to make any remarks himself; but neither 
side was prepared to come to an understanding. 
The King, to whom the House appealed, supported 



182 Bismarck. 



[1862- 



the Ministry, and a few days later the House was 
prorogued. The second session was over. 

Three days later, by Royal proclamation, a series 
of ordinances was published creating very stringent 
regulations for the control of the Press ; they gave 
the police the right of forbidding a newspaper to 
appear for no other reason except disapproval of its 
general tendency. It was a power more extreme 
than in the worst days of the Carlsbad decrees had 
ever been claimed by any German Government. 
The ordinances were based on a clause in the Con- 
stitution which gave the Government at times of 
crisis, if Parliament were not sitting, the power of 
making special regulations for the government of the 
Press. The reference to the Constitution seemed 
almost an insult ; the kind of crisis which was meant 
was obviously a period of civil war or invasion ; it 
seemed as though the Government had taken the 
first pretext for proroguing Parliament to be able to 
avail themselves of this clause. The ordinances 
reminded men of those of Charles X. ; surely, they 
said, this was the beginning of a reign of violence. 

The struggle was now no longer confined to Par- 
liament. Parliament indeed was clearly impotent ; 
all that could be done by speeches and votes and 
addresses had been done and had failed ; the King 
still supported the Ministry. It was now the time 
for the people at large ; the natural leaders were the 
corporations of the large towns ; the Liberal policy 
of the Prussian Government had given them con- 
siderable independence ; they were elected by the 
people, and in nearly every town there was a large 



1863] The Conflict. 183 

majority opposed to the Government. Headed by 
the capital, they began a series of addresses to the 
King ; pubhc meetings were organised ; at Cologne 
a great festival was arranged to welcome Sybel and 
the other representatives from the Rhine. It was 
more serious that in so monarchical a country the 
discontent with the personal action of the King found 
public expression. The Crown Prince was at this time 
on a tour of military inspection in East Prussia ; town 
after town refused the ordinary loyal addresses ; they 
would not welcome him or take part in the usual 
ceremonies; the ordinary loyal addresses to the 
King and other members of the Royal Family were 
refused. It was no longer a conflict between the 
Ministry and the Parliament, but between the King 
and the country. 

Suddenly the country learned that the Crown 
Prince himself, the Heir Apparent to the throne, was 
on their side. He had always disliked Bismarck; he 
was offended by the brusqueness of his manner. He 
disliked the genial and careless bonhonimie with 
which Bismarck, who hated affectation, discussed 
the most serious subjects; he had opposed his ap- 
pointment, and he now held a position towards his 
father's Government similar to that which ten years 
before his father had held towards his own brother. 
He was much influenced by his English relations, 
and the opinion of the English Court was strongly 
unfavourable to Bismarck. Hitherto the Crown 
Prince had refrained from any public active oppo- 
sition ; he had, however, not been asked his opinion 
concerning the Press ordinances, nor had he even 



184 Bismarck. [I862- 

received an invitation to the council at which they 
were passed. Bitterly offended at this slight upon 
himself, seriously alarmed lest the action of the 
Government might even endanger the dynasty, on 
his entry into Danzig he took occasion to dissociate 
himself from the action of the Government. He had 
not, he said, been asked; he had known nothing 
about it ; he was not responsible. The words were 
few and they were moderate, but they served to 
shew the whole of Germany what hitherto only those 
about the Court had known, that the Crown Prince 
was to be counted among the opponents of the 
Government. 

An incident followed a few days later which could 
only serve to increase the breach. After his speech 
at Danzig, the Crown Prince had offered to surren- 
der all his official positions ; the King had not re- 
quired this of him, but had strictly ordered him 
not again to come into opposition to his Govern- 
ment. The Crown Prince had promised obedience, 
but continued his private protests against "these 
rude and insolent Ministers." The letters on both 
sides had been affectionate and dignified. A few 
days later, however, the Berlin correspondent of 
the Times was enabled to publish the contents of 
them. It is not known who was to blame for this 
very serious breach of confidence; but the publica- 
tion must have been brought about by someone very 
closely connected with the Crown Prince ; suspicion 
was naturally directed towards the Court of Coburg. 
It was not the last time that the confidence of the 
Crown Prince was to be abused in a similar manner, 



1863] The Confiict. 185 

The event naturally much increased Bismarck's dis- 
like to the entourage of the Prince. There was in- 
deed a considerable number of men, half men of 
letters, half politicians, who were glad to play a part 
by attaching themselves to a Liberal Prince ; they 
did not scruple to call in the help of the Press of the 
foreign countries, especially of England, and use its 
influence for the decision of Prussian affairs. Unfor- 
tunately their connections were largely with Eng- 
land ; they had a great admiration for English 
liberty, and they were often known as the English 
party. This want of discretion, which afterwards 
caused a strong prejudice against them in Germany, 
was used to create a prejudice also against England. 
People in Germany confused with the English na- 
tion, which was supremely indifferent to Continental 
affairs, the opinions of a few writers who were nearly 
always German. For many years after this, the rela- 
tions between Bismarck and the Crown Prince were 
very distant, and the breach was to be increased by the 
very decided line which the Crown Prince afterwards 
took with regard to the Schleswig-Holstein affair. 

The event shewed that Bismarck knew well the 
country with which he was dealing ; the Press ordi- 
nances were not actually illegal, they were strictly 
enforced ; many papers were warned, others were 
suppressed ; the majority at once changed their tone 
and moderated their expression of hostility to the 
Government. In England, under similar circum- 
stances, a host of scurrilous pamphlets have always 
appeared ; the Prussian police were too prompt for 
this to be possible. The King refused to receive the 



1 86 Bismarck. 



[1862- 



addresses ; an order from the Home Office forbade 
town councils to discuss political matters ; a Burger- 
meister who disregarded the order was suspended 
from his office ; public meetings were suppressed. 
These measures were successful ; the discontent re- 
mained and increased, but there was no disorder and 
there were no riots. Great courage was required to 
defy public opinion, but with courage it could be 
defied with as much impunity as that of the Parlia- 
ment. Englishmen at the time asked why the peo- 
ple did not refuse to pay the taxes ; the answer is 
easy : there would have been no legal justification 
for this, for though, until the estimates had been 
passed, the Ministers were not legally enabled to 
spend a farthing of public money, the taxes could 
still be levied ; they were not voted annually ; once 
imposed, they continued until a law was passed 
withdrawing them. The situation, in fact, was this, 
that the Ministry were obliged to collect the money 
though they were not authorised in spending it. To 
this we must add that the country was very prosper- 
ous ; the revenue was constantly increasing ; there 
was no distress. The socialist agitation which was 
just beginning was directed not against the Govern- 
ment but against society ; Lassalle found more sym.- 
pathy in Bismarck than he did with the Liberal 
leaders. He publicly exhorted his followers to sup- 
port the Monarchy against these miserable Bour- 
geois, as he called the Liberals. Except on the one 
ground of the constitutional conflict, the country 
was well governed ; there was no other interference 
with liberty of thought or action, 



1863] The Conflict. 187 

Moreover, there was a general feeling that things 
could not last long ; the Liberals believed that the 
future was with them ; time itself would bring re- 
venge. At the worst they would wait till the death 
of the King ; he was already nearly seventy years of 
age ; the political difficulties had much injured his 
health. When he was gone, then with the Crown 
Prince the constitutional cause would triumph. 

How different was the future to be! Year after 
year the conflict continued. Each year the House \J 
was summoned and the Budget laid before it ; each 
year the House rejected the Budget ; they threw 
out Government measures, they refused the loans, 
and they addressed the King to dismiss his Ministers. 
The sessions, however, were very short; that of 1864 
lasted only a few weeks. 

Each year Bismarck's open contempt for -the Par- 
liament and their unqualified hatred of him increased. J/'''^ 
The people still continued to support their represent- 
atives. The cities still continued to withhold their 
loyal addresses to the King. With each year, how- 
ever, the Government gained confidence. It was 
easy to see that the final result would depend on 
the success of the Government in external affairs. 
To these we must now turn, 

English opinion at that time was unanimously 
opposed to the King; it is difficult even now to /^ 
judge the issue. It was natural for Englishmen to 
sympathise with those who wished to imitate them. 
Their pride was pleased when they found the ablest 
Parliamentary leaders, the most learned historians 
and keenest jurists desirous to assimilate the institu- 



1 88 Bis77ta7'-ck. [1862^ 

tions of Prussia to those which existed in England. It 
is just this which ought to make us pause. What do 
we think of pohticians who try to introduce among 
us the institutions and the faults of foreign countries ? 
" Why will not the King of Prussia be content 
with the position which the Queen of England holds, 
or the King of the Belgians, — then all his unpopular- 
ity would be gone ? " was a question asked at the time 
by an English writer. We may ask, on the other 
hand, why should the King of Prussia sacrifice his 
power and prerogative ? The question is really as 
absurd as it would be to ask, why is not an English 
Parliament content with the power enjoyed by the 
Prussian Parliament? It was a commonplace of the 
time, that the continued conflict shewed a want of 
statesmanship ; so it did, if it is statesmanship always 
to court popularity and always to surrender one's 
cause when one believes it to be right, even at the 
risk of ruining one's country. It must be remem- 
bered that through all these years the existence of 
Prussia was at stake. If the Prussian Government 
insisted on the necessity for a large and efficient 
army, they were accused of reckless militarism. 
People forgot that the Prussian Monarchy could no 
more maintain itself without a large army than the 
British Empire could without a large navy. In all 
the secret diplomatic negotiations of the time, the 
dismemberment of Prussia was a policy to be con- 
sidered. France wished to acquire part of the left 
bank of the Rhine, Austria had never quite given .up 
hope of regaining part of Silesia; it was not fifty 
years since Prussia had acquired half the kingdom 



1863J The Conflict. 189 

of Saxony ; might not a hostile coaHtion restore this 
territory ? And then the philanthropy of England 
and the intrigues of France were still considering 
the possibility of a revived Poland, but in Poland 
would have to be included part of the territory 
which Prussia had acquired. 

It is often said that from this conflict must be 
dated the great growth of militarism in Europe ; it 
is to the victory of the King and Bismarck that we 
are to attribute the wars which followed and the 
immense armaments which since then have been \/ 
built up in Europe. To a certain extent, of course, 
this is true, though it is not clear that the presence 
of these immense armies is an unmixed evil. It 
is, however, only half the truth ; the Prussian Gov- 
ernment was not solely responsible. It was not 
they who began arming, it was not they who first 
broke the peace which had been maintained in 
Europe since 18 15. Their fault seems to have been, 
not that they armed first, but that when they put '^ 
their hand to the work, they did it better than other 
nations. If they are exposed to any criticism in the 
matter, it must rather be this, that the Government 
of the late King had unduly neglected the army ; 
they began to prepare not too soon but almost too 
late. It was in Austria in 1848 that the new mili- 
tary dominion began ; Austria was supported by 
Russia and imitated by France ; Prussia, surrounded 
by these empires, each at least double herself in 
population, was compelled to arm in self-defence. 
By not doing so sooner she had incurred the dis- 
grace of Olmiitz ; her whole policy had been weak 



190 Bismarck. [1862- 

and vacillating, because the Government was fright- 
ened at stirring up a conflict in which they would 
almost certainly be defeated. 4, 

There is one other matter with regard to the con- 
flict so far as regards Bismarck personally. We 
must always remember that he was not responsible 
for it. It had originated at a time when he was 

Wabsent from Germany, and had very little influence 
on the conduct of affairs. Had he been Minister 
two years before, there probably would have been 
no conflict at all. The responsibility for it lies 
partly with the leaders of the Liberal party, whc, as 
we know from memoirs that have since been pub- 
lished, were acting against their own convictions, in 
opposing the military demands of the Government, 
for they feared that otherwise the party would not 
follow them. Much of the responsibility also rests 

^ Avith the Ministry of the neiv era; they had mis- 
managed affairs ; the mismanagement arose from 
the want of union among them, for the Liberal 
majority were in many matters opposed to the King 
and the throne. It was this want of cordial co- 
operation in the Ministry which led to the great 
blunder by which the Minister of War acted in a 
way which seemed to be, and in fact was, a breach 
of an engagement made by the Minister of Finance. 
Had Bismarck been in authority at the time, we 
can hardly doubt that he would have found some 
way of effecting a compromise between the Govern- 
ment and the leaders of the Moderate Liberal party. 
At least no blame attached to him for what had 
happened. Still less can we afford him anything 



1863] 



The Conflict. 



191 



but the highest commendation, that, when the King ,/ 
had got into an absolutely untenable position, he 
came forward, and at the risk of his reputation, his 
future, perhaps his life, stood by his side. 




CHAPTER VIII. 



SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 



1 863-1 864. 



WE have seen that the result of the conflict 
would eventually depend upon the man- 
agement of foreign affairs. Bismarck be- 
fore his appointment had always said that the 
Government could only gain freedom at home by a 
more vigorous policy abroad. He was now in a 
position to follow the policy he desired. The conflict 
made him indispensable to the King ; if he retired, 
the King would have to surrender to the House. 
This was always present to his mind and enabled 
him to keep his influence against all his enemies, who 
throughout the spring" had used every effort to un- 
dermine his authority with the King. 

There were many who thought that he deliberately 
maintained the friction in order to make himself 
indispensable, and in truth his relations to the Par- 
liament had this advantage, that there was no use in 
attempting to take into consideration their wishes. 
Had he been supported by a friendly House he would 

192 



1863] Schlesivig-Holstein. 193 

have had to justify his policy, perhaps to modify it ; 
as it was, since they were sure to refuse supplies 
whatever he did, one or two more votes of censure 
were a matter of indifference to him, and he went on 
his own way directing the diplomacy of the country 
with as sure and firm a hand as though no Parliament 
existed. 

In the autumn he had the first opportunity for 
shewing how great his influence already was. Dur- 
ing the summer holidays, he was in almost constant 
attendance on the King, who as usual had gone to 
Gastein for a cure. Perhaps he did not venture to 
leave the King, but he often complained of the new 
conditions in which his life was passed ; he wished 
to be back with his wife and children in Pomerania. 
He writes to his wife from Baden : " I wish that some 
intrigue would necessitate another Ministry, so that 
I might honourably turn my back on this basin of 
ink and live quietly in the country. The restlessness 
of this life is unbearable ; for ten weeks I have been 
doing clerk's work at an inn — it is no life for an hon- 
est country gentleman." 

At the end of July, a proposal came from the Em- 
peror of Austria which, but for Bismarck's firmness, 
might have had very far-reaching results. The Em- 
peror had visited the King and discussed with him 
proposals for the reform of the Confederation. He 
explained an Austrian plan for the reform which was 
so much needed, and asked the King if he would 
join in an assembly of all the German Princes to 
discuss the plan. The King for many reasons re- 
fused ; nevertheless two days afterwards formal invit- 
13 



194 Bismarck. [1863- 

ations were sent out to all the Princes and to the 
Burgomasters of the free cities, inviting them to a 
Congress which was to meet at Frankfort. All the 
other Princes accepted, and the Congress met on the 
15th of August. The Emperor presided in person, 
and he hoped to be able to persuade them to adopt 
his proposals, which would be very favourable for 
Austria. It was, however, apparent that without the 
presence of the King of Prussia the Congress would 
come to no result ; it was therefore determined to 
send a special deputation to invite him to recon- 
sider his refusal. The King had the day before 
moved from Karlsbad to Baden and was therefore in 
the immediate neighbourhood of Frankfort. It was 
very difficult for him not to accept this special invi- 
tation. " How can I refuse," he said, " when thirty 
Princes invite me and they send the message by a 
King!" 

Personally he wished to go, though he agreed with 
Bismarck that it would be wiser to stay away ; all 
his relations pressed him to go. It would have 
been pleasant for once to meet in friendly conclave 
all his fellow Princes. Bismarck, however, was de- 
termined that it should not be. He also had gone 
to Baden-Baden ; the King consulted him before 
sending the answer. After a long and exhausting 
struggle, Bismarck gained his point and a refusal 
was sent. He had threatened to resign if his advice 
were not taken. As soon as the letter was sealed 
and despatched, Bismarck turned to a tray with 
glasses which stood on the table and smashed them 
in pieces. " Are you ill ? " asked a friend who was 




EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH. 



1864] Schleswig-Holstem. 195 

in the room. " No," was the answer ; " I was, but I 
am better now. I felt I must break something." 
So much were his nerves affected by the struggle. 

The Congress went on without the representative 
of Prussia. The Kings and Princes discussed the 
proposals in secret session. They enjoyed this un- 
accustomed freedom ; for the first time they had 
been able to discuss the affairs of their own country 
without the intervention of their Ministers. The 
Ministers had, of course, come to Frankfort, but 
they found themselves excluded from all participa- 
tion in affairs. With what admiration and jealousy 
must they have looked on Bismarck, but there was 
none of them who had done for his Prince what Bis- 
marck had for the King of Prussia. 

Perhaps it was his intention at once to press for- 
ward the struggle with Austria for supremacy in 
Germany. If so, he was to be disappointed. A new 
difficulty was now appearing in the diplomatic 
world: the Schleswig-Holstein question, which had 
been so long slumbering, broke out into open fire, 
and nearly three years were to pass before Bismarck 
was able to resume the policy on which he had 
determined. Men often speak as though he were 
responsible for the outbreak of this difficulty and 
the war which followed ; that was far from being 
the case ; it interrupted his plans as much as did the 
Polish question. We shall have to see with what 
ingenuity he gained for his country an advantage 
from what appeared at first to be a most incon- 
venient situation. 

\Ve must shortly explain the origin of this ques- 



196 Bismarck. [1863- 

tion, the most complicated that has ever occupied 
European diplomacy. 

The Duchy of Holstein had been part of the Ger- 
man Empire ; for many hundreds of years the Duke 
of Holstein had also been King of Denmark ; the 
connection at first had been a purely personal union ; 
it was, however, complicated by the existence of the 
Duchy of Schleswig. Schleswig was outside the 
Confederation, as it had been outside the German 
Empire, and had in old days been a fief of the King- 
dom of Denmark. The nobles of Holstein had, 
however, gradually succeeded in extending German 
influence and the German language into Schleswig, 
so that this Duchy had become more than half 
German. Schleswig and Holstein were also joined 
together by very old customs, which were, it is said, 
founded on charters given by the Kings of Den- 
mark ; it was claimed that the two Duchies were 
always to be ruled by the same man, and also that 
they were to be kept quite distinct from the King- 
dom of Denmark. These charters are not undis- 
puted, but in this case, as so often happens in 
politics, the popular belief in the existence of a right 
was to be more important than the legal question 
whether the right really existed. 

The trouble began about 1 830. There was a 
double question, the question of constitution and 
the question of inheritance. The Danes, desirous 
to consolidate the Monarchy, had neglected the 
rights of the old local Estates in the Duchies ; this 
led to an agitation and a conflict. It was a struggle 
for the maintenance of local privileges against the 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. i(^y 

Monarchy in Copenhagen. Moreover, a vigorous 
democratic party had arisen in Denmark ; their ob- 
ject was to incorporate the whole of Schleswig in 
the Danish Monarchy ; they did not care what hap- 
pened to Holstein. This party were called the 
Eider Danes, for they wished Denmark to be ex- 
tended to the Eider. Against this proposed separa- 
tion of the two Duchies violent protests were raised, 
and in 1848 a rebellion broke out. This was the re- 
bellion which had been supported in that year by 
Prussia, and it had the universal sympathy of every- 
one in Germany, Princes and people alike. 

The question of constitution was complicated by 
one of succession. The male line of the Royal House 
which ruled in Denmark was dying out ; according 
to a law introduced in 1660, descendants of the fe- 
male branch might succeed in the Kingdom. This 
law had proba.bly never been legally enacted for the 
Duchies ; in Schleswig and Holstein the old Salic 
law prevailed. In the ordinary course of things, on 
the~death of Frederick VH., who had succeeded in 
1847, the long connection between Holstein and 
Denmark would cease. Would, however, Schleswig 
go with Holstein or with Denmark ? Every Schles- 
wig-Holsteiner and every German declared that the 
two Duchies must remain for ever " unvertheilt " ; 
the majority of the Danes determined, whatever the 
law might be, that they would keep Schleswig, which 
had once been Danish. The King took a different 
line ; he wished to maintain all the possessions in his 
House, and that the same man should succeed both 
in the Kingdom and the Duchies. There was no 



198 Bzsma7'-ck. [1863- 

authority qualified to decide the legal question ; and 
therefore the question of right was sure to become 
one of power. At first, strange as it may seem, the 
power was on the side of the Danes. Germany was 
weak and disunited, the Prussian troops who had 
been sent to help the rebellion were withdrawn, and 
the surrender of Olmiitz was fatal to the inhabitants 
of the Duchies. The whole question was brought 
before a European Congress which met at London. 
The integrity of the Danish Monarchy was declared 
to be a European interest ; and the Congress of the 
Powers presumed to determine who should succeed 
to the ducal and royal power. They chose Christian 
of Glucksburg, and all the Powers pledged them- 
selves to recognise him as ruler over all the domin- 
ions of the King of Denmark. 

Prussia and Austria were among the Powers who 
signed the Treaty of London, but the Diet of Frank- 
fort was not bound by it. At the same time, Den- 
mark had entered into certain engagements pledging 
itself to preserve the separation between Schleswig- 
Holstein and Denmark, and also not to oppress the 
German people in Schleswig. The Danes did not 
keep their engagement ; despising the Germans, 
they renewed the old policy, attempted to drive 
back the German language, and introduced new laws 
which were inconsistent with the local privileges of 
Holstein and Schleswig. The Holstein Estates ap- 
pealed for protection to the Diet. The Germans 
protested, but the Danes were obstinate. As years 
went on, the excitement of the Germans grew ; they 
believed, and justly believed, that it was a matter of 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 199 

honour to defend the rights of the Duchies. Schles- 
wig-Holstein was the symbol of German weakness 
and disgrace, and in defence of them the national 
enthusiasm was again roused. 

With this popular enthusiasm Bismarck had no 
sympathy ; and he had no interest for the cause of / 

Schleswig-Holstein. He had originally considered \y/ 
the inhabitants merely as rebels against their lawful 
sovereign. He had learnt at Frankfort sufficient to 
make this indifferent to him, but he still regarded 
them as foreigners and looked on their claims merely 
from the point of view of Prussian interests. Both 
his sympathy and his reason led him in fact rather 
to take the Danish side. " The maintenance of 
Denmark is in our interest," he wrote in 1857, t>ut 
Denmark could only continue to exist if it were 
ruled, more or less arbitrarily, with provincial Estates 
as it has been for the last hundred years ; and in 
another letter : " We have no reason to desire that the 
Holsteiners should live very happily under their 
Duke, for if they do they will no longer be interested 
in Prussia, and under certain circumstances their 
interest may be very useful to us. It is important 
that, however just their cause may be, Prussia should 
act with great prudence." He recognised that if 
the complaints of the Duchies led again to a war 
between Germany and Denmark all the loss would 
fall on Prussia ; the coast of Prussia was exposed to 
the attacks of the Danish fleet. If the war was suc- 
cessful, the result would be to strengthen the Diet 
and the Federal Constitution ; and, as we know, that 
was the last thing which Bismarck desired ; if it 



200 Bismarck. 



[1863- 



failed, the disgrace and the blame would fall upon 
Prussia. 

The only thing which would have induced him 
warmly to take up the cause was the prospect of 
winning the Duchies for Prussia, but of that there 
seemed little hope. 

So long, therefore, as he remained at Frankfort, he 
had endeavoured to keep the peace, and he continued 
this policy after he became Minister. The greater 
number of the German States wished to carry out 
a Federal execution in Holstein ; he tried to 
avert this and warmly gave his support to Lord 
Russell in his attempt to settle the question by Eng- 
lish mediation. His efforts, however, were unavail- 
ing, for the Danish Government, presuming on the 
weakness of Germany, continued their provocative 
action. On March 30, 1863, a new Constitution was 
proclaimed, completely severing Holstein from the 
rest of the Monarchy. The Holstein Estates had 
not been consulted and appealed to the Diet for 
protection ; the law of the Federation enabled the 
Diet in a case like this to occupy the territory of the 
offending sovereign in order to compel him to rule 
according to the Constitution. The national German 
party wished to go farther, to confuse the questions 
of Schleswig and of Holstein, and so bring about a 
war with Denmark. Bismarck wrote to the Duke of 
Oldenburg to explain his objections to this : it would 
make the worst impression in England ; and he in- 
sisted that they should attempt nothing more than 
Federal execution in Holstein. As Holstein belonged 
to the Federation, this would be a purely German 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 201 

affair and no ground would be given for interfering 
to England or France. In consequence, the simple 
execution in Holstein was voted. Even now, how- 
ever, Bismarck did not give up hopes of keeping 
peace. He brought pressure to bear on the Danes 
and was supported by England. If only they would 
withdraw the proclamation of March 30th, and ac- 
cept English mediation for Schleswig, he promised 
them that he would use all his influence to prevent 
the execution and would probably be successful. 

His moderation, which received the warm approval 
of Lord Russell, of course only added to his unpop- 
ularity in Germany. The Danish Government, how- 
ever, refused to accept Bismarck's proposal ; they 
brought in still another Constitution by which the 
complete incorporation of Schleswig with the Mon- 
archy was decreed. This was an overt breach of their 
treaty engagements and a declaration of war with Ger- 
many. At the beginning of November, it was carried 
through the Rigsrad by the required majority of two- 
thirds, and was sent up to the King to receive his sig- 
nature. Before he had time to sign it the King died. 

It was expected that the death of the King would 
make little difference in the situation, for it had been 
agreed that Christian of Glucksburg should succeed to 
all the provinces of the Monarchy. The first act he 
had to perform was the signature of the new Consti- 
tution ; it is said that he hesitated, but was told by 
the Ministers that if he refused they would answer 
neither for his crown nor his head. On November 
23d he signed. 

Before this had happened the situation had re- 



202 Bismarck. 



[1863- 



ceived an unexpected change. A new claimant ap- 
peared to dispute his title to the Duchies. The 
day after the death of the King, Frederick, eldest 
son of the Duke of Augustenburg, published a pro- 
clamation announcing his succession to the Duchy 
under the title of Frederick VIII. No one seems to 
have foreseen this step ; it was supposed that after 
the agreement of 1853 the question of succession 
had been finally settled. The whole of the German 
nation, however, received with enthusiasm the news 
that it was again to be raised. 

They believed that the Prince was the lawful heir ; 
they saw in his claim the possibility of permanently 
separating the Duchies from Denmark. Nothing 
seemed to stand between this and accomplishment 
except the Treaty of London. Surely the rights of 
the Duchies, and the claim of Augustenburg, sup- 
ported by united Germany, would be strong enough 
to bear down this treaty which was so unjust. 

The question will be asked, was the claim of 
Augustenburg valid? No positive answer can be 
given, for it has never been tried by a competent 
court of law. It may, however, I think, be said that 
although there were objections, which might invali- 
date his right to at least a part of the Duchies, it is 
almost certain that a quite impartial tribunal would 
have decided that he had at least a better claim than 
any of his rivals. This at least would have been 
true fifteen years before. When, however, the Treaty 
of London was arranged it was necessary to procure 
the renunciation of all the different claimants. That 
of the Emperor of Russia, the Duke of Oldenburg, 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 203 

and others was obtained without much difificulty ; 
the Duke of Augustenburg long refused. In order 
to compel him to renounce, the Danish Government 
refused to restore to him his private property, which 
had been confiscated owing to the part he had taken 
in the late rebellion. He had been enormously 
wealthy, but was now living in exile and deprived of 
his revenues. By this means they had at last in- 
duced him to sign a document, in which he pro- 
mised, for himself and his successors, not to make 
any attempt to enforce his claims to the succession. 
The document was curiously worded ; there was no 
actual renunciation, only a promise to abstain from 
action. In return for this a sum of money, not 
equal, however, to that which he had lost, was handed 
over to him. Now it was Bismarck who, while en- 
voy at Frankfort, had carried on the negotiations ; 
he had taken much trouble about the matter, and 
earned the warm gratitude both of the King of 
Denmark and of the Duke. There is, I think, no 
doubt that he beheved that the agreement was a 
bona fide one and would be maintained. Since then 
the Duke had renounced all his claims in favour of 
his eldest son ; Prince Frederick had not signed the 
contract and maintained that he was not bound by 
it. Of course Bismarck could not admit this, and 
his whole attitude towards the Prince must from the 
beginning be hostile. 

It is only fair to point out that there was no rea- 
son whatever why the Augustenburgs should do 
anything more than that to which they were bound 
by the strict letter of the agreement ; they had no 



204 Bismarck. [1863- 

ties of gratitude towards Denmark ; they had not, as 
is often said, sold their rights, for they had received 
only a portion of their own possessions. However 
this may be, his claim was supported, not only 
by the people and Parliaments, but by leaders of 
the German Governments, headed by the King of 
Bavaria. 

Bismarck was now asked to denounce the Treaty 
of London to which Prussia had given her assent ; 
to support the claims of Augustenburg ; to carry 
out the policy of the Diet, and if necessary to allow 
the Prussian army to be used in fighting for Prince 
Frederick against the King of Denmark. This he 
had not the slightest intention of doing. He had 
to consider first of all that Prussia was bound by 
treaties. As he said : " We may regret that we 
signed, but the signature took place. Honour as 
well as wisdom allows us to leave no doubt as to our 
loyalty to our engagements." He had moreover to 
consider that if he acted as the Germans wished he 
would find himself opposed, not only by Denmark, 
but also by Russia and England, and in military op- 
erations on the narrow peninsula the power of the 
English fleet would easily outbalance the superiority 
of the Prussian army. Moreover, and this was the 
point which affected him most, what good would 
come to Prussia even if she were successful in this 
war ? "I cannot regard it as a Prussian interest to 
wage war in order in the most favourable result to 
establish a new Grand Duke in Schleswig-Holstein, 
who out of fear of Prussian aggression would vote 
against us at the Diet." 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 205 

His policy, therefore, was clearly marked out for 
him: he must refuse to recognise the claims of Au- 
gustenburg ; he must refuse to break the Treaty of 
London. This, however, would not prevent him 
from bringing pressure to bear on the new King of 
Denmark, as he had done on his predecessor, to in- 
duce him to abide by his treaty engagements, and, 
if he did not do so, from declaring war against him. 

There was even at this time in his mind another 
thought. He had the hope that in some way or 
other he might be able to gain a direct increase of 
territory for Prussia. If they recognised the Au- 
gustenburg claims this would be always impossible, 
for then either the Duchies would remain under the 
King of Denmark or, if the Danes were defeated, 
they would have to be given to the Prince. 

In this policy he was supported by Austria. The 
Austrian Government was also bound by the Treaty 
of London ; they were much annoyed at the violent 
and almost revolutionary agitation which had broken 
out in Germany ; it was with much relief that they 
learned that Prussia, instead of heading the move- 
ment as in 1849, w^s ready to oppose it. The two 
great Powers so lately in opposition now acted in 
close union. 

Issue was joined at the Diet between the two part- 
ies. The Prince brought his claim before it, and 
those who supported him proposed that, as the suc- 
cession to the Duchies was in dispute, they should 
be occupied by a Federal army until the true ruler 
had been determined. Against this Austria and 
Prussia proposed that the Federal execution in Hoi- 



2o6 Bismarck. [1863- 

stein, which had before been resolved on, should be 
at once carried out. If the execution were voted it 
would be an indirect recognition of Christian as ruler, 
for it would be carried out as against his Govern- 
ment ; on this point, execution or occupation, the 
votes were taken. 

Bismarck was, however, greatly embarrassed by 
the strong influence which the Prince of Augusten- 
burg had in the Prussian Royal Family ; he was an 
intimate friend of the Crown Princess, and the Crown 
Princess and the King himself regarded his claims 
with favour. Directly after his proclamation the 
pretender came to Berlin ; he had a very friendly 
reception from the King, who expressed his deep 
regret that he was tied by the London Convention, 
but clearly shewed that he hoped this difficulty 
might be overcome. Bismarck took another line ; 
he said that he was trying to induce the new King 
not to sign the Constitution ; the Prince, to Bis- 
marck's obvious annoyance, explained that that 
would be no use ; he should maintain his claims just 
the same. 

The King disliked the Treaty of London as much 
as everyone else did ; he had to agree to Bismarck's 
arguments that it would not be safe to denounce it, 
but he would have been quite willing, supposing 
Prussia was outvoted in the Diet, to accept the vote 
and obey the decision of the majority ; he even 
hoped that this would be the result. Bismarck would 
have regarded an adverse vote as a sufficient reason 
for retiring from the Federation altogether. Were 
Prussia outvoted, it would be forced into a Euro- 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 207 

pean war, which he wished to avoid, and made to 
fight as a single member of the German Confedera- 
tion. Rather than do this he would prefer to fight 
on the other side ; " Denmark is a better ally than 
the German States," he said. The two parties were 
contending as keenly at the Prussian Court as at 
Frankfort ; Vincke wrote a long and pressing letter 
to the King ; Schleinitz appeared again, supported as 
of old by the Queen ; the Crown Prince was still in 
England, but he and his wife were enthusiastic on the 
Prince's side. 

How much Bismarck was hampered by adverse 
influences at Court we see from a letter to Roon : 

" I am far removed from any hasty or selfish resolu- 
tion, but I have a feeling that tlie cause of the King 
against the Revolution is lost ; his heart is in the other 
camp and he has more confidence in his opponents than 
his friends. For us it will be indifferent, one year or 
thirty years hence, but not for our children. The King 
has ordered me to come to him before the sitting to dis- 
cuss what is to be said ; I shall not say much, partly 
because I have not closed my eyes all night and am 
wretched, and then I really do not know what to say. 
They will certainly reject the loan, and his Majesty at 
the risk of breaking with Europe and experiencing a 
second Olmiitz will at last join the Democracy, and work 
with it in order to set up Augustenburg and found a new 
State. What is the good of making speeches and scold- 
ing? Without some miracle of God the game is lost. 
Now and with posterity the blame will be laid upon 
us. As God will. He will know how long Prussia has 
to exist. But God knows I shall be sorry when it 
ceases." 



2o8 Bis77iarck. [1863- 

The only ally that Bismarck had was Austria. 
Their combined influence was sufficiently strong by 
a majority of one to carry through the Diet execu- 
tion instead of occupation ; though there was ap- 
pended to the motion a rider that the question of 
succession was not thereby prejudiced. 

The execution took place. During the month of 
December the Hanoverians and Saxons occupied 
Holstein ; the Danes did not resist but retreated 
across the Eider. At the end of the year the occu- 
pation was complete. In the rear of the German 
troops had come also the Prince of Augustenburg, 
who had settled himself in the land of which he 
claimed to be ruler. 

What was now to be done ? The Augustenburg 
party wished at once to press forward with the 
question of the succession ; let the Diet decide this 
immediately ; then hand over Holstein to the new 
Duke and immediately seize Schleswig also and vin- 
dicate it from Christian, the alien usurper. Bismarck 
would not hear of this ; he still maintained his policy 
that Prussia should not denounce the London Con- 
vention, should recognise the sovereignty of Christ- 
ian, and should demand from him as lawful ruler 
of all the Danish possessions the repeal of the obnox- 
ious November Constitution. In this he was still 
supported by Austria ; if the Danes did not acquiesce 
in these very moderate demands, the Germans should 
enter Schleswig and seize it as a security. Then he 
would be able when he wished to free himself from 
the Treaty of London, for war dissolves all treaties. 

The advantage of this plan was that it entirely de- 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 209 

prived England of any grounds for interference ; 
Prussia alone was now defending the London Con- 
vention ; Prussia was preventing the Diet from a 
breach of treaty ; the claim of Denmark was one in 
regard to which the Danes were absolutely wrong. 
Bismarck had therefore on his side Austria, Russia, 
probably France, and averted the hostility of Eng- 
land. Against him was German public opinion, the 
German Diet, and the Prussian Parliament ; every- 
one, that is, whom he neither feared nor regarded. 
So long as the King was firm he could look with 
confidence to the future, even though he did not 
know what it would bring forth. 

With the Parliament indeed nothing was to be 
done ; they, of course, strongly supported Augusten- 
burg. They refused to look at the question from a 
Prussian point of view. " On your side," Bismarck 
said, " no one dares honestly to say that he acts for 
the interests of Prussia and as a Prussian." They 
feared that he proposed to hand back the Duchies to 
Denmark; they refused to consider him seriously as 
Foreign Minister ; they spoke of him as a rash ama- 
teur. It was to attack him on his most sensitive 
point. Here, at least, he felt on completely secure 
ground ; diplomacy was his profession ; what did the 
professors and talkers in the Chamber know of it ? 
They were trying to control the policy of the State, 
but, he said, " in these days an Assembly of 350 
members cannot in the last instance direct the policy 
of a great Power." The Government asked for a 
loan for military operations; he appealed to their 
patriotism, but it was in vain ; the House voted an 



2IO Bismarck. 



[1863- 



address to the King, remonstrating against the con- 
duct of foreign affairs, and threw out the loan by a 
majority of 275 to 51. "If you do not vote the 
money, we shall take it where we can get it," Bis- 
marck had warned them. The House was immedi- 
ately prorogued after a session of only two months, 
not to meet again till January, 1865. 

This policy of Bismarck was proposed by Austria 
and Prussia at the Diet ; the other States refused to 
adopt it, as they wished to raise the question of 
succession ; on a division Prussia was outvoted. The 
two great Powers therefore entered into a separate 
agreement in which, while still recognising the in- 
tegrity of the Danish Monarchy, they undertook to 
force the King to withdraw the obnoxious Constitu- 
tion, and, if he did not consent to do so, they agreed 
to occupy Schleswig. 

The Prussian House, in its address to the King, 
had declared that the only result of this policy would 
be to give back the Duchies to Denmark. Was there 
no fear of this ? What would have happened had 
Denmark after all given in, as England strongly 
pressed her to do? Had she withdrawn the obnox- 
ious Constitution, and granted all that Bismarck 
asked, why then Prussia and Austria would have 
been bound to support the integrity of Denmark, 
and, if necessary, by force of arms to eject the Fed- 
eral troops from Holstein. Bismarck had consid- 
ered this contingency, and guarded himself against 
it. Many years later Beust put the question to him. 
" Oh, I was all right," he answered ; " I had assured 
myself that the Danes would not give in. I had 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 2 1 1 

led them to think that England would support them, 
though I knew this was not the case." He had, 
however, even a surer guarantee than this; the ulti- 
matum presented to Denmark was couched in such 
a form that even if he would the King could not 
comply with it. The requirement was that the Con- 
stitution should be revoked before the 1st of Janu- 
ary, By the Constitution the King could not do 
this of his own prerogative ; he must have the assent 
of the Rigsrad. This assent could not be obtained 
for the following reasons : the Rigsrad of the old 
Constitution had been dissolved and had no longer 
a legal existence ; a new assembly could not be 
summoned before the 1st of January — there was 
not time. If an assembly were summoned after that 
date, it must be of course summoned according to 
the new Constitution. To do this, however, would 
be to bring the obnoxious Constitution actually into 
force, and would mean, so to speak, a declaration of 
war against Prussia. If the King wished to give in 
he must have time ; he must be allowed to summon 
the new assembly, lay before it the German de- 
mands, and require it to declare its own revocation. 
The English Government, still anxious to keep the 
peace, represented to Bismarck the dilemma in which 
he had placed the Danes. Lord Wodehouse, who 
was in Berlin in December, requested that at least 
more time should be allowed. Bismarck refused to 
listen to the request. 

" These constitutional questions," he said, " had no- 
thing to do with him ; the Danes had put off the Germans 
for years ; they could not wait any longer. The King 



212 Bismarck. 



[1863- 



could always make a coup d'etat ; he would have to do so 
sooner or later. Germany and Denmark could never be 
at peace so long as the Democratic party had the au- 
thority." 

Denmark did not give way; the help from Eng- 
land, on which they had reckoned, was not forth- 
coming ; the fatal day passed ; the Austrians and 
Prussians entered Holstein, marched across that 
Duchy, and in the early part of February began the 
invasion of Schleswig. The relations of the Allied 
troops to the Federal army of occupation were very 
remarkable. Both were opposed to the Danes, but 
they were equally opposed to one another ; had 
they dared to do so, the Saxons would have op- 
posed the Prussian advance. As it was they sul- 
lenly watched the Prussian and Austrian columns 
marching north to the invasion of Denmark. 

It was the first time that the remodelled Prussian 
army had been tested on the field of battle ; Bis- 
marck had brought it about that they were fighting 
for the cause of Germany and in alliance with 
Austria. As soon as war began, his own position 
improved. The King and the army were, of course, 
all the more confident in a Minister who had given 
them so good a cause of war and allowed them to 
take the field side by side with their old ally. Their 
superiority in number and discipline ensured success 
in the military operations ; the Danes evacuated 
their first position at the Dannewirk ; the German 
troops occupied the whole of Schleswig, then after 
some further delay advanced into Jutland, and 
finally began the siege of the strong fortification of 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 213 

the Diippel. The taking of this was a difficult piece 
of work, which, after some delay, was successfully 
carried out at the beginning of April. 

Meanwhile the diplomatic difficulties had con- 
tinued. There had now come from England the 
proposal of a Conference. This Bismarck, always 
wishing to preserve the appearance of moderation, 
accepted. Before doing so, he knew that he had 
gained a very important ally. Napoleon was dis- 
pleased with the English Government ; he it was 
who suggested to Bismarck that the best solution 
of the difficulty would be the annexation of the 
Duchies to Prussia. It was just what Bismarck him- 
self desired. Would he be able to bring it about? 
This was what was in his mind when he had to 
consider the attitude he should adopt at the 
Conference. 

He could not, of course, propose it openly;' he 
might be able to arrange affairs so that in the uni- 
versal confusion this solution should be welcomed. 
He first of all began to change his attitude towards 
the German agitation for Augustenburg ; hitherto 
he had opposed and discouraged it ; now he let it 
have free course. He wrote : 

" The present situation is such that it seems to me 
desirable to let loose the whole pack against the Danes 
at the Congress ; the joint noise will work in the direc- 
tion of making the subjugation of the Duchies to Den- 
mark appear impossible to foreigners ; they will have to 
consider programmes which the Prussian Government 
cannot lay before them." 



214 Bismarck. [1863- 

What this means is that England and Russia were 
to be convinced that Denmark could not regain the 
Duchies ; then they would have to consider who 
should have them. Bismarck believed that Austria 
was irrevocably opposed to Augustenburg. " She 
would rather see the Duchies in our hands than in 
those of the Prince," he wrote. Austria and Russia 
would, therefore, oppose this solution ; if both Den- 
mark and Augustenburg were impossible, then would 
be the time for France to ask why should they not 
be given to Prussia, and to join this proposal with 
another one for the division of the Duchies accord- 
ing to nationality. 

Napoleon, in accordance with his principles, wished 
entirely to disregard the question of law ; he was 
equally indifferent to the Treaty of London, the 
hereditary rights of Augustenburg, or the chartered 
privileges of the Duchies. He wished to consult 
the inhabitants and allow each village to vote 
whether it wished to be German or Danish ; thus, 
districts in the north where Danish was spoken 
would then be incorporated in Denmark ; the whole 
of Holstein and the south of Schleswig would be per- 
manently united to Germany, and by preference to 
Prussia. These revolutionary principles of Napo- 
leon were in the eyes of the Austrian statesmen 
criminal, for if applied consistently not only would 
Austria be deprived of Venetia, but the whole Em- 
pire would be dissolved. It required all Bismarck's 
ingenuity to maintain the alliance with Austria, 
which was still necessary to him, and at the same 
time to keep Napoleon's friendship by giving his 




BISMARCK. 

FROM A PAINTING BY F. VON LENBACH. 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 215 

assent to doctrines that would be so convenient to 
Prussia. 

In considering Bismarck's diplomatic work we 
must not suppose that he ever deceived himself into 
thinking that he would be able clearly to foresee all 
that would happen ; he knew too well the uncertain 
nature of the pieces with which he had to deal: no 
one could quite foretell, for instance, the result of the 
struggle which was going on in the English Ministry 
or the votes of the House of Commons ; equally 
impossible was it to build on the assurances of 
Napoleon. 

"The longer I work at politics," he said, "the smaller 
is my belief in human calculation. I look at the affair 
according to my human understanding, but gratitude for 
God's assistance so far, raises in me the confidence that 
the Lord is able to turn our errors to our own good ; that 
I experience daily to my wholesome humiliation." 

This time he had been mistaken in his forecast. 
In a despatch of May 23d to Austria he suggested 
two solutions, — ^the Augustenburg succession, and 
annexation by Prussia ; he inclined towards the for- 
mer, though, as he said, if the Prince was to be 
recognised, 

" it would be imperatively necessary to obtain guarantees 
for a Conservative administration, and some security that 
the Duchies should not become the home of democratic 
agitations." 

As he said elsewhere, " Kiel must not become a sec- 
ond Goth^." He no doubt anticipated that Austria 



2 1 6 Bismarck. 



[1863- 



would refuse this first alternative ; then the annex- 
ation by Prussia would naturally arise for discussion. 
Had Austria been consistent, all would have been well, 
but a change had taken place there ; the Government 
was not disinclined to win the popularity that would 
accrue to them if they took up the Augustenburg 
cause ; after all, Austria would be rather strengthened 
than weakened by the establishment of a new Fed- 
eral State, which, as all the other smaller Princes, 
would probably be inclined to take the Austrian side. 
In answer, therefore, to this despatch the Austrians, 
throwing aside all attempt at consistency, proposed 
vigorously to press the Augustenburg claim. " It is 
just what we were going to suggest ourselves," they 
said. Bismarck therefore was compelled now, as best 
he could, to get out of the difficulty, and, as Austria 
had not rejected it, he begins to withdraw the pro- 
posal he had himself made. To Bernstorff, his envoy 
at the Congress, he writes : 

" Austria is endeavouring to establish irrevocably the 
candidacy of Augustenburg in order by this means to 
render it difficult for Prussia to impose special conditions. 
We cannot consent to this. The dynastic questions must 
be discussed with special consideration for Prussian in- 
terests, and, consequently, other possibilities cannot be 
ruled out, until we have negotiated with Augustenburg 
and ascertained in what relation to Prussia he intends to 
place himself and his country. If the person of August- 
enburg meets with more opposition in the Conference 
than the project of a division, then let the former drop." 

The proposal, however, had to be made ; for once, 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 217 

all the German Powers appeared in agreement when 
they demanded from the neutrals the recognition of 
Augustenburg ; but Bismarck proposed it in such 
words as to avoid pledging himself to the legality. 
Of course the proposal was rejected by the Danes 
and Russians and it was allowed to fall to the ground. 
For Bismarck the interest is for the moment diverted 
from London to Berlin. 

The time had come when Bismarck should defin- 
itely decide on the attitude he was to adopt toward 
Augustenburg. Hitherto he had avoided committing 
himself irrevocably ; it was still open to him either to 
adopt him as the Prussian candidate on such condi- 
tions as might seem desirable, or to refuse to have any 
dealings with him. He had, in fact, kept both plans 
open, for it was characteristic of his diplomatic work 
that he would generally keep in his mind, and, to 
some extent, carry out in action, several different 
plans at the same time. If one failed him he could 
take up another. In this case he intended, if possi- 
ble, to get the Duchies for Prussia ; it was always to 
be foreseen that the difficulties might be insurmount- 
able; he had therefore to consider the next best 
alternative. This would be the creation of a new 
State, but one which was bound to Prussia by a spe- 
cial and separate treaty. There were many demands, 
some of them legitimate, which Prussia was prepared 
to make. Bismarck attributed great importance to 
the acquisition of Kiel, because he wanted to found 
a Prussian navy. Then he was very anxious to 
have a canal made across Holstein so that Prussian 
vessels could reach the North Sea without passing 



2i8 Bismarck. [1863- 

the Sound ; and of course he had to consider the 
military protection on the north. It would there- 
fore be a condition that, whoever was made Duke, 
certain military and other privileges should be 
granted to Prussia. On this, all through the sum- 
mer, negotiations were carried on unofficially be- 
tween the Prince of Augustenburg and the Prussian 
authorities. We cannot here discuss them in detail, 
but the Prince seems to have been quite willing to 
acquiesce in these naval and military requirements. 
He made several suggestions and objections in de- 
tail, and he also pointed out that constitutionally he 
could not enter into a valid treaty until after he had 
been made Duke and received the assent of the 
Estates. I think, however, that no one can doubt 
that he was quite loyal to Prussia and really wished 
to bring the matter to a satisfactory issue. As might 
be expected, he was very cautious in his negotia- 
tions with Bismarck, but his letters to the King are 
more open. Had Bismarck wished he could at any 
time have come to an agreement with the Prince, 
but he never gave the opportunity for a serious and 
careful discussion on the detailed wording of the con- 
ditions. He did not wish to be bound by them, but 
he kept the negotiations open in case events occurred 
which might compel him to accept this solution. 

In his treatment of the question he was, to some 
extent, influenced by the personal dislike he always 
felt for the Prince. 

What was the cause of this enmity ? There was 
nothing in the Prince's character to justify it ; he was 
a modestj honourable, and educa,ted man ; though 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 219 

deficient in practical ability, he had at a very critical 
time announced his claims to a decision and main- 
tained them with resolution. Bismarck, who in pri- 
vate life was always able to do justice to his enemies, 
recognised this: "I should have acted in just the 
same way myself had I been in your place," he said. 
He always himself said that his distrust of the 
Prince was caused by his dislike of the men whom 
the latter relied upon for advice. He was too closely 
connected with the Progressive party. He had 
surrounded himself with a kind of ministry, consist- 
ing chiefly of men who, though by birth inhabitants 
of the Duchies, had for some years been living at 
Gotha under the protection of the Duke of Coburg. 
They were strong Liberals and belonged to that 
party in Germany of which the Court of Coburg was 
the centre, who maintained a close connection with 
the Crown Prince, and who undoubtedly were look- 
ing forward to the time when the Crown Prince 
would become King of Prussia, Bismarck would be 
dismissed, and their party would come into offlce. 
This is probably quite sufficient reason to explain 
Bismarck's personal dislike of Augustenburg, though 
it is probable that he laid more stress on this aspect 
of the matter than he otherwise would have done, 
for he hoped thereby to prejudice the King against 
the Prince ; as long as the King recognised Augusten- 
burg's claims, his own hands would be tied in the 
attempt to win the Duchies for Prussia. 

He had, as we have seen, had a short interview 
with the Prince at the end of the previous year ; 
now a new meeting was arranged, avowedly to dis- 



2 20 Bismarck. 



[1863- 



cuss the conditions which Prussia would require if 
she supported the Prince. The Crown Prince, who 
was very anxious to help his friend, persuaded him 
to go to Berlin and if possible come to some clear 
understanding with the King and Bismarck. Au- 
gustenburg was reluctant to take this step. Loyal 
as he was to Prussia he much distrusted Bismarck. 
He feared that if he unreservedly placed his cause in 
Prussia's hands, Bismarck would in some way betray 
him. The position he took up was perfectly con- 
sistent. He was, by hereditary right, reigning Duke ; 
he only wished to be left alone with the Duchies ; 
he knew that if he was, they would at once recognise 
him and he would enter into government. In order 
to win his dominions, he had required the help of 
Germany ; it was comparatively indifferent to him 
whether the help came from Prussia, Austria, or the 
Federation. But he quite understood that Prussia 
must have some recompense for the help it had given. 
What he had to fear was that, if he entered into any 
separate and secret engagements with Prussia, he 
would thereby lose the support he enjoyed in the 
rest of Germany, and that then Bismarck would find 
some excuse not to carry out his promises, so that 
at the end he would be left entirely without support. 
We know that his suspicions were unfounded, for 
Bismarck was not the man in this way to desert any- 
one who had entered into an agreement with him, 
but Augustenburg could not know this and had 
every reason for distrusting Bismarck, who was his 
avowed enemy. 

On the 30th of May, the Prince, with many mis- 



1864] 



Schlesww-Holstein. 2 2 1 



givings, came to Berlin. The evening of the next 
day he had a long interview with Bismarck ; it began 
about nine o'clock and lasted till after midnight. 
There is no doubt that this interview was decisive 
against his chances. From that time Bismarck was 
determined that under no circumstances should he 
succeed, and we shall see that when Bismarck wished 
for anything he usually attained it. We would gladly, 
therefore, know exactly what happened ; both Bis- 
marck and the Prince have given accounts of what 
took place, but unfortunately they differ on very 
important points, and no one else was present at the 
interview. It is clear that the Prince throughout, for 
the reasons we have named, observed great reserve. 
It would undoubtedly have been wiser of him openly 
to place himself entirely in Bismarck's hands, to 
throw himself on the generosity of Prussia, and to 
agree to the terms which Bismarck offered. Why 
he did not do this we have explained. The con- 
versation chiefly turned on the Prussian demands 
for the harbour of Kiel and certain other concessions ; 
the Prince expressed himself quite willing to grant 
most of what was required, but he could not enter 
into any formal treaty without the consent of the Es- 
tates of the Duchies. When he left the room he 
seems to have been fairly satisfied with what had 
been said. If so he deceived himself grievously. 
Scarcely had he gone (it was already midnight) when 
Bismarck sent off despatches to St. Petersburg, Paris, 
and London, explaining that he was not inclined to 
support Augustenburg any longer, and instructing 
the Ambassadors to act accordingly. 



222 Bismarck. [1863- 

Not content with this he at once brought forward 
an alternative candidate. Among the many claim- 
ants to the Duchies had been the Duke of Olden- 
burg and the Czar, who both belonged to the same 
branch of the family. The Czar had, at the end of 
May, transferred his claims to the Duke, and Bis- 
marck now wrote to St. Petersburg that he would 
also be prepared to support him. We must not sup- 
pose that in doing this he had the slightest intention 
of allowing the Duke to be successful. He gained, 
however, a double advantage. First of all he pleased 
the Czar and prevented any dif^culties from Russia; 
secondly, the very fact of a rival candidate coming 
forward would indefinitely postpone any settlement. 
So long as Augustenburg was the only German candi- 
date there was always the danger, as at the Congress 
of London, that he might suddenly be installed and 
Bismarck be unable to prevent it. If, however, the 
Duke of Oldenburg came forward, Bismarck would 
at once take up the position that, as there were 
rival claimants, a proper legal verdict must be ob- 
tained and that Prussia could not act so unjustly 
as to prejudice the decision by extending her sup- 
port to either. It was not necessary for anyone to 
know that he himself had induced the Duke of 
Oldenburg to revive his claim. 

At the same time he took other steps to frustrate 
Augustenburg's hopes ; he caused the statement to 
be published in the Prussian papers that during the 
conversation of May 31st the Prince had said that 
he had never asked the Prussians for help, and that 
he could have got on very well without them. It 



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 223 

was just the sort of thing which would strongly 
prejudice the King against him, and Bismarck was 
very anxious to destroy the influence which the 
Prince still had with the King and with many other 
Prussians. At that time, and always later, the Prince 
denied that he had said anything of the kind. Even 
if, in the course of a long conversation, he had said 
anything which might have been interpreted to 
mean this, it was a great breach of confidence to 
publish these words from a private discussion taken 
out of their context. The Prussian Press received 
the word, and for years to come did not cease to 
pour out its venom against the Prince. This action 
of Bismarck's seemed quite to justify the apprehen- 
sion with which the Prince had gone to Berlin. 

It is not necessary to look for any far-fetched ex- 
planation of Bismarck's action ; the simplest is the 
most probable. He had not arranged the interview 
with any intention of entrapping Augustenburg ; he 
had really been doubtful whether, after all, it might 
not be wiser to accept the Prince and make a separ- 
ate treaty with him. All depended on his personal 
character and the attitude he adopted towards Prus- 
sia. Bismarck, who had great confidence in his own 
judgment of mankind, regarded a personal interview 
as the best means of coming to a conclusion ; the 
( result of it was that he felt it impossible to rely on 
the Prince, who, instead of being open, positive, and 
ready to do business, was reserved, hesitating, dis- 
trustful, and critical. Bismarck had given him his 
chance ; he had failed to seize it. Instead of being a 
grateful client he was a mere obstacle in the road of 



2 24 Bismarck. [1863- 

Prussian greatness, and had to be swept away. 
Against him all the resources of diplomacy were 
now directed. His influence must be destroyed, but 
not by force, for his strength came from his very 
weakness ; the task was to undermine the regard 
which the German people had for him and their en- 
thusiasm for his cause — work to be properly assigned 
to the Prussian Press. 

The Conference in London separated at the end 
of June without coming to any conclusion ; it had, 
however, enabled Bismarck formally to dissociate 
himself from the former Treaty of London, and 
henceforward he had a free hand in his dealings 
with Denmark. 

Another brilliant feat of arms, the transference of 
the Prussian troops across the sea to the island of 
Alsen, completed the war. Denmark had to capit- 
ulate, and the terms of peace, which were ultimately 
decided at Vienna, were that Schleswig, Holstein, 
and also Lauenburg should be given up. Christian 
transferred to the Emperor of Austria and the King 
of Prussia all the rights which he possessed. As to 
Lauenburg the matter was simple — the authority of 
the King of Denmark over this Duchy was undis- 
puted ; as to Schleswig-Holstein all the old ques- 
tions still continued ; the King had transferred his 
rights, but what were his rights ? He could only 
grant that which belonged to him ; if the Prince of 
Augustenburg was Duke, then the King of Den- 
mark could not confer another man's throne. There 
was, however, this difference : hitherto the question 
had been a European one, but since the London 



1864] 



Schleswig-Holstein. 



225 



Congress no other State had any claim to interfere. 
The disputed succession of the Duchies must be set- 
tled between Austria and Prussia. It was a special 
clause in the terms of peace that it should be decided 
by agreement between them and not referred to the 
Diet. 




CHAPTER IX. 

THE TREATY OF GASTEIN. 
1 864- 1 865. 

BISMARCK always looked back with peculiar 
pleasure on the negotiations which were con- 
cluded by the Peace of Vienna. His conduct 
of the affair had in fact been masterly ; he had suc- 
ceeded in permanently severing the Duchies from 
Denmark ; he had done this without allowing foreign 
nations the opportunity for interfering ; he had main- 
tained a close alliance with Austria ; he had pleased 
and flattered the Emperors of Russia and France. 
What perhaps gave him most satisfaction was that, 
though the result had been what the whole of the 
German nation desired, he had brought it about 
by means which were universally condemned, and 
the rescue of the Duchies had been a severe defeat 
to the Democratic and National party. 

With the Peace a new stage begins ; the Duchies 
had been transferred to the Allied Powers ; how 
were they now to be disposed of? We have seen 
that Bismarck desired to acquire them for Prussia ; 
if it were absolutely necessary, he would accept an 

226 



1864] The Treaty of Gastein. 227 

arrangement which would leave them to be ruled by 
another Prince, provided very extensive rights were 
given to Prussia. He would acquiesce in this arrange- 
ment if annexation would involve a war with one of 
the European Powers. If, however, a Duke of Schles- 
wig-Holstein was to be created he was determined 
that it should not be the Prince of Augustenburg, 
whom he distrusted and disliked. The real object 
of his diplomacy must be to get the Duchies offered 
to Prussia ; it was, however, very improbable, as the 
Czar once said to him, that this would happen. 

He wished for annexation, but he wished to have 
it peacefully ; he had not forgotten his own resolu- 
tion to have a war with Austria, but he did not wish 
to make the Duchies the occasion of a war. Austria, 
however, refused to assent to annexation unless the 
King of Prussia would give her a corresponding in- 
crease of territory ; this the King positively refused. 
It was an unchangeable principle with him that he 
would not surrender a single village from the Prus- 
sian Monarchy ; his pride revolted from the idea of 
bartering old provinces for new. If Austria would 
not offer the Duchies to Prussia, neither would the 
Diet ; the majority remained loyal to Augustenburg. 
The people of the Duchies were equally determined 
in their opposition to the scheme ; attempts were 
made by Bismarck's friends and agents to get up a 
petition to incorporate them with Prussia, but they 
always failed. Even the Prussian people were not 
really very anxious for this acquisition, and it required 
two years of constant writing in the inspired Press to 
bring them into such a state of mind that they would 



2 28 Bisma7^ck. [1864- 

believe that it was, I will not say the most honour- 
able, but the most desirable solution. The King him- 
self hesitated. It was true that ever since the taking 
of the Diippel the lust of conquest had been aroused 
in his mind ; he had visited the place where so many 
Prussian soldiers had laid down their lives ; and it was 
a natural feeling if he wished that the country they 
had conquered should belong to their own State. On 
the other hand, he still felt that the rights of August- 
enburg could not be neglected.; when he discussed 
the matter with the Emperor of Austria and the sub- 
ject of annexation was raised, he remained silent and 
was ill at ease. 

If Bismarck was to get his way, he must first of all 
convince the King ; this done, an opportunity might 
be found. There was one man who was prepared to 
offer him the Duchies, and that man was Napoleon. It 
is instructive to notice that as soon as the negotiations 
at Vienna had been concluded, Bismarck went to 
spend a few weeks at his old holiday resort of Biarritz. 
He took the opportunity of having some conversation 
with both the Emperor and his Ministers. 

He required rest and change after the prolonged 
anxieties of the two years ; at no place did he find it 
so well as in the south of France : 

" It seems like a dream to be here again," he writes to 
his wife. " I am already quite well, and would be quite 
cheerful if I only knew that all was well with you. 
The life I lead at Berlin is a kind of penal servitude, 
when I think of my independent life abroad." Sea- 
bathing, expeditions across the frontier, and sport 
passed three weeks. " I have not for a long time found 



1865] The Treaty of Gastezn. 229 

myself in such comfortable conditions, and yet the evil 
habit of work has rooted itself so deeply in my nature, 
that I feel some disquiet of conscience at my laziness. I 
almost long for the Wilhelmstrasse, at least if my dear 
ones were there." 

On the 25th he left "dear Biarritz" for Paris, 
where he found plenty of politics awaiting him ; 
here he had another of those interviews with Napo- 
leon and his Ministers on which so much depended, 
and then he went back to his labours at Berlin. 

At that time he was not prepared to break with 
Austria, and he still hoped that some peaceful means 
of acquisition might be found, as he wrote some 
months later to Goltz, " We have not got all the 
good we can from the Austrian alliance." Prussia 
had the distinct advantage that she was more truly 
in possession of the Duchies than Austria. This 
possession would more and more guarantee its own 
continuance ; it was improbable that any Power 
would undertake an offensive war to expel her. On 
the whole, therefore, Bismarck seems to have wished 
for the present to leave things as they were; gradu- 
ally to increase the hold of Prussia on the Duchies, 
and wait until they fell of themselves into his hands. 
In pursuit of this policy it was necessary, however, 
to expel all other claimants, and this could not be 
done without the consent of Austria ; this produced 
a cause of friction between the two great Powers 
which made it impossible to maintain the co-do- 
minium. 

There were in Holstein the Confederate troops 
who had gone there a year ago and had never been 



230 Bismarck. [1864- 

withdrawn ; Augustenburg was still living at Kiel 
with his phantom Court ; and then there were the 
Austrian soldiers, Prussia's own allies. One after 
another they had to be removed. Bismarck dealt 
first with the Confederate troops. 

He had, as indeed he always was careful to have, 
the strict letter of the law on his side ; he pointed 
out that as the execution had been directed against 
the government of Christian, and Christian had 
ceased to have any authority, the execution itself 
must ipso facto cease ; he therefore wrote asking 
Austria to join in a demand to Saxony and Han- 
over ; he was prepared, if the States refused, to ex- 
pel their troops by force. Hanover — for the King 
strongly disliked Augustenburg — at once acquiesced ; 
Saxony refused. Bismarck began to make military 
preparations ; the Saxons began to arm ; the Crown 
treasures were taken from Dresden to Konigstein. 
Would Austria support Saxony or Prussia ? For 
some days the question was in debate ; at last Aus- 
tria determined to support a motion at the Diet de- 
claring the execution ended. It was carried by 
eight votes to seven, and the Saxons had to obey. 
The troops on their return home refused to march 
across Prussian territory; and from this time Beust 
and the King of Saxony must be reckoned among 
the determined and irreconcilable enemies of Bis- 
marck. 

The first of the rivals was removed ; there re- 
mained Austria and the Prince. 

Just at this time a change of Ministry had taken 
place in Austria ; Rechberg, who had kept up the 



1865] The Treaty of Gastein. 231 

alliance, was removed, and the anti-Prussian party 
came to the front. It was, therefore, no longer so 
easy to deal with the Prince, for he had a new and 
vigorous ally in Austria. Mensdorf, the new Min- 
ister, proposed in a series of lengthy despatches his 
solution of the question ; it was that the rights of 
the two Powers should be transferred to Augusten- 
burg, and that Schleswig-Holstein should be estab- 
lished as an independent Confederate State. The 
Austrian position was from this time clearly defined, 
and it was in favour of that policy to which Bis- 
marck would never consent. It remained for him to 
propose an alternative. Prussia, he said, could only 
allow the new State to be created on condition that 
large rights were given to Prussia ; what these were 
would require consideration ; he must consult the 
different departments. This took time, and every 
month's delay was so much gain for Prussia ; it was 
not till February, 1865, that Bismarck was able to 
present his demands, which were, that Kiel should 
be a Prussian port, Rendsburg a Prussian fortress ; 
that the canal was to be made by Prussia and be- 
long to Prussia, the management of the post and 
telegraph service to be Prussian and also the rail- 
ways ; the army was to be not only organised on the 
Prussian system but actually incorporated with the 
Prussian army, so that the soldiers would take 
the oath of allegiance not to their own Duke but to 
the King of Prussia. The Duchies were to join the 
Prussian Customs' Union and assimilate their sys- 
tem of finance with that of Prussia. The proposals 
were so drawn up that it would be impossible for 



232 Bzs7narck. [1864- 

Austria to support, or for the Prince of Augusten- 
burg to accept them. They were, in fact, as Bis- 
marck himself told the Crown Prince, not meant to 
be accepted. " I would rather dig potatoes than be 
a reigning Prince under such conditions," said one 
of the Austrian Ministers. When they were offi- 
cially presented, Karolyi was instructed to meet them 
with an unhesitating negative, and all discussion on 
them ceased. 

Prussia and Austria had both proposed their solu- 
tion ; each State even refused to consider the sug- 
gestion made by the other. Meanwhile, since the 
departure of the Confederate troops the administra- 
tion of the Duchies was in their hands ; each Power 
attempted so to manage affairs as to prepare the 
way for the final settlement it desired, Prussia for 
annexation, Austria for Augustenburg. Prince Fred- 
erick was still living at Kiel. His position was very 
anomalous : he assumed the style and title of a reign- 
ing Prince, he was attended by something like a 
Court and by Ministers ; throughout Holstein, almost 
without exception, and to a great extent also in 
Schleswig, he was looked upon and treated by the 
population as their lawful sovereign ; his birthday 
was celebrated as a public holiday ; he was often 
prayed for in church. All this the Austrians re- 
garded with equanimity and indirectly supported ; 
Bismarck wished to expel him from the country, but 
could not do so without the consent of Austria. At 
the end of March the matter again came up in the 
Diet ; Bavaria and Saxony brought in a motion that 
they expected that Austria and Prussia would trans- 



1865] The Treaty of Gastein. 233 

fer the administration to Frederick. The Prussian 
Envoy rose and explained that they might expect 
it, but that Prussia would not fulfil their expecta- 
tions ; he moved that the claims of all candidates 
should be considered by the Diet, not only those of 
Augustenburg and of the Duke of Oldenburg, but 
also of Brandenburg. 

The claims of Brandenburg were a new weapon of 
which Bismarck was glad to avail himself. No one 
supposed that they had really any foundation ; they 
were not seriously put forward ; but if the motion 
was carried, the Diet would be involved in the solu- 
tion of a very complicated and necessarily very 
lengthy legal discussion. What the result was 
would be known from the beginning, but the Diet 
and its committees always worked slowly, and Bis- 
marck could with much force maintain that, until 
they had come to a decision, there was no reason for 
handing over the administration to Augustenburg; 
it was at least decent not to do this till the claims 
of the rivals had been duly weighed. In the months 
that must elapse many things might happen. In the 
meantime the Diet would be helpless. When it had 
come to a decision he would then be able to point 
out, as he had already done, that they had no legal 
power for determining who was the ruler of any 
State, and that their decision therefore was quite 
valueless, and everything would have been again ex- 
actly as it was before. Austria supported the mo- 
tion of Saxony, which was carried by nine votes to six. 
Prussia answered by sending her fleet from Danzig to 
Kiel, and occupying the harbour; the Government 



234 Bismarck. [1864 

asked for a vote for the erection of fortifications and 
docks and for the building of a fleet ; the Cham- 
ber refused the money, but Roon declared publicly 
in the House that Prussia would retain Kiel, — they 
had gone there and did not intend to leave. The 
occupation of Kiel was an open defiance to Austria; 
that it was intended to be so is shewn by the fact 
that a few days later Bismarck wrote to Usedom, 
the Prussian Minister at Florence, instructing him to 
sound the Italian Government as to whether they 
would be willing to join Prussia in war against Aus- 
tria. At the same time he wrote to Goltz to find out 
in Paris whether there was any alliance between 
Austria and France. It would be some time before 
foreign relations could be sufficiently cleared up for 
him to determine whether or not war would be safe. 
He occupied the intervening period by continuing 
the negotiations as to the principles on which the 
joint administration should be conducted. He came 
forward with a new proposal and one which was ex- 
tremely surprising, that the Estates of the Duchies 
should be summoned, and negotiations entered into 
with them. It is one of the most obscure of all his 
actions ; he did it contrary to the advice of those on 
the spot. Everyone warned him that if the Estates 
were summoned their first action would be to pro- 
claim Augustenburg as Duke. Some suppose that 
the King insisted on his taking this step ; that is, 
however, very improbable ; others that he proposed 
it in order that it might be rejected by Austria, so 
that Austria might lose the great influence which 
by her support of Augustenburg she was gaining in 



1865] The Treaty of Gastein. 235 

Germany. Austria, however, accepted the proposal, 
and then negotiations began as to the form in which 
the Estates should be called together; what should 
be the relations to them of the two Powers? This 
gave rise to a minute controversy, which could not be 
settled, and no doubt Bismarck did not wish that it 
should be settled. One of his conditions, however, 
was that, before the Estates were summoned, August- 
enburg should be compelled to leave Holstein. Of 
course the Prince refused, for he well knew that, if 
he once went away, he would never be allowed to 
return. The Duke of Oldenburg, who was always 
ready to come forward when Bismarck wished it, 
himself demanded the expulsion of the Prince. The 
King of Prussia wrote a severe letter to Augusten- 
burg, intimating his displeasure at his conduct and 
warning him to leave the country. The Prince an- 
swered, as he always did to the King, expressing his 
gratitude and his constant loyalty to Prussia, but re- 
fused, and his refusal was published in the papers. 
It was still impossible to remove him except by force, 
but before he ventured on that Bismarck had to make 
secure the position of Prussia. 

At the beginning of July events began to move 
towards a crisis. Bismarck had appointed a com- 
mission of Prussian lawyers to report on the legal 
claim of the different candidates for the Ducal 
throne; their report was now published. They 
came to the conclusion, as we might anticipate that 
they would, that Augustenburg had absolutely no 
claim, and that legally the full authority was pos- 
sessed by the two Powers who had the de facto 



236 Bismarck. [1864- 

government. Their opinion did not carry much 
weight even in Prussia itself, but they seem to 
have succeeded in convincing the King. Hitherto 
he had always been haunted by the fear lest, in dis- 
possessing Augustenburg, he would be keeping a 
German Prince from the throne which was his right, 
and that to him was a very serious consideration. 
Now his conscience was set at rest. From this time 
the last support which Augustenburg had in Prussia 
was taken from him, for the Crown Prince, who 
always remained faithful to him, was almost without 
influence. Bismarck was henceforward able to move 
more rapidly. On the 5th of July the Prince's 
birthday was celebrated throughout the Duchy with 
great enthusiasm ; this gave bitter offence to the 
King; shortly afterwards Bismarck left Berlin and 
joined the King, who was taking his annual cure at 
Carlsbad, and for July 28th a Council of State was 
summoned to meet at Regensburg. Probably this 
is the only instance of a King coming to so im- 
portant a decision outside his own territories. The 
Council was attended not only by the Ministers, but 
also by some of the generals and by Goltz, who was 
summoned from Paris for the purpose. It was de- 
termined to send an ultimatum to Austria; the chief 
demand was that Austria should withdraw all sup- 
port from Augustenburg, and agree immediately to 
eject him from the Duchies. If Austria refused to 
agree, Prussia would do so herself; he was to be 
seized, put on board a ship, and carried off to East 
Prussia. To shew that they were in earnest, a begin- 
ning was made by seizing in Holstein Prussian sub- 



1865] 



The Treaty of Gastein. 237 



jects who had written in the newspapers in a sense 
opposed to the wishes of the Prussian Government, 
and carrying them off to be tried at BerHn. In order 
to be prepared for all possibilities, an ofificial request 
was sent to Italy to ask for her assistance in case of 
an outbreak of war. After these decisions were ar- 
rived at, the King continued his journey to Gastein 
to complete his cure ; there, on Austrian territory in 
company with Bismarck, he awaited the answer. 

In Austria opinions were divided ; the feeling of 
annoyance with Prussia had been steadily growing 
during the last year. The military party was gaining 
ground ; many would have been only too glad to 
take up the challenge. It would indeed have been 
their wisest plan to do so — openly to support the 
claim of Augustenburg, to demand that the Estates 
of Holstein should be at once summoned, and if 
Bismarck carried out his threats, to put herself at the 
head of Germany and in the name of the outraged 
right of a German Prince and a German State to 
take up the Prussian challenge. 

There were, however, serious reasons against this. 
The Emperor was very reluctant to go to war, and, 
as so often, the personal feelings of the rulers had 
much to do with the policy of the Government. 
Then the internal condition of Austria both politically 
and financially was very unsatisfactory ; it would 
have been necessary to raise a loan and this could not 
be easily done. There was also the constant danger 
from Italy, for Austria knew that, even if there were 
no alliance, as soon as she was attacked on one side 
by Prussia, the Italians on the other side would in- 



238 Bismarck. [1864- 

vade Venetia. Count Metternich was instructed to 
ask Napoleon, but received as an answer that they 
could not hope for a French alliance ; the Austrians 
feared that he might already be engaged on the side 
of Prussia. For all these reasons it was determined 
to attempt to bring about a compromise. A change 
of Ministry took place, and Count Blome, one of the 
new Ministers, was sent to Gastein. He found both 
the King and Bismarck not disinclined to some com- 
promise. The reports both from Florence and Paris 
did not seem to Bismarck to be entirely satisfactory : 
he did not find such readiness as he had hoped for; 
he feared that some secret understanding might be 
arrived at between Austria and Napoleon ; and then, 
as we have seen, he was really anxious to avoid war 
for the sake of the Duchies ; he had not given up his 
intention of war with Austria some day, but it would 
be impossible to find a less agreeable excuse for it. 

" Halbuber and Augustenburg are acting so that we 
shall soon have to apply force ; this will cause bad blood 
in Vienna ; it is not what I wish, but Austria gives us no 
choice," 

he had written a few days before. After a few days 
of indecision a compromise therefore was agreed 
upon. The joint administration of the Duchies was 
to be given up ; Austria was to administer Holstein, 
Prussia, Schleswig ; they both undertook not to bring 
the question before the Diet ; the Duchy of Lauen- 
burg was to be handed over absolutely to the King 
of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria receiving two 
million thalers for his share. 



1865] 



The Treaty of Gastein. 



239 



Lauenburg was the first new possession which Bis- 
marck was able to offer to the King; the grateful 
monarch conferred on him the title of Count, and in 
later years presented to him large estates out of the 
very valuable royal domains. It was from Lauen- 
burg that in later years the young German Emperor 
took the title which he wished to confer on the retir- 
ing Chancellor. 




CHAPTER X. 



OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH AUSTRIA. 



1 865- 1 866. 



THE arrangement made at Gastein could not be 
permanent ; it was only a temporary expedi- 
ent to put off the conflict which henceforward 
was inevitable — inevitable, that is, if the Emperor of 
Austria still refused to sell Holstein to Prussia. It 
was, however, so far as it went, a great gain to Prus- 
sia, because it deprived Austria of the esteem of the 
other German States. Her strength had hitherto 
lain in her strict adhesion to popular feeling and to 
what the majority of the Germans, Princes and 
people alike, believed was justice; by coming to a 
separate agreement with Prussia, she had shaken 
their confidence. Bavaria especially was much an- 
noyed by this change of front, and it seemed prob- 
able that the most important of the southern States 
would soon be ranged on the side of Prussia. This 
was a consummation which Bismarck ardently de- 
sired, and to which he addressed himself with much 
energy. 

The attitude of France was more important than 
that of the German States, and in the autumn Bis- 

240 



1865] Outbj^eak of War ivith Austria. 241 

marck made a fresh visit to that country. Just as 
he had done the year before, he went to take the 
sea-baths at Biarritz. This step was the more re- 
markable because Napoleon had received the news 
of the Treaty of Gastein with marked displeasure, 
and had given public expression to his opinions. 
Bismarck saw Drouyn de Lhuys at Paris and then 
went on to Biarritz where the Emperor was ; for 
ten days he lived there in constant association with 
the Imperial family. The personal impression which 
he made was very favourable : " A really great man," 
wrote Merimee, " free from feeling and full of esprit^ 
He saw Napoleon again on his return through Paris ; 
the two succeeded in coming to an understanding. 
Napoleon assured him that he might depend on 
the absolute neutrality of France, in case of a war 
between Prussia and Austria ; it was agreed also 
that the annexation of the Duchies to Prussia would 
not be an increase of territory which would cause 
any uneasiness at Paris ; Napoleon would view it 
with favour. Bismarck went farther than this ; he 
opened the subject of a complete reform of the 
German Constitution on the lines that Prussia was 
to have a free hand in the north of Germany ; he 
pointed out 

"that the acquisition of the Duchies would only be an 
earnest for the fulfilment of the pledge which history 
had laid upon the State of Prussia ; for the future pro- 
secution of it we need the most friendly relations with 
France. It seems to me in the interest of France to 
encourage Prussia in the ambitious fulfilment of her 

national duty." 
16 



242 Bismarck. [1865 

The Emperor acquiesced ; as we know, the division 
of Europe into large national States was what he 
meant by Napoleonic ideas ; he was willing enough 
to help in Germany a change such as that he had 
brought about in Italy. It was agreed that events 
should be allowed to develop themselves ; when the 
time came it would be easy enough to come to some 
definite agreement. 

This however was not all ; it was not to be expected 
that Napoleon should render Prussia so valuable a 
service without receiving something in exchange; 
we know Bismarck's opinion of a statesman who, 
out of sympathy for another country, would sacri- 
fice the interests of his own. The creation of a 
strong consolidated State in the north of Germany 
could not be in the interests of France ; the power 
of France had always been founded on the weakness 
of Germany. Even if Napoleon himself, with his 
generous and cosmopolitan sympathies, was willing 
to make the sacrifice, France was not ; Napoleon 
knew, and Bismarck knew, that Napoleon could not 
disregard the feeling of the country ; his power was 
based on universal suffrage and the popularity of 
his name ; he could not, as a King of Prussia could, 
brave the displeasure of the people. France must 
then have some compensation. What was it to be? 
What were to be the terms of the more intimate and 
special understanding? We do not know exactly 
what was said ; we do know that Bismarck led both 
the Emperor and his Ministers to believe that Prus- 
sia would support them in an extension of the 
frontier. He clearly stated that the King would 



1866] Outbreak of War with Atistria. 243 

not be willing to surrender a single Prussian village ; 
he probably said that they would not acquiesce in 
the restoration to France of any German territory. 
France therefore must seek her reward in a French- 
speaking people. It was perhaps an exaggeration if 
Drouyn de Lhuys said " he offered us all kinds of 
things which did not belong to him," but Napoleon 
also in later years repeated that Bismarck had 
promised him all kinds of recompenses. No written 
agreement was made ; that was reserved for later 
negotiations, but there was a verbal understanding, 
which both parties felt was binding. This was the 
pendant to the interview of Plombieres. But Bis- 
marck had improved on Cavour's example ; he did 
not want so much, he asked only for neutrality : the 
King of Prussia would not be called upon, like Victor 
Emmanuel, to surrender the old possessions of his 
House. 

Bismarck returned to Berlin with his health invig- 
orated by the Atlantic winds and his spirits raised 
by success. The first step now was to secure the 
help of Italy ; he had seen Nigra, the Italian Minis- 
ter, at Paris, and told him that war was inevitable ; 
he hoped he could reckon on Italian alliance, but 
there was still, however, much ground for anxiety 
that Austria might succeed in arranging affairs with 
Italy. 

The relations of the four Powers at this time were 
very remarkable. All turned on Venetia. The new 
Kingdom of Italy would not rest until it had secured 
this province. Napoleon also was bound by honour 
to complete his promise and " free Italy to the 



244 Bismarck. [1865- 

Adriatic " ; neither his throne nor that of his son 
would be secure if he failed to do so. A war be- 
tween Austria and Prussia would obviously afford 
the best opportunity, and his whole efforts were 
therefore directed to preventing a reconciliation be- 
tween the two German Powers. His great fear was 
that Austria should come to terms with Prussia, and 
surrender the Duchies on condition that Prussia 
should guarantee her Italian possessions. When 
Bismarck visited Napoleon at Biarritz, the first ques- 
tion of the Emperor was, " Have you guaranteed 
Venetia to Austria ? " It was the fear of this which 
caused his anger at the Treaty of Gastein. On the 
other hand, Bismarck had his reasons for anxiety. 
It was always possible that Austria, instead of com- 
ing to terms with Prussia, might choose the other 
■side ; she might surrender Venetia in order to obtain 
French'and Italian support in a German war. The 
situation indeed was this: Austria was liable at any 
moment to be attacked by both Italy and Prussia; 
it would probably be beyond her strength to resist 
both assailants at the same time. A wise statesman 
would probably have made terms with one or the 
other. He would have either surrendered Venetia, 
which was really a source of weakness, to Italy, 
or agreed with Prussia over the Duchies and the 
German problem, thereby gaining Prussian support 
against Italy. The honourable pride of Mensdorf 
and the military party in Austria refused to surren- 
der anything till it was too late. 

None the less, the constant fear lest Austria 
should make terms with one of her enemies for a 



1866] Outbreak of War with Austria. 245 

long time prevented an alliance between Prussia and 
Italy. The Italians did not trust Bismarck ; they 
feared that if they made a treaty with him, he would 
allow them to get entangled in war, and then, as at 
Gastein, make up his quarrel with Austria. Bis- 
marck did not trust the Italians ; he feared that they 
and Napoleon would even at the last moment take 
Venetia as a present, and, as very nearly happened, 
offer Austria one of the Prussian provinces instead. 
It was impossible to have any reliance on Napoleon's 
promises, for he was constantl)^ being pulled two 
ways ; his own policy and sympathies would lead 
him to an alliance with Prussia ; the clerical party, 
which was yearly growing stronger and had the sup- 
port of the Empress, wished him to side with the 
Catholic power. In consequence, even after his 
return from France, Bismarck could not pass a day 
with full security that he might not find himself 
opposed by a coalition of Austria, France, and Italy ; 
the Austrians felt that they were to be made the 
victims of a similar coalition between Prussia, France, 
and Italy ; France always feared a national union 
between the two great German Powers. 

Bismarck began by completing and bringing to a 
conclusion the arrangements for a commercial treaty 
with Italy ; at the beginning of January the King of 
Prussia sent Victor Emmanuel the order of the Black 
Eagle ; Bismarck also used his influence to induce 
Bavaria to join in the commercial treaty and to recog- 
nise the Kingdom of Italy. Then on January 13th 
he wrote to Usedom that the eventual decision in 
Germany would be influenced by the action of Italy ; 



246 Bismarck. [1865- 

if they could not depend on the support of Italy, 
he hinted that peace would be maintained ; in this 
way he hoped to force the Italians to join him. 

Affairs in the Duchies gave Bismarck the op- 
portunity for adopting with good grounds a hostile 
attitude towards Austria ; Gablenz, the new Governor 
of Holstein, continued to favour the Augustenburg 
agitation. Many had expected that Austria would 
govern Holstein as a part of the Empire ; instead of 
doing so, with marked design the country was adminis- 
tered as though it were held in trust for the Prince ; 
no taxes were levied, full freedom was allowed to the 
Press, and while the Prussians daily became more ij.n- 
popular in Schleswig the Austrians by their leniency 
won the affection of Holstein. At the end of 
January, they even allowed a mass meeting, which 
was attended by over 4000 men, to be held at Altona. 
This made a very unfavourable impression on the 
King, and any action of Austria that offended the 
King was most useful to Bismarck. " Bismarck is 
using all his activity to inspire the King with his own 
views and feelings," wrote Benedetti, the French 
Ambassador, at this time. At the end of January he 
felt sufficiently secure to protest seriously against the 
Austrian action in Holstein. " Why," he asked, 
" had they left the alliance against our common 
enemy, the Revolution ? " Austria, in return, refused 
peremptorily to allow Bismarck any voice in the 
administration of Holstein. Bismarck, when the 
despatch was read to him, answered curtly that he 
must consider that henceforth the relations of the two 
Powers had lost their intimate character ; " we are as 



1866] Outbreak of War with Austria. 247 

we were before the Danish war, neither worse nor 
better." He sent no answer to the Austrian despatch 
and ceased to discuss with them the affairs of the 
Duchies. 

This was a fair warning to Austria and it was 
understood ; they took it as an intimation that 
hostihties were intended, and from this day began 
quietly to make their preparations. As soon as they 
did this, they were given into Bismarck's hands ; 
the Prussians, owing to the admirable organisation 
of the army, could prepare for war in a fortnight or 
three weeks' time less than the Austrians would re- 
quire ; Austria to be secure must therefore begin to 
arm first ; as soon as she did so the Prussian Govern- 
ment would be able, with full protestation of inno- 
cence, to point to the fact that they had not moved 
a man, and then to begin their own mobilisation, not 
apparently for offence but, as it were, to protect 
themselves from an unprovoked attack. In a minute 
of February 22d Moltke writes that it would be 
better for political reasons not to mobilise yet ; 
then they would appear to put Austria in the wrong ; 
Austria had now 100,000 men in Bohemia and it 
would be impossible to undertake any ofTensive 
movement against Prussia with less than 150,000 or 
200,000 ; to collect these at least six weeks would 
be required, and the preparations could not be con- 
cealed. Six days later a great council was held in 
Berlin. " A war with Austria must come sooner or 
later ; it is wiser to undertake it now, under these 
most favourable circumstances, than to leave it to 
Austria to choose the most auspicious moment for 



248 Bismarck. ' [1865- 

herself," said Bismarck, The rupture, he explained, 
had already really been effected ; that had been 
completed at his last interview with Karolyi. Bis- 
marck was supported by most of the Ministers ; the 
King said that the Duchies were worth a war, but 
he still hoped that peace would be kept. The arrange- 
ment of the foreign alliances was now pushed on. The 
King wrote an autograph letter to Napoleon saying 
that the time for the special understanding had 
come; Goltz discussed with him at length the terms 
of French compensation. Napoleon did not ask for 
any definite promise, but suggested the annexation 
of some German territory to France ; it was explained 
to him that Prussia would not surrender any German 
territory, but that, if France took part of Belgium, 
the Prussian frontier must be extended to the Maas, 
that is, must include the north-east of Belgium. 

Again no definite agreement was made, but Na- 
poleon's favouring neutrality seemed secure. There 
was more difficulty with Italy, for here an active 
alliance was required, and the Italians still feared 
they would be tricked. It was decided to send 
Moltke to Florence to arrange affairs there ; this, 
however, was unnecessary, for Victor Emmanuel sent 
one of his generals, Govone, nominally to gain some 
information about the new military inventions ; for 
the next three weeks, Govone and Barrel, the Italian 
Minister, were engaged in constant discussions as to 
the terms of the treaty. Of course the Austrians 
were not entirely ignorant of what was going on. 
The negotiations with Italy roused among them in- 
tense bitterness ; without actually mobilising they 




GENERAL VON MOLTKE. 



1866] Outbj^eak of War with Attstria. 249 

slowly and cautiously made all preliminary arrange- 
ments ; a despatch was sent to Berlin accusing the 
Prussians of the intention of breaking the Treaty of 
Gastein, and another despatch to the German Courts 
asking for their assistance. Karolyi waited on Bis- 
marck, assured him that their military preparations 
were purely defensive, and asked point-blank whether 
Prussia proposed to violate the treaty. The answer, 
of course, was a simple " No," but according to the 
gossip of Berlin, Bismarck added, " You do not 
think I should tell you if I did intend to do so." 
On March 24th a despatch was sent to the envoys at 
all the German Courts drawing their attention to 
the Austrian preparations, for which it was said there 
was no cause ; in view of this obvious aggression 
Prussia must begin to arm. That this was a mere 
pretext is shewn by a confidential note of Moltke of 
this same date ; in it he states that all the Austrian 
preparations up to this time were purely defensive ; 
there was as yet no sign of an attempt to take the 
offensive. Two days later, a meeting of the Prussian 
Council was held and the orders for a partial mobil- 
isation of the army were given, though some time 
elapsed before they were actually carried out. 

Under the constant excitement of these weeks 
Bismarck's health again began to break down ; ex- 
cept himself, there was in fact scarcely a single 
man who desired the war ; the King still seized 
every opportunity of preserving the peace ; Eng- 
land, as so often, was beginning to make proposals 
for mediation ; all the Prussian diplomatists, he com- 
plained, were working against his warlike projects, 



250 Bismarck. [1865- 

He made it clear to the Italians that the result would 
depend on them ; if they would not sign a treaty 
there would be no war. The great difficulty in ar- 
ranging the terms of the treaty was to determine 
who should begin. The old suspicion was still there : 
each side expected that if they began they would be 
deserted by their ally. The suspicion was unjust, 
for on both sides there were honourable men. The 
treaty was eventually signed on April 9th ; it was to 
the effect that if Prussia went to war with Austria 
within the next three months, Italy would also at 
once declare war ; neither country was to make a 
separate peace ; Prussia would continue the war till 
Venetia was surrendered. On the very day that this 
treaty was signed, Bismarck, in answer to an Austrian 
despatch, wrote insisting that he had no intention of 
entering on an offensive war against Austria. In 
private conversation he was more open ; to Bene- 
detti he said : " I have at last succeeded in deter- 
mining a King of Prussia to break the intimate 
relations of his House with that of Austria, to con- 
clude a treaty of alliance with Italy, to accept ar- 
rangements with Imperial France ; I am proud of 
the result." 

Suddenly a fresh impediment appeared : the Aus- 
trians, on April i8th, wrote proposing a disarming 
on both sides ; the Prussian answer was delayed for 
many days ; it was said in Berlin that there was 
a difference of opinion between Bismarck and the 
King ; Bismarck complained to Benedetti that he 
was wavering ; when at last the answer was sent it 
was to accept the principle, but Bismarck boasted 



1866] OtUbi^eak of War with Austria. 251 

that he had accepted it under such conditions that it 
could hardly be carried out. The reluctance of the 
King to go to war caused him much difficulty ; all 
his influence was required ; it is curious to read the 
following words which he wrote at this time : 

" It is opposed to my feelings, I may say to my faith, to 
attempt to use influence or pressure on your paternal 
feelings with regard to the decision on peace or war ; 
this is a sphere in which, trusting to God alone, I leave 
it to your Majesty's heart to steer for the good of the 
Fatherland ; my part is prayer, rather than counsel " ; 

and then he again lays before the King the insuper- 
able arguments in favour of war. 

Let us not suppose that this letter was but a cun- 
ning device to win the consent of the King. In 
these words more than in anything else we see his 
deepest feelings and his truest character, Bismarck 
was no Napoleon ; he had determined that war was 
necessary, but he did not go to the terrible arbitra- 
ment with a light heart. He was not a man who 
from personal ambition would order thousands of 
men to go to their death or bring his country to 
ruin. It was his strength that he never forgot that 
he was working, not for himself, but for others. Be- 
hind the far-sighted plotter and the keen intriguer 
there always remained the primitive honesty of his 
younger years. He may at times have complained of 
the difficulties which arose from the reluctance of the 
King to follow his advice, but he himself felt that 
it was a source of strength to him that he had to ex- 
plain, justify, and recommend his policy to the King. 



252 Bismarck. 



[1865- 



All anxiety was, however, removed by news which 
came the next day. A report was spread through- 
out the papers that Italy had begun to mobihse, and 
that a band of Garibaldians had crossed the frontier. 
The report seems to have been untrue. How it 
originated we know not ; when Roon heard of it he 
exclaimed, " Now the Italians are arming, the Aus- 
trians cannot disarm." He was right. The Austrian 
Government sent a message to Berlin that they 
would withdraw part of their northern army from 
Bohemia, but must at once put the whole of their 
southern army on a war footing. Prussia refused to 
accept this plea, and the order for the mobilisation 
of the Prussian army went out. 

As soon as Austria had begun to mobilise, war was 
inevitable ; the state of the finances of the Empire 
would not permit them to maintain their army on a 
war footing for any time. None the less, another 
six weeks were to elapse before hostilities began. 

We have seen how throughout these complications 
Bismarck had desired, if he fought Austria, to fight, 
not for the sake of the Duchies, but for a reform of 
the German Confederation. 

In March he had said to the Italians that the Hol- 
stein question was not enough to warrant a declara- 
tion of war. Prussia intended to bring forward the 
reform of the Confederation. This would take sev- 
eral months. He hoped that among other advan- 
tages, he would have at least Bavaria on his side ; 
for the kind of proposal he had in his mind, though 
at this time he seems to have had no clear plan, was 
some arrangement by which the whole of the north 



18661 Outbreak of War with Austria. 253 

of Germany should be closely united to Prussia, and 
the southern States formed in a separate union with 
Bavaria at the head. He had always pointed out, 
even when he was at Frankfort, that Bavaria was a 
natural ally of Prussia. In a great war the consider- 
able army of Bavaria would not be unimportant. 

At the beginning of April Bismarck instructed^ 
Savigny, his envoy at the Diet, to propose the con- 
sideration of a reform in the Constitution. The pro- 
posal he made was quite unexpected. No details 
were mentioned as to changes in the relations of the 
Princes, but a Parliament elected by universal suf- 
frage and direct elections was to be chosen, to help 
in the management of common German affairs. It 
is impossible to exaggerate the bewilderment and 
astonishment with which this proposal was greeted. 
Here was the man who had risen into power as the 
champion of monarchical government, as the enemy 
of Parliaments and Democracy, voluntarily taking up 
the extreme demand of the German Radicals. It 
must be remembered that universal suffrage was at 
this time regarded not as a mere scheme of voting, 
— it was a principle ; it was the cardinal principle of 
the Revolution ; it meant the sovereignty of the 
people. It was the basis of the French Republic of 
1848, it had been incorporated in the German Con- 
stitution of 1849, and this was one of the reasons 
why the King of Prussia had refused then to accept 
that Constitution. The proposal was universally 
condemned. Bismarck had perhaps hoped to win 
the Liberals ; if so, he was disappointed ; their con- 
fidence could not be gained by this sudden and 



254 Bismarck. [1865- 

amazing change — they distrusted him all the more ; 
" a Government that, despising the laws of its own 
country, comes forward with plans for Confederate 
reform, cannot have the confidence of the German 
people," was the verdict of the National party. The 
Moderate Liberals, men like Sybel, had always been 
opposed to universal suffrage ; even the English 
statesmen were alarmed ; it was two years before 
Disraeli made his leap in the dark, and here was the 
Prussian statesman making a far bolder leap in a 
country not yet accustomed to the natural working 
of representative institutions. He did not gain the 
adhesion of the Liberals, and he lost the confidence 
of his old friends. Napoleon alone expressed his 
pleasure that the institutions of the two countries 
should become so like one another. 

There was, indeed, ample reason for distrust ; uni- 
versal suffrage meant not only Democracy, — it was 
the foundation on which Napoleon had built his 
Empire ; he had shewn that the voice of the people 
might become the instrument of despotism. All the 
old suspicions were aroused ; people began to see 
fresh meaning in these constant visits to France ; 
Napoleon had found an apt pupil not only in foreign 
but in internal matters. It could mean nothing 
more than the institution of a democratic monarchy ; 
this was Bonapartism ; it seemed to be the achieve- 
ment of that change which, years ago, Gerlach had 
foreboded. No wonder the King of Hanover began 
to feel his crown less steady on his head. 

What was the truth in the matter? What were 
the motives which influenced Bismarck? The ex- 



1866] Outbreak of War with Austria. 255 

planation he gave was probably the true one : by 
universal suffrage he hoped to attain a Conservative 
and nnonarchical assembly ; he appealed from the 
educated and Liberal -middle classes to the peasants 
and artisans. We remember how often he had told 
the Prussian House of Commons that they were not 
the true representatives of the people. 

" Direct election and universal suffrage I consider to be 
greater guarantees of Conservative action than any arti- 
ficial electoral law ; the artificial systeni of indirect elec- 
tion and elections by classes is a much more dangerous 
one in a country of monarchical traditions and loyal 
patriotism. Universal suffrage, doing away as it does 
with the influence of the Liberal bourgeoisie, leads to 
monarchical elections." 

There was in his mind a vague ideal, the ideal of a 
king, the father of his country, supported by the 
masses of the people. He had a genuine inter- 
est in the welfare of the poorest ; he thought he 
would find in them more gratitude and confidence 
than in the middle classes. We know that he was 
wrong ; universal suffrage in Germany was to make 
possible the Social Democrats and Ultramontanes ; 
it was to give the Parliamentary power into the 
hands of an opponent far more dangerous than the 
Liberals of the Prussian Assembly. Probably no 
one had more responsibility for this measure than 
the brilliant founder of the Socialist party. Bis- 
marck had watched with interest the career of Las- 
salle ; he had seen with admiration his power of 
organisation ; he felt that here was a man who in 



256 Bismarck. [1865- 

internal affairs and in the management of the people 
had something of the skill and courage which he 
himself had in foreign affairs. He was a great dema- 
gogue, and Bismarck had already learnt that a man 
who aimed at being not only a diplomatist, but a 
statesman and a ruler, must have something of the 
demagogic art. From Lassalle he could learn much. 
We have letters written two years before this in 
which Lassalle, obviously referring to some previous 
conversation, says : " Above all, I accuse myself of 
having forgotten yesterday to impress upon you that 
the right of being elected must be given to all Ger- 
mans. This is an immense means of power; the 
moral conquest of Germany." Obviously there had 
been a long discussion, in which Lassalle had per- 
suaded the Minister to adopt universal suffrage. 
The letters continue with reference to the machinery 
of the elections, and means of preventing abstention 
from the poll, for which Lassalle professes to have 
found a magic charm. 

One other remark we must make : this measure, 
as later events were to prove, was in some ways 
characteristic of all Bismarck's internal policy. Roon 
once complained of his strokes of genius, his unfore- 
seen decisions. In foreign policy, bold and decisive 
as he could be, he was also cautious and prudent ; 
to this he owes his success ; he could strike when 
the time came, but he never did so unless he had 
tested the situation in every way ; he never be- 
gan a war unless he was sure to win, and he left 
nothing to chance or good fortune. In internal 
affairs he was less prudent ; he did not know his 



1866] Outbreak of War zvith Austria. 257 

ground so well, and he exaggerated his own influ- 
ence. Moreover, in giving up the simpler Conserva- 
tive policy of his younger years, he became an 
opportunist ; he would introduce important measures 
in order to secure the support of a party, even 
though he might thereby be sacrificing the interests 
of his country to a temporary emergency. He really \ 
applied to home affairs the habits he had learned in 
diplomacy ; there every alliance is temporary ; when 
the occasion of it has passed by, it ceases, and leaves 
no permanent effect. He tried to govern Germany 
by a series of political alliances ; but the alliance of 
the Government with a party can never be barren ; 
the laws to which it gives birth remain. Bismarck 
sometimes thought more of the advantage of the 
alliance than of the permanent effect of the laws. 

Even after this there was still delay ; there were 
the usual abortive attempts at a congress, which, as in 
1859, broke down through the refusal of Austria to 
give way. There were dark intrigues of Napoleon, 
who even at the last moment attempted to divert the 
Italians from their Prussian alliance. In Germany 
there was extreme indignation against the man who 
was forcing his country into a fratricidal war. Bis- 
marck had often received threatening letters ; now 
an attempt was made on his life; as he was walking 
along Unter den Linden a young man approached 
and fired several shots at him. He was seized by 
Bismarck, and that night put an end to his own life 
in prison. He was a South German who wished to 
save his country from the horrors of civil war. 
Moltke, now that all was prepared, was anxious to 



258 Bismarck. [1866 

begin. Bismarck still hesitated ; he was so cautious 
that he would not take the first step. At last the 
final provocation came, as he hoped it would, from 
Austria. He knew that if he waited long enough 
they would take the initiative. They proposed to 
summon the Estates of Holstein, and at the same 
time brought the question of the Duchies before the 
Diet. Bismarck declared that this was a breach of 
the Treaty of Gastein, and that that agreement was 
therefore void ; Prussian troops were ordered to 
enter Holstein. Austria appealed for protection to 
the Diet, and moved that the Federal forces should 
be mobilised. The motion was carried by nine votes 
to seven. The Prussian Envoy then rose and de- 
clared that this was a breach of the Federal law ; 
Prussia withdrew from the Federation and declared 
war on all those States which had supported Austria. 
Hanover and Hesse had to the end attempted to 
maintain neutrality, but this Bismarck would not 
allow ; they Were given the alternative of alliance 
with Prussia or disarmament. The result was that, 
when war began, the whole of Germany, except the 
small northern States, was opposed to Prussia. " I 
have no ally but the Duke of Mecklenburg and 
Mazzini," said the King. 




^(^^^^)^ 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE CONQUEST OF GERMANY. 
1866. 



BISMARCK had no part in the management of 
the army. This the King always kept in his 
own hands. He was himself Commander-in- 
Chief, and on all military questions he took the ad- 
vice of his Minister of War and the chief of the staff. 
When his power and influence in the State were 
greatest, Bismarck's authority always ceased as soon 
as technical and military matters arose for consider- 
ation. He often chafed at this limitation and even 
in a campaign was eager to offer his advice ; there 
was soldier's blood in his veins, and he would have 
liked himself to bear arms in the war. At least he 
was able to be present on the field of battle with the 
King and witness part of the campaign. 

With the King he left Berlin on June 30th to join 
the army in Bohemia. Already the news had come 
of the capitulation of the Hanoverians ; the whole of 
North-West Germany had been conquered in a week 
and the Prussian flank was secure. The effect of 
these victories was soon seen : his unpopularity was 

259 



26o Bismarck. 



[1866 



wiped out in blood. Night by night as the bulletins 
arrived, crowds collected to cheer and applaud the 
Minister. 

The King and his suite reached the army on July 
1st ; they were just in time to be present at the 
decisive battle. At midnight on July 2d it was 
known that the Austrians were preparing to give 
battle near Koniggratz with the Elbe in their rear. 
Early the next morning the King with Bismarck, 
Roon, and Moltke rode out and took up their posi- 
tions on the hill of Dub, whence they could view 
what was to be the decisive battle in the history of 
Germany. Here, after the lapse of more than a 
hundred years, they were completing the work which 
Frederick the Great had begun. The battle was 
long and doubtful. The army of Prince Frederick 
Charles attacked the Austrian division under the 
eyes of the King, but could make no advance against 
their powerful artillery. They had to wait till the 
Crown Prince, who was many miles away, could come 
up and attack the right flank of the Austrians. 
Hour after hour went by and the Crown Prince did 
not come ; if he delayed longer the attack would 
fail and the Prussians be defeated. We can easily 
imagine what must have been Bismarck's thoughts 
during this crisis. On the result depended his posi- 
tion, his reputation, perhaps his life ; into those few 
hours was concentrated the struggle to which he 
had devoted so much of his lifetime, and yet he was 
quite helpless. Success or failure did not depend on 
him. It is the crudest trial to the statesman that 
he must see his best plans undone by the mistakes 



1866] The Conquest of Germany. 261 

of the generals. Bismarck often looked with anxiety 
at Moltke's face to see whether he could read in it 
the result of the battle. The King, too, was getting 
nervous. Bismarck at last could stand it no longer ; 
he rode up to Moltke, took out a cigar case, and 
offered it to the General ; Moltke looked at the 
cigars carefully and took the best ; " then I knew we 
were all right," said Bismarck in telling this story. 
It was after two when at last the cannon of the 
Crown Prince's army came into action, and the 
Austrian army, attacked on two sides, was 
overthrown. 

"This time the brave grenadiers have saved us," 
said Roon. It was true ; but for the army which he 
and the King had made, all the genius of Moltke 
and Bismarck would have been unavailing. 

" Our men deserve to be kissed," wrote Bismarck to 
his wife. " Every man is brave to the death, quiet, 
obedient ; with empty stomachs, wet clothes, little sleep, 
the soles of their boots falling off, they are friendly to- 
wards everyone ; there is no plundering and burning ; 
they pay what they are able, though they have mouldy 
bread to eat. There must exist a depth of piety in our 
common soldier or all this could not be." 

Bismarck might well be proud of this practical 
illustration which was given of that which he so often 
in older days maintained. This was a true comment 
on the pictures of the loyalty of the Prussian people 
and the simple faith of the German peasants, which 
from his place in Parliament he had opposed to the 
new sceptical teaching of the Liberals. As soon as 
he was able he went about among the wounded ; as 



262 Bismarck. 



[1866 



he once said, the King of Prussia was accustomed to 
look into the eyes of wounded men on the field of 
battle and therefore would never venture on an un- 
just or unnecessary war, and in this Bismarck felt as 
the King. He writes home for cigars for distribut- 
ing among the wounded. Personally he endured 
something of the hardships of campaigning, for in 
the miserable Bohemian villages there was little food 
and shelter to be had. He composed himself to 
sleep, as best he could, on a dung-heap by the 
roadside, until he was roused by the Prince of 
Mecklenburg, who had found more acceptable 
quarters. 

It was not for long that this life, which was to him 
almost a welcome reminiscence of his sporting days, 
could continue. Diplomatic cares soon fell upon 
him. 

Not two days had passed since the great battle, 
when a telegram from Napoleon was placed in the 
King's hands informing him that Austria had re- 
quested France's mediation, that Venetia had been 
surrendered to France, and inviting the King to 
conclude an armistice. Immediately afterwards came 
the news that the surrender of Venetia to France 
had been published in the Moniteiir. 

If this meant anything, it meant that Napoleon 
intended to stop the further progress of the Prussian 
army, to rescue Austria, and to dictate the terms of 
peace ; it could not be doubted that he would be 
prepared to support his mediation by arms, and in a 
few days they might expect to hear that the French 
corps were being stationed on the frontier. 



1866] The Conq2iest of Germany. 263 

What was to be done? Bismarck neither doubted 
nor hesitated ; it was impossible to refuse French 
mediation. West Germany was almost undefended, 
the whole of the southern States were still uncon- 
quered ; however imperfect the French military 
preparations might be, it was impossible to run such 
a risk. At his advice the King at once sent a 
courteous answer accepting the French proposal. 
He was more disposed to this because in doing so he 
really bound himself to nothing. He accepted the 
principle of French mediation ; but he was still free 
to discuss and refuse the special terms which might 
be offered. He said that he was willing to accept an 
armistice, but it was only on condition that the pre- 
liminaries of peace were settled before hostilities, 
ceased, and to them the King could not agree except 
after consultation with the King of Italy. It was a 
friendly answer, which cost nothing, and meanwhile 
the army continued to advance. An Austrian re- 
quest for an armistice was refused ; Vienna was now 
the goal ; Napoleon, if he wished to stop them, must 
take the next move, must explain the terms of peace 
he wished to secure, and shew by what measures he 
was prepared to enforce them. 

By his prompt action, Bismarck, who knew Napo- 
leon well, hoped to escape the threatened danger. 
We shall see with what address he used the situation, 
so that the vacillation of France became to him more 
useful than even her faithful friendship would have 
been, for now he felt himself free from all ties of 
gratitude. Whatever services France might do to 
Prussia she could henceforth look to hini for no vol- 



264 Bismarck. [I866 

untary recompense. Napoleon had deceived him ; 
he would henceforward have no scruples in deceiving 
Napoleon. He had entered on the war relying on 
the friendship and neutrality of France; at the first 
crisis this had failed him ; he never forgot and he 
never forgave ; years later, when the news of Napo- 
leon's death was brought to him, this was the first 
incident in their long connection which came into his 
mind. 

Intercourse with Paris was slow and uncertain ; the 
telegraph wires were often cut by the Bohemian 
peasants ; some time must elapse before an answer 
came. In the meanwhile, as the army steadily ad- 
vanced towards the Austrian capital, Bismarck had 
to consider the terms of peace he would be willing to 
accept. He had to think not only of what he would 
wish, but of what it was possible to acquire. He 
wrote to his wife at this time : 

" We are getting on well. If we are not extreme in 
our claims and do not imagine that we have conquered 
the world, we shall obtain a peace that is worth having. 
But we are as easily intoxicated as we are discouraged, 
and I have the thankless task of pouring water into the 
foaming wine and of pointing out that we are not alone 
in Europe, but have three neighbours." 

Of the three neighbours there was little to fear 
from England. With the death of Lord Palmerston, 
English policy had entered on a new phase; the tra- 
ditions of Pitt and Canning were forgotten ; England 
no longer aimed at being the arbitress of Europe; 
the leaders of both parties agreed that unless her 



1866] The Co7iquest of Germany. 265 

own interests were immediately affected, England 
would not interfere in Continental matters. The 
internal organisation of Germany did not appear to 
concern her; she was the first to recognise the new 
principle that the relations of the German States to 
one another were to be settled by the Germans 
themselves, and to extend to Germany that doctrine 
of non-intervention which she had applied to Spain 
and Itsely. 

Neither France nor Russia would be so accommo- 
dating ; France, we have already seen, had begun to 
interfere, Russia would probably do so ; if they 
came to some agreement they would demand a con- 
gress ; and, as a matter of fact, a few days later the 
Czar proposed a congress, both in Paris and in Lon- 
don. Of all issues this was the one which Bismarck 
dreaded most. A war with France he would have 
disliked, but at the worst he was not afraid of it. 
But he did not wish that the terms of peace he pro- 
posed to dictate should be subjected to the criticism 
and revision of the European Powers, nor to un- 
dergo the fate which fell on Russia twelve years 
later. Had the congress, however, been supported 
by Russia and France he must have accepted it. 
It is for this reason that he was so ready to meet 
the wishes of France, for if Napoleon once entered 
into separate and private negotiations, then what- 
ever the result of them might be, he could not join 
with the other Powers in common action. 

With regard to the terms of peace, it was obvious 
that Schleswig-Holstein would now be Prussian; it 
could scarcely be doubted that there must be a 



266 Bismarck. [I866 

reform in the Confederation, which would be re- 
organised under the hegemony of Prussia, and that 
Austria would be excluded from ail participation in 
German affairs. It might, in fact, be anticipated 
that the very great successes of Prussia would en- 
able her to carry out the programme of 1849, ^"^ 
to unite the whole of Germany in a close union. 
This, however, was not what Bismarck intended ; 
for him the unity of Germany was a matter of 
secondary importance; what he desired was com- 
plete control over the north. In this he was going 
■back to the sound and true principles of Prussian 
policy ; he, as nearly all other Prussian statesmen, 
looked on the line of the Main as a real division. 
He, therefore, on the 9th of July, wrote to Goltz, 
explaining the ideas he had of the terms on which 
peace might be concluded. 

''The essential thing," he said, was that they 
should get control over North Germany in some 
form or other. 

" I use the term North German Confederation without 
any hesitation, because I consider that if the necessary 
consolidation of the Federation is to be made certain it 
will be at present impossible to include South Germany 
in it. The present moment is very favourable for giving 
our new creation just that delimitation which will secure 
it a firm union." 

The question remained, what form the Union should 
take. On this he writes : " Your Excellency must 
have the same impression as myself, that public 
opinion in- our country demands the incorporation 



1866] The Conquest of Germany. 267 

of Hanover, Saxony, and Schleswig." He adds that 
this would undoubtedly be the best solution of the 
matter for all concerned, if it could be effected with- 
out the cession of other Prussian territory, but he 
did not himself consider the difference between a 
satisfactory system of reform and the acquisition of 
these territories sufficient to justify him in risking 
the fate of the whole monarchy. It was the same 
alternative which had presented itself to him about 
Schleswig-Holstein ; now, as then, annexation was 
what he aimed at, and he was not the man easily to 
reconcile himself to a less favourable solution. At 
the same time that he wrote this letter he sent 
orders that Falkenstein should quickly occupy all 
the territory north of the Main. 

It is important to notice the date at which this 
letter was sent. It shews us that these proposals 
were Bismarck's own. Attempts have often been 
made since to suggest that the policy of annexation 
was not his, but was forced on him by the King, or 
by the military powers, or by the nation. This was 
not the case. He appeals indeed to public opinion, 
but public opinion, had it been asked, would really 
have demanded, not the dethronement of the Kings 
of Hanover and Saxony, but the unity of all Ger- 
many ; and we know that Bismarck would never 
pursue what he thought a dangerous policy sim- 
ply because public opinion demanded it. It has also 
been said that the dethronement of the King of Han- 
over was the natural result of the obstinacy of him- 
self and his advisers, and his folly in going to Vienna 
to appeal there to the help of the Austrian Emperor. 



268 Bismarck. [1866 

This also is not true. We find that Bismarck has 
determined on this policy some days before the King 
had left Thuringia. This, like all he did, was the 
deliberate result of the consideration : What would 
tend most to the growth of Prussian power? He 
had to consider three alternatives : that these States 
should be compelled to come into a union with Prus- 
sia on the terms that the Princes should hand over 
the command of their forces to the Prussian King, 
but he knew that the King of Hanover would never 
consent to this, and probably the King of Saxbny 
would also refuse ; he might also require the reigning 
Kings to abdicate in place of their sons ; or he might 
leave them with considerable freedom, but cripple 
their power by taking away part of their territory. 
These solutions seemed to him undesirable because 
they would leave dynasties, who would naturally be 
hostile, jealous, and suspicious, with the control of 
large powers of government. Surely it would be 
better, safer, and wiser to sweep them away alto- 
gether. It may be objected that there was no ground 
in justice for so doing. This is true, and Bismarck 
has never pretended that there was. He has left it 
to the writers of the Prussian Press to justify an 
action which was based purely on policy, by the pre- 
tence that it was the due recompense of the crimes 
of the rival dynasties. 

Sybel says that Bismarck determined on these 
terms because they were those which would be most 
acceptable to France; that he would have preferred 
at once to secure the unity of the whole of Germany, 
but that from his knowledge of French thought and 



1866] The Conquest of Geinnany. 269 

French character he foresaw that this would be pos- 
sible only after another war, and he did not wish to 
risk the whole. So far as our information goes, it is 
against this hypothesis ; it is rather true to say that 
he used the danger of French interference as a means 
of persuading the King to adopt a policy which was 
naturally repugnant to him. It is true that these 
terms would be agreeable to Napoleon. It would 
appear in France and in Europe as if it was French 
power which had persuaded Prussia to stop at the 
Main and to spare Austria ; Bismarck did not mind 
that, because what was pleasant to France was con- 
venient to him. He knew also that the proposal to 
annex the conquered territories would be very agree- 
able to Napoleon ; the dethronement of old-estab- 
lished dynasties might be regarded as a delicate 
compliment to the principles he had always main- 
tained and to the traditional policy of his house. If, 
however, we wish to find Bismarck's own motives, we 
must remember that before the war broke out he had 
in his mind some such division of Germany ; he 
knew that it would be impossible at once to unite 
the whole in a firm union. If Bavaria were to be in- 
cluded in the new Confederation they would lose in 
harmony what they gained in extent. As he said 
in his drastic way : 

"We cannot use these Ultramontanes, and we must 
not swallow more than we can digest. We will not fall 
into the blunder of Piedmont, which has been more weak- 
ened than strengthened by the annexation of Naples." 

Of course he could not express this openly, and 



270 Bismarck. [1866 

even now German writers obscure the thought, for in 
Germany, as in Italy, the desire for unity was so 
powerful that it was difficult to pardon any statesman 
who did not take the most immediate path to this 
result. It was fortunate for Germany that Bismarck 
was strong enough not to do so, for the Confedera- 
tion of the north could be founded and confirmed 
before the Catholic and hostile south was included. 
The prize was in his hands ; he deliberately refused to 
pick it up. 

Supposing, however, that, after all, France would 
not accept the terms he suggested — during the anx- 
ious days which passed, this contingency was often 
before him. It was not till the 14th that Goltz 
was able to send him any decisive information, for 
the very good reason that Napoleon had not until 
then made up his own mind. Bismarck's anxiety 
was increased by the arrival of Benedetti. He had 
received instructions to follow the King, and, after 
undergoing the discomfort of a hasty journey in the 
rear of the Prussian army, reached headquarters on 
the loth at Zwittau. He was taken straight to Bis- 
marck's room although it was far on into the night. 
He found him sitting in a deserted house, writing, 
with a large revolver by his side ; for as Roon com- 
plains, even during the campaign Bismarck would not 
give up his old custom of working all night and sleep- 
ing till midday or later. Bismarck received the French 
Ambassador with his wonted cordiality and the con- 
versation was prolonged till three or four o'clock in 
the morning, and continued on the following days. 
Bismarck hoped that he had com.e with full powers 



18661 The Conquest of Germany. 271 

to treat, or at least with full information on the in- 
tentions of his Government ; that was not the case ; 
he had no instructions except to use his influence to 
persuade Prussia to moderation ; Napoleon was far 
too much divided in his own mind to be able to tell 
him anything further. Bismarck with his usual frank- 
ness explained what he wished, laying much stress on 
the annexations in North Germany ; Benedetti, so 
little did he follow Napoleon's thought, protested 
warmly against this. " We are not," he said, " in the 
times of Frederick the Great." Bismarck then tried 
to probe him on other matters ; as before, he assumed 
that Napoleon's support and good-will were not to 
be had for nothing. He took it as a matter of course 
that if France was friendly to Prussia, she would re- 
quire some recompense. He had already instructed 
Goltz to enquire what non-German compensation 
would be asked ; he was much disturbed when Ben- 
edetti met his overtures with silence ; he feared that 
Napoleon had some other plan. Benedetti in his 
report writes : 

" Without any encouragement on my part, he attempted 
to prove to me that the defeat of Austria permitted 
France and Prussia to modify their territorial limits and 
to solve the greater part of the difficulties which con- 
tinued to menace the peace of Europe. I reminded him 
that there were treaties and that the war which he desired 
to prevent would be the first result of a policy of this kind. 
M. de Bismarck answered that I misunderstood him, that 
France and Prussia united and resolved to rectify their 
respective countries, binding themselves by solemn en- 
gagements henceforth to regulate together these ques- 



272 Bzsmai^ck. [I866 

tions, need not fear any armed resistance either from 
England or from Russia." 

What was Bismarck's motive in making these sug- 
gestions and enquiries? German writers generally 
take the view that he was not serious in his proposal, 
that he was deliberately playing with Napoleon, 
that he wished to secure from him some compro- 
mising document which he might then be able, as, 
in fact, was to happen, to use against him. They 
seem to find some pleasure in admiring him in the 
part of Agent provocateur. Perhaps we may inter- 
pret his thought rather differently. We have often 
seen that it was not his practice to lay down a clear 
and definite course of action, but he met each crisis 
/as it occurred. The immediate necessity was to 
y secure the friendship of France ; believing, as he did, 
that in politics no one acted simply on principle or 
out of friendship, he assumed that Napoleon, who 
had control of the situation, would not give his sup- 
port unless he had the promise of some important 
recompense. The natural thing for him, as he 
always preferred plain dealing, was to ask straight 
out what the Emperor wanted. When the answer 
came, then fresh questions would arise ; if it was of 
such a kind that Bismarck would be able to accept 
it, a formal treaty between the two States might be 
made ; if it was more than Bismarck was willing to 
grant, then there would be an opportunity for pro- 
longing negotiations with France, and haggling over 
smaller points, and he would be able to come to 
some agreement with Austria quickly. If he could 
not come to any agreement with France, and war 



1866] The Conquest of Germany. 273 

were to break out, he would always have this advan- 
tage, that he would be able to make it appear that 
the cause of war arose not in the want of moderation 
of Prussia, but in the illegitimate claims of France. 
Finally he had this to consider, that so long as 
France was discussing terms with him, there was no 
danger of their accepting the Russian proposal for 
a congress. Probably the one contingency which 
did not occur to him was that which, in fact, was 
nearest to the truth, namely, that Napoleon did not 
care much for any recompense, and that he had not 
seriously considered what he ought to demand. 

He was, however, prepared for the case that 
France should not be accommodating. He deter- 
mined to enter on separate negotiations with Austria. 
As he could not do this directly, he let it be known 
at Vienna by way of St. Petersburg that he was 
willing to negotiate terms of peace. At Brunn, 
where he was living, he opened up a new channel of 
intercourse. An Austrian nobleman, who was well 
disposed towards Prussia, undertook an unofficial 
mission, and announced to the Emperor the terms 
on which Prussia would make peace. They were 
extraordinarily lenient, namely, that, with the excep- 
tion of Venetia, the territory of Austria should 
remain intact, that no war indemnity should be 
expected, that the Main should form the boundary 
of Prussian ambition, that South Germany should 
be left free, and might enter into close connection 
with Austria if it chose ; the only condition was that 
no intervention or mediation of France should be 

allowed. If the negotiations with France were suc- 
18 



2 74 Bismarck. tl866 

cessful, then the French and Prussian armies united 
would bid defiance to the world. If those with 
France failed, then he hoped to bring about an 
understanding with Austria ; the two great Powers 
would divide Germany between them, but present 
a united front to all outsiders. If both negotiations 
broke down, he would be reduced to a third and more 
terrible alternative : against a union of France and of 
Austria he would put himself at the head of the 
German national movement ; he would adopt the 
programme of 1849 ! ^^ would appeal to the Revolu- 
tion ; he would stir up rebellion in Hungary; he 
would encourage the Italians to deliver a thrust into 
the very heart of the Austrian Monarchy ; and, 
while Austria was destroyed by internal dissensions, 
he would meet the French invasion at the head of 
a united army of the other German States. 

After all, however, Napoleon withdrew his oppo- 
sition. It was represented to him that he had not 
the military force to carry out his new programme ; 
Italy refused to desert Prussia or even to receive 
Venetia from the hands of France ; Prince Napoleon 
warned his cousin against undoing the work of his 
lifetime. The Emperor himself, broken in health 
and racked by pain, confessed that his action of July 
5th had been a mistake ; he apologised to Goltz 
for his proclamation ; he asked only that Prussia 
should be moderate in her demands ; the one thing 
was that the unity of Germany should be avoided, if 
only in appearance. This, we have seen, was Bis- 
marck's own view. Napoleon accepted the terms 
which Goltz proposed, but asked only that the King- 



1866] The Conquest of Germany. 2 75 

dom of Saxony should be spared ; if this was done, 
he would not only adopt, he would recommend 
them. An agreement was quickly come to. Bene- 
detti went on to Vienna ; he and Gramont had little 
dif^culty in persuading the Emperor to agree to 
terms of peace by which the whole loss of the war 
would fall not upon him, not even upon his only 
active and faithful ally, the King of Saxony, but on 
those other States who had refused to join them- 
selves to either party. What a triumph was it of 
Bismarck's skill that the addition of 4,000,000 sub- 
jects to the Prussian Crown and complete dominion 
over Northern Germany should appear, not as the 
demand which, as a ruthless conqueror, he enforced 
on his helpless enemies, but as the solution of all 
difificulties which was recommended to him in reward 
for his moderation by the ruler of France ! 

On the 23d of July an armistice was agreed on, 
and a conference was held at Nikolsburg to arrange 
the preliminaries of peace. There was no delay. In 
olden days Bismarck had shewn how he was able to 
prolong negotiations year after year when it was 
convenient to him that they should come to no con- 
clusion ; now he hurried through in three days the 
discussion by which the whole future of Germany 
and Europe were to be determined. When all were 
agreed on the main points, difificulties on details 
were easily overcome. It remained only to procure 
the assent of the King. Here again, as so often be- 
fore, Bismarck met with most serious resistance. 
He drew up a careful memorandum which he pre- 
sented to the monarch, pressing on him in the very 



276 Bismarck. [1866 

strongest terms the acceptance of these conditions. 
Up to the last moment, however, there seems to 
have been a great rekictance ; Sybel represents the 
difficulties as rising from the immoderate demands 
of the military party at Court ; they were not pre- 
pared, after so great a victory, to leave Austria with 
undiminished territory ; they wished at least to 
have part of Austrian Silesia. This account seems 
misleading. It was not that the King wanted more 
than Bismarck had desired ; he wanted his acquisi- 
tion of territory to come in a different way. He 
was not reconciled to the dethronement of the King 
of Hanover ; he wished to take part of Hanover, 
part of Saxony, part of Bavaria, and something from 
Darmstadt ; to his simple and honest mind it seemed 
unjust that those who had been his bitterest enemies 
should be treated with the greatest consideration. 
It was the old difficulty which Bismarck had met 
with in dealing with Schleswig-Holstein : the King 
had much regard for the rights of other Princes. 
This time, however, Bismarck, we are surprised to 
learn, had the influential support of the Crown 
Prince ; the scruples which he had felt as regards 
Schleswig-Holstein did not apply to Hanover. He 
was sent in to his father ; the interview lasted two 
hours ; what passed we do not know ; he came out 
exhausted and wearied with the long struggle, but 
the King had given in, and the policy of Bismarck 
triumphed. The preliminaries of Nikolsburg were 
signed, and two days afterwards were ratified, for 
Bismarck pressed on the arrangements with feverish 
impetuosity. 



1866] The Conquest of Gei^many. 277 

He had good reason to do so ; he had just received 
intelligence that the Emperor of Russia was making 
an official demand for a congress and fresh news had 
come from France. On the 25th Benedetti had 
again come to him and had sounded him with regard 
to the recompense which France might receive. On 
the 26th, just as Bismarck was going to the final sit- 
ting of the Conference, the French Ambassador again 
called on him, this time to lay before him a despatch 
in which Drouyn de Lhuys stated that he had not 
wished to impede the negotiations with Austria, but 
would now observe that the French sanction to 
the Prussian annexations presupposed a fair indem- 
nification to France, and that the Emperor would 
confer with Prussia concerning this as soon as his 
role of mediator was at an end. What madness this 
was ! As soon as the role of mediator was at an 
end, as soon as peace was arranged with Austria, the 
one means which France had for compelling the ac- 
quiescence of Prussia was lost. 

What had happened was this : Napoleon had, in 
conversation with Goltz, refused to consider the ques- 
tion of compensation : it was not worth while, he said ; 
the gain of a few square miles of territory would not 
be of any use. He therefore, when he still might 
have procured them, made no conditions. Drouyn 
de Lhuys, however, who had disapproved of the 
whole of the Emperor's policy, still remained in 
office ; he still wished, as he well might wish, to 
strengthen France in view of the great increase of 
Prussian power. He, therefore, on the 21st again 
approached Napoleon and laid before him a des- 



278 Bismarck. [1866 

patch in which he brought up the question of com- 
pensation. He was encouraged to this course by the 
reports which Benedetti had sent of his conversa- 
tions with Bismarck ; it was clear that Bismarck ex- 
pected some demand ; he had almost asked that it 
should be made. " We wish to avoid any injury to 
the balance of power," Goltz had said ; " we will 
either moderate our demands or discuss those of 
France." It appeared absurd not to accept this 
offer. Napoleon was still reluctant to do so, but he 
was in a paroxysm of pain. " Leave me in peace," 
was his only answer to his Minister's request, and 
the Minister took it as an assent. 

Bismarck, when Benedetti informed him of the de- 
mand that was to be made, at once answered that he 
was quite ready to consider the proposal. Bene- 
detti then suggested that it would probably concern 
certain strips of territory on the left bank of the 
Rhine ; on this, Bismarck stopped him : " Do not 
make any official announcements of that kind to me 
to-day." He went away, the Conference was con- 
cluded, the preliminaries were signed and ratified. 
France had been too late, and when the demand 
was renewed Bismarck was able to adopt a very 
different tone. 

Let us complete the history of these celebrated 
negotiations. 

The discussion which had been broken off so 
suddenly at Nikolsburg was continued at Berlin ; 
during the interval the matter had been further dis- 
cussed in Paris, and it had been determined firmly 
to demand compensation. Benedetti had warned 



18661 The Conquest of Germany. 279 

the Government that Bismarck would not surrender 
any German territory ; it was no good even asking 
for this, unless the demand was supported by urgent 
and threatening language. The result of the con- 
siderations was that he was instructed categorically 
to require the surrender to France of the Palatinate 
and Mayence. Benedetti undertook the task with 
some reluctance ; in order to avoid being present at 
the explosion of anger which he might expect, he 
addressed the demand to Bismarck on August 5th, 
by letter. Two days he waited for an answer, but 
received none ; on the evening of the 7th, he himself 
called on the Count, and a long discussion took place. 
Bismarck adopted a tone of indignation : " The whole 
affair makes us doubt Napoleon and threatens to 
destroy our confidence." The pith of it was con- 
tained in the last words : " Do you ask this from us 
under threat of war?" said Bismarck. "Yes," said 
Benedetti. " Then it will be war." Benedetti asked 
to have an interview with the King ; it was granted, 
and he received the same answer. This was the re- 
sult he had anticipated, and the next evening he 
returned to Paris to consider with the Government 
what was to be done. Bismarck meanwhile had 
taken care that some information as to these secret 
negotiations should become known ; with character- 
istic cleverness he caused it to be published in a 
French paper, Le Silrle, that France had asked for 
the Rhine country and been refused. Of course, 
the German Press took up the matter ; with patriotic 
fervour they supported the King and Minister. 
Napoleon found himself confronted by the danger 



28o Bismarck. 



[1866 



of a union of all Germany in opposition to French 
usurpation, and his own diplomatic defeat had be- 
come known in a most inconvenient form ; he at 
once travelled to Paris, consulted Benedetti, re- 
turned to his former policy, and asked that the de- 
mand of August 5th might be forgotten ; it was 
withdrawn, and things were to be as if it had never 
been made. 

Were they, however, still to give up all hope of 
some increase of French territory ? The demand 
for German soil had been refused ; it was not at all 
clear that Bismarck would not support the acquisi- 
tion of at least part of Belgium. In conversation 
with Benedetti, on August 7th, he had said : " Per- 
haps we will find other means of satisfying you." 
Goltz was still very sympathetic ; he regarded the 
French desire as quite legitimate in principle. It 
was determined, therefore, now to act on these 
hints and suggestions which had been repeated so 
often during the last twelve months; Benedetti was 
instructed to return with a draft treaty ; the French 
demands were put in three forms ; first of all he was 
to ask for the Saar Valley, Landau, Luxemburg, 
and Belgium ; if this was too much, he was to be con- 
tent with Belgium and Luxemburg, and if it seemed 
desirable he should offer that Antwerp be made a 
free city ; by this perhaps the extreme hostility of 
England would be averted. With this demand, on 
August 20th, he again appeared before Bismarck. 
Of course, the Minister, as soon as Saarbriick and 
Landau were mentioned, drew himself up to his full 
height, adopted an angry air, and reminded Bene- 



1866] The Conquest of Germany. 281 

detti of his repeated declaration that they were not 
going to give up a single German village. Benedetti, 
therefore, in accordance with his instructions, with- 
drew this clause. The rest of the treaty he and 
Bismarck discussed together carefully ; they took it 
line by line and clause by clause, Bismarck dealing 
with the matter in a serious and practical manner. 
After this had been finished a revised draft was 
written out by Benedetti, Bismarck dictating to him 
the alterations which had been made. This revised 
draft consisted of five articles: (i) The Emperor 
recognised the recent acquisitions of Prussia ; (2) the 
King of Prussia should bind himself to assist France 
in acquiring Luxemburg from the King of Holland 
by purchase or exchange ; (3) the Emperor bound 
himself not to oppose a union of the North German 
Federation with the South German States and the 
establishment of a common Parliament ; (4) if the 
Emperor at any time wished to acquire Belgium, 
the King of Prussia was to support him and give 
him military assistance against the interference of 
any other Power ; (5) a general treaty of alliance. 

It will be seen that this treaty consists of two 
parts. The first refers to what has already taken 
place, — the Emperor of the French in return for past 
assistance is to have Luxemburg ; this part would 
naturally come into operation immediately. The 
next two clauses referred to the future ; the union of 
all Germany would in the natural course of events 
not be long delayed ; this would seriously alter the 
balance of power and weaken France. Napoleon 
would naturally in the future use all his efforts to 



282 Bismarck. 



[1866 



prevent it, as he had done during this year, and by 
an alliance with Austria he would probably be able 
to do so. He would, however, withdraw his opposi- 
tion if he was allowed to gain a similar increase of 
territory for France. After all, the acquisition of at 
least part of Belgium by France might be justified by 
the same arguments by which the dethronement of 
the King of Hanover was defended. Many of the 
Belgians were French ; there was no natural division 
between Belgium and France ; probably the people 
would offer no opposition. 

Bismarck had to remember that he could not com- 
plete the union of Germany without considering 
Napoleon ; there Avere only two ways of doing the 
work, (i) by war with France, (2) by an alliance. 
Need we be surprised that he at least considered 
whether the latter would not be the safer, the 
cheaper, and the more humane ? Was it not bet- 
ter to complete the work by the sacrifice of Belgian 
independence rather than by the loss of 300,000 
lives? 

Benedetti sent the revised draft to Paris ; it was 
submitted to the Emperor, accepted in principle, and 
returned with some small alterations and sugges- 
tions. Benedetti sent in the revision to Bismarck 
and said he would be ready at any time to meet the 
Minister and finish the negotiations. He himself left 
Berlin for Carlsbad and there awaited the summons. 
It never came. Week after week went by, Bismarck 
retired to his Pomeranian estate ; he did not return 
to Berlin till December and he never renewed the 
negotiations, The revised draft in Benedetti's hand- 



1866] The Conquest of Germany. 283 

writing was in his hands ; four years later, when war 
had been declared against France, he published it in 
order to destroy whatever sympathy for Napoleon 
there might be in England. 

Bismarck did not continue the negotiations, for 
he had found a better way. Till August 23d his 
relations to Austria were still doubtful ; he always 
had to fear that there was some secret understand- 
ing between France and Austria, that a coalition of 
the two States had been completed, and that Prussia 
might suddenly find herself attacked on both sides. 
He had, therefore, not wished to offend France. 
Moreover his relations to Russia were not quite sat- 
isfactory. The Czar took a very serious view of the 
annexations in North Germany : " I do not like it," 
he said ; " I do not like this dethronement of dy- 
nasties." It was necessary to send General Man- 
teuffel on a special mission to St. Petersburg ; the 
Czar did not alter his opinion, but Bismarck found it 
possible at least to quiet him. We do not know all 
that passed, but he seems to have used a threat and 
a promise. If the Czar attempted to interfere in 
Germany, Bismarck hinted, as he had already done, 
that he might have to put himself at the head of the 
Revolution, and proclaim the Constitution of 1849; 
then what would happen to the monarchical princi- 
ples? He even suggested that a Revolution which 
began in Germany might spread to Poland. The Czar 
explained that he was discontented with many 
clauses in the Treaty of Paris. There was an under- 
standing, if there was no formal compact, that Prussia 
would lend her support, when the time came for the 



284 Bismarck. [I866 

Czar to declare that he was no longer willing to ob- 
serve this treaty. 

By the end of August Bismarck had therefore re- 
moved the chief dangers which threatened him. 
Russia was quieted, France was expectant, Austria 
was pacified. He had, however, done more than this : 
he had already laid the foundation for the union of 
the whole of Germany which Napoleon thought he 
had prevented. 

The four southern States had joined in the war 
against Prussia. In a brilliant and interesting cam- 
paign a small Prussian army had defeated the Fed- 
eral forces and occupied the whole of South Germany. 
The conquest of Germany by Prussia was complete. 
These States had applied at Nikolsburg to be al- 
lowed to join in the negotiations. The request was 
refused, and Bismarck at this time treated them 
with a deliberate and obtrusive brutality. Baron 
von der Pfortden, the Bavarian Minister, had himself 
travelled to Nikolsburg to ask for peace. He was 
greeted by Bismarck with the words : " What are 
you doing here? You have no safe-conduct. I 
should be justified in treating you as a prisoner of 
war." He had to return without achieving anything. 
Frankfort had been occupied by the Prussian army ; 
the citizens were required to pay a war indemnity 
of a million pounds ; Manteuffel, who was in com- 
mand, threatened to plunder the town, and the full 
force of Prussian displeasure was felt by the city 
where Bismarck had passed so many years. It was 
arranged with Austria and France that the southern 
States should participate in the suspension of hos- 



1866] The Conqttest of Germmty. 285 

tilities ; that they should preserve their independence 
and should be allowed to enter into any kind of 
Federal alliance with one another. The result of 
this would have been that South Germany would be 
a weak, disunited confederation, which would be 
under the control partly of France and partly of 
Austria. This would have meant the perpetuation 
in its worst form of French influence over South 
Germany. When this clause was agreed on, the 
terms of peace between these States and Prussia had 
not yet been arranged. The King of Prussia wished 
that they should surrender to him some parts of 
their territory. Bismarck, however, opposed this. 
He was guided by the same principles which had 
influenced him all along. Some States should be 
entirely absorbed in Prussia, the others treated so 
leniently that the events of this year should leave no 
feeling of hostility. If Bavaria had to surrender 
Bayreuth and Anspach, he knew that the Bavarians 
would naturally take part in the first coalition against 
Prussia. With much trouble he persuaded the King 
to adopt this point of view. The wisdom of it was 
soon shewn. At the beginning of August he still 
maintained a very imperious attitude, and talked 
to the Bavarians of large annexations. Pfortden in 
despair had cried, " Do not drive us too far ; we 
shall have to go for help to France." Then was Bis- 
marck's turn. He told the Bavarian Minister of 
Napoleon's suggestion, shewed him that it was Prus- 
sia alone who had prevented Napoleon from annex- 
ing a large part of Bavaria, and then appealed to him 
through his German patriotism : Would not Bavaria 



286 Bismarck. 



[1866 



join Prussia in an alliance ? Pfortden was much 
moved, the Count and the Baron embraced one an- 
other, and by the end of August Bismarck had ar- 
ranged with all the four southern States a secret 
offensive and defensive alliance. By this they bound 
themselves to support Prussia if she was attacked. 
Prussia guaranteed to them their territory ; in case of 
war they would put their army under the command 
of the King of Prussia. He was now sure, therefore, 
of an alliance of all Germany against France. He 
no longer required French assistance. The unity of 
Germany, when it was made, would be achieved by 
the unaided forces of the united German States. 
The draft treaty with Napoleon might now be put 
aside. 

These negotiations mark indeed a most important 
change in Bismarck's own attitude. Hitherto he had 
thought and acted as a Prussian ; he had deliber- 
ately refused on all occasions to support or adopt the 
German programme. He had done this because he 
did not wish Germany to be made strong until the 
ascendancy of Prussia was secured. The battle of 
Koniggratz had done that ; North Germany was 
now Prussian ; the time had come when he could be- 
gin to think and act as a German, for the power of 
Prussia was founded on a rock of bronze. 

This change was not the only one which dates 
from the great victory. The constitutional conflict 
had still to be settled. The Parliament had been 
dissolved just before the war ; the new elections had 
taken place on the 3d of July, after the news of the 
first victory was known. The result was shewn in a 



1866] The Conquest of Germany. 287 

great gain of seats to the Government and to the 
Moderate Liberal party. The great question, how- 
ever, was, How would Bismarck use his victory over y 
the House? for a victory it was. It was the cannon 
of Koniggratz which decided the Parliamentary con- / 
flict. The House had refused the money to re- 
organise the army, and it was this reorganised army 
which had achieved so unexampled a triumph. 
Would the Government now press their victory and 
use the enthusiasm of the moment permanently to 
cripple the Constitution ? This is what the Con- 
servative party, what Roon and the army wished to 
do. It was not Bismarck's intention. He required 
the support of the patriotic Liberals for the work he 
had to do ; he proposed, therefore, that the Govern- 
ment should come before the House and ask for an 
indemnity. They did not confess that they had 
acted wrongly, they did not express regret, but they 
recognised that in spending the money without a 
vote of the House there had been an offence against 
the Constitution ; this could now only be made good 
if a Bill was brought in approving of what had hap- 
pened. He carried his opinion, not without diffi- 
culty ; the Bill of indemnity was introduced and 
passed. He immediately had his reward. The 
Liberal party, which had hitherto opposed him, 
broke into two portions. The extreme Radicals and 
Progressives still continued their opposition ; the 
majority of the party formed themselves into a new 
organisation, to which they gave the name of Na- 
tional Liberals. They pledged themselves to sup- 
port the National and German policy of the 



288 Bismarck. [I866 

Government, while they undertook, so far as they 
were able, to maintain and strengthen the constitu- 
tional rights, of Parliament. By this Bismarck had 
a Parliamentary majority, and he more and more 
depended upon them rather than his old friends, the 
Conservatives. He required their support because 
henceforward he would have to deal not with one 
Parliament, but two. The North German Confed- 
eration was to have its Parliament elected by uni- 
versal suffrage. Bismarck foresaw that the principles 
he had upheld in the past could not be applied in 
the same form to the whole of the Confederation. 
The Prussian Conservative party was purely Prus- 
sian, it was Particularist ; had he continued to depend 
upon it, then all the members sent to the new 
Reichstag, not only from Saxony, but also from the 
annexed States, would have been thrown into oppo- 
sition ; the Liberal party had always been not Prus- 
sian but German ; now that he had to govern so 
large a portion of Germany, that which had in the 
past been the great cause of difference would be the 
strongest bond of union. The National Liberal 
party was alone able to join him in the work of cre- 
ating enthusiasm for the new institutions and new 
loyalty. How often had he in the old days com- 
plained of the Liberals that they thought not as 
Prussians, that they were ashamed of Prussia, that 
they were not really loyal to Prussia. Now he knew 
that just for this reason they would be most loyal to 
the North German Confederation. 

Bismarck's moderation in the hour of victory 
must not obscure the importance of his triumph. 




BISMARCK AND HIS DOGS. 



1866] The Conquest of Germany. 289 

The question had been tried which should rule — ■ 
the Crown or the Parliament ; the Crown had won 
not only a physical but a moral victory. Bismarck 
had maintained that the House of Representatives 
could not govern Prussia ; the foreign affairs of the 
State, he had always said, must be carried on by a 
Minister who was responsible, not to the House, but 
to the King. No one could doubt that had the 
House been able to control him he would not have 
won these great successes. From that time the con- 
fidence of the German people in Parliamentary gov- 
ernment was broken. Moreover, it was the first 
time in the history of Europe in which one of these 
struggles had conclusively ended in the defeat of 
Parliament. The result of it was to be shewn in the 
history of every country in Europe during the next 
thirty years. It is the most serious bloAv which the 
principle of representative government has yet re- 
ceived. 

By the end of August most of the labour was 
completed ; there remained only the arrangement of 
peace with Saxony ; this he left to his subordinates 
and retired to Pomerania for the long period of rest 
which he so much required. 

During his absence a motion was brought before 
Parliament for conferring a donation on the victorious 
generals. At the instance of one of his most con- 
sistent opponents Bismarck's name was included in 
the list on account of his great services to his coun- 
try ; a protest was raised by Virchow on the ground 
that no Minister while in ofifice should receive a pres- 
ent, and that of all men Bismarck least deserved one, 



290 



Bismarck. 



[1866 



but scarcely fifty members could be found to oppose 
the vote. The donation of 40,000 thalers he used 
in purchasing the estate of Varzin, in Pomerania, 
which was to be his home for the next twenty 
years. 




CHAPTER XII. 

THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH GERMAN 
CONFEDERATION. 



1 866-1 867. 

WE have hitherto seen Bismarck in the charac- 
ter of party leader, Parliamentary debater, 
a keen and accomplished diplomatist ; now 
he comes before us in a new role, that of creative 
statesman ; he adopts it with the same ease and 
complete mastery with which he had borne himself 
in the earlier stages of his career. The Constitution 
of the North German Confederation was his work, 
and it shews the same intellectual resource, the ori- 
ginality, and practical sense which mark all he did. 
By a treaty of August 18, 1866, all the North 
German States which had survived entered into a 
treaty with one another and with Prussia; they mu- 
tually guaranteed each other's possessions, engaged 
to place their forces under the command of the 
King of Prussia, and promised to enter into a new 
federation ; for this purpose they were to send 
envoys to Berlin who should agree on a Constitu- 
tion, and they were to allow elections to take place 

291 



2g2 Bismarck. [1866- 

by universal suffrage for a North German Parliament 
before which was to be laid the draft Constitution 
agreed upon by the envoys of the States. These 
treaties did not actually create the new federation ; 
they only bound the separate States to enter into 
negotiations, and, as they expired on August 30, 1867, 
it was necessary that the new Constitution should be 
completed and ratified by that date. The time was 
short, for in it had to be compressed both the nego- 
tiations between the States and the debates in the 
assembly ; but all past experience had shewn that 
the shorter the time allowed for making a Constitu- 
tion the more probable was it that the work would 
be completed. Bismarck did not intend to allow the 
precious months, when enthusiasm was still high and 
new party factions had not seized hold of men's 
minds, to be lost. 

He had spent the autumn in Pomerania and did 
not return to Berlin till the 21st of December; not 
a week remained before the representatives of the 
North German States would assemble in the capital 
of Prussia. To the astonishment and almost dis- 
may of his friends, he had taken no steps for prepar- 
ing a draft. As soon as he arrived two drafts were 
laid before him ; he put them aside and the next 
day dictated the outlines of the new Constitution. 

This document has not been published, but it was 
the basis of the discussion with the envoys ; Bis- 
marck allowed no prolonged debates ; they were 
kept for some weeks in Berlin, but only three formal 
meetings took place. They made suggestions and 
criticisms, some of which were accepted, but they 



1867] The North Germa^t Confederation, ic^'}^ 

were of course obliged to assent to everything on 
which Bismarck insisted. The scheme as finally 
agreed upon by the conference was then laid before 
the assembly which met in Berlin on February 24th. 

A full analysis of this Constitution, for which we 
have no space here, would be very instructive ; it 
must not be compared with those elaborate constitu- 
tions drawn up by political theorists of which so 
many have been introduced during this century. 
Bismarck's work was like that of Augustus ; he found 
most of the institutions of government to his hand, 
but they were badly co-ordinated ; what he had to 
do was to bring them into better relations with each 
other, and to add to them where necessary. Many 
men would have swept away everything which ex- 
isted, made a clear field, and begun to build up a new 
State from the foundations. Bismarck was much too 
wise to attempt this, for he knew that the foundations 
of political life cannot be securely laid by one man 
or in one generation. He built on the foundations 
which others had laid, and for this reason it is prob- 
able that his work will be as permanent as that of 
the founder of the Roman Empire. 

We find in the new State old and new mixed to- 
gether in an inseparable union, and we find a com- 
plete indifference to theory or symmetry ; each point 
is decided purely by reference to the political situation 
at the moment. Take, for instance, the question of 
diplomatic representation ; Bismarck wished to give 
the real power to the King of Prussia, but at the 
same time to preserve the external dignity and re- 
spect due to the Allied Princes. He arranged that 



/294 Bismarck. [1866- 

the King of Prussia as President of the Confedera- 
tion appointed envoys and ambassadors to foreign 
States ; from this time there ceased to be a Prussian 
diplomatic service, and, in this matter, Prussia is en- 
tirely absorbed in Germany. It would have been 
only natural that the smaller Allied States should 
also surrender their right to enter into direct diplo- 
matic relations with foreign Powers. This Bismarck 
did not require. Saxony, for instance, continued to 
have its own envoys ; England and France, as in the 
old days, kept a Minister in Dresden. Bismarck was 
much criticised for this, but he knew that nothing 
would so much reconcile the King of Saxony to his 
new position, and it was indeed no small thing that 
the Princes thus preserved in a formal way a right_ 
which shewed to all the world that they were not 
subjects but sovereign allies. When it was repre- 
sented to Bismarck that this right might be the 
source of intrigues with foreign States, he answered 
characteristically that if Saxony wished to intrigue- 
nothing could prevent her doing so ; it was not 
necessary to have a formal embassy for this purpose. 
His confidence was absolutely justified. A few 
months later Napoleon sent to the King of Saxony a 
special invitation to a European congress ; the King 
at once sent on the invitation to Berlin and let it be 
known that he did not wish to be represented apart 
from the North German Confederation. The same 
leniency was shewn in 1870. Nothing is a better 
proof of Bismarck's immense superiority both in 
practical wisdom and in judgment of character. The 
Liberal Press in Germany had never ceased to revile 



1867] The North German Confederation. 295 

the German dynasties ; Bismarck knew that their 
apparent disloyalty to Germany arose not from their 
wishes but was a necessary result of the faults of the 
old Constitution. He made their interests coincide 
with the interests of Germany, and from this time 
they have been the most loyal supporters, first of the 
Confederation, and afterwards of the Empire. This 
he was himself the first to acknowledge ; both before 
and after the foundation of the Empire he has on 
many occasions expressed his sense of the great 
services rendered to Germany by the dynasties. 
"They," he said once, "were the true guardians of 
German unity, not the Reichstag and its parties." 

The most important provisions of the Constitution 
were those by which the military supremacy of 
Prussia was secured ; in this chapter every detail is 
arranged and provided for; the armies of all the 
various States were henceforth to form one army, 
under the command of the King of Prussia, with 
common organisation and similar uniform in every 
State ; in every State the Prussian military system 
was to be introduced, and all the details of Prussian 
military law. 

Now let us compare with this the navy : the army 
represented the old Germany, the navy the new ; 
the army was arranged and organised as Prussian, 
Saxon, Mecklenburg ; the navy, on the other hand, 
was German and organised by the new Federal 
ofificials. There was a Federal Minister of Marine, 
but no Federal Minister of War ; the army con- 
tinued the living sign of Prussian supremacy among 
a group of sovereign States, the navy was the first 



296 Bismarck. tl866- 

fruit of the united German institutions which were 
to be built up by the united efforts of the whole 
people— a curious resemblance to the manner in 
which Augustus also added an Imperial navy to the 
older Republican army. 

The very form in which the Constitution was pre- 
sented is characteristic ; in the Parliamentary debates 
men complained that there was no preamble, no 
introduction, no explanation. Bismarck answered 
that this was omitted for two reasons : first, there 
had not been time to draw it up, and secondly, it 
would be far more difficult to agree on the principles 
which the Constitution was to represent than on the 
details themselves. There is no attempt at laying 
down general principles, no definitions, and no 
enumeration of fundamental rights ; all these rocks, 
on which so often in Germany, as in France, precious 
months had been wasted, were entirely omitted. 

And now let us turn to that which after the 
organisation of the army was of most importance, 
— the arrangement of the administration and legisla- 
tion. Here it is that we see the greatest originality. 
German writers have often explained that it is im- 
possible to classify the new State in any known 
category, and in following their attempts to find the 
technical definition for the authority on which it 
rests, one is led almost to doubt whether it really 
exists at all. 

There are two agents of government, the Federal 
Council, or Biindesrath, and the Parliament, or Reich- 
stag. Here again we see the blending of the old 
and new, for while the Parliament was now created 



1867] 



The North German Confederation. 297 



for the first time, the Council was really nothing but 
the old Federal Diet. Even the old system of voting 
was retained ; not that this was better than any other 
system, but, as Bismarck explained, it was easier to 
preserve the old than to agree on a new. Any sys- 
tem must have been purely arbitrary, for had each 
State received a number of votes proportionate to its 
population even the appearance of a federation 
would have been lost, and Bismarck was very 
anxious not to establish an absolute unity under 
Prussia. 

It will be asked, Why was Bismarck now so careful 
in his treatment of the smaller States ? The answer 
will be found in words which he had written many 
years ago : 

" I do not wish to see Germany substituted for Prussia 
on our banner until we have brought about a closer and 
more practical union with our fellow-countrymen." 

Now the time had come, and now he was to be the 
first and most patriotic of Germans as in old days he 
had been the strictest of Prussians. Do not let us 
in welcoming the change condemn his earlier policy. 
It was only his loyalty to Prussia which had made 
Germany possible ; for it is indeed true that he could 
never have ruled Germany had he not first conquered 
it. The real and indisputable supremacy of Prussia 
was still preserved ; and Prussia was now so strong 
that she could afford to be generous. It was wise 
to be generous, for the work was only half com- 
pleted ; the southern States were still outside the 



298 Bismarck. [1866- 

union ; he wished to bring them into the fold, but 
to do so not by force of arms but of their own free 
will ; and they certainly would be more easily at- 
tracted if they saw that the North German States 
were treated with good faith and kindness. 

Side by side with the Council we have the Reichs- 
tag ; this was, in accordance with the proposal made 
in the spring of 1866, to be elected by universal 
suffrage. And now we see that this proposal, which 
a few months ago had appeared merely as a despair- 
ing bid for popularity by a statesman who had 
sacrificed every other m.eans of securing his policy, 
had become a device convincing in its simplicity ; 
at once all possibility of discussion or opposition was 
prevented ; not indeed that there were not many 
warning voices raised, but as Bismarck, in defend- 
ing this measure, asked, — what was the alterna- 
tive? Any other system would have been purely 
arbitrary, and any arbitrary system would at once 
have opened the gate to a prolonged discussion 
and political struggle on questions of the franchise. 
In a modern European State, when all men can read 
and write, and all men must serve in the army, there 
is no means of limiting the franchise in a way which 
will command universal consent. In Germany there 
was not any old historical practice to which men 
could appeal or which could naturally be applied to 
the new Parliament ; universal suffrage at least gave 
something clear, comprehensible, final. Men more 
easily believed in the permanence of the new State 
when every German received for the first time the 
full privilege of citizenship. We must notice, hoW' 



1867] The North Germaji Confederation. 299 

ever, that Bismarck had always intended that voting 
should be open ; the Parliament in revising the Con- 
stitution introduced the ballot. He gave his consent 
with much reluctance ; voting seemed to him to be 
a public duty, and to perform it in secret was to un- 
dermine the roots of political life. He was a man 
who was constitutionally unable to understand fear. 
We have then the Council and the Parliament, and 
we must now enquire as to their duties. In nearly 
every modern State the popular representative as- 
sembly holds the real power ; before it, everything 
else is humbled ; the chief occupation of lawgivers 
is to find some ingenious device by which it may at 
least be controlled and moderated in the exercise of 
its power. It was not likely that Bismarck would 
allow Germany to be governed by a democratic as-// 
sem.bly ; he was not satisfied with creating an arti- 
ficial Upper House which might, perhaps, be able 
for one year or two to check the extravagances of 
a popular House, or with allowing to the King a veto 
which could only be exercised with fear and tremb- 
ling. Generally the Lower House is the predomi- 
nant partner ; it governs ; the Upper House can only . 
amend, criticise, moderate. Bismarck completely // 
reversed the situation : the true government, the 
full authority in the State was given to the Council ; 
the Parliament had to content itself with a limited 
opportunity for criticism, with the power to amend 
or veto Bills, and to refuse its assent to new taxes. 
In England the government rests in the House of > 
Commons ; in Germany it is in the Federal Council, 
and for the same reason, — that the Council has both 



300 Bismarck. [1866- 

executive and legislative power. Constitutions have 
generally been made by men whose chief object was 
to weaken the power of the Government, who be- 
lieved that those rulers do least harm who have least 
power, with whom suspicion is the first of political 
virtues, and who would condemn to permanent 
inefficiency the institutions they have invented. It 
was not likely Bismarck would do this. The ordi- 
nary device is to separate the legislative and execu- 
tive power; to set up two rival and equal authorities 
which may check and neutralise each other. Bis- 
marck, deserting all the principles of the books, 
united all the powers of government in the Council. 
The whole administration was subjected to it ; all 
laws were introduced in it. The debates were secret ; 
it was an assembly of the ablest statesmen in Ger- 
many ; the decisions at which it arrived were laid in 
their complete form before the Reichstag. It was a 
substitute for a Second Chamber, but it was also a 
Council of State; it united the duties of the Privy 
Council and the House of Lords ; it reminds us in 
its composition of the American Senate, but it would 
be a Senate in which the President of the Republic 
presided. 

Bismarck never ceased to maintain the importance 
of the Federal Council ; he always looked on it as 
the key to the whole new Constitution. Shortly 
after the war with France, when the Liberals made 
an attempt to overthrow its authority, he warned 
them not to do so. 

" I believe," he said, " that the Federal Council has a 



1867] The North German Confederation. 301 

great future. Great as Prussia is, we have been able to 
learn much from the small, even from the smallest 
member of it ; they on their side have learnt much 
from us. From my own experience I can say that I 
have made considerable advance in my political educa- 
tion by taking part in the sittings of the Council and by 
the life which comes from the friction of five and twenty 
German centres with one another. I beg you do not 
interfere with the Council. I consider it a kind of 
Palladium for our future, a great guarantee for the 
future of Germany in its present form." 

Now, from the peculiar character of the Council 
arose a very noticeable omission; just as there u^as 
no Upper House (though the Prussian Conservatives 
strongly desired to see one), so, also, there was no 
Federal Ministry. In every modern State there is a 
Council formed of the heads of different administra- 
tive departments ; this was so universal that it was 
supposed to be essential to a constitution. In the 
German Empire we search for it in vain ; there is 
only one responsible Minister, and he is the Chan- 
cellor, the representative of Prussia and Chairman of 
the Council. The Liberals could not reconcile them- 
selves to this strange device ; they passed it with 
reluctance in the stress of the moment, but they 
have never ceased to protest against it. Again and 
again, both in public and in private, we hear the 
same demand : till we have a responsible Ministry 
the Constitution will never work. Two years later 
a motion was introduced and passed through the 
Reichstag demanding the formation of a Federal 
Ministry ; Bismarck opposed the motion and refused 
to carry it out. 



302 Bismarck. [1866- 

He had several reasons for omitting what was 
apparently almost a necessary institution. The first 
was respect for the rights of the Federal States. If 
a Ministry, responsible to Parliament, had existed, 
the executive power would have been taken away 
from the Bundesrath, and the Princes of the smaller 
States would really have been subjected to the new 
organ ; the Ministers must have been appointed by 
the President ; they would have looked to him and 
to the Reichstag for support, and would soon have 
begun to carry out their policy, not by agreement 
with the Governments arrived at by technical discus- 
sions across the table of the Council-room, but by 
orders and decrees based on the will of the Parlia- 
ment. This would inevitably have aroused just what 
Bismarck wished to avoid. It would have produced 
a struggle between the central and local authorities ; 
it would again have thrown the smaller Governments 
into opposition to national unity; it would have 
frightened the southern States. 

His other reasons for opposing the introduction 
of a Ministry were that he did not wish to give more 
power to the Parliament, and above all he disliked 
the system of collegiate responsibility. 

"You wish," he said, "to make the Government re- 
sponsible, and do it by introducing a board. I say the 
responsibility will disappear as soon as you do so ; re- 
sponsibility is only there when there is a single man who 
can be brought to task for any mistakes. ... I con- 
sider that in and for itself a Constitution which intro- 
duces joint ministerial responsibility is a political 
blunder from which every State ought to free itself as 



1867] The North German Confederatio7t. 303 

soon as it can. Anyone who has ever been a Minister 
and at the head of a Ministry, and has been obliged to 
take resolutions upon his own responsibility, ceases at 
last to fear this responsibility, but he does shrink from 
the necessity of convincing seven people that that which 
he wishes is really right. That is a very different work 
from governing a State." 

These reasons are very characteristic of him ; the 
feeling became more confirmed as he grew older. 
In 1875 he says : 

" Under no circumstances could I any longer submit 
to the thankless role of Minister-President of Prussia in 
a Ministry with joint responsibility, if I were not accus- 
tomed, from my old affection, to submit to the wishes of 
my King and Master. So thankless, so powerless, and so 
little responsible is that position ; one can only be re- 
sponsible for that which one does of one's own will ; a 
board is responsible for nothing." 

He alvi^ays said himself that he would be satisfied 
with the position of an English Prime Minister. He 
was thinking, of course, of the constitutional right 
which the Prime Minister has, to appoint and dis- 
miss his colleagues, which if he has strength of 
character will, of course, give him the real control 
of affairs, and also of the right which he enjoys of 
being the sole means by which the views of the 
Ministers are represented to the sovereign. In 
Prussia the Minister-President had not acquired by 
habit these privileges, and the power of the different 
Ministers was much more equal. In the new Fed- 



304 Bismarck. [1866- 

eration he intended to have a single will directing 
the whole machine. 

The matter is of some interest because of the 
light it throws on one side of his character. He 
was not a man with whom others found it easy to 
work; he did not easily brook opposition, and he 
disliked having to explain and justify his policy to 
anyone besides the King. He was not able to keep 
a single one of his colleagues throughout his official 
career. Even Roon found it often difificult to con- 
tinue working with him ; he complained of the Her- 
mit of Varzin, " who wishes to do everything himself, 
and nevertheless issues the strictest prohibition that 
he is never to be disturbed." What suited him best 
was the position of almost absolute ruler, and he 
looked on his colleagues rather as subordinates than 
as equals. 

But, it will be objected, if there was to be a single 
will governing the whole, the government could not 
be left to the Council ; a board comprising the 
representatives of twenty States could not really ad- 
minister, and in truth the Council was but the veil ; 
behind it is the all-pervading power of the King of 
Prussia — and his Minister. The ruler of Germany 
was the Chancellor of the Federation ; it was he 
alone that united and inspired the whole. Let us 
enumerate his duties. He was sole Minister to the 
President of the Confederation (after 1870 to the Em- 
peror). The President (who was King of Prussia) 
could declare peace and war, sign treaties, and ap- 
pointed all ofificials, but all his acts required the 
signature of the Chancellor, who was thereby For- 



1867] The North German Confederation. 305 

eign Minister of the Confederation and had the 
whole of the patronage. More than this, he was at 
the head of the whole internal administration ; from 
time to time different departments of State were 
created, — marine, post-office, finance, — but the men 
who stood at the head of each department were not 
co-ordinate with the Chancellor ; they were not his 
colleagues, but were subordinates to whom he dele- 
gated the work. They were not immediately re- 
sponsible to the Emperor, Council, or Reichstag, 
but to him ; he, whenever he wished, could under- 
take the immediate control of each department, he 
could defend its actions, and was technically re- 
sponsible to the Council for any failure. Of course, 
as a matter of fact, the different departments gen- 
erally were left to work alone, but if at any time it 
seemed desirable, the Chancellor could always inter- 
fere and issue orders which must be obeyed ; if the 
head of the department did not agree, then he had 
nothing to do but resign, and the Chancellor would 
appoint his successor. 

The Chancellor was, then, the working head of the 
Government ; but it will be said that his power would 
be so limited by the interference of the Emperor, 
the Council, the Parliament, that he would have no 
freedom. The contrary is the truth. There were 
five different sources of authority with which he had 
to deal : the President of the Federation (the Em- 
peror), who was King of Prussia, the Council, the 
Prussian Parliament, the German Parliament, and 
the Prussian Ministry. Now in the Council he pre- 
sided, and also represented the will of Prussia, which 



3o6 Bisinarck. [1866- 

was almost irresistible, for if the Constitution was to 
work well there must be harmony of intention be- 
tween Prussia and the Federal Government ; here 
therefore he could generally carry out his policy : 
but in the Prussian Ministry he spoke as sole Minis- 
ter of the Federation and the im-mense authority he 
thus enjoyed raised him at once to a position of 
superiority to all his colleagues. More than this, he 
was now free from the danger of Parliamentary con- 
trol ; it was easier to deal with one Parliament than 
two ; they had no locus standi for constitutional op- 
position to his policy. The double position he held 
enabled him to elude all control. Policy was decided 
in the Council ; when he voted there he acted as 
representative of the King of Prussia and was bound 
by the instructions he received from the Prussian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs ; the Reichstag had 
nothing to do with Prussian policy and had no right 
to criticise the action of the Prussian Minister. It 
did not matter that Bismarck himself was not only 
Chancellor of the Diet, but also Minister-President 
of Prussia and Foreign Minister, and was really act- 
ing in accordance with the instructions he had given 
to himself "^ ; the principle remained, — each envoy to 
the Diet was responsible, not to the Reichstag, but to 
the Government he represented. When, however, he 



* The complication of oiBces became most remarkable when Bis- 
marck in later years undertook the immediate direction of trade. He 
became Minister of Finance for Prussia; and we have a long corre- 
spondence which he carries on with himself in his various capacities 
of Prussian Minister, Prussian representative in the Council, and 
Chancellor of the Empire. 



1867] The North German Confederation. 307 

appeared in the Reichstag to explain and defend the 
pohcy adopted by the Council, then he stood before 
them as representative not necessarily of his own 
policy, but of that which had been decided on by a 
board in which he had possibly been outvoted. The 
Reichstag could reject the proposal if it were a law 
or a tax ; they could criticise and debate, but there 
was no ground on which they could constitutionally 
demand the dismissal of the Minister. 

Of course Bismarck did not attempt to evade the 
full moral responsibility for the policy which he ad- 
vocated, but he knew that so long as he had the con- 
fidence of the King of Prussia and the majority of 
the Allied States, all the power of Parliament could 
not injure him. 

What probably not even he foresaw was that the 
new Constitution so greatly added to the power of 
the Minister that even the authority of the King be- 
gan to pale before it. As before, there was only one 
department of State where his authority ceased, — 
the army. 

It will be easily understood that this Constitution, 
when it was laid before the assembly, was not ac- 
cepted without much discussion and many objections. 
There were some — the representatives of conquered 
districts, Poles, Hanoverians, and the deputies from 
Schleswig-Holstein — who wished to overthrow the 
new Federation which was built up on the destruc- 
tion of the States to which they had belonged. 
Theirs was an enmity which was open, honourable, 
and easy to meet. More insidious and dangerous 
was the criticism of those men who, while they pro- 



3o8 Bis7narck. [1866- 

fessed to desire the ends which Bismarck had attained, 
refused to approve of the Constitution because they 
would have to renounce some of the principles of the 
parties to which they belonged. 

There were some to whom it seemed that he gave 
too much freedom to the individual States ; they 
wished for a more complete unity, but now Bismarck, 
for the first time, was strong enough to shew the 
essential moderation of his character ; he knew what 
the Liberals were ready to forget, that moderation, 
while foolish in the moment of conflict, is the proper 
adornment of the conqueror. When they asked him 
to take away many of the privileges reserved to the 
smaller States, he reminded them that, though 
Mecklenburg and the Saxon duchies were helpless 
before the increased power of the Prussian Crown, 
they were protected by Prussian promises, and that 
a King of Prussia, though he might strike down his 
enemies, must always fulfil in spirit and in letter his 
obligations to his friends. The basis of the new alli- 
ance must be the mutual confidence of the allies ; he 
had taught them to fear Prussia, now they must learn 
to trust her. 

The Prussian Conservatives feared that the power 
of the Prussian King and the independence of the 
Prussian State would be affected ; but Bismarck's in- 
fluence with them was sufficient to prevent any open 
opposition. More dangerous were the Progressives, 
who apprehended that the new Constitution would 
limit the influence of the Prussian Parliament. On 
many points they refused to accept the proposals of 
the Government ; they feared for liberty. For them 



1867] The North German Confederation. 309 

Bismarck had no sympathy and no words but con- 
tempt, and he put curtly before them the ques- 
tion, did they wish to sacrifice all he had attained 
to their principles of Parliamentary government ? 
They demanded, for instance, that, as the Constitu- 
tion of Prussia could not be altered without the con- 
sent of the Prussian Parliament, the new Federal 
Constitution must be laid before the Prussian Parlia- 
ment for discussion and ratification. It is curious to 
notice that this is exactly the same claim which Bis- 
marck in 1852 had supported as against Radowitz ; 
he had, however, learned much since then ; he 
pointed out that the same claim which was made by 
the Prussian Parliament might be made by the Par- 
liament of each of the twenty-two States. It was 
now his duty to defend the unification of Germany 
against this new Partiailarism ; in old days Particu- 
larism found its support in the dynasties, " now it is," 
he said, " in the Parliaments." 

"Do you really believe," he said, "that the great 
movement which last year led the peoples to battle from 
the Belt to the Sicilian Sea, from the Rhine to the 
Pruth and the Dniester, in the throw of the iron dice 
when we played for the crowns of kings and emperors, 
that the millions of German warriors who fought against 
one another and bled on the battle-fields from the Rhine 
to the Carpathians, that the thousands and ten thousands 
who were left dead on the battle-field and struck down 
by pestilence, who by their death have sealed the national 
decision, — that all this can be pigeon-holed by a reso- 
lution of Parliament ? Gentlemen, in this case you 
really do not stand on the height of the situation. . . . 



3IO Bis7narck. [1866- 

I should like to see the gentlemen who consider this 
possibility answer an invalid from Koniggratz when he 
asks for the result of this mighty effort. You would say 
to him : ' Yes, indeed, for the German unity nothing is 
achieved, the occasion for that will probably come, that 
we can have easily, we can come to an understanding 
any day, but we have saved the Budget-right of the 
Chamber of Deputies, we have saved the right of the Prus- 
sian Parliament every year to put the existence of the 
Prussian army in question,' . . . and therewith the 
invalid must console himself for the loss of his limbs and 
the widow as she buries her husband." 

It is interesting to compare this speech with the 
similar speech he made after Olmiitz : how great is the 
similarity in thought and expression, how changed 
is the position of the speaker ! He had no sympathy 
with these doubts and hesitations ; why so much dis- 
trust of one another? His Constitution might not 
be the best, it might not be perfect, but at least let 
it be completed. " Gentlemen," he said, " let us 
work quickly, let us put Germany in the saddle ; it 
will soon learn to ride." He was annoyed and irri- 
tated by the opposition he met. 

" If one has struggled hard for five years to achieve that 
which now lies before us, if one has spent one's time, the 
best years of one's life, and sacrificed one's health for it, 
if one remembers the trouble it has cost to decide quite 
a small paragraph, even a question of punctuation, with 
two and twenty Governments, if at last we have agreed 
on that as it here lies before us, then gentlemen who 
have experienced little of all these struggles, and know 
nothing of the official proceedings which have gone be- 



1867] The North German Confederation. 311 

fore, come forward in a manner which I can only com- 
pare to that of a man who throws a stone at m};- window 
without knowing where I stand. He knows not where 
he hits me, he knows not what business he impedes." 

He compared himself v/ith Hotspur when after the 
battle he met the courtier who came to demand his 
prisoners, and when wounded and tired from the 
fight had to hear a long lecture over instruments of 
slaughter and internal wounds. 

The debates were continued for two months with 
much spirit and ability; again and again a majority 
of the Parliament voted amendments against which 
Bismarck had spoken. When they had completed 
the revision of the Constitution, these had again to 
be referred to the separate Governments. Forty 
were adopted ; on two only Bismarck informed the 
Parliament that their proposals could not be accepted. 
One of these was the arrangements for the army 
Budget ; so soon did a fresh conflict on this matter 
threaten. A compromise was agreed upon ; in con- 
sideration of the immediate danger (it was just the 
time when a war with France regarding Luxemburg 
appeared imminent), the House voted the money re- 
quired for the army for the next four years ; in 1 87 1 
a new arrangement would have to be made, but for 
this time the Government was able to maintain 
the army at the strength which they wished for. The 
other matter was of less immediate importance : the 
majority of the House had voted that members of 
the Parliament should receive payment for their serv- 
ices, Bismarck had spoken strongly against this ; 



312 Bismarck. [1866- 

now he made it a question of confidence, and warned 
them that the Governments would not accept it. The 
House had no alternative except to withdraw their 
vote. 

The Constitution as finally agreed on exists to this 
day as that of the German Empire. Notwithstand- 
ing the evil forebodings made at the time, it has 
worked well for over thirty years. 

From the moment that the new State had been 
created and the new Constitution adopted, a great 
change took place in Bismarck's public position. He 
was no longer merely the first and ablest servant of 
the Prussian King; he was no longer one in the dis- 
tinguished series of Prussian Ministers. His position 
was — let us recognise it clearly — greater than that 
of the King and Emperor, for he was truly the 
Father of the State : it was his will which had cre- 
ated and his brain which had devised it ; he watched 
over it with the affection of a father for his son ; none 
quite understood it but himself ; he alone could au- 
thoritatively expound the laws of the Constitution. 
A criticism of it was an attack upon himself ; opposi- 
tion to him was scarcely to be distinguished from 
treason to the State. Is it not inevitable that as 
years went on we should find an increasing intoler- 
ance of all rivals, who wished to alter what he had 
made, or to take his place as captain of his ship, and 
at the same time a most careful and strict regard for 
the loyal fulfilment of the law and spirit of the Con- 
stitution? From this time all other interests are laid 
aside, his whole life is absorbed in the prosperity of 
Germany. 



1867] The North German Confederation. 313 

Of course Germany did not at once settle down 
to political rest ; there were many difficulties to be 
overcome on which we cannot enter here. The most 
serious arose from the regulation of the affairs in the 
conquered provinces, and especially in the Kingdom 
of Hanover. The annexation to Prussia was very un- 
popular among all classes except the tradesmen and 
middle classes of the towns. The Hanoverian depu- 
ties to both the Prussian Parliament and the Parlia- 
ment of the North German Confederation on principle 
opposed all measures of the Government. The 
King himself, though in exile, kept up a close con- 
nection with his former subjects. There were long 
negotiations regarding his private property. At last 
it was agreed that this should be paid over to him. 
The King, however, used the money for organising 
a Legion to be used when the time came against 
Prussia ; it was therefore necessary to cease paying 
him funds which could be used for this purpose. 
This is the origin of the notorious Welfenfond. The 
money was to be appropriated for secret service 
and especially for purposes of the Press. The party 
of the Guelphs, of course, maintained a bitter feud 
against the Government in their papers. Bismarck, 
who had had ample experience of this kind of war- 
fare, met them on their own ground. 

He defended this proposal by drawing attention 
to one of the weaknesses of Germany. What other 
country, he asked, was there where a defeated party 
would look forward to the help of foreign armies? 
" There are unfortunately," he said, " many Corio- 
lani in Germany, only the Volsgi ?ire wanting ; if 



314 Bismarck. [1867 

they found their Volsci they would soon be un- 
masked." Everyone knew that the Volsci from over 
the Rhine would not be slow to come when the 
occasion offered. 

" It was," he said, " a melancholy result of the cen- 
turies of disunion. There were traitors in the country ; 
they did not hide themselves ; they carried their heads 
erect ; they found public defenders even in the walls of 
Parliament." Then he continued : " Everywhere where 
corruption is found there a form of life begins which no 
one can touch with clean kid gloves. In view of these 
facts you speak to me of espionage. In my nature I am 
not born to be a spy, but I believe we deserve your 
thanks if we condescend to follow malignant reptiles 
into their cave to observe their actions." 

This is the origin of the expression " the reptile 
Press,'' for the name was given by the people not to 
those against whom the efforts of the Government 
were directed, but to the paid organs to which, if 
report is true, so large a portion of the Guelph fund 
was given. 

But we must pass on to the events by which the 
work of 1866 was to be completed. 




CHAPTER XIII. 

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH FRANCE. 
1 867- 1 870. 

EVER since the conclusion of peace, the danger 
of a conflict between France and Germany 
had been apparent. It was not only the grow- 
ing discontent and suspicion of the French nation and 
the French army, who truly felt that the suprem- 
acy of France had been shaken by the growth of 
this new power ; it was not only that the deep-rooted 
hatred of France which prevailed in Germany had 
been stirred by Napoleon's action, and that the Ger- 
mans had received confidence from the consciousness 
of their own strength. Had there been nothing more 
than this, year after year might have gone by and, as 
has happened since and had happened before, a war 
always anticipated might have been always deferred. 
We may be sure that Bismarck would not have gone 
to war unless he believed it to be necessary and de- 
sirable, and he would not have thought this unless 
there was something to be gained. He has often 
shewn, before and since, that he was quite as well 
able to use his powers in the maintenance of peace 

315 



J 



1 6 Bismarck. [1867- 



as in creating causes for war. There was, however, 
one reason which made war ahuost inevitable. The 
unity of Germany was only half completed ; the 
Southern States still existed in a curious state of 
V semi-isolation. This could not long continue; their 
position must be regulated. War arises from that 
state of uncertainty which is always present when a 
political community has not found a stable and per- 
manent constitution. In Germany men were look- 
ing forward to the time when the southern States 
should join the north. The work was progressing; 
the treaties of offensive and defensive alliance had 
been followed by the creation of a new Customs' 
Union, and it was a further step when at Bismarck's 
proposal a Parliament consisting of members elected 
throughout the whole of Germany was summoned at 
Berlin for the management of matters connected with 
the tariff. Further than this, however, he was not 
able to go ; the new Constitution was working well ; 
they could risk welcoming the States of the south 
into it ; but this could not be done without a war 
with France. Bismarck had rejected the French 
proposal for an alliance. He knew, and everyone else 
knew, that France would oppose by the sword any 
attempt to complete the unity of Germany ; and, 
Avhich was more serious, unless great caution was 
used, that she would be supported by Austria and 
perhaps by the anti-Prussian party in Bavaria. There 
were some who wished to press it forward at once. 
Bismarck was very strongly pressed by the National 
Liberals to hasten the union with the south ; at the 
beginning of 1870 the Grand Duke of Baden, him- 



1870] OzLtbreak of War with France. 317 

self a son-in-law of the King of Prussia and always 
the chief supporter of Prussian influence in the south, 
formally applied to be admitted into the Federation. 
The request had to be refused, but Bismarck' had 
some dif^culty in defending his position against his 
enthusiastic friends. He had to warn them not to 
hurry ; they must not press the development too 
quickly. If they did so, they would stir the resent- 
ment of the anti-Prussian party ; they would play 
into the hands of Napoleon and Austria. But if 
there was danger in haste, there was equal danger in 
delay ; the prestige of Prussia would suffer. 

It is clear that there was one way in which the 
union might be brought about almost without re- 
sistance, and that was, if France were to make an 
unprovoked attack upon Germany, an attack so com- 
pletely without reason and excuse that the strong 
national passion it provoked might in the enthusiasm 
of war sweep away all minor differences and party 
feelings. 

There was another element which we must not 
omit. These years witnessed the growth in deter- 
mination and in power of the Ultramontane party. 
We can find their influence in every country in 
Europe ; their chief aim was the preservation of the 
temporal power of the Pope and the destruction of 
the newly created Kingdom of Italy. They were also 
opposed to the unity of Germany under Prussia. 
They were very active and powerful in South Ger- 
many, and at the elections in 1869 had gained a 
majority. Their real object must be to win over 
the Emperor of the French to a complete agreement 



3i8 Bismarck. [1867- 

with themselves, to persuade him to forsake his 
earlier policy and to destroy what he had done so 
much to create. They had a strong support in the 
person of the Empress, and they joined with the 
injured vanity of the French to press the Emperor 
towards war. 

In 1867, war had almost broken out on the ques- 
tion of Luxemburg. Napoleon had attempted to get 
at least this small extension of territory ; relying on 
the support of Prussia he entered into negotiations 
with the King of Holland ; the King agreed to sur- 
render the Grand Duchy to France, making, however, 
a condition that Napoleon should secure the assent 
of Prussia to this arrangement. At the very last mo- 
ment, when the treaty was almost signed, Bismarck 
made it clear that the national feeling in Germany 
was so strong that if the transaction took place he 
would have to declare war against France. At the 
same time, he published the secret treaties with the 
southern States. These events destroyed the last 
hope of maintaining the old friendly relations with 
Napoleon ; " I have been duped," said the Emperor, 
who at once began reorganising and rearming his 
forces. For some weeks there was great danger of 
war concerning the right of garrisoning Luxemburg ; 
this had hitherto belonged to Prussia, but of course 
with the dissolution of the German Confederation 
the right had lapsed. The German nation, which was 
much excited and thought little of the precise terms 
of treaties, wished to defend the right ; Bismarck 
knew that in this matter the Prussian claim could 
not be supported ; moreover, even if he had wished 



1870] Outbi^eak of War with France. 319 

to go to Avar with France he was not ready ; for some 
time must elapse before the army of the North Ger- 
man Confederation could be reorganised on the 
Prussian model. He therefore preserved the peace 
and the matter was settled by a European Congress. 
In the summer of 1867, he visited Paris with the 
King ; externally the good relations between the two 
States were restored, but it was in reality only an 
armed peace. 

It is difficult to decipher Napoleon's wishes ; he 
seems to have believed that war was inevitable ; 
there is no proof that he desired it. He made 
preparations ; the army was reorganised, the num- 
bers increased, and a new weapon introduced. At 
the same time he looked about for allies. Negotia- 
tions were carried on with Austria ; in 1868 a meet- 
ing was ari'anged between the two Emperors ; Beust, 
who was now Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, was 
anxious to make an attempt to overthrow the power 
of Prussia in Germany. In 1 870, negotiations were 
entered into for a military alliance ; a special envoy, 
General Lebrun, was sent to Vienna to discuss the 
military arrangements in case of war. No treaty 
was signed, but it was an almost understood thing 
that sooner or later an" alliance between the two Em- 
perors should be formed against Prussia. 

It will be seen then that at the beginning of 1 870 
everything was tending towards war, and that under 
certain circumstances war was desirable, both for 
France and for Germany ; much seemed to depend 
on the occasion of the outbreak. If Prussia took 
the offensive, if she attempted by force to win the 



320 Bismarck. [1867- 

southern States, she would be faced by a coalition of 
France and Austria, supported only too probably 
by Bavaria, and this was a coalition which would 
find much sympathy among the discontented in 
North Germany. On the other hand, it was for the 
advantage of Prussia not to delay the conflict : the 
King was growing old ; Bismarck could never be sure 
how long he would remain in office ; moreover, the 
whole forces of North Germany had now been com- 
pletely reorganised and were ready for war, but with 
the year 1871 it was to be foreseen that a fresh at- 
tempt would be made to reduce their numbers ; it 
was desirable to avoid a fresh conflict on the military 
budget ; everything shews that 1870 was the year in 
which it would be most convenient for Prussia to 
fight. 

Prussia, at this time, had no active allies on whom 
she could depend ; Bismarck indeed had secured the 
neutrality of Russia, but he did not know that the 
Czar would come actively to his help ; we may feel 
sure that he would prefer not to have to call upon 
Russia for assistance, for, as we have seen in older 
days, a war between France and Russia, in which 
Germany joined, would be very harmful to Germany. 
It was in these circumstances that an opportunity 
shewed itself of gaining another ally who would be 
more subservient than Russia. One of the many 
revolutions which had harassed Spain during this 
century had broken out. Queen Isabella had lost 
the throne, and General Prim found himself obliged 
to look about for a new sovereign. He applied in 
vain to all the Catholic Courts ; nobody was anxious 



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 321 

to accept an honour coupled with such danger as 
ruHng over the Spanish people. Among others he 
applied to Leopold, hereditary Prince of Hohen- 
zoUern, eldest son of that Prince of Hohenzollern 
who a few years before had been President of the 
Prussian Ministry. The choice seemed a good one : 
the Prince was an amiable, courageous man ; he was 
a Catholic ; he was, moreover, connected with the 
Napoleonic family. His brother had, three years 
before, been appointed King of Roumania with 
Napoleon's good-will. 

The proposal was probably made in all good faith ; 
under ordinary circumstances, the Prince, had he 
been willing to accept, would have been a very proper 
candidate. It was, however, known from the first 
that Napoleon would not give his consent, and, ac- 
cording to the comity of Europe, he had a right to 
be consulted. Nor can we say that Napoleon was 
not justified in opposing the appointment. It has 
indeed been said that the Prince was not a member 
of the Prussian Royal House and that his connection 
with Napoleon was really closer than that with the 
King of Prussia. This is true, but to lay stress on it 
is to ignore the very remarkable voluntary connec- 
tion which united the two branches of the House of 
Hohenzollern. The Prince's father had done what 
no sovereign prince in Germany has ever done before 
or since : out of loyalty to Prussia he had surren- 
dered his position as sovereign ruler and presented 
his dominions to the King of Prussia ; he had on 
this occasion been adopted into the Royal Family ; 
he had formally recognised the King as Head of 



32 2 Bismarck. [1867- 

the House, and subjected himself to his authority. 
More than this, he had even condescended to accept 
the position of Prussian Minister. Was not Napoleon 
justified if he feared that the son of a man who had 
shewn so great an affection to Prussia would not be 
an agreeable neighbour on the throne of Spain? 

It was in the early spring of 1869 that the first 
proposals were made to the Prince ; our information 
as to this is very defective, but it seems that they 
were at once rejected. Benedetti's suspicions were, 
however, aroused. He heard that a Spanish diplo- 
matist, who had formerly been Ambassador at Berlin, 
had again visited the city and had had two interviews 
with Bismarck. He feared that perhaps he had 
some mission with regard to the Hohenzollern candi- 
dature, and, in accordance with instructions from his 
Government, enquired first of Thiele and, after a visit 
to Paris, saw Bismarck himself. The Count was 
quite ready to discuss the matter ; with great frank- 
ness he explained all the reasons why, if the throne 
were offered to the Prince, the King would doubtless 
advise him not to accept it. Benedetti was still sus- 
picious, but for the time the matter dropped. From 
what happened later, though we have no proof, we 
must, I think, share his suspicion that Bismarck was 
already considering the proposal and was prepared 
to lend it his support. 

In September of the same year, the affair began 
to advance. Prim sent Salazar, a Spanish gentleman, 
to Germany with a semi-ofificial commission to invite 
the Prince to become a candidate, and gave him a 
letter to a German acquaintance who would procure 



1870] Otitbi^eak of War with France. 323 

him an introduction to the Prince. This German 
acquaintance was no other than Herr von Werther, 
Prussian Ambassador at Vienna. If we remember 
the very strict discipline which Bismarck maintained 
in the Diplomatic Service we must feel convinced 
that Werther was acting according to instructions."^ 
He brought the envoy to the Prince of Hohenzol- 
lern ; the very greatest caution was taken to pre- 
serve secrecy ; the Spaniard did not go directly to 
the castle of Weinburg, but left the train at another 
station, waited in the town till it was dark, and only 
approached the castle when hidden from observa- 
tion by night and a thick mist. He first of all asked 
Prince Charles himself to accept the throne, and 
when he refused, offered it to Prince Leopold, who 
also, though he did not refuse point-blank, left no 
doubt that he was disinclined to the proposal ; he 
could only accept, he said, if the Spanish Govern- 
ment procured the assent of the Emperor Napoleon 
and the King of Prussia. Notwithstanding the re- 
luctance of the family to take the proffered dignity, 
Herr von Werther (and we must look on him as 
Bismarck's agent *) a fortnight later travelled from 
Munich in order to press on the Prince of Roumania 
that he should use his influence not to allow the 
House of Hohenzollern to refuse the throne. For 
the time, however, the subject seems to have dropped. 
A few months later, for the third time, the offer was 
repeated, and now Bismarck uses the whole of his 
influence in its favour. At the end of February, 
Salazar came on an of^cial mission to Berlin ; he 



* Sybel states that this was not the case. 



324 Bismarck. [1867- 

had three letters, one to the King, one to Bismarck, 
one to the Prince. The King refused to receive 
him ; Prince Leopold did not waver in his refusal 
and was supported by his father ; their attitude was 
that they should not consider the matter seriously 
unless higher reasons of State required it. With 
Prince Bismarck, however, the envoy was more suc- 
cessful ; he had several interviews with the Minister, 
and then left the city in order that suspicions might 
not be aroused or the attention of the French Gov- 
ernment directed to the negotiations. Bismarck 
pleaded with great warmth for the acceptance of the 
offer; in a memoir to the King, he dwelt on the great 
importance which the summons of a Hohenzollern 
prince to the Spanish throne would have for Ger- 
many ; it would be politically invaluable to have a 
friendly land in the rear of France ; it would be of 
the greatest economic advantage for Germany and 
Spain if this thoroughly monarchical country de- 
veloped its resources under a king of German 
descent. In consequence of this, a conference was 
held at Berlin, at which there were present, besides 
the King, the Crown Prince, Prince Carl Anton, and 
Prince Leopold, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Schlei- 
nitz, Thiele, and Delbriick. By summoning the 
advice of these men, the matter was taken out of 
the range of a private and family matter ; it is true 
that it was not ofificially brought before the Prussian 
Ministry, but those consulted were the men by whom 
the policy of the State was directed. The unani- 
mous decision of the councillors was for acceptance 
on the ground that it was the fulfilment of a patri- 



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 325 

otic duty to Prussia. The Crown Prince saw great 
difficulties in the way, and warned his cousin, if he 
accepted, not to rely on Prussian help in the future, 
even if, for the attainment of a definite end, the 
Prussian Government furthered the project for the 
moment. The King did not agree with his Minis- 
ters ; he had many serious objections, and refused to 
give any definite order to the Prince that he should 
accept the offer; he left the final decision to him. 
He eventually refused. 

Bismarck, however, was not to be beaten ; he in- 
sisted that the Hohenzollerns should not let the mat- 
ter drop ; and, as he could not persuade the King to 
use his authority, acted directly upon the family with 
such success that Prince Carl Anton telegraphed to 
his third son, Frederick, to ask if he would not ac- 
cept instead of his brother. Bismarck had now de- 
clared that the acceptance by one of the Princes was 
a political necessity ; this he said repeatedly and 
with the greatest emphasis. At the same time, he 
despatched a Prussian officer of the general staff and 
his private secretary, Lothar Bucher, to Spain in or- 
der that they might study the situation. It was 
important that as far as possible the official repre- 
sentative of Prussia should have no share in the 
arrangement of this matter. 

Prince Frederick came to Berlin, but, like his 
brother, he refused, unless the King gave a command. 
At the end of April, the negotiations seemed again 
to have broken down. Bismarck, who was in ill 
health, left Berlin for Varzin, where he remained for 
six weeks. 



326 Bismarck. [1867- 

We are, however, not surprised, since we know that 
Bismarck's interest was so strongly engaged, that he 
was able after all to carry the matter through. He 
seems to have persuaded Prince Carl Anton ; he then 
wrote to Prim telling him not to despair; the can- 
didature was an excellent thing which was not to be 
lost sight of ; he must, however, negotiate not with 
the Prussian Government, but with the Prince him- 
self. When he wrote this he knew that he had at 
last succeeded in breaking down the reluctance of 
the Prince, and that the King, though he still was 
unwilling to undertake any responsibility, would not 
refuse his consent if the Prince voluntarily accepted. 
Prince Leopold was influenced not only by his inter- 
est in the Spanish race, but also by a letter from Bis- 
marck, in which he said that he ought to put aside all 
scruples and accept in the interests of Prussia. The 
envoys had also returned from Spain and brought 
back a favourable report ; they received an extra- 
ordinarily hearty welcome ; we may perhaps suspect 
with the King that they had allowed their report to 
receive too rosy a colour ; no doubt, however, they 
were acting in accordance with what they knew were 
the wishes of the man who had sent them out. In 
the beginning of June the decision was made ; Prince 
Leopold wrote to the King that he accepted the 
crown which had been ofTered to him, since he thereby 
hoped to do a great service to his Fatherland. King 
William immediately answered that he approved of 
the decision. 

Bismarck then at last was successful. A few days 
later Don Salazar again travelled to Germany ; this 



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 327 

time he brought a formal offer, which was formally- 
accepted. The Cortes were then in session ; it was 
arranged that they should remain at Madrid till his 
return ; the election would then be at once completed, 
for a majority was assured. The secrecy had been 
strictly maintained ; there were rumours indeed, but 
no one knew of all the secret interviews ; men might 
suspect, but they could not prove that it was an in- 
trigue of Bismarck. If the election had once been 
made the solemn act of the whole nation, Napoleon 
would have been confronted with a fait accompli. 
To have objected would have been most injurious; 
he would have had to do, not with Prussia, which ap- 
parently was not concerned, but with the Spanish 
nation. The feeling of France would not allow him 
to acquiesce in the election, but it would have deeply 
offended the dignity and pride of Spain had he 
claimed that the King who had been formally ac- 
cepted should, at his demand, be rejected. He could 
scarcely have done so without bringing about a war; 
a war with Spain would have crippled French re- 
sources and diverted their attention from Prussia ; 
even if a war did not ensue, permanent ill feeling 
would be created. It is not difificult to understand 
the motives by which Bismarck had been influenced. 
At the last moment the plan failed. A cipher 
telegram from Berlin was misinterpreted in Madrid ; 
and in consequence the Cortes, instead of remaining 
in session, were prorogued till the autumn. All had 
depended on the election being carried out before 
the secret was disclosed ; a delay of some weeks 
must take place, and some indiscreet words of Salazar 



328 Bismarck. [1867- 

disclosed the truth. General Prim had no course 
left him but to send to the French Ambassador, to 
give him official information as to what had been 
done and try to calm his uneasiness. 

What were Bismarck's motives in this affair ? It 
is improbable that he intended to use it as a means 
of bringing about a war with France. He could not 
possibly have foreseen the very remarkable series of 
events which were to follow, and but for them a war 
arising out of this would have been very unwise, for 
German public opinion and the sympathy of all the 
neutral Powers would have been opposed to Prussia, 
had it appeared that the Government was disturbing 
the peace of Europe simply in order to put a Prus- 
sian prince on the throne of Spain contrary to the 
wishes of France. He could not ignore German 
public opinion now as he had done in old days ; he 
did not want to conquer South Germany, he wished 
to attract it. It seems much more probable that he 
had no very clear conception of the results which 
would follow ; he did not wish to lose what might 
be the means of gaining an ally to Germany and 
weakening France. It would be quite invaluable if, 
supposing there were to be war (arising from this or 
other causes), Spain could be persuaded to join in 
the attack on France and act the part which Italy 
had played in 1866. What he probably hoped for 
more than anything else was that France would de- 
clare war against Spain ; then Napoleon would waste 
his strength in a new Mexico ; he would no longer 
be a danger to Germany, and whether Germany 
joined in the war or not, she would gain a free hand 



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 329 

by the preoccupation of France. If none of these 
events happened, it would be an advantage that 
some commercial gain might be secured for Ger- 
many. 

On the whole, the affair is not one which shews his 
strongest points as a diplomatist ; it was too subtle 
and too hazardous. 

The news aroused the sleeping jealousy of Prussia 
among the French people ; the suspicion and irrita- 
tion of the Government was extreme, and this feel- 
ing was not ill-founded. They assumed that the 
whole matter was an intrigue of Bismarck's, though, 
owing to the caution with which the negotiations 
had been conducted, they had no proofs. They 
might argue that a Prussian prince could not accept 
such an offer without the permission of his sovereign, 
and they had a great cause of complaint that this 
permission had been given without any communica- 
tion with Napoleon, whom the matter so nearly con- 
cerned. The arrangement itself was not alone the 
cause of alarm. The secrecy with which it had 
been surrounded was interpreted as a sign of ma- 
levolence. 

Of course they must interfere to prevent the elec- 
tion being completed. Where, however, were they 
to address themselves ? With a just instinct they 
directed their remonstrance, not to Madrid, but to 
Berlin; they would thereby appear not to be inter- 
fering with the independence of the Spaniards, but 
to be acting in self-defence against the insidious 
advance of German power. 

They could not, however, approach Bismarck ; he 



2,3*^ Bismarck. [1867- 

had retired to Varzin, to recruit his health ; the 
other Ministers also were absent ; the King was at 
Ems. It was convenient that at this sudden crisis 
they should be away, for it was imperative that the 
Prussian Government should deny all complicity. 
Bismarck must not let it appear that he had any 
interest in, or knowledge of, the matter ; he therefore 
remained in the seclusion of Pomerania. 

Benedetti also was absent in the Black Forest. On 
the 4th of July, therefore, the French Charge d' Af- 
faires, M. de Sourds, called at the Foreign Office and 
saw Herr von Thiele. " Visibly embarrassed," he 
writes, " he told me that the Prussian Government 
was absolutely ignorant of the matter and that it 
did not exist for them." This was the only answer 
to be got; in a despatch sent on the nth to the 
Prussian agents in Germany, Bismarck repeated the 
assertion. " The matter has nothing to do with Prus- 
sia. The Prussian Government has always considered 
and treated this affair as one in which Spain and the 
selected candidate are alone concerned." This was 
literally true, for it had never been brought before 
the Prussian Ministry, and no doubt the records of 
the office would contain no allusion to it ; the 
majority of the Ministers were absolutely ignorant 
of it. 

Of course M. de Sourds did not believe Herr von 
Thiele's statement, and his Government was not satis- 
fied with the explanation ; the excitement in Paris 
was increasing; it was fomented by the agents of the 
Ministry, and in answer to an interpolation in the 
Chamber, the Due de Grammont on the 6th de- 



1870] Outbreak of War- with France. 331 

clared that the election of the Prince was inadmissi- 
ble ; he trusted to the wisdom of the Prussian and the 
friendship of the Spanish people not to proceed in 
it, but if his hope were frustrated they would know 
how to do their duty. They were not obliged to 
endure that a foreign Power by setting one of its 
Princes on the throne of Charles V. should destroy 
the balance of power and endanger the interests and 
honour of France. He hoped this would not happen ; 
they relied on the wisdom of the German and the 
friendship of the Spanish people to avoid it ; but if 
it were necessary, then, strong in the support of the 
nation and the Chamber, they knew how to fulfil their 
duty without hesitation or weakness. 

The French Ministry hereby publicly declared that 
they held the Prussian Government responsible for 
the election, and they persisted in demanding the 
withdrawal, not from Spain, but from Prussia ; Prim 
had suggested that as the Foreign Office refused to 
discuss the matter, Grammont should approach the 
King personally. Benedetti received instructions to 
go to the King at Ems and request him to order or 
advise the Prince to withdraw. At first Grammont 
wished him also to see the Prince himself ; on se- 
cond thoughts he forbade this, for, as he said, it was 
of the first importance that the messages should be 
conveyed by the King ; he was determined to use 
the opportunity for the humiliation of Germany. 

If it was the desire of the French in this way to 
establish the complicity of Prussia, it was impera- 
tive that the Prussian Government should not allow 
them to do so. They were indeed in a disagreeable 



T);^2 Bismarck. [1867- 

situation ; they could not take up the French chal- 
lenge and allow war to break out ; not only would 
the feeling of the neutral Powers, of England and of 
Russia, be against them, but that of Germany itself 
would be divided. With what force would the anti- 
Prussian party in Bavaria and Wiirtemberg be able 
to oppose a war undertaken apparently for the dynas- 
tic interests of the Hohenzollern ! If, however, the 
Prince now withdrew, the French would be able to 
proclaim that he had done so in consequence of the 
open threats of France ; supposing they were able to 
connect the King in any way with him, then they 
might assert that they had checked the ambition of 
Prussia ; Prussian prestige would be seriously injured 
at home, and distrust of Prussian good faith would 
be aroused abroad. 

The King therefore had a difficult task when 
Benedetti asked for an interview. He had been 
brought into this situation against his own will, and 
his former scruples seemed fully justified. He com- 
plained of the violence of the French Press and the 
Ministry ; he repeated the assertion that the Prus- 
sian Government had been unconnected with the 
negotiations and had been ignorant of them ; he had 
avoided associating himself with them, and had only 
given an opinion when Prince Leopold, having de- 
cided to accept, asked his consent. He had then 
acted, not in his sovereign capacity as King of Prus- 
sia, but as head of the family. He had neither col- 
lected nor summoned his council of Ministers, though 
he had informed Count Bismarck privately. He 
refused to use his authority to order the Prince to 



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 333 

withdraw, and said that he would leave him full 
freedom as he had done before. 

These statements were of course verbally true ; 
probably the King did not know to what extent 
Bismarck was responsible for the acceptance by 
the Prince. They did not make the confidence of 
the French any greater ; it was now apparent that the 
King had been asked, and had given his consent 
without considering the effect on France ; they could 
not acquiesce in this distinction between his acts as 
sovereign and his acts as head of the family, for, as 
Benedetti pointed out, he was only head of the family 
because he was sovereign. 

All this time Bismarck was still at Varzin ; while 
Paris was full of excitement, while there were hour- 
ly conferences of the Ministers and the city was 
already talking of war, the Prussian Ministers osten- 
tatiously continued to enjoy their holidays. There 
was no danger in doing so ; the army was so well 
prepared that they could afford quietly to await what 
the French would do. What Bismarck's plans and 
hopes were we do not know; during these days he 
preserved silence ; the violence of the French gave 
him a further reason for refusing to enter into any 
discussion. When, however, he heard of Benedetti's 
visit to Ems he became uneasy ; he feared that the 
King would compromise himself; he feared that the 
French would succeed in their endeavour to inflict 
a diplomatic defeat on Prussia. He proposed to go 
to Ems to support the King, and on the 12th left 
Varzin ; that night he arrived in Berlin. There 
he received the news that the Prince of Hohen- 



334 Bismarck. [1867- 

zollern, on behalf of his son, had announced his 
withdrawal. 

The retirement was probably the spontaneous act 
of the Prince and his father ; the decisive influence 
was the fear lest the enmity of Napoleon might 
endanger the position of the Prince of Roumania. 
Everyone was delighted ; the cloud of war was dis- 
pelled ; two men only were dissatisfied — Bismarck 
and Grammont. It was the severest check which Bis- 
marck's policy had yet received ; he had persuaded 
the Prince to accept against his will ; he had per- 
suaded the King reluctantly to keep the negotia- 
tions secret from Napoleon ; however others might 
disguise the truth, he knew that they had had to 
retreat from an untenable position, and retreat before 
the noisy insults of the French Press and the open 
menace of the French Government ; his anger was 
increased by the fact that neither the King nor the 
Prince had in this crisis acted as he would have 
wished. 

We have no authoritative statement as to the 
course he himself would have pursued ; he had, ac- 
cording to his own statement, advised the King not 
to receive the French Ambassador ; probably he 
wished that the Prince should declare that as the 
Spaniards had offered him the crown and he had 
accepted it, he could not now withdraw unless he 
were asked to do so by Spain ; the attempt of Gram- 
mont to fasten a quarrel on Prussia would have been 
deprived of any responsible pretext ; he would have 
been compelled to bring pressure to bear on the Span- 
iards, with all the dangers that that course would 



1870] Outbj^eak of War with Finance. 335 

involve. We may suspect that he had advised this 
course and that his advice had been rejected. How- 
ever this may be, Bismarck felt the reverse so keenly 
that it seemed to him impossible he could any longer 
remain Minister, unless he could obtain redress for 
the insults and menaces of France. What prospect 
was there now of this ? It was no use now going on 
to Ems; he proposed to return next day to Varzin, 
and he expected that when he did so he would be 
once more a private man. 

He was to be saved by the folly of the French. 
Grammont, vain, careless, and inaccurate, carried 
away by his hatred of Prussia, hot-headed and blus- 
tering, did not even see how great an advantage he 
had gained. When Guizot, now a very old man, living 
in retirement, heard that the Prince had withdrawn, 
he exclaimed : " What good fortune these people 
have! This is the finest diplomatic victory which 
has been won in my lifetime." This is indeed the 
truth ; how easy it would have been to declare that 
France had spoken and her wishes had been fulfilled ! 
the Government need have said no more, but every 
Frenchman would have always told the story how 
Bismarck had tried to put a Hohenzollern on the 
throne of Spain, had been foiled by the word of the 
Emperor, and had been driven from office. Gram- 
mont prepared to complete the humiliation of Prussia, 
and in doing so he lost all and more than all he had 
won. 

He had at first declared that the withdrawal of 
the Prince was worthless when it was officially com- 
municated to him by Prussia ; now he extended his 



^T,6 Bismarck. [i867~ 

demands. He suggested to the Prussian Ambassador 
at Paris that the King should write to the Emperor 
a letter, in which he should express his regret for 
what had happened and his assurance that he 
had had no intention of injuring France. To Ben- 
edetti he telegraphed imperative orders that he was 
to request from the King a guarantee for the future, 
and a promise that he would never again allow the 
Prince to return to the candidature. It was to give 
himself over to an implacable foe. As soon as Bis- 
marck heard from Werther of the first suggestion, he 
telegraphed to him a stern reprimand for having 
listened to demands so prejudicial to the honour of 
his master, and ordered him, under the pretext of ill 
health, to depart from Paris and leave a post for 
which he had shewn himself so ill-suited. 

That same morning he saw Lord Augustus Loftus, 
and he explained that the incident was not yet 
closed ; Germany, he said, did not wish for war, but 
they did not fear it. They were not called on to 
endure humiliations from France ; after what had 
happened they must have some security for the 
future ; the Due de Grammont must recall or ex- 
plain the language he had used ; France had begun 
to prepare for war and that would not be allowed. 

" It is clear," writes the English Ambassador, " that 
Count Bismarck and the Prussian Ministry regret the 
attitude which the King has shewn to Count Benedetti, 
and feel, in regard to public opinion, the necessity of 
guarding the honour of the nation." 

To the Crown Prince, who had come to Berlin, 



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 2iZl 

Bismarck was more open ; he declared that war was 
necessary. 

This very day there were taking place at Ems 
events which were to give him the opportunity for 
which he longed. On Benedetti had fallen the task 
of presenting the new demands to the King ; it was 
one of the most ungrateful of the many unpleasant 
duties which had been entrusted to him during the 
last few years. In the early morning, he went out in 
the hope that he might see someone of the Court ; 
he met the King, himself who was taking the waters. 
The King at once beckoned to him, entered into 
conversation, and shewed him a copy of the Cologne 
Gazette containing the statement of the Prince's 
withdrawal. Benedetti then, as in duty bound, 
asked permission to inform his Government that the 
King would undertake that the candidature should 
not be resumed at any time. The King, of course, 
refused, and, when Benedetti pressed the request, 
repeated the refusal with some emphasis, and then, 
beckoning to his adjutant, who had withdrawn a few 
paces, broke off the conversation. When a few 
hours later the King received a letter from the 
Prince of Hohenzollern confirming the public state- 
ment, he sent a message to Benedetti by his aide-de- 
camp. Count Radziwill, and added to it that there 
would now be nothing further to say, as the incident 
was closed. Benedetti twice asked for another in- 
terview, but it was refused. 

He had done his duty, he had made his request, 
as he expected, in vain, but between him and the 
King there had been no departure by word or gest- 



338 Bismarck. [i867- 

ure from the ordinary courtesy which we should ex- 
pect from these two accomplished gentlemen. All 
the proceedings indeed had been unusual, for it was 
not the habit of the King, as it was of Napoleon, to 
receive foreign envoys except on the advice of his 
Ministers, and the last conversation had taken place 
on the public promenade of the fashionable water- 
ing-place ; but the exception had been explained 
and justified by the theory that the King's interest in 
the affair was domestic and not political. Both were 
anxious to avoid war, and the King to the last 
treated Benedetti with marked graciousness ; he had 
while at Ems invited him to the royal table, and 
even now, the next morning before leaving Ems, 
granted him an audience at the station to take leave. 
Nevertheless, he had been seriously annoyed by this 
fresh demand ; he was pained and surprised by the 
continuance of the French menaces ; he could not 
but fear that there was a deliberate intention to force 
a quarrel on him. He determined, therefore, to re- 
turn to Berlin, and ordered Abeken, Secretary to 
the Foreign Office, who was with him, to telegraph 
to Bismarck an account of what had taken place, with 
a suggestion that the facts should be published. 

It happened that Bismarck, when the telegram 
arrived, was dining with Roon and Moltke, who had 
both been summoned to Berlin. The three men 
were gloomy and depressed ; they felt that their 
country had been humiliated, and they saw no pros- 
pect of revenge. This feeling was increased when 
Bismarck read aloud the telegram to his two col- 
leagues. These repeated and impatient demands, 



1870] Oiitbreak of War with France. 339 

this intrusion on the King's privacy, this ungenerous 
playing with his kindly and pacific disposition, stirred 
their deepest indignation ; to them it seemed that 
Benedetti had been treated with a consideration he 
did not deserve ; the man who came with these pro- 
posals should have been repulsed with more marked 
indignation. But in the suggestion that the facts 
should be published, Bismarck saw the opportunity 
he had wished. He went into the next room and 
drafted a statement ; he kept to the very words of 
the original telegram, but he left out much, and ar- 
ranged it so that it should convey to the reader the 
impression, not of what had really occurred, but of 
what he would have wished should happen. With 
this he returned, and as he read it to them, Roon 
and Moltke brightened ; here at last was an answer 
to the French insults ; before, it sounded like a 
" Chamade " (a retreat), now it is a " Fanfare," 
said Moltke. " That is better," said Roon. Bis- 
marck asked a few questions about the army. Roon 
assured him that all was prepared ; Moltke, that, 
though no one could ever foretell with certainty the 
result of a great war, he looked to it with confidence ; 
they all knew that with the publication of this state- 
ment the last prospect of peace would be gone. It 
was published late that night in a special edition of 
the North German Gazette, and at the same time a 
copy was sent from the Foreign Office to all German 
embassies and legations. 

It is not altogether correct to call this (as has often 
been done) a falsification of the telegram. Under 
no circumstances could Bismarck have published in 



340 Bismarck. [1867- 

its original form the confidential nnessage to him from 
his sovereign ; all he had to do was to communi- 
cate to the newspapers the facts of which he had 
been informed, or so much of the facts as it seemed 
to him desirable that the public should know. He, 
of course, made the selection in such a form as to 
produce upon public opinion the particular effect 
which for the purposes of his policy he wished. 
What to some extent justifies the charge is that the 
altered version was published under the heading, 
" Ems." The official statement was supplemented 
by another notice in the NortJi German Gazette, which 
was printed in large type, and stated that Benedetti 
had so far forgotten all diplomatic etiquette that he 
had allowed himself to disturb the King in his holi- 
days, to intercept him on the promenade, and to at- 
tempt to force demands upon him. This was untrue, 
but on this point the telegram to Bismarck had been 
itself incorrect. Besides this, Bismarck doubtless saw 
to it that the right instructions should be given to 
the writers for the Press. 

But, indeed, this was hardly necessary ; the state- 
ment itself was a call to arms. During all these days 
the German people had been left almost Avithout in- 
struction or guidance from the Government ; they 
had heard with astonishment the sudden outbreak 
of Gallic wrath ; they were told, and were inclined to 
believe it, that the Prussian Government was inno- 
cent of the hostile designs attributed to it ; and the 
calm of the Government had communicated itself to 
them. They remained quiet, but they were still un- 
easy, they knew not what to think ; now all doubt 



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 341 

was removed. It was then true that with unexam- 
pled eagerness the French had fastened an alien 
quarrel upon them, had without excuse or justifica- 
tion advanced from insult to insult and menace to 
menace ; and now, to crown their unparalleled acts, 
they had sent this foreigner to intrude on the reserve 
of the aged King, and to insult him publicly in his 
own country. Then false reports came from Ems ; 
it was said that the King had publicly turned his 
back on Benedetti on the promenade, that the Am- 
bassador had followed the King to his house, and 
had at last been shewn the door, but that even 
then he had not scrupled again to intrude on the 
King at the railway station.* From one end of Ger- 
many to another a storm of indignation arose ; they 
had had enough of this French annoyance ; if the 
French wished for war then war should they have ; 
now there could no longer be talk of Prussian ambi- 
tion ; all differences of North and South were swept 
away ; wherever the German tongue was spoken men 
felt that they had been insulted in the person of the 
King, that it was theirs to protect his honour, and 
from that day he reigned in their hearts as uncrowned 
Emperor. 

The telegram was as successful in France as in 
Germany. There the question of peace and war 
was still in debate ; there was a majority for peace, 
and indeed there was no longer an excuse for war 
which would satisfy even a Frenchman. Then there 

* Some of the more exaggerated statements were contradicted at 
the time, apparently by Prince Radziwill, but in the excitement of 
the moment no one paid attention to this. 



342 Bismarck. [1867- 

came in quick succession the recall and disavowment 
of the Prussian Ambassador, news of the serious 
language Bismarck had used to Lord A. Loftus, and 
then despatches from other Courts that an official 
message had been sent from Berlin carrying the 
record of an insult offered to the King by the French 
Ambassador ; add to this the changed tone of the 
German Press, the enthusiasm with which the French 
challenge had been taken up ; they could have no 
doubt that they had gone too far ; they would now be 
not the accuser but the accused ; had they wished, 
they did not dare retreat with the fear of the Paris 
mob before them, and so they decided on war, and 
on the 15th the official statement was made and 
approved in the Chamber. 

It was on this same day that the King travelled 
from Ems to Berlin. When he left Ems he still 
refused to believe in the serious danger of war, but 
as he travelled north and saw the excited crowd 
that thronged to meet him at every station his own 
belief was almost overthrown. To his surprise, when 
he reached Brandenburg he found Bismarck and the 
Crown Prince awaiting him ; the news that they had 
come to meet the King was itself looked on almost 
as a declaration of war ; all through the return 
journey Bismarck unsuccessfully tried to persuade 
his master to give the order for mobilisation. When 
they reached Berlin they found the station again 
surrounded by a tumultuous throng; through it 
pressed one of the secretaries of the Foreign Office ; 
he brought the news that the order for mobilisation 
had been given in France. Then, at last, the reluc- 



1870] 



Outbreak of War with France. 343 



tance of the King was broken down ; he gave the 
order, and at once the Crown Prince, who was stand- 
ing near, proclaimed the news to all within earshot. 
The North German Parliament was summoned, and 
five days later Bismarck was able to announce to 
them that he had received the Declaration of War 
from France, adding as he did so that this was the 
first ofScial communication which throughout the 
whole affair he had received from the French Govern- 
ment, a circumstance for which there was no prece- 
dent in history. 

What a contrast is there between the two countries ! 
On the one hand, a King and a Minister who by seven 
years of loyal co-operation have learnt to trust and 
depend upon one another, who together have faced 
danger, who have not shrunk from extreme un- 
popularity, and who, just for this reason, can now 
depend on the absolute loyalty of the people. On 
the other side, the Emperor broken in health, his 
will shattered by prolonged pain and sickness, 
trying by the introduction of liberal institutions to 
free himself from the burden of government and 
weight of responsibility which he had voluntarily 
taken upon his shoulders. At Berlin, Bismarck's 
severity and love of power had brought it about that 
the divergent policy and uncertainty of early years 
had ceased ; there was one mind and one will direct- 
ing this State ; the unauthorised interference and 
amateur criticism of courtiers were no longer per- 
mitted. In France, all the evils from which Prussia 
had been freed by Bismarck were increasing ; here 
there was no single will ; the Ministry were divided. 



344 Bismarck. [1867- 

there was no authority over them ; no one could 
foresee by whom the decision of the Emperor would 
be determined ; the deliberate results of long and 
painful negotiations might be overthrown in ten 
minutes by the interference of the Empress or the 
advice of Prince Napoleon. The Emperor would 
pursue half a dozen inconsistent policies in as many 
hours. And then, below all, there was this fatal 
fact, that Napoleon could not venture to be un- 
popular. He knew the folly of the course into which 
he was being driven, but he did not dare to face the 
mob of Paris, or to defy the Chamber of Deputies. 
He owed his throne to universal suffrage, and he 
knew that the people who had set him up could 
quickly overthrow him. No man can ever govern 
who fears unpopularity. Bismarck did not, Napoleon 
did. 

Before the campaign began, two events took place 
which we must record. The first was the publica- 
tion in the Times of the text of the treaty with 
France regarding Belgium. We need not add any- 
thing further to what we have said regarding it ; 
published at this moment it had a great effect on 
English public opinion. The other arose out of 
the opposition which the exiled King of Hanover 
had continued to maintain. He had used the very 
large sums of money which he possessed to keep 
together a Hanoverian Legion, recruited from former 
oflficers and soldiers of the Hanoverian army. He 
had hoped that war would break out before this 
and would be accompanied ,by a rising in Hanover. 
His means had now come to an end, and the un- 



1870] Outbreak of War with Fra^tce. 345 

fortunate men were living in Paris almost without 
support. They were now exposed to a terrible 
alternative. They could not return to Germany ; 
they did not wish to take part in a war on the 
French side. Their only hope was emigration to 
America. Bismarck heard of their position ; he 
offered to pardon them all and to pay to them from 
the Prussian funds the full pension which they would 
have received had they continued to serve in the 
Hanoverian army. It was a timely act of generosity, 
and it had the effect that the last element of hostil- 
ity in Germany was stilled and the whole nation 
could unite as one man in this foreign war. 

Note. — In this chapter, besides the ordinary authorities, I have 
depended largely on the memoirs of the King of Roumania. Bis- 
marck, in his own memoirs, states that the writer was not accurately 
informed ; but even if there are some errors in detail, the remarkable 
statements contained in this work must command belief until they 
are fully contradicted and disproved. There has, I believe, been no 
attempt to do this. 




CHAPTER XIV. 

THE WAR WITH FRANCE AND FOUNDATION OF THE 
EMPIRE. 

1870- 1 87 1. 

ON July 31, 1870, Bismarck left Berlin with 
the King for the seat of war, for, as in 1866, 
he was to accompany the army in the field. 
For the next few months indeed Germany was to 
be governed from the soil of France, and it was 
necessary for the Minister to be constantly with the 
King. Bismarck never forgot that he was a soldier ; 
he was more proud of his general's uniform than of 
his civil rank, and, though not a combatant, it was 
his pride and pleasure that he should share something 
of the hardships and dangers of war. He was as a 
matter of fact never so well as during the campaign : 
the early hours, the moderate and at times meagre 
food, the long hours in the saddle and the open air, 
restored the nerves and health which had been 
injured by the annoyances of ofifice, late hours, and 
prolonged sedentary work. He was accompanied 
by part of the staff of the Foreign Office, and many 
of the distinguished strangers who followed the 

346 



1870] 



War zvith Finance. 347 



army were often guests at his table ; he especially 
shewed his old friendliness for Americans : General 
Sheridan and many others of his countrymen found 
a hearty welcome from the Chancellor. 

It was not till the 17th of August that the head- 
quarters came up with the fighting front of the 
army ; but the next day, during the decisive battle 
of Gravelotte, Bismarck watched the combat by the 
side of the King, and, as at Koniggratz, they more 
than once came under fire. At one period, Bis- 
marck was in considerable danger of being taken 
prisoner. His two sons were serving in the army; 
they were dragoons in the Cuirassiers of the Guards, 
serving in the ranks in the same regiment whose 
uniform their father was entitled to wear. They 
both took part in the terrible cavalry charge at 
Mars-la-Tour, in which their regiment suffered so 
severely ; the eldest, Count Herbert, was wounded 
and had to be invalided home. Bismarck could 
justly boast that there was no nepotism in the Prus- 
sian Government when his two sons were serving as 
privates. It was not till the war had gone on some 
weeks and they had taken part in many engage- 
ments, that they received their commissions. This 
would have happened in no other country or army. 
This was the true equality, so different from the 
exaggerated democracy of France, — an equality not 
of privilege but of obligation ; every Pomeranian 
peasant who sent his son to fight and die in France 
knew that the sons of the most powerful man in the 
country and in Europe were fighting with them not 
as officers but as comrades. Bismarck was more 



34^ Bismarck. [1870- 

fortunate than his friends in that neither of his sons — 
nor any of his near relatives — lost his life ; Roon's 
second son fell at Sedan, and the bloody days of 
Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte placed in mourning 
nearly every noble family in Prussia. 

From Gravelotte to Sedan he accompanied the 
army, and he was by the King's side on that fatal 
day when the white flag was hoisted on the citadel 
of Sedan, and the French general came out of the 
town with the message that Napoleon, having in 
vain sought death at the head of his troops, placed 
his sword in the hands of the King of Prussia. 

The surrender of Sedan was a military event, and 
the conditions had to be arranged between Moltke 
and Wimpffen, who had succeeded MacMahon in 
command, but Bismarck was present at the confer- 
ence, which was held in his quarters, in case political 
questions arose. As they rode down together to 
Doncheroy he and Moltke had agreed that no terms 
could be offered except the unconditional surrender 
of the whole army, the officers alone being allowed 
to retain their swords. Against thes6 conditions 
Wimpffen and his companions struggled long, but in 
vain. Moltke coldly assured them that they could 
not escape, and that it would be madness to begin 
the fight again ; they were surrounded ; if the sur- 
render were not complete by four o'clock the next 
morning the bombardment of the town would begin. 
Wimpffen suggested that it would be more politic of 
the Germans to show generosity ; they would thereby 
earn the gratitude of France, and this might be 
made the beginning of a lasting peace,; otherwise 



1871] War with France. 349 

what had they to look forward to but a long series 
of wars ? Now was the time for Bismarck to inter- 
fere ; it was impossible, he declared, to reckon on the 
gratitude of nations ; at times men might indeed 
build with confidence on that of a sovereign and his 
family ; " but I repeat, nothing can be expected from 
the gratitude of a nation." Above all was this true 
of France. "The Governments there have so little 
power, the changes are so quick and so unforeseen, 
that there is nothing on which one can rely." Be- 
sides, it would be absurd to imagine that France 
would ever forgive us our successes. " You are an 
irritable and jealous people, envious and jealous to 
the last degree. You have not forgiven us Sadowa, 
and would you forgive us Sedan? Never." 

They could not therefore modify the terms in or- 
der to win the gratitude and friendship of France ; 
they might have done so had there been prospects 
of immediate peace. One of the officers, General 
Castelnau, announced that he had a special message 
from Napoleon, who had sent his sword to the King 
and surrendered in the hope that the King would 
appreciate the sacrifice and grant a more honourable 
capitulation. "Whose sword is it that the Emperor 
Napoleon has surrendered ? " asked Bismarck ; " is it 
the sword of France or his own? If it is the sword 
of France the conditions can be greatly softened ; 
your message would have an extraordinary import- 
ance." He thought and he hoped that the Em- 
peror wished to sue for peace, but it was not so. 
" It is only the sword of the Emperor," answered 
the General. " All then remains as it was," said 



350 Bismarck. [1870- 

Moltke; he insisted on his demands; Wimpffen asked 
at least that time might be allowed him to return to 
Sedan and consult his colleagues. He had only 
come from Algeria two days before ; he could not 
begin his command by signing so terrible a surrender. 
Even this Moltke refused. Then Wimpffen declared 
the conference ended ; rather than this they would 
continue the battle ; he asked that his horses might 
be brought. A terrible silence fell on the room ; 
Moltke, with Bismarck by his side, stood cold and im- 
penetrable, facing the three French officers ; their 
faces were lighted by two candles on the table ; be- 
hind stood the stalwart forms of the German ofificers 
of the staff, and from the walls of the room looked 
down the picture of Napoleon I. Then again Bis- 
marck interfered ; he begged Wimpffen not in a mo- 
ment of pique to take a step which must have such 
horrible consequences ; he whispered a few words to 
Moltke, and procured from him a concession ; hos- 
tilities should not be renewed till nine o'clock the 
next morning. Wimpffen might return to Sedan 
and report to the Emperor and his colleagues. 

It was past midnight when the conference broke 
up ; before daybreak Bismarck was aroused by a 
messenger who announced that the Emperor had 
left Sedan and wished to see him. He hastily sprang 
up, and as he was, unwashed, without breakfast, 
in his undress uniform, his old cap, and his high 
boots, shewing all the marks of his long day in the 
saddle, he mounted his horse and rode down to the 
spot near the highroad where the Emperor in his 
carriage, accompanied by three officers and attended 



1871] War with France. 351 

by three more on horseback, awaited him. Bismarck 
rode quickly up to him, dismounted, and as he ap- 
proached saluted and removed his cap, though this 
was contrary to etiquette, but it was not a time when 
he wished even to appear to be wanting in courtesy. 
Napoleon had come to plead for the army ; he wished 
to see the King, for he hoped that in a personal in- 
terview he might extract from him more favourable 
terms. Bismarck was determined just for this reason 
that the sovereigns should not meet until the capitu- 
lation was signed ; he answered, therefore, that it 
was impossible, as the King was ten miles away. He 
then accompanied the Emperor to a neighbouring 
cottage; there in a small room, ten feet square, con- 
taining a wooden table and two rush chairs, they sat 
for some time talking ; afterwards they came down 
and sat smoking in front of the cottage. 

" A wonderful contrast to our last meeting in the 
Tuileries," wrote Bismarck to his wife. " Our conversa- 
tion was difificult, if I was to avoid matters which would 
be painful to the man who had been struck down by the 
mighty hand of God. He first lamented this unhappy 
war, which he said he had not desired ; he had been 
forced into it by the pressure of public opinion. I 
answered that with us also no one, least of all the King, 
had wished for the war. We had looked on the Spanish 
affair as Spanish and not as German." 

The Emperor asked for more favourable terms of 
surrender, but Bismarck refused to discuss this with 
him ; it was a military question which must be settled 
between Moltke and Wimpffen. On the other hand, 



352 Bismarck. ti870- 

when Bismarck enquired if he were inclined for ne- 
gotiations for peace, Napoleon answered that he 
could not discuss this ; he was a prisoner"of war and 
could not treat ; he referred Bismarck to the Govern- 
ment in Paris. 

This meeting had therefore no effect on the situa- 
tion. Bismarck suggested that the Emperor should 
go to the neighbouring Chateau of Belle Vue, which 
was not occupied by wounded ; there he would be 
able to rest. Thither Bismarck, now in full uniform 
(for he had hurried back to his own quarters), accom- 
panied him, and in the same house the negotiations 
of the previous evening were continued ; Bismarck 
did not wish to be present at them, for, as he said, 
the military men could be harsher ; and so gave 
orders that after a few minutes he should be sum- 
moned out of the room by a message that the King 
wished to see him. After the capitulation was signed, 
he rode up with Moltke to present it to the King, 
who received it on the heights whence he had watched 
the battle, surrounded by the headquarters staff and 
all the princes who were making the campaign. Then, 
followed by a brilliant cavalcade, he rode down to 
visit the captive sovereign. 

Bismarck would at this time willingly have made 
peace, but there was no opportunity of opening 
necfotiations and it is doubtful whether even his 
influence would have been able successfully to com- 
bat the desire of the army to march on Paris. On 
September 4th, the march, which had been inter- 
rupted ten days before, was begun. Immediately 
afterwards news came which stopped all hopes of a 




i: J 



1871] 



War with France. 353 



speedy peace. How soon was his warning as to the 
instability of French Governments to be fulfilled ! 
A revolution had broken out in Paris, the dethrone- 
ment of the Emperor had been proclaimed, and a 
Provisional Government instituted. They at once 
declared that they were a government of national 
defence, they would not rest till the invaders were 
driven from the land, they appealed to the memo- 
ries of 1792. They were indeed ready to make 
peace, for the war, they said, had been undertaken 
not against France but against the Emperor ; the 
Emperor had fallen, a free France had arisen ; they 
would make peace, but they would not yield an inch 
of their country or a stone of their fortresses. With 
great energy they prepared the defence of Paris and 
the organisation of new armies ; M. Thiers was in- 
structed to visit the neutral Courts and to beg for 
the support of Europe. 

Under these circumstances it was Bismarck's duty 
to explain the German view ; he did so in two circu- 
lar notes of September i 3th and September i6th. He 
began by expounding those principles he had already 
expressed to Wimpffen, principles which had already 
been communicated by his secretaries to the Ger- 
man Press and been repeated in almost every paper 
of the country. The war had not been caused by 
the Emperor ; it was the nation which was responsi- 
ble for it. It had arisen from the intolerance of the 
French character, which looked on the prosperity of 
other nations as an insult to themselves. They 
must expect the same feeling to continue : 

" We cannot seek guarantees for the future in French 
23 



354 Bis7narck. [1870- 

feeling. We must not deceive ourselves ; we must soon 
expect a new attack ; we cannot look forward to a 
lasting peace, and this is quite independent of the con- 
ditions we might impose on France. It is their defeat 
which the French nation will never forgive. If now we 
were to withdraw from France without any accession of 
territory, without any contribution, without any advan- 
tage but the glory of our arms, there would remain in 
the French nation the same hatred, the same spirit of 
revenge, for the injury done to their vanity and to their 
love of power." 

Against this they must demand security ; the de- 
mand was addressed not to any single Government 
but to the nation as a whole ; South Germany must 
be protected from the danger of French attack ; 
they would never be safe so long as Strasburg and 
Metz were in French hands ; Strasburg was the gate 
of Germany ; restored to Germany, these cities 
would regain their defensive character. Twenty 
times had France made war on Germany, but from 
Germany no danger of disturbance to the peace of 
Europe was to be feared. 

For the first time he hereby officially stated that 
Germany would not make peace without some ac- 
cession of territory ; that this would be the case, 
everyone had known since the beginning of the war. 
At a council of war directly after Gravelotte it was 
determined to require Alsace ; after Sedan the terms 
naturally rose. The demand for at least some terri- 
tory was indeed inevitable. The suggestion that 
from confidence in the peaceful and friendly charac- 
ter of the French nation they should renounce all 



1871] War zvith Frmice. 355 

the advantages gained by their unparalleled victor- 
ies scarcely deserved serious consideration. Had 
the French been successful they would have taken 
all the left bank of the Rhine ; this was actually 
specified in the draft treaty which General Le Brun 
had presented to the Emperor of Austria. What 
claim had France to be treated with a leniency which 
she has never shewn to any conquered enemy ? 
Bismarck had to meet the assumption that France 
was a privileged and special land ; that she had free- 
dom to conquer, pillage, and divide the land of her 
neighbours, but that every proposal to win back from 
her what she had taken from others was a crime 
against humanity. 

So long as the Provisional Government adopted 
the attitude that they would not even consider peace 
on the basis of some surrender of territory, there was 
no prospect of any useful negotiations. The armies 
must advance, and beneath the walls of Paris the 
struggle be fought out to its bitter end. Bismarck 
meanwhile treated the Government with great re- 
serve. They had no legal status ; as he often pointed 
out, the Emperor was still the only legal authority in 
France, and he would be quite prepared to enter into 
negotiations with him. When by the medium of the 
English Ambassador they asked to be allowed to open 
negotiations for an armistice and discuss the terms 
of peace, he answered by the question. What guaran- 
tee was there that France or the armies in Metz and 
Strasburg would recognise the arrangements made 
by the present Government in Paris, or any that 
might succeed it ? It was a quite fair question ; for as 



356 Bismarck. Li 870- 

events were to shew, the commander of the army 
in Metz refused to recognise them, and wished to 
restore the Emperor to the throne ; and the Govern- 
ment themselves had declared that they would at 
once be driven from power if they withdrew from their 
determination not to accept the principle of a ces- 
sion of territory. They would be driven from power 
by the same authority to which they owed their ex- 
istence, — the mob of Paris ; it was the mob of Paris 
which, from the beginning, was really responsible 
for the war. What use was there in a negotiation 
in which the two parties had no common ground ? 
None the less Bismarck consented to receive M. 
Jules Favre, who held the portfolio of Foreign Af- 
fairs, and who at the advice of Lord Lyons came 
out from Paris, even at the risk of a rebuff, to see if 
by a personal interview he might not be able to influ- 
ence the German Chancellor. " It is well at least to 
see what sort of man he is," was the explanation 
which Bismarck gave ; but as the interview was not 
strictly official he did not, by granting it, bind him- 
self to recognise Favre's authority. 

Jules Favre met Bismarck on September i8th. 
They had a long conversation that evening, and it 
was continued the next day at Ferrieres, Baron 
Rothschild's house, in which the King was at that 
time quartered. The French envoy did not make 
a favourable impression ; a lawyer by profession, he 
had no experience in diplomatic negotiations ; vain, 
verbose, rhetorical, and sentimental, his own report 
of the interview which he presented to his colleagues 
in Paris is sufficient evidence of his incapacity, for the 



1871] War with France. 357 

task he had taken upon himself. " He spoke to me 
as if I were a public meeting," said Bismarck after- 
wards, using an expression which in his mouth was 
peculiarly contemptuous, for he had a platonic dis- 
like of long speeches. But let us hear Favre him- 
self : 

"Although fifty-eight years of, age Count Bismarck 
appeared to be in full vigour. His tall figure, his power- 
ful head, his strongly marked features gave him an as- 
pect both imposing and severe, tempered, however, by a 
natural simplicity amounting to good-nature. His man- 
ners were courteous and grave, and quite free from 
stiffness or affectation. As soon as the conversation com- 
menced he displayed a communicativeness and good- 
will which he preserved while it lasted. He certainly 
regarded me as a negotiator unworthy of him and he 
had the politeness not to let this be seen, and appeared 
interested by my sincerity. I was struck with the clear- 
ness of his ideas, his vigorous good sense, and his origin- 
ality of mind. His freedom from all pretensions was no 
less remarkable." 

It is interesting to compare with this the account 
given by another Frenchman of one of the later 
interviews between the two men * : 

"The negotiations began seriously and quietly. The 
Chancellor said simply and seriously what he wanted 
with astonishing frankness and admirable logic. He 
went straight to the mark and at every turn he discon- 
certed Jules Favre, who was accustomed to legal quibbles 
and diplomatic jobbery, and did not in the least under- 



*Comte Herisson d'Herisson, yournal d'u7i officier d'orjonnance. 



358 Bismarck. [1870- 

stand the perfect loyalty of his opponent or his superb 
fashion of treating questions, so different from the 
ordinary method. The Chancellor expressed himself in 
French with a fidelity I have never met with except 
among the Russians. He made use of expressions at 
once elegant and vigorous, finding the proper word to 
describe an idea or define a situation without effort or 
hesitation." 

" I was at the outset struck by the contrast between 
the two negotiators. Count Bismarck wore the uniform 
of the White Cuirassiers, white tunic, white cap, and 
yellow band. He looked like a giant. In his tight 
uniform, with his broad chest and square shoulders and 
bursting with health and strength, he overwhelmed the 
stooping, thin, tall, miserable-looking lawyer with his 
frock coat, wrinkled all over, and his white hair falling 
over his collar. A look, alas, at the pair was sufficient to 
distinguish between the conqueror and the conquered, 
the strong and the weak." 

This, however, was four months later, when Jules 
Favre was doubtless much broken by the anxieties 
of his position, and perhaps also by the want of 
sufficient food, and Comte d'H^risson is not an 
impartial witness, for, though a patriotic Frenchman, 
he was an enemy of the Minister. 

Bismarck in granting the interview had said that 
he would not discuss an armistice, but only terms of 
peace. For the reasons we have explained, Favre 
refused to listen even to the proposition of the only 
terms which Bismarck was empowered to bring for- 
ward. The Chancellor explained those ideas with 
which we are already acquainted : " Strasburg," he 



1871] War with France. 359 

said, " is the key of our house and we must have it." 
Favre protested that he could not discuss conditions 
which were so dishonourable to France. On this 
expression we need only quote Bismarck's comment : 

" I did not succeed in convincing him that conditions, 
the fulfilment of which France had required from Italy, 
and demanded from Germany without having been at 
war, conditions which France would undoubtedly have 
imposed upon us had we been defeated and which had 
been the result of nearly every war, even in the latest 
time, could not have anything dishonourable in them- 
selves for a country which had been defeated after a 
brave resistance, and that the honour of France was not 
of a different kind to that of other countries." 

It was impossible to refuse to discuss terms of an 
armistice ; as in 1 866 the military authorities objected 
to any kind of armistice because from a military point 
of view any cessation of hostilities must be an advan- 
tage to France ; it would enable them to continue 
their preparations and get together new armies, 
while Germany would have the enormous expense 
of maintaining 500,000 men in a foreign country. 
Bismarck himself from a political point of view also 
knew the advantage of bringing the war to a rapid 
close, while the moral effect of the great victories 
had not been dissipated. However, France had no 
Government ; a legal Government could not be 
created without elections, and Favre refused to con- 
sider holding elections during the progress of hos- 
tilities. After a long discussion Bismarck, other 
suggestions being rejected, offered an armistice on 



360 Bismarck. [1870- 

condition that the war should continue round Metz 
and Paris, but that Toul and Strasburg should be 
surrendered and the garrison of Strasburg made 
prisoners of war. " The towns would anyhow fall 
into our hands," he said ; " it is only a question of 
engineering." " At these words," says Favre, " I 
sprang into the air from pain and cried out, * You 
forget that you speak to a Frenchman. To sacrifice 
an heroic garrison which is the object of our admira- 
tion and that of the world would be a cowardice. I 
do not promise even to say that you have offered 
such a condition.' " Bismarck said that he had no 
wish to offend him ; if the King allowed it the 
article might be modified ; he left the room, and 
after a quarter of an hour returned, saying that the 
King would accept no alteration on this point. " My 
powers were exhausted," writes Favre ; " I feared 
for a moment that I should fall down ; I turned 
away to overcome the tears which choked me, and, 
while I excused myself for this involuntary weakness, 
I took leave with a few simple words." He asked 
Bismarck not to betray his weakness. The Count, 
who seems really to have been touched by the display 
of emotion, attempted in some sort of way to console 
him, but a few days later his sympathy was changed 
into amusement when he found that the tears which 
he had been asked to pass over in silence were 
paraded before the people of Paris to prove the 
patriotism of the man, " He may have meant it," 
said Bismarck, " but people ought not to bring 
sentiment into politics." 
The terras which Bismarck had offered were gs a 



1871] 



War with France. 361 



matter of fact not at at all harsh ; a week later the 
garrison of Strasburg had become prisoners of war ; 
had the French accepted the armistice and begun 
negotiations for peace they would probably, though 
they could not have saved Strasburg and Alsace, 
have received far better terms than those to which 
they had to assent four months later. 

Bismarck in refusing to recognise the Provisional 
Government always reminded them that the Em- 
peror was still the only legitimate Government in 
France. He professed that he was willing to ne- 
gotiate with the Emperor, and often talked of releas- 
ing him from his confinement in Germany, coming to 
terms with Bazaine, and allowing the Emperor at 
the head of the army at Metz to regain his authority 
in France. We do not quite know to what extent 
he was serious in using this language, for he often 
threatened more than he intended to perform. It is 
at least possible that he only used it as a means for 
compelling the Provisional Government quickly to 
come to terms and thereby to bring the war to an 
end. It is, however, certain that negotiations went 
on between him and the Empress and also with 
Bazaine. They came to nothing because the Em- 
press absolutely refused to negotiate if she was to 
be required to surrender any French territory. In 
this she adopted the language of the Provisional 
Government in Paris, and was supported by the 
Emperor. 

The negotiations with the Provisional Govern- 
ment were more than once renewed ; soon after 
the investiture of Paris had begun, General Burnside 



362 Bismarck. 



[1870- 



and another American passed as unofficial mes- 
sengers between the French and German Govern- 
ments, and at the beginning of November, Thiers 
came as the official agent of the Government in 
Tours ; these attempts were, however, always without 
result ; the French would not accept an armistice on 
the only conditions which Bismarck was authorised by 
the King and the military authorities to offer. Dur- 
ing the rest of the year there was little direct com- 
munication with the French authorities. Bismarck, 
however, was not idle. In his quarters at Versailles 
he had with him many of the Foreign Office staff ; 
he had not only to conduct important diplomatic 
negotiations, but also to maintain control over the 
nation, to keep in touch with the Press, to communi- 
cate to the newspapers both events and comments 
on them. At this crisis he could not leave public 
opinion without proper direction ; he had to com- 
bat the misstatements of the French, who had so 
long had the ear of Europe, and were still carrying 
their grievances to the Courts of the neutral Powers, 
and found often eager advocates in the Press of the 
neutral countries. He had to check the proposal of 
the neutral Powers to interfere between the two 
combatants, to inform the German public of the 
demands that were to be made on France and the 
proposals for the unity of the country, and to justify 
the policy of the Government ; all this was done not 
only by official notes, but by articles written at his 
dictation or under his instruction, and by information 
or suggestions conveyed by his secretaries to his 
newspapers, Jn old days the Prqssian Goy^rnnaent 



1871] War with Finance. 363 

had been inarticulate, it had never been able to de- 
fend itself against the attacks of foreign critics ; it 
had suffered much by misrepresentation ; it had lost 
popularity at home and prestige abroad. In the 
former struggles with France the voice of Germany 
had scarcely been heard ; Europe, which was accus- 
tomed to listen to every whisper from Paris, ignored 
the feelings and the just grievances of Germany. 
Bismarck changed all this ; now he saw to it that 
the policy of the Government should be explained 
and defended in Germany itself ; for though he de- 
spised public opinion when it claimed to be the 
canon by which the Government should be directed, 
he never neglected this, as he never neglected any 
means by which the Government might be strength- 
ened. Speaking now from Versailles, he could be 
confident that Europe would listen to what Ger- 
many said, and it was no small benefit to his nation 
that it had as its spokesman a man whose character 
and abilities ensured that no word that he uttered 
would be neglected. 

The neutral Powers really gave him little concern. 
There was no intention of supporting France either 
in England, Russia, or Austria. He shewed great 
activity, however, in defending the Germans from 
the charges so freely made against them by the 
French Press, of conducting the war in a cruel man- 
ner; charges which were untrue, for, according to 
the unanimous testimony of foreign observers who 
accompanied the army, the moderation of the Ger- 
man soldiers was as remarkable as their successes. 
Bismarck was not content with rebutting unjust ac- 



364 Bismarck. [1870~ 

cusations, — he carried on the war into the enemy's 
camp. He was especially indignant at the misuse 
made by the French of irregular troops ; he often 
maintained that the German soldiers ought never to 
imprison the franc-tireurs, but shoot them at once. 
He feared that if civilians were encouraged to take 
part in the war it would necessarily assume a very 
cruel character. At Meaux he came upon a number 
of franc-tireurs who had been taken prisoners. 
" You are assassins, gentlemen," he said to them ; 
"you will all be hung." And, indeed, these men 
who fired secretly on the German troops from be- 
hind hedges and in forests, and had no kind of uni- 
form, could not claim to be treated as prisoners of 
war. When the bombardment of Paris began he 
took great pains to defend a measure which was 
much attacked in other countries ; he had used all 
his influence that the bombardment should not be 
delayed, and often spoke with great annoyance of 
the reluctance of the military authorities to begin. 
He wished every measure to be taken which would 
bring the war to an end as soon as possible. The 
long delay before Paris seems to have affected his 
nerves and spirits ; there were many anxious hours, 
and it was always difficult for him to wait patiently 
the result of what others were doing. The military 
authorities were, as always, very jealous of all at- 
tempts by him to interfere in their department, and 
he was not always satisfied with their decisions. 
Like all the Germans he was surprised and angry at 
the unexpected resistance of Paris, and the success 
of Gambetta's appeal to the nation. He was espe- 



1871] 



War zvith France. 365 



daily indignant at the help which Garibaldi gave : 
"This," he said, "is the gratitude of the Italians"; 
he declared that he would have the General taken 
prisoner and paraded through the streets of Berlin. 

During the long weeks at Versailles, Bismarck was 
much occupied with German affairs. The victory of 
Sedan was the foundation of German unity ; Bis- 
marck's moderation and reserve now earned its re- 
ward ; he had always refused to press the southern 
States into the Federation; now the offer to join 
came from them. Baden asked, as she had already 
done at the beginning of the year, to be received 
into the Union ; the settlement with Wiirtemberg, 
and above all with Bavaria, was less simple. At the 
request of the Bavarian Government Delbriick was 
sent to Munich for an interchange of opinion, and 
the negotiations which were begun there were after- 
wards continued at Versailles and Berlin. There 
were many difficulties to be overcome : the Bava- 
rians were very jealous of their independence and 
were not prepared to put themselves into the posi- 
tion which, for instance, Saxony occupied. But the 
difficulties on the Prussian side were equally great : 
the Liberal party wished that the Constitution 
should be revised and those points in it which they 
had always disliked altered ; they would have made 
the government of the Federal authorities more 
direct, have created a Federal Ministry and a Federal 
Upper House, and so really changed the Federation 
into a simple State, thereby taking away all the in- 
dependence of the dynasties. It was quite certain 
that Bavaria would not accept this, and there was 



366 Bismarck. [1870- 

some considerable danger that their exaggerated 
demands might lead to a reaction in South Germany. 
Probably under any circumstances the unification of 
Germany would have been completed, but it required 
all Bismarck's tact to prevent the outbreak of a regu- 
lar party struggle. The most extreme line was 
taken by the Crown Prince of Prussia ; he desired 
the immediate creation of an emperor who should 
have sovereign authority over the whole of Ger- 
many, and he even went so far as to suggest that, if 
the Bavarians would not accept this voluntarily, 
they might be compelled to do so. He had re- 
peated conversations with Bismarck on this, and on 
one occasion at least it ended in an angry scene. The 
Crown Prince wished to threaten the South Ger- 
mans. " There is no danger," he said ; " let us take a 
firm and commanding attitude. You will see I was 
right in maintaining that you are not nearly suffi- 
ciently conscious of your own power." It is almost 
incredible that he should have used such language, 
but the evidence is conclusive ; he was at this time 
commanding the Bavarian troops against the French ; 
Bavaria had with great loyalty supported Prussia 
through the war and performed very valuable serv- 
ices, and now he proposed to reward their friendship 
by compelling them to accept terms by which the 
independence of the King and the very existence of 
the State would be endangered. The last request 
which the King of Bavaria had sent to the Crown 
Prince as he left Munich to take command of the 
Bavarian armj^ was that nothing might be done to 
interfere with Bavarian independence. Of course 



1871] War with France. 367 

Bismarck refused to listen to these suggestions ; had 
he done so, the probable result would have been that 
the Bavarian army would have been withdrawn from 
France and then all the result of the victories would 
have been lost. 

What Bismarck did was in accordance with his 
usual practice to make no greater alteration in exist- 
ing institutions than was absolutely necessary ; he 
did not therefore undertake any reform of the Fed- 
eral Constitution, but simply proposed treaties by 
which the southern States, each separately, entered 
into the existing alliance. Certain special conditions 
were allowed : the King of Bavaria was to maintain 
the command over his troops in time of peace ; a 
voice was given to Bavaria in the management of 
foreign affairs ; she retained her own post and tele- 
graph, and there were certain special privileges with 
regard to finance to meet the system of taxation on 
beer; and then the Prussian military code was not 
to apply to Bavaria, and Bavaria was to retain her 
own special laws with regard to marriage and citi- 
zenship. These concessions were undoubtedly very 
considerable, but Bismarck granted them, for, as he 
said to the Bavarian envoys, " we do not want a dis- 
contented Bavaria ; we want one which will join us 
freely." The Liberal Publicists in Germany with 
characteristic intolerance complained that when they 
had hoped to see the Constitution made simpler and 
the central government stronger it had really be- 
come more federal ; they did not see that this feder- 
alism was merely the expression of existing facts 
which could not be ignored. They prophesied all 



368 Bismarck. [1870- 

kinds of difficulties which have not been fulfilled, 
for they forgot that harmonious working, in an 
alliance voluntarily made, would be a firmer bond 
of union than the most stringent articles of treaties 
which were looked on as an unjust burden. Bis- 
marck's own words, spoken the evening after the 
agreements were signed, give the true account of the 
matter : 

" The newspapers will not be satisfied, the historian 
may very likely condemn our Conventions ; he may say, 
'The stupid fellow might easily have asked for more, he 
would have got it, they would have had to give it him ; 
his might was his right.' I was more anxious that these 
people should go away heartily satisfied. What is the 
use of treaties which men are forced to sign ? I know 
that they went away satisfied. I do not wish to press 
them or to take full advantage of the situation. The 
Convention has its defects, but it is all the stronger on 
account of them." 

He could afford now to be generous because in 
1866 he had been so stern ; he had refused to take 
in Bavaria when it would have weakened the associ- 
ation of the North ; now that the nucleus had been 
formed he could allow the Catholic South greater 
freedom. He was right ; the concessions granted to 
Bavaria have not been in any way a danger to the 
Empire. 

As soon as he had signed the Convention he 
looked into the room where his secretaries were, 
and said : " The work is done ; the unity of Germany 
is completed and with it Kaiser and Reich." Up to 



1871] 



War with France. 369 



this time he had taken no open steps towards the 
proclamation of the Empire; but it was unanimously- 
demanded by almost the whole nation and especially 
by the South Germans. But here he kept himself 
in the background ; he refused to make it appear as 
though he were to make the Emperor or found the 
Empire. He allowed the natural wish of the people 
to work itself out spontaneously. There was indeed 
some reluctance to assume the title at the Prussian 
Court ; the King himself was not anxious for a new 
dignity which would obscure that title which he and 
his ancestors had made so honourable. This feeling 
was shared by many of the nobility and the officers ; 
we find it strongest in Roon, who in this represents 
the genuine feeling of the older Prussian nobility. 
They disliked a change which must mean that the 
Prussia to which they were so devotedly attached 
was to become merged in a greater Germany. There 
was also some apprehension that with the new title 
the old traditions of the Prussian Court, traditions 
of economy, almost of parsimony, might be forgot- 
ten, and that a new career might begin in which they 
would attempt to imitate the extravagance and 
pomp of less prudent sovereigns. With this per- 
haps Bismarck himself had some sympathy. 

The King would, of course, only assume the new 
title if it was offered to him by his fellow-princes ; 
there was some danger lest the Reichstag, which 
had been summoned to ratify the treaties, might 
ask him to assume it before the princes did ; had 
they done so, he would probably have refused. The 

Crown Prince, who was very eager for the new 
24 



370 Bismarck. [I87b- 

title, and the Grand Duke of Baden used all their 
influence with their fellow-princes. The initiative 
must come from the King of Bavaria ; he was in 
difficulty as to the form in which the offer should be 
made. Bismarck, who throughout the whole nego- 
tiations worked behind the scenes, smoothing away 
difificulties, thereupon drafted a letter which he sent 
by special messenger to the King of Bavaria. The 
King at once adopted it, copied it out and signed it, 
and at the same time wrote another letter to the 
other princes, asking them to join in the request 
which he had made to the King of Prussia, to assume 
the title of Emperor which had been in abeyance 
for over sixty years. So it came about that the 
letter by which the offer to the King was made 
had really emanated from his own Chancellor. It 
shews to what good purpose Bismarck used the con- 
fidence which, by his conduct in the previous nego- 
tiations, the King of Bavaria had been led to place 
in him. 

On the 1 8th of January, 1871, in the Palace of Ver- 
sailles, the King publicly assumed the new title ; a 
few days later Bismarck was raised to the rank of 
Prince. 

A few days later Paris fell ; the prolonged siege 
was over and the power of resistance exhausted ; 
then again, as three months before, Favre asked for 
an audience, this time to negotiate the capitulation 
of the city ; we need not here dwell on the terms of 
the capitulation — we need only quote what Favre 
himself says of Bismarck's attitude : 

" I should be unfaithful to truth if I did not recognise 



1871] Wai'' with France. 371 

that in these mournful discussions I always found the 
Chancellor eager to soften in form the cruelty of his 
requirements. He applied himself as much as was 
possible to temper the military harshness of the general 
staff, and on many points he consented to make himself 
the advocate of our demands." 

A few weeks were allowed for elections to be 
held and an assembly to meet at Bordeaux, and 
then once more M. Thiers appeared, to negotiate 
the terms of peace. He knew that the demands 
would be very heavy ; he anticipated that they would 
be asked to surrender Alsace, including Belfort, and 
of Lorraine at least the department of the Moselle, 
with Metz ; he expected a large war indemnity — five 
thousand million francs. The terms Bismarck had 
to offer were almost identical with these, except 
that the idemnity was placed at six thousand mil- 
lion francs. The part Thiers had to play was a very 
difficult one ; he knew that if Germany insisted on 
her full demands he must accept ; he was too ex- 
perienced a politician to be misled by any of the 
illusions under which Favre had laboured. He, as 
all other Frenchmen, had during the last three 
months learned a bitter lesson. "Had we made 
peace," he said, " before the fall of Metz, we might 
at least have saved Lorraine." He hoped against 
hope that he might still be able to do so. With 
all the resources of his intellect and his eloquence 
he tried to break down the opposition of the Count. 
When Metz was refused to him then he pleaded for 
Belfort. Let us hear what Favre, who was present 
at the decisive interview, tells us ; we may use his 



372 Bismarck. [1870- 

authority with more confidence that he was a silent 
and passive auditor. 

" One must have been present at this pathetic scene to 
have an idea of the superhuman resources which the 
iUustrious statesman displayed. I still see him, pale, 
agitated, now sitting, now springing to his feet ; I hear 
his voice broken by grief, his words cut short, his tones 
in turn suppliant and proud ; I know nothing grander 
than the sublime passion of this noble heart bursting 
out in petitions, menaces, prayers, now caressing, now 
terrible, growing by degrees more angry in face of this 
cruel refusal, ready for the last extremities, impervious 
to the counsels of reason, so violent and sacred were 
the sentiments by which he was governed." 

Bismarck remained obdurate ; he would surrender 
neither Metz nor Belfort. Then Thiers cried out : 

" Well, let it be as you will ; these negotiations are a 
pretence. We appear to deliberate, we have only to pass 
under your yoke. We ask for a city absolutely French, 
you refuse it to us ; it is to avow that you have resolved 
to wage against us a war of extremity. Do it ! Ravish 
our provinces, burn our houses, cut the throats of their 
unoffending inhabitants, in a word, complete your work. 
We will fight to the last breath ; we shall succumb at 
last, but we will not be dishonoured." 

It was a burst of passion, all the more admirable 
that Thiers knew his threats were vain ; but it was 
not ineffective. Bismarck was troubled ; he said he 
understood what they suffered ; he would be glad 
to make a concession, " but," he added, " I can promise 
nothing; the King has commanded me to maintain 




LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS. 



1871] War with France. 373 

the conditions, he alone has the right to modify them ; 
I will take his orders ; I must consult with Mons. de 
Moltke," He left the room ; it was nearly an hour 
before he could find Moltke ; then he returned to 
give the answer to the Frenchmen. " You had re- 
fused that we should enter Paris ; if you will agree 
that the German troops occupy Paris, then Belfort 
shall be restored to you." There could be no doubt 
as to the answer, and some hours later the assent of 
the King was given to this alteration in the condi- 
tions. Before this the indemnity had been reduced to 
five thousand million francs ; below that all the efforts 
of the French were not able to bring it. There were 
many other exciting scenes during the progress of 
the negotiations ; on one occasion Thiers threatened 
Bismarck with interposition of the neutral Powers ; 
" If you speak to me of Europe, I will speak of the 
Emperor," was Bismarck's answer. He threatened 
to open negotiations with him and to send him back 
to France at the head of Bazaine's army. On another 
occasion — it was during the discussion of finance — 
another scene took place which Favre describes : 

" As the discussion continued, he grew animated, he 
interrupted Thiers at every word, accused him of wish- 
ing to spoil everything ; he said that he was ill, at the 
end of his powers, he was incapable of going further, in 
a work that we were pleased to make of no use. Then, 
allowing his feelings to break out, walking up and down 
the little room in which we were deliberating with great 
strides, he cried, ' It is very kind of me to take the trouble 
to which you condemn me ; our conditions are ultima- 
tums — you must accept or reject them. I will not take 



374 Bismarck. [1870- 

part in it any longer ; bring an interpreter to-morrow, 
henceforward I will not speak French any longer.' " 

And he began forthwith to talk German at a great 
rate, a language which of course neither of the 
Frenchmen understood. 

It is interesting to compare with this Bismarck's 
own account of the same scene : 

" When I addressed a definite demand to Thiers, al- 
though he generally could command himself, he sprang 
up and cried, ' Mais c'est un indignite.' I took no notice 
but began to talk German. For a time he listened, but 
obviously did not know what to think of it. Then in a 
plaintive voice he said, ' But, Count, you know that I do 
not understand German.' I answered him now in French. 
' When just now you spoke of indignite, I found that 
I did not understand French enough and preferred to 
speak German, where I know what I say and hear.' He 
understood what I meant and at once agreed to that 
which he had just refused as an indignite." 

Bismarck's part in these negotiations was not alto- 
gether an easy one, for it is probable that, in part at 
least, he secretly sympathised with the arguments 
and protests of the French. He was far too loyal to 
his master and his country not to defend and adopt 
the policy which had been accepted ; but there is 
much reason to believe that, had he been completely 
master, Germany would not have insisted on having 
Metz, but would have made the demand only to 
withdraw it. The arguments for the annexation of 
Alsace were indeed unanswerable, and again and 
again Bismarck had pointed out that Germany could 
never be safe so long as France held Strasburg, and 



1871] 



War with France. 375 



a French army supported on the strong basis of the 
Vosges could use Strasburg as a gate whence to sally 
forth into Germany. No one indeed who has ever 
stood on the slopes of the Black Forest and looked 
across the magnificent valley, sheltered by the hills 
on either side, through which the Rhine flows, can 
doubt that this is all one country, and that the front- 
ier must be sought, not in the river, which is not a 
separation, but the chief means of communication, 
but on the top of the hills on the further side. 
Every argument, however, which is used to support 
German claims to Strasburg may be used with equal 
force to support French claims to Metz. If Stras- 
burg in French hands is the gate of Germany, Metz 
in German hands is, and always will remain, a mili- 
tary post on the soil of France. No one who reads 
Bismarck's arguments on this point can fail to notice 
how they are all nearly conclusive as to Strasburg, 
but that he scarcely takes the trouble to make it 
even appear as though they applied to Metz. Even 
in the speech before the Reichstag in which he ex- 
plains and justifies the terms of peace, he speaks 
again and again of Strasburg but hardly a word of 
Metz. He told how fourteen years before, the old 
King of Wiirtemberg had said to him, at the time of 
the Crimean troubles, that Prussia might count on 
his voice in the Diet as against the Western Powers, 
but only till war broke out. 

" Then the matter takes another form. I am determined 
as well as any other to maintain the engagements I have 
entered into. But do not judge me unjustly ; give us 
Strasburg and we shall be ready for all eventualities, but 



2,^^ Bismarck. [1871- 

so long as Strasburg is a sally-port for a Power which is 
always armed, I must fear that my country will be over- 
run by foreign troops before my confederates can come 
to my help." 

The King was right ; Germany would never be se- 
cure so long as Strasburg was French ; but can 
France ever be secure so long as Metz is German ? ' 

The demand for Metz was based purely on mili- 
tary considerations ; it was supported on the theory, 
which we have already learnt, that Germany could 
never take the offensive in a war with France, and 
that the possession of Metz would make it impossi- 
ble, as indeed is the case, for France to attack Ger- 
many. It was not, however, Bismarck's practice to 
subordinate political considerations to military. It 
may be said that France would never acquiesce in 
the loss of either province, but while we can imagine 
a generation of Frenchmen arising who would learn 
to recognise the watershed of the Vosges as a perma- 
nent boundary between the two nations, it is difificult 
to believe that the time will ever come when a single 
Frenchman will regard with contentment the pre- 
sence of the Germans on the Upper Moselle. 

Even after the preliminaries of peace were settled 
fresh difficulties arose; the outbreak of the Com- 
mune in Paris made it impossible for the French to 
fulfil all the arrangements ; Bismarck, who did not 
trust the French, treated them with much severity, 
and more than once he threatened again to begin 
hostilities. At last Favre asked for a fresh interview ; 
the two statesmen met at Frankfort, and then the 
fin^l treaty of peage was signed, 



CHAPTER XV. 

THE NEW EMPIRE. 
1871-1878. 

WITH the peace of Frankfort, Bismarck's work 
was completed. Not nine years had passed 
since he had become Minister ; in that 
short time he completed the work which so many 
statesmen before him had in vain attempted. Nine 
years ago he had found the King ready to retire 
from the throne; now he had made him the most 
powerful ruler in Europe. Prussia, which then had 
been divided in itself and without influence in the 
councils of Europe, was the undisputed leader in a 
United Germany. 

Fate, which always was so kind to Bismarck, was 
not to snatch him away, as it did Cavour, in the 
hour of his triumph; twenty years longer he was to 
preside over the State which he had created and to 
guide the course of the ship which he had built. A 
weaker or more timid man would quickly have re- 
tired from public life ; he would have considered that 
nothing that he could do could add to his fame, and 
th^t he w^s always risking the loss of soine of the 

377 



^yS Bismai'-ck. [1871- 

reputation he had attained. Bismarck was not in- 
fluenced by such motives. The exercise of power had 
become to him a pleasure ; he was prepared if his 
King required it to continue in ofifice to the end of 
his days, and he never feared to hazard fame and 
popularity if he could thereby add to the prosperity 
of the State. 

These latter years of Bismarck's life we cannot 
narrate in detail ; space alone would forbid it. It 
would be to write the history of the German Em- 
pire, and though events are not so dramatic they 
are no less numerous than in the earlier period. 
Moreover, we have not the material for a complete 
biographical narrative ; there is indeed a great abund- 
ance of public records ; but as to the secret reasons 
of State by which in the last resource the policy of 
the Government was determined, we have little 
knowledge. From time to time indeed some illicit 
disclosure, the publication of some confidential docu- 
ment, throws an unexpected light on a situation 
which is obscure ; but these disclosures, so hazardous 
to the good repute of the men who are responsible 
and the country in which they are possible, must be 
treated with great reserve. Prompted by motives 
of private revenge or public ambition, they disclose 
only half the truth, and a portion of the truth is 
often more misleading than complete ignorance. 

In foreign policy he was henceforward sole, undis- 
puted master ; in Parliament and in the Press scarcely 
a voice was raised to challenge his pre-eminence ; he 
enjoyed the complete confidence of the allied sov- 
ereigns and the enthusiastic affection of the nation;* 



1878] The New Empire. 379 

even those parties which often opposed and criticised 
his internal poHcy supported him always on foreign 
affairs. Those only opposed him who were hostile 
to the Empire itself, those whose ideals or interests 
were injured by this great military monarchy — Poles 
and Ultramontanes, Guelphs and Socialists ; in op- 
posing Bismarck they seemed to be traitors to their 
country, and he and his supporters were not slow to 
divide the nation into the loyal and the Reichs- 
feindlich. 

He deserved the confidence which was placed in 
him. He succeeded in preserving to the newly 
founded Empire all the prestige it had gained ; he 
was enabled to soothe the jealousy of the neutral 
Powers. He did so by his policy of peace. Now 
he pursued peace with the same decision with which 
but two years before he had brought about a war. 
He was guided by the same motive ; as war had then 
been for the benefit of Germany, so now was peace. 
He had never loved war for the sake of war ; he was 
too good a diplomatist for this ; war is the negation 
of diplomacy, and the statesman who has recourse to 
it must for the time give over the control to other 
hands. It is always a clumsy method. The love of 
war for the sake of war will be found more commonly 
among autocratic sovereigns who are their own gen- 
erals than among skilled and practised ministers, and 
generally war is the last resource by which a weak 
diplomatist attempts to conceal his blunders and to 
regain what he has lost. 

There had been much anxiety in Europe how the 
new Empire would deport itself ; would it use this 



o 



80 Bismarck. [1871- 



power which had been so irresistible for fresh con- 
flicts? The excuse might easily have been found ; 
Bismarck might have put on his banner, " The Union 
of All Germans in One State " ; he might have re- 
called and reawakened the enthusiasm of fifty years 
ago ; he might have reminded the people that there 
were still in Holland and in Switzerland, in Austria 
and in Russia, Germans who were separated from 
their country, and languishing under a foreign rule. 
Had he been an idealist he would have done so, and 
raised in Germany a cry like that of the Italian 
Irredentists. Or he might have claimed for his 
country its natural boundaries ; after freeing the 
upper waters of the Rhine from foreign dominion he 
might have claimed that the great river should flow 
to the sea, German. This is what Frenchmen had 
done under similar circumstances, but he was not the 
man to repeat the crimes and blunders of Louis and 
Napoleon. 

He knew that Germany desired peace ; a new gen- 
eration must grow up in the new order of things ; 
the old wounds must be healed by time, the old 
divisions forgotten ; long years of common work 
must cement the alliances that he had made, till the 
jealousy of the defeated was appeased and the new 
Empire had become as firm and indissoluble as any 
other State in Europe. 

The chief danger came from France ; in that un- 
happy country the cry for revenge seemed the only 
link with the pride which had been so rudely over- 
thrown. The defeat and the disgrace could not be 
forgotten ; the recovery of the lost provinces was 



18781 The New Empire. 381 



the desire of the nation, and the programme of every 
party- As we have seen, the German statesmen had 
foreseen the danger and deHberately defied it. They 
cared not for the hostility of France, now that they 
need not fear her power. Oderint duin metuant. 
Against French demands for restitution they pre- 
sented a firm and unchangeable negative ; it was 
kinder so and juster, to allow no opening for hope, 
no loophole for negotiation, no intervention by other 
Powers. Alsace-Lorraine were German by the right 
of the hundred thousand German soldiers who had 
perished to conquer them. Any appearance of 
weakness would have led to hopes which could never 
be realised, discussions which could have had no 
result. The answer to all suggestions was to be 
found in the strength of Germany ; the only diplom- 
acy was to make the army so strong that no French 
statesman, not even the mob of Paris, could dream 
of undertaking single-handed a war of revenge. 

This was not enough ; it was necessary besides to 
isolate France. There were many men in Europe 
who would have wished to bring about a new coali- 
tion of the armies by whose defeat Germany had 
been built up — France and Austria, Denmark and 
the Poles ; then it was always to be expected that 
Russia, who had done so much for Germany in the 
past, would cease to regard with complacency the 
success of her protege ; after all, the influence of 
the Czar in Europe had depended upon the divisions 
of Germany as much as had that of France. How 
soon would the Russian nation wake up, as the French 
had done, to the fact that the sympathies of their 



382 Bismarck. [1871- 

Emperor had created a great barrier to Russian 
ambition and Russian diplomacy ? It was especially 
the Clerical party who wished to bring about some 
coalition ; for them the chief object was the over- 
throw of Italy, and the world still seemed to centre 
in Rome ; they could not gain the assistance of Ger- 
many in this work, and they therefore looked on 
the great Protestant Empire as an enemy. They 
would have liked by monarchical reaction to gain 
control of France ; by the success of the Carlist 
movement to obtain that of Spain, and then, assisted 
by Austria, to overthrow the new order in Europe. 
Against this Bismarck's chief energies were directed ; 
we shall see how he fought the Ultramontanes at 
home. With regard to France, he was inclined to 
support the Republic, and refused all attempts which 
were made by some German statesmen, and especially 
by Count Arnim, the Ambassador at Paris, to win 
German sympathy and support to the monarchical 
party. In Spain his support and sympathy were given 
to the Government, which with difificulty maintained 
itself against the Carlists ; a visit of Victor Emmanuel 
to Berlin confirmed the friendship with Italy, over 
which the action of Garibaldi in 1870 had thrown a 
cloud. The greatest triumph of Bismarck's policy 
was, however, the reconciliation with Austria. One 
of the most intimate of his councillors, when asked 
which of Bismarck's actions he admired most, speci- 
fied this. It was peculiarly his own ; he had long 
worked for it ; even while the war of 1866 was still 
being waged, he had foreseen that a day would come 
when Germany and Austria, now that they were 



1878] The New Enipii^e. 383 

separated, might become, as they never had been 
when joined by an unnatural union, honest aUies. 
It was probably to a great extent brought about by 
the strong regard and confidence which the Austrian 
Emperor reposed in the German Chancellor, The 
beginnings of an approximation were laid by the dis- 
missal of Beust, who himself now was to become a 
personal friend of the statesman against whom he 
had for so long and with such ingenuity waged an 
unequal conflict. The union was sealed when, in 
December, 1872, the Czar of Russia and Francis 
Joseph came to Berlin as guests of the Emperor. 
There was no signed contract, no written alliance, 
but the old union of the Eastern monarchies under 
which a generation before Europe had groaned, was 
now restored, and on the Continent there was no 
place to which France could look for help or 
sympathy. 

The years that followed were those in which 
foreign affairs gave Bismarck least anxiety or occu- 
pation. He even began to complain that he was dull ; 
after all these years of conflict and intrigue he found 
the security which he now enjoyed uninteresting. 
Now and again the shadow of war passed over 
Europe, but it was soon dispelled. The most serious 
was in 1875. 

It appears that the French reforms of the army 
and some movements of French troops had caused 
alarm at Berlin ; I say alarm, though it is difificult to 
believe that any serious concern could have been 
felt. There was, however, a party who believed that 
war must come sooner or later, and it was better, 



384 Bismarck. [1871- 

they said, not to wait till France was again powerful 
and had won allies ; surely the wisest thing was while 
she was still weak and friendless to take some excuse 
(and how easy would it be to find the excuse!), fall 
upon her, and crush her^ — crush and destroy, so that 
she could never again raise her head ; treat her as 
she had in old days treated Germany. How far this 
plan was deliberately adopted we do not know, but 
in the spring of this year, the signs became so alarm- 
ing that both the Russian and the English Govern- 
ments were seriously disturbed, and interfered. So 
sober a statesman as Lord Derby believed that the 
danger was real. The Czar, who visited Berlin at 
the beginning of April, dealt with the matter per- 
sonally ; the Queen of England wrote a letter to 
the German Emperor, in which she said that the in- 
formation she had could leave no doubt that an ag- 
gressive war on France was meditated, and used her 
personal influence with the sovereign to prevent it. 
The Emperor himself had not sympathised with the 
idea of war, and it is said did not even know of the 
approaching danger. It did not require the inter- 
vention of other sovereigns to induce him to refuse 
his assent to a wanton war, but this advice from 
foreign Powers of course caused great indignation 
in Bismarck ; it was just the kind of thing which 
always angered him beyond everything. He main- 
tained that he had had no warlike intentions, that 
the reports were untrue. The whole story had its 
origin, he said, in the intrigues of the Ultramontanes 
and the vanity of Gortschakoff ; the object was to 
make it appear that France owed her security and 



1878] The New Empire. 385 

preservation to the friendly interference of Russia, 
and thereby prepare the way for an alliance between 
the two Powers. It is almost impossible to believe 
that Bismarck had seriously intended to bring about 
a war ; he must have known that the other Powers 
of Europe would not allow a second and unprovoked 
attack on France ; he would not be likely to risk all 
he had achieved and bring about a European coali- 
tion against him. On the other hand his explana- 
tion is probably not the whole truth ; even German 
writers confess that the plan of attacking France 
was meditated, and it was a plan of a nature to re- 
commend itself to the military party in Prussia. 

Yet this may have been the beginning of a diverg- 
ence with Russia. The union had depended more 
on the personal feelings of the Czar than on the 
wishes of the people or their real interests. The ris- 
ing Pan-Slavonic party was anti-German ; their leader 
was General Ignatieff, but Gortschakoff, partly per- 
haps from personal hostility to Bismarck, partly from 
a just consideration of Russian interests, sympa- 
thised with their anti-Teutonic policy. The outbreak 
of disturbances in the East roused that national feel- 
ing which had slept for twenty years ; in truth the 
strong patriotism of modern Germany naturally cre- 
ated a similar feeling in the neighbouring countries; 
just as the Germans were proud to free themselves 
from the dominant culture of France, so the Rus- 
sians began to look with jealousy on the Teutonic 
influence which since the days of Peter the Great 
had been so powerful among them. 

In internal matters the situation was very differ- 



386 Bismarck. [1871- 

ent ; here Bismarck could not rule in the same undis- 
puted manner ; he had rivals, critics, and colleagues. 
The power of the Prussian Parliament and the 
Reichstag was indeed limited, but without their 
assent no new law could be passed ; each year their 
assent must be obtained to the Budget. Though 
they had waived all claim to control the foreign 
policy, the parties still criticised and often rejected 
the laws proposed by the Government. Then in 
Prussian affairs he could not act without the good- 
will of his colleagues ; in finance, in legal reform, 
the management of Church and schools, the initia- 
tive belonged to the Ministers responsible for each 
department. Some of the difficulties of govern- 
ment would have been met had Bismarck identified 
himself with a single party, formed a party Ministry 
and carried out their programme. This he always 
refused to do ; he did not wish in his old age to be- 
come a Parliamentary Minister, for had he depended 
for his support on a party, then if he lost their con- 
fidence, or they lost the confidence of the country, 
he would have had to retire from office. The whole 
work of his earlier years would have been undone. 
What he wished to secure was a Government party, 
a Bismarck party sans phrase, who would always 
support all his measures in internal as well as exter- 
nal policy. In this, however, he did not succeed. He 
was therefore reduced to another course : in order 
to get the measures of the Government passed, 
he executed a series of alliances, now with one, 
now with another party. In these, however, he 
had to give as well as to receive, and it is curious 



1878] 



The New Empii'e. 387 



to see how easily his pride was offended and his 
anger roused by any attempt of the party with which 
at the time he was alHed to control and influence his 
policy. No one of the alliances lasted long, and he 
seems to have taken peculiar pleasure in breaking 
away from each of them in turn when the time 
came. 

The alliance with the Conservatives which he had 
inherited' from the older days had begun to break 
directly after 1866. Many of them had been disap- 
pointed by his policy in that year. The grant of 
universal suffrage had alarmed them ; they had 
wished that he would use his power to check and 
punish the Parliament for its opposition ; instead of 
that he asked for an indemnity. They felt that 
they had borne with him the struggle for the in- 
tegrity of the Prussian Monarchy ; no sooner was 
the victory won than he held out his hand to the 
Liberals and it was to them that the prize went. 
They were hurt and disappointed, and this personal 
feeling was increased by Bismarck's want of consid- 
eration, his brusqueness of manner, his refusal to 
consider complaints and remonstrances. Even the 
success of 1870 had not altogether reconciled them ; 
these Prussian nobles, the men to whom in earlier 
days he himself had belonged, saw with regret the 
name of King of Prussia hidden behind the newer 
glory of the German Emperor ; it is curious to read 
how even Roon speaks with something of contempt 
and disgust of this new title: " I hope," he writes, 
" Bismarck will be in a better temper now that the 
Kaiser egg has been safely hatched." It was, how- 



388 Bismarck. [1871- 

ever, the struggle with the CathoHc Church which 
achieved the separation ; the complete subjection of 
the Church to the State, the new laws for school in- 
spection, the introduction of compulsory civil mar- 
riage, were all opposed to the strongest and the 
healthiest feelings of the Prussian Conservatives. 
These did not seem to be matters in which the safety 
of the Empire was concerned; Bismarck had simply 
gone over to, and adopted the programme of, the 
Liberals ; he was supporting that all-pervading power 
of the Prussian bureaucracy which he, in his earlier 
days, had so bitterly attacked. Then came a pro- 
posal for change in the local government which 
would diminish the influence of the landed proprie- 
tors. The Conservatives refused to support these 
measures ; the Conservative majority in the House 
of Lords threw them out. Bismarck's own brother, 
all his old friends and comrades, were now ranged 
against him. He accepted opposition from them as 
little as from anyone else ; the consent of the King 
was obtained to the creation of new peers, and by 
this means the obnoxious measures were forced 
through the unwilling House. Bismarck by his 
speeches intensified the bitterness ; he came down 
himself to make an attack on the Conservatives. 
"The Government is disappointed," he said; "we 
had looked for confidence from the Conservative 
party ; confidence is a delicate plant ; if it is once 
destroyed it does not grow again. We shall have to 
look elsewhere for support." 

A crisis in his relations to the party came at the 
end of 1872 ; up to this time Roon had still remained 



1878] 



The New Empire. 389 



in the Government ; now, in consequence of the 
manner in which the creation of peers had been de- 
cided upon, he requested permission to resign. The 
King, who could not bear to part with him, and who 
really in many matters of internal policy had more 
sympathy with him than with Bismarck, refused to 
accept the resignation. The crisis which arose had 
an unexpected ending: Bismarck himself resigned 
the office of Minister-President of Prussia, which 
was transferred to Roon, keeping only that of For- 
eign Minister and Chancellor of the Empire. 

A letter to Roon shews the deep depression under 
which he laboured at this time, chiefly the result of 
ill-health. " It was," he said, " an unheard-of anom- 
aly that the Foreign Minister of a great Empire 
should be responsible also for internal afTairs." And 
yet he himself had arranged that it should be so. 
The desertion of the Conservative party had, he 
said, deprived him of his footing; he was dispirited 
by the loss of his old friends and the illness of his 
wife ; he spoke of his advancing years and his con- 
viction that he had not much longer to live ; "the 
King scarcely knows how he is riding a good horse 
to death." He would continue to do what he could 
in foreign affairs, but he would no longer be responsi- 
ble for colleagues over whom he had no influence 
except by requests, and for the wishes of the Em- 
peror which he did not share. The arrangement 
lasted for a year, and then Roon had again to re- 
quest, and this time received, permission to retire 
into private life ; his health would no longer allow 
him to endure the constant anxiety of office. His 



390 Bismarck. [1871- 

retirement occasioned genuine grief to the King ; 
and of all the severances which he had to undergo, 
this was probably that which affected Bismarck most. 
For none of his colleagues could he ever have the 
same afTection he had had for Roon ; he it was who 
had brought him into the Ministry, and had gone 
through with him all the days of storm and trouble. 
" It will be lonely for me," he writes, " in my work; 
ever more so, the old friends become enemies and 
one makes no new ones. As God will." In 1873 
he again assumed the Presidency. The resignation 
of Roon was followed by a complete breach with 
the party of the Kreuz Zeitiing ; the more moderate 
of the Conservatives split off from it and continued to 
support the Government ; the remainder entered on 
a campaign of factious opposition. 

The quarrel was inevitable, for quite apart from 
the question of religion it would indeed have been 
impossible to govern Germany according to their 
principles. We may, however, regret that the quar- 
rel was not conducted with more amenity. These 
Prussian nobles were of the same race as Bismarck 
himself ; they resembled him in character if not in 
ability ; they believed that they had been betrayed, 
and they did not easily forgive. They were not 
scrupulous in the weapons they adopted ; the Press 
was used for anonymous attacks on his person and 
his character; they accused him of using his public 
position for making money by speculation, and of 
sacrificing to that the alliance with Russia. More 
than once he had recourse to the law of libel to 
defend himself against these unworthy insults, 



1878] The New Empire. 391 

When he publicly in the Reichstag protested 
against the language of the Kreiiz Zeitimg, the dis- 
honourable attacks and the scandalous lies it spread 
abroad, a large number of the leading men among 
the Prussian nobility signed a declaration formally 
defending the management of the paper, as true ad- 
herents of the monarchical and Conservative banner. 
These Declaranten, as they were called, were hence- 
forward enemies whom he could never forgive. At 
the bottom of the list we read, not without emotion, 
the words, " Signed with deep regret, A. von Thad- 
den " ; so far apart were now the two knight-errants 
of the Christian Monarchy. It was in reality the 
end of the old Conservative party ; it had done its 
work ; Bismarck was now thrown on the support of 
the National Liberals. 

Since 1866 they had grown in numbers and in 
weight. They represented at this time the general 
sense of the German people ; it was with their help 
that during the years down to 1878 the new institu- 
tions for the Empire were built up. In the elections 
of 1871 they numbered 120; in 1874 their numbers 
rose to 152 ; they had not an absolute majority, but 
in all questions regarding the defence of the Empire, 
foreign policy, and the army they were supported 
by the moderate Conservatives ; in the conflict with 
the Catholics and internal matters they could gen- 
erally depend on the support of the Progressives; so 
that as long as they maintained their authority they 
gave the Government the required majority in both 
the Prussian and the German Parliament. There 
were differences in the party which afterwards were 



392 Bismarck. [1871- 

to lead to a secession, but during this time, which 
they looked upon as the golden era of the Empire, 
they succeeded in maintaining their unity. They 
numbered many of the ablest leaders, the lawyers 
and men of learning who had opposed Bismarck at 
the time of the conflict. Their leader was Bennig- 
sen ; himself a Hanoverian, he had brought no feel- 
ings of hostility from the older days of conflict. 
Moderate, tactful, restrained, patriotic, he was the 
only man who, when difficulties arose, was always 
able to approach the Chancellor, sure of finding some 
tenable compromise. Different was it with Lasker, 
the ablest of Parliamentary orators, whose subordin- 
ation to the decisions of the party was often doubt- 
ful, and whose criticism, friendly as it often was, 
always aroused Bismarck's anger. 

As a matter of fact the alliance was, however, never 
complete ; it was always felt that at any moment 
some question might arise on which it would be 
wrecked. This was shewn by Bismarck's language 
as early as 1871 ; in a debate on the army he ex- 
plained that what he demanded was full support ; 
members, he said, were expressly elected to support 
him ; they had no right to make conditions or with- 
draw their support ; if they did so he would resign. 
The party, which was very loyal to him, constantly 
gave up its own views when he made it a, question 
of confidence, but the strain was there and was al- 
ways felt. The great question now as before was 
that of the organisation of the army. It will be 
remembered that, under the North German Confed- 
eration, a provisional arrangement was made by 



1878] The New Empire. 393 

which the numbers of the army in peace were to be 
fixed at one per cent, of the population. This 
terminated at the end of 1871 ; the Government, 
however, did not then consider it safe to alter the 
arrangement, and with some misgiving the Reichstag 
accepted the proposal that this system should be 
applied to the whole Empire for three years. If, 
however, the numbers of the army were absolutely 
fixed in this way, the Reichstag would cease to have 
any control over the expenses ; all other important 
taxes and expenses came before the individual 
States. In 1874, the Government had to make their 
proposal for the future. This was that the system 
which had hitherto been provisionally accepted 
should become permanent, and that the army should 
henceforward in time of peace always consist of the 
same number of men. To agree to this would be 
permanently to give up all possibility of exercising 
any control over the finance. It was impossible for 
the National Liberal party to accept the proposal 
without giving up at the same time all hope of con- 
stitutional development ; Bismarck was ill and could 
take no part in defending the law; they voted 
against it, it was thrown out, and it seemed as 
though a new conflict was going to arise. 

When the Reichstag adjourned in April for the 
Easter holidays the agitation spread over the coun- 
try, but the country was determined not again to 
have a conflict on the Budget. "There was a regu- 
lar fanaticism for unconditional acceptance of the 
law; those even on the Left refused to hear anything 
of constitutional considerations," writes one member 



394 Bismarck. [1871- 

of the National Liberty party after meeting his con- 
stituents. If the Reichstag persisted in their refusal 
and a dissolution took place, there was no doubt that 
there would be a great majority for the Government. 
It was the first time since 1870 that the question of 
constitutional privileges was raised, and now it was 
found, as ever afterwards was the case, that, for the 
German people, whatever might be the opinion of 
their elected representatives, the name of Bismarck 
alone outweighed all else. Bennigsen arranged a com- 
promise and the required number of men was agreed 
to, not indeed permanently, but for seven years. 
For four years more the alliance was continued. 

At this time all other questions were thrown into 
the shade by the great conflict with the Roman 
Catholic Church on which the Government had em- 
barked. Looking back now, it is still difificult to 
judge or even to understand the causes which 
brought it about. Both sides claim that they were 
acting in self-defence. Bismarck has often explained 
his motives, but we cannot be sure that those he 
puts forward were the only considerations by which 
he was moved. He, however, insisted that the strug- 
gle was not religious but political ; he was not moved 
by Protestant animosity to the Catholic Church, but 
by his alarm lest in the organisation of the Roman 
hierarchy a power might arise within the Empire 
which would be hostile to the State. But even if the 
Chancellor himself was at first free from Protestant 
hatred to Catholicism,^and this is not quite clear, — 
he was forced into alliance with a large party who 
appealed at once to the memories of the Reforma- 



1878] The New Empire. 395 

tion, who stirred up all that latent hatred of Rome 
which is as strong a force in North Germany as in 
England ; and with others who saw in this an op- 
portunity for more completely subduing all, Pro- 
testant and Catholic alike, to the triumphant power 
of the State, and making one more step towards the 
dissociation of the State from any religious body. 

The immediate cause of the struggle was the pro- 
clamation of the infallibility of the Pope. It might 
be thought that this change or development in 
the Constitution of the Roman Church was one 
which concerned chiefly Roman Catholics. This is 
the view which Bismarck seems to have taken 
during the meetings of the Vatican Council. The 
opposition to the decrees was strongest among the 
German Bishops, and Prince Hohenlohe, the Prime 
Minister of Bavaria, supported by his brother the 
Cardinal, was anxious to persuade the Governments 
of Europe to interfere, and, as they could have done, 
to prevent the Council from coming to any conclu- 
sion. Bismarck refused on behalf of the Prussian 
Government to take any steps in this direction. 
The conclusion of the Council and the proclamation 
of the decrees took place just at the time of the out- 
break of war with France. For some months Bis- 
marck, occupied as he was with other matters, was 
unable to consider the changes which might be 
caused ; it was moreover very important for him 
during the negotiations with Bavaria, which lasted 
all through the autumn, not to do anything which 
would arouse the fears of the Ultramontanes or in- 
tensify their reluctance to enter the Empire, 



396 Bismarck. 



[1871- 



In the winter of 1870 the first sign of the dangers 
ahead was to be seen. They arose from the occu- 
pation of Rome by the Italians. The inevitable 
result of this was that the Roman Catholics of all 
countries in Europe were at once given a common 
cause of political endeavour; they were bound each 
of them in his own State to use his full influence to 
procure interference either by diplomacy or by arms, 
and to work for the rescue of the prisoner of the 
Vatican. The German Catholics felt this as strongly 
as their co-religionists, and, while he was still at 
Versailles, a cardinal and bishop of the Church 
addressed a memorial to the King of Prussia on this 
matter. This attempt to influence the foreign policy 
of the new Empire, and to use it for a purpose alien 
to the direct interest of Germany, was very repug- 
nant to Bismarck and was quite sufificient to arouse 
feelings of hostility towards the Roman Catholics. 
These were increased when he heard that the Roman 
Catholic leaders were combining to form a new 
political party ; in the elections for the first Reich- 
stag this movement was very successful and fifty 
members were returned whose sole bond of union 
was religion. This he looked upon as " a mobilisa- 
tion of the Church against the State " ; the formation 
of a political party founded simply on unity of con- 
fession was, he said, an unheard-of innovation in 
political life. His distrust increased when he found 
that their leader was Windthorst, a former Minister 
of the King of Hanover, and, as a patriotic Hanover- 
ian, one of the chief opponents of a powerful and 
centralised Government. The influence the Church 



16781 The New Empire. 397 

had in the PoHsh provinces was a further cause of 
hostihty, and seemed to justify him in condemning 
them as anti-German. During the first session the 
new party prominently appeared on two occasions. 
In the debate on the address to the Crown they 
asked for the interference of Germany on behalf of 
the Pope ; in this they stood alone and on a division 
found no supporters. Then they demanded that in 
the Constitution of the Empire certain clauses from 
the Prussian Constitution should be introduced 
which would ensure freedom to all religious de- 
nominations. Here they gained considerable sup- 
port from some other parties. 

An impartial observer will find it difficult to justify 
from these acts the charge of disloyalty to the Em- 
pire, but a storm of indignation arose in the Press, 
especially in the organs of the National Liberal party, 
and it was supported by those of the Government. 

The desire for conflict was awakened ; meetings 
were held in the autumn of 1871 to defend the Pro- 
testant faith, which hardly seemed to have been at- 
tacked, and a clearer cause for dispute soon occurred. 
It was required by the authorities of the Church that 
all bishops and priests should declare their assent to 
the new Vatican decrees; the majority did so, but a 
certain number refused ; they were of course excom- 
municated ; a secession from the Roman Catholic 
Church took place, and a new communion formed 
to which the name of Old Catholics was given. The 
bishops required that all the priests and religious 
teachers at the universities and schools who had re- 
fused to obey the orders of the Pope should be dis- 



398 Bismarck. [1871- 

missed from their office ; the Prussian Government 
refused their assent. The legal question involved 
was a difficult one. The Government held that as 
the Roman Catholic Church had changed its teach- 
ings, those who maintained the old doctrine must be 
supported in the offices conferred on them. The 
Church authorities denied there had been any es- 
sential change. On the whole we may say that they 
were right ; a priest of the Catholic Church held his 
position not only in virtue of his assent to the actual 
doctrines taught, but was also bound by his vow of 
obedience to accept any fresh teaching which, in ac- 
cordance with the Constitution of the Church and by 
the recognised organ of Government, should in the 
future also be declared to be of faith. The duty of 
every man to obey the laws applies not only to the 
laws existing at any moment, but to any future laws 
which may be passed by the proper agent of legisla- 
tion. Even though the doctrine of infallibility were 
a new doctrine, which is very doubtful, it had been 
passed at a Council; and the proceedings of the 
Council, even if, in some details, they were irregular, 
were not more so than those of any other Council in 
the past. 

The action of the Government in supporting the 
Old Catholics may, however, be attributed to another 
motive. The Catholics maintained that Bismarck 
desired to take this opportunity of creating a national 
German Church, and reunite Protestants and Catho- 
lics. To have done so, had it been possible, would 
have been indeed to confer on the country the great- 
est of all blessings. We cannot doubt that the thought 



1878] The New Empire. 399 

had often come into Bismarck's mind ; it would be 
the proper and fitting conclusion to the work of creat- 
ing a nation. It was, however, impossible ; under no 
circumstances could it have been done by a Protest- 
ant statesman ; the impulse must have come from 
Bavaria, and the opposition of the Bavarian bishops 
to the Vatican decrees had been easily overcome. 
Twice an opportunity had presented itself of making 
a national German Church: once at the Reforma- 
tion, once after the Revolution. On both occasions 
it was lost and it will never recur. 

The result, however, was that a bitter feeling of 
opposition was created between Church and State. 
The secessionist priests were maintained in their 
positions by the Government, they were excommuni- 
cated by the bishops ; students were forbidden to 
attend their lectures and the people to worship in 
the churches where they ministered. It spread even 
to the army, when the Minister of War required the 
army chaplain at Cologne to celebrate Mass in a 
church which was used also by the Old Catholics. 
He was forbidden to do so by his bishop, and the 
bishop was in consequence deprived of his salary 
and threatened with arrest. 

The conflict having once begun soon spread ; a 
new Minister of Culture was appointed ; in the 
Reichstag a law was proposed expelling the Jesuits 
from Germany ; and a number of important laws, the 
so-called May laws, were introduced into the Prussian 
Parliament, giving to the State great powers with re- 
gard to the education and appointment of priests; 
it was, for instance, ordered that no one should be 



400 Bismarck. [1871- 

appointed to a cure of souls who was not a German, 
and had not been brought up and educated in the 
State schools and universities of Prussia. Then 
other laws were introduced, to which we have already 
referred, making civil marriage compulsory, so as to 
cripple the very strong power which the Roman 
Catholic priests could exercise, not only by refusing 
their consent to mixed marriages, but also by refus- 
ing to marry Old Catholics ; a law was introduced 
taking the inspection of elementary schools out of 
the hands of the clergy, and finally a change was 
made in those articles of the Prussian Constitution 
which ensured to each denomination the manage- 
ment of its own affairs. Bismarck was probably not 
responsible for the drafting of all these laws ; he 
only occasionally took part in the discussion and 
was often away from Berlin. 

The contrast between these proposals and the 
principles he had maintained in his earlier years was 
very marked ; his old friend Kleist recalled the elo- 
quent speech which in former years he had made 
against civil marriage. Bismarck did not attempt 
to defend himself against the charge of inconsistency ; 
he did not even avow that he had changed his per- 
sonal opinions ; he had, however, he said, learnt to 
submit his personal convictions to the requirements 
of the State ; he had only done so unwillingly and 
by a great struggle. This was to be the end of the 
doctrine of the Christian State. With Gneist, Lasker, 
Virchow, he was subduing the Church to this new 
idol of the State ; he was doing that against which in 
the old days he had struggled with the greatest 



1878] The New Empire. 401 

resolution and spoken with the greatest eloquence. 
Not many years were to go by before he began to 
repent of what he had done, for, as he saw the 
new danger from Social Democracy, he like many 
other Germans believed that the true means of de- 
feating it was to be found in increased intensity of 
religious conviction. It was, however, then too late. 
He, however, especially in the Prussian Upper 
House, threw all the weight of his authority into the 
conflict. It was, he said, not a religious conflict but 
a political one ; they were not actuated by hatred 
of Catholicism, but they were protecting the rights 
of the State. 

" The question at issue," he said, " is not a struggle 
of an Evangelical dynasty against the Catholic Church ; 
it is the old struggle ... a struggle for power as old as 
the human race . . . between king and priest ... a 
struggle which is much older than the appearance of our 
Redeemer in this world. ... a struggle which has filled 
German history of the Middle Ages till the destruction of 
th*e German Empire, and which found its conclusion when 
the last representative of the glorious Swabian dynasty 
died on the scaffold, under the axe of a French con- 
queror who stood in alliance with the Pope.* We are 
not far from an analogous solution of the situation, 
always translated into the customs of our time." 

He assured the House that now, as always, he would 
defend the Empire against internal and external 
enemies. " Rest assured we will not go to Canossa," 
he said. 



* The Ghibellines were expelled from Italy in 1267, when Con- 

radin of Hohenstaufen was beheaded by Charles of Anjou. 
26 



402 Bismai^ck. [1871- 

In undertaking this struggle with the Church he 
had two enemies to contend with — the Pope and 
the governnaent of the Church on the one side, on 
the other the Cathohc population of Germany. He 
tried to come to some agreement with the Pope and 
to separate the two ; it seemed in fact as if the real 
enemy to be contended against was not the foreign 
priesthood, but the Catholic Democracy in Germany. 
All Bismarck's efforts to separate the two and to 
procure the assistance of the Pope against the party 
of the Centre were to be unavailing; for some years 
all official communication between the German Gov- 
ernment and the Papal See was broken off. It was 
not till the death of Pius IX. and the accession 
of a more liberal-minded Pope that communica- 
tion was restored ; then we are surprised to find 
Bismarck appealing to the Pope to use his influence 
on the Centre in order to persuade them to vote for 
a proposed increase in the German army. This is 
a curious comment on the boast, " We will not go 
to Canossa." 

The truth is that in undertaking the conflict and 
associating himself with the anti-Clerical party Bis- 
marck had stirred up an enemy whom he was not 
able to overcome. He soon found that the priests 
and the Catholics were men of a different calibre to 
the Liberals. They dared to do what none of the 
Progressives had ventured on — they disobeyed the 
law. With them it was not likely that the conflict 
would be confined to Parliamentary debates. The 
Government attempted to meet this resistance, but 
in vain. The priests were deprived of their cures. 



1878] The New Empire. 403 

bishops were thrown into prison, nearly half the 
Catholic parishes in Prussia were deprived of their 
spiritual shepherds, the churches were closed, there 
was no one to celebrate baptisms or weddings. 
Against this resistance what could the Government 
do? The people supported the leaders of the party, 
and a united body of one hundred members under 
Windhorst, ablest of Parliamentary leaders, was com- 
mitted to absolute opposition to every Government 
measure so long as the conflict continued. Cgm we 
be surprised that as the years went on Bismarck 
looked with some concern on the result of the 
struggle he had brought about ? 

He attempted to conceal the failure : "Th^^sult 
will be," he said, " that we shall have two gr^t par- 
ties — one which supports and maintains the State, 
and another which attacks it. The former will 
be the great majority and it will be formed in 
the school of conflict." These words are the strong- 
est condemnation of his policy. It could not be 
wise for any statesman to arrange that party conflict 
should take the form of loyalty and disloyalty to 
the Empire. 

There can be little doubt that his sense of failure 
helped to bring about a feeling of enmity towards 
the National Liberals. Suddenly in the spring of 
1877 he sent in his resignation. There were, how- 
ever, other reasons for doing this. He had become 
aware that the financial policy of the Empire had 
not been successful ; on every side it seemed that 
new blood and new methods were required. In 
financial matters he had little experience or author- 



404 Bismarck. [i878 

ity ; he had to depend on his colleagues and he 
complained of their unfruitfulness. Influenced per- 
haps by his perception of this, under the pretext — a 
genuine pretext- — of ill-health, he asked the Em- 
peror to relieve him of his offices. The Emperor 
refused. " Never," he wrote on the side of the min- 
ute. Instead he granted to Bismarck unlimited 
leave of absence. In the month of April the Chan- 
cellor retired to Varzin ; for ten months he was 
absent from Berlin, and when he returned, recruited 
in health, in February, 1878, it was soon apparent 
that a new period in his career and in the history of 
the Empire was to begin. 




CHAPTER XVI. 

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND ECONOMIC REFORM. 
1878-1887. 

THE year 1878 forms a turning-point both in 
internal and in external politics. Up to this 
year Prussia has been aUied with the two 
Eastern monarchies ; the Empire has been governed 
by the help of the National Liberal party ; the chief 
enemy has been the Clericals. The traditions of the 
time before the war are still maintained. After this 
year the understanding with Russia breaks down ; 
instead of it the peace of Europe is preserved by the 
Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy. In internal 
affairs the change is even more marked ; the rising 
power of the Socialists is the enemy to be fought 
against ; for this conflict, peace has to be made with 
the Catholics — the May laws are modified or repealed. 
The alliance with Liberalism breaks down, and the 
efforts of the Government are devoted to a far- 
reaching scheme of financial reform and social legis- 
lation. 

When, in April, 1877, the Emperor refused to ac- 
cept Bismarck's resignation, the whole country 

405 



4o6 Bismarck. [1878- 

applauded the decision. In the Reichstag a great 
demonstration was made of confidence in the Chan- 
cellor. Everyone felt that he could not b*e spared 
at a time when the complications in the East were 
bringing new dangers upon Europe, and in the se- 
clusion of Varzin he did not cease during the next 
months to direct the foreign policy of the Empire. 
He was able with the other Governments of Europe 
to prevent the spread of hostilities from Turkey to 
the rest of Europe, and when the next year the Eng- 
lish Government refused its assent to the provisional 
peace of San Stefano, it was the unanimous desire 
of all the other States that the settlement of Turkey 
should be submitted to a Congress at Berlin over 
which he should preside. It was the culmination of 
his public career ; it was the recognition by Europe 
in the most impressive way of his primacy among 
living statesmen. In his management of the Con- 
gress he answered to the expectations formed of 
him. "We do not wish to go," he had said, "the 
way of Napoleon ; we do not desire to be the arbitra- 
tors or schoolmasters of Europe. We do not wish to 
force our policy on other States by appealing to the 
strength of our army. I look on our task as a more 
useful though a humbler one ; it is enough if we can 
-be an honest broker." He succeeded in the task he 
had set before himself, and in reconciling the appar- 
ently incompatible desires of England and Russia. 
Again and again when the Congress seemed about 
to break up without result he made himself the 
spokesman of Russian wishes, and conveyed them 
to Lord Beaconsfield, the English plenipotentiary. 




H E 



1887] The Ti'iple Alliance. 407 

None the less the friendship of Russia, which had 
before wavered, now broke down. A bitter attack 
on Germany and Bismarck was begun in the Russian 
Press ; the new German fiscal policy led to misun- 
derstandings ; the Czar in private letters to the Em- 
peror demanded in the negotiations that were still 
going on the absolute and unconditional support of 
Germany to all Russian demands as the condition of 
Russian friendship. In the autumn of the next 
year matters came near to war ; it was in these cir- 
cumstances that Bismarck brought about that alli- 
ance which ever since then has governed European 
politics. He hastily arranged a meeting with Count 
Andrassy, the Austrian Minister, and in a few days 
the two statesmen agreed on a defensive alliance be- 
tween the two Empires. Many years later, in 1886, 
the instrument of alliance was published. It was 
agreed that if either of the German States was at- 
tacked by Russia the other would join to defend it ; 
if either was attacked by France the other would 
observe neutrality ; but if the French were supported 
by Russia then the first clause would come into 
force. The Emperor of Austria willingly gave his 
assent ; it was only after a prolonged struggle that 
Bismarck was able to gain the assent of his own 
sovereign. This alliance, which in the next year 
was joined by Italy, again gave Germany the ruling 
position in Europe. 

During this crisis in foreign affairs Bismarck was 
occupied by another, which threatened to be equally 
serious, in home politics. In the spring of 1878 an 
attempt was made on the life of the Emperor; a 



4o8 Bismarck. [1878- 

young man, named Hobel, a shoemaker's apprentice, 
shot at him in the streets of BerHn, fortunately with- 
out result. The attempt naturally created intense 
indignation throughout the country. This was in- 
creased when it became known that he had been to 
some extent connected with the Socialist party, and 
it seemed as though the motives of the crime were 
supplied by the violent speeches made at Socialist 
gatherings. Bismarck had long regarded the growth 
of Socialism with concern. He determined to use 
this opportunity to crush it. He at once brought 
into the Bundesrath a very severe law, forbidding 
all Socialist agitation and propaganda. He suc- 
ceeded in passing it through the Council, but it 
was thrown out in the Reichstag by a very large 
majority. No one voted for it except the Conserva- 
tives. The law indeed was so drawn up that one 
does not see how anyone could have voted for it ; 
the first clause began, " Printed writings and unions 
which follow the aims of Social Democracy may be 
forbidden by the Federal Council," but, as was pointed 
out, among the aims of Social Democracy were many 
which were good in themselves, and many others 
which, though they might be considered harmful by 
other parties, were at least legitimate. Directly after- 
wards the Reichstag was prorogued. Ten days 
later, another attempt was made on the Emperor's 
life ; this time a man of the name of Nobeling (an 
educated man who had studied at the University) 
shot at him while driving in the Unter den Linden, 
and wounded him severely in the head and arms 
with large shot. The Emperor was driven home to 



1887] Economic Reform. 409 

his palace almost unconscious, and for some time bis 
life was in danger. This second attempt in so short 
a time on the life of a man almost eighty years of 
age, so universally loved and respected, who had 
conferred such benefits on his country, naturally 
aroused a storm of indignation. When Bismarck 
received the news his first words were, " Now the 
Reichstag must be dissolved." This was done ; the 
general elections took place while the excitement 
was still hot, and of course resulted in a great loss to 
those parties — especially the National Liberals — who 
had voted against the Socialist law ; the Centre alone 
retained its numbers. Before this new Parliament a 
fresh law was laid, drafted with much more skill. It 
absolutely forbade all speeches or writing in favour 
of plans for overthrowing the order of society, or di- 
rected against marriage and property. It enabled 
the Government to proclaim in all large towns a state 
of siege, and to expel from them by the mere decree 
of the police anyone suspected of Socialist agitation. 
The law, which was easily carried, was enforced with 
great severity ; a state of siege was proclaimed in 
Berlin and many other places. Socialist papers, and 
even books, for instance the writings of Lassalle, 
were forbidden ; they might not even be read in 
public libraries ; and for the next twelve years the 
Socialist party had to carry on their propaganda by 
secret means. 

This Socialist law is very disappointing; we find 
the Government again having recourse to the same 
means for checking and guiding opinion which Met- 
ternich had used fifty years before. Not indeed 



4IO Bis7narck. [1878- 

that the Socialists themselves had any ground for 
complaint ; their avowed end was the overthrow of 
government and society ; they professed to be at 
war with all established institutions ; if they con- 
fined their efforts to legal measures and did not use 
violence, it was only because the time had not yet 
come. The men who avowed admiration for the 
Paris Commune, who were openly preparing for a 
revolution more complete than any which Europe 
had hitherto seen, could not complain if the Govern- 
ment, while there was yet time, used every means 
for crushing them. The mistake was in supposing 
that this measure would be successful. Bismarck 
would, indeed, had he been able, have made it far 
more severe ; his own idea was that anyone who had 
been legally convicted of holding Socialist opinions 
should be deprived of the franchise and excluded 
from the Parliament. What a misunderstanding 
does this shew of the whole object and nature of 
representative institutions ! It had been decided 
that in Germany Parliament was not to govern ; 
what then was its function except to display the 
opinions of the people? If, as was the case, so 
large a proportion of the German nation belonged 
to a party of discontent, then it was above all desir- 
able that their wishes and desires should have open 
expression, and be discussed where they could be 
overthrown. The Government had enormous means 
of influencing opinion. In the old days the men of 
letters had been on principle in opposition ; now Ger- 
many was flooded by papers, books, and pamphlets^ 
all devoted to the most extravagant praise of the 



1887] Economic Refor^n. 411 

new institutions. The excuse which was made for 
these laws was not a sufficient one. It is seldom 
necessary to meet political assassination by repress- 
ive measures, for they must always create a danger 
which they intend to avert. There was not the 
slightest ground for supposing that either Hobel or 
Nobeling had any confederates ; there was no plot ; 
it was but the wild and wicked action of an individ- 
ual. It was as absurd to put a large party under 
police control for this reason as it was to punish 
Liberals for the action of Sand. And it was ineffect- 
ive, as the events of the next years shewed ; for the 
Socialist law did not spare Germany from the infec- 
tion of outrage which in these years overran Europe. 

The Socialist laws were soon followed by other pro- 
posals of a more useful kind, and now we come to 
one of the most remarkable episodes in Bismarck's 
career. He was over sixty years of age; his health 
was uncertain ; he had long complained of the ex- 
treme toil and the constant annoyance which his 
public duties brought upon him. It might appear 
that he had finished his work, and, if he could not 
retire altogether, would give over the management of 
all internal affairs to others. That he would now 
take upon himself a whole new department of public 
duties, that he would after his prolonged absence 
appear again as leader and innovator in Parliament- 
ary strife — this no one anticipated. 

Up to the year 1876 he had taken little active part 
in finance ; his energies had been entirely absorbed 
by foreign affairs and he had been content to adopt 
and support the measures recommended by his tech- 



412 Bismarck. [i878- 

nical advisers. When he had interfered at all it had 
only been on those occasions when, as with regard to 
commercial treaties, the policy of his colleagues had 
impeded his own political objects. In 1864 he had 
been much annoyed because difference on commer- 
cial matters had interfered with the good understand- 
ing with Austria, which at that time he was trying to 
maintain. Since the foundation of the Empire al- 
most the complete control over the commercial pol- 
icy of the Empire had been entrusted to Delbriick, 
who held the very important post of President of 
the Imperial Chancery, and was treated by Bismarck 
with a deference and consideration which no other 
of his fellow-workers received, except Moltke and 
Roon. Delbriick was a confirmed Free-Trader, and 
the result was that, partly by commercial treaties, and 
partly by the abolition of customs dues, the tariff 
had been reduced and simplified. The years follow- 
ing the war had, however, not been altogether pros- 
perous; a great outbreak of speculation was followed 
in 1873 by a serious commercial crisis. And since 
that year there had been a permanent decrease in 
the Imperial receipts. This was, for political reasons, 
a serious inconvenience. By the arrangement made 
in 1866 the proceeds of the customs and of the indi- 
rect taxation (with some exceptions) were paid into 
the Exchequer of the Federation, and afterwards of 
the Empire. If the receipts from these sources were 
not sufficient to meet the Imperial requirements, the 
deficit had to be made up by contributions paid (in 
proportion to their population) by the separate 
States. During later years these contributions had 



1887] 



Economic Reform. 413 



annually increased, and it is needless to point out 
that this was sufficient to make the relations of the 
State Governments to the central authorities disa- 
greeable, and to cause some discontent with the new 
Constitution. This meant also an increase of the 
amount which had to be raised by direct taxation. 
Now Bismarck had always much disliked direct 
taxes ; he had again and again pointed out that they 
were paid with great reluctance, and often fell with 
peculiar hardship on that very large class which 
could only just, by constant and assiduous labour, 
make an income sufficient for their needs. Worst 
of all was it when they were unable to pay even the 
few shillings required ; they then had to undergo 
the hardship and disgrace of distraint, and see their 
furniture seized and sold by the tax-collectors. He 
had therefore always wished that the income derived 
from customs and indirect taxation should be in- 
creased so as by degrees to do away with the neces- 
sity for direct taxation, and if this could be done, 
then, instead of the States paying an annual con- 
tribution to the Empire, they would receive from the 
central Government pecuniary assistance. 

The dislike of direct taxation is an essential part 
of Bismarck's reform ; he especially disapproved of 
the Prussian system, the barbarous system, as he 
called it, according to which every man had to pay a 
small portion, it might be even a few groschen, in 
direct taxes. 

" I ascribe," he said, " the large part of our emigra- 
tion to the fact that the emigrant wishes to escape the 



414 Bismarck. [1878- 

direct pressure of the taxes and execution, and to go to 
a land where the klassensteuer does not exist, and where 
he will also have the pleasure of knowing that the pro- 
duce of' his labours will be protected against foreign 
interference." 

His opinion cannot be called exaggerated if it is 
true that, as he stated, there were every year over a 
million executions involving the seizure and sale of 
household goods on account of arrears of taxation. 
It was not only the State taxes to which he objected ; 
the local rates for municipal expenses, and especially 
for education, fell very heavily on the inhabitants of 
large cities such as Berlin. He intended to devote 
part of the money which was raised by indirect 
taxation to relieving the rates. 

His first proposals for raising the money were of a 
very sweeping nature. He wished to introduce a 
State monopoly for the sale of tobacco, brandy, and 
beer. He entered into calculations by which he 
proved that were his policy adopted all direct taxa- 
tion might be repealed, and he would have a large 
surplus for an object which he had very much at 
heart — the provision of old-age pensions. It was a 
method of legislation copied from that which pre- 
vails in France and Italy. He pointed out with 
perfect justice that the revenue raised in Germany 
from the consumption of tobacco was much smaller 
than it ought to be. The total sum gained by the 
State was not a tenth of that which was produced 
in England by the taxing of tobacco, but no one 
could maintain that smoking was more common in 



1887] 



Economic Reform. 415 



England than in Germany. In fact tobacco was less 
heavily taxed in Germany than in any other country 
in Europe. 

In introducing a monopoly Bismarck intended and 
hoped iiot only to relieve the pressure of direct 
taxation, — though this would have been a change suf- 
ficient in its magnitude and importance for most 
men, — but proposed to use the very large sum which 
the Government would have at its disposal for the 
direct relief of the working classes. The Socialist 
law was not to go alone ; he intended absolutely to 
stamp out this obnoxious agitation, but it was not 
from any indifference as to the condition of the 
working classes. From his earliest days he had 
been opposed to the Liberal doctrine of laissez-faire ; 
it will be remembered how much he had disliked the 
bourgeois domination of the July Monarchy ; as a 
young man he had tried to prevent the abolition of 
guilds. He considered that much of the distress 
and discontent arose from the unrestricted influence 
of capital. He was only acting in accordance with 
the oldest and best traditions of the Prussian Mon- 
archy when he called in the power of the State to 
protect the poor. His plan was a very bold one; he 
wished to institute a fund from which there should 
be paid to every working man who was incapacitated 
by sickness, accident, or old age, a pension from the 
State. In his original plan he intended the work- 
ing men should not be required to make any contri- 
bution themselves towards this fund. It was not to 
be made to appear to them as a new burden imposed 
on them by the State. The tobacco monopoly, he 



41 6 Bismarck. [1878- 

said, he looked on as " the patrimony of the disin- 
herited." 

He did not fear the charge of SociaHsm which 
might be brought against him ; he defended himself 
by the provisions of the Prussian law. The Code of 
Frederick the Great contained the words : 

" It is the duty of the State to provide for the sustenance 
and support of those of its citizens who cannot procure 
sustenance themselves " ; and again, " work„adapted to 
their strength, and capacity shall be supplied to those 
who lack means and opportunity of earmng^^ivelihood 
for themselves and those dependent on them." 

In the most public way the new policy was intro- 
duced by an Imperial message, on November 17, 
1881, in which the Emperor expressed his conviction 
that the social difificulties could not be healed simply 
by the repression of the exaggerations of Social De- 
mocracy, but at the same time the welfare of the 
workmen must be advanced. This new policy had 
the warm approval of both the Emperor and the 
Crown Prince ; no one greeted more heartily the 
change than Windthorst. 

" Allow me," he once said to Bismarck, " to speak 
openly : you have done me much evil in my life, but, as 
a German patriot, I must confess to you my gratitude 
that after all his political deeds you have persuaded our 
Imperial Master to turn to this path of Social Reform." 

There were, he said, dif^culties to be met ; he ap- 
proved of the end, but not of all the details, 

"and," he continued, "something of the difficulty, if I 



1887] Economic Reform. 417 

may say so, you cause yourself. You are often too stormy 
for us ; you are always coming with something new and 
we cannot always follow you in it, but you must not 
take that amiss. We are both old men and the Emperor 
is much older than we are, but we should like ourselves 
in our lifetime to see some of these reforms established. 
That I wish for all of us and for our German country, 
and we will do our best to help in it." 

Opinions may differ as to the wisdom of Bis- 
marck's social and financial policy ; nobody can 
deny their admiration for the energy and patriotism 
which he displayed. It was no small thing for him, 
at his age, to come out of his comparative retirement 
to bring forward proposals which would be sure to 
excite the bitterest opposition of the men with whom 
he had been working, to embark again on a Parlia- 
mentary conflict as keen as any of those which had 
so taxed his energies in his younger years. Not con- 
tent with inaugurating and suggesting these plans, he 
himself undertook the immediate execution of them. 
In addition to his other offices, in 1880 he under- 
took that of Minister of Trade in Prussia, for he found 
no one whom he could entirely trust to carry out his 
proposals. During the next years he again took a 
prominent part in the Parliamentary debates ; day 
after day he attended to answer objections and to 
defend his measures in some of his ablest and longest 
speeches. By his proposals for a duty on corn he 
regained the support of most of the Conservatives, 
but in the Reichstag which was elected in 1884 he 
found himself opposed by a majority consisting of 
the Centre, Socialists, and Progressives. Many of the 



41 8 Bismarck. [1878- 

laws were rejected or amended, and it was not until 
1890 that, in a modified form, the whole of the social 
legislation had been carried through. 

For the monopoly he gained no support ; scarcely 
a voice was raised in its favour, nor can we be 
surprised at this. It was a proposal very characteristic 
of his internal policy ; he had a definite aim in view 
and at once took the shortest, boldest, and most 
direct road towards it, putting aside the thought of 
all further consequences. In this others could not 
follow him ; quite apart from the difficulties of 
organisation and the unknown effect of the law on all 
those who gained their livelihood by the growth, 
preparation, and sale of tobacco, there was a deep feel- 
ing that it was not safe to entrust the Government with 
so enormous a power. Men did not wish to see so 
many thousands enrolled in the army of of^cials, 
already too great ; they did not desire a new check 
on the freedom of life and occupation, nor that the 
Government should have the uncontrolled use of so 
great a sum of money. And then the use he proposed 
to make of the proceeds : if the calculations were 
correct, if the results were what he foretold, if from 
this monopoly they would be able to pay not only 
the chief expenses of the Government but also 
assign an old-age pension to every German workman 
who reached the age of seventy— what would this be 
except to make the great majority of the nation 
prospective pensioners of the State? With compul- 
sory attendance at the State schools ; with the State 
universities as the only entrance to public life and 
professions ; when everyone for three years had to 



1887] Economic Reform. 419 

serve in the army ; when so large a proportion of the 
population earned their livelihood in the railways, 
the post-office, the customs, the administration — 
the State had already a power and influence which 
many besides the Liberals regarded with alarm. 
What would it be when every working man looked 
forward to receiving, after his working days were 
over, a free gift from the Government ? Could not 
this power be used for political measures also ; could 
not it become a means for checking the freedom of 
opinions and even for interfering in the liberty of 
voting? ' 

He had to raise the money he wanted in another 
way, and, in 1879, he began the great financial 
change that he had been meditating for three years; 
he threw all his vigour into overthrowing Free Trade 
and introducing a general system of Protection. 

In this he was only doing what a large number of 
his countrymen desired. The results of Free Trade 
had not been satisfactory. In 1876 there was a 
great crisis in the iron trade ; owing to overpro- 
duction there was a great fall of prices in England, 
and Germany was being flooded with English goods 
sold below cost price. Many factories had to be 
closed, owners were ruined, and men thrown out of 
work; it happened that, by a law passed in 1873, the 
last duty on imported iron would cease on the 31st 
of December, 1876. Many of the manufacturers 
and a large party in the Reichstag petitioned that 
the action of the law might at any rate be sus- 
pended. Free-Traders, however, still had a majority, 
for the greater portion of the National Liberals be- 



420 Bismarck. [1878-- 

longed to that school, and the law was carried out. 
It was, however, apparent that not only the iron 
but other industries were threatened. The building 
of railways in Russia would bring about an increased 
importation of Russian corn and threatened the pros- 
perity, not only of the large proprietors, but also of 
the peasants. It had always been the wise policy of 
the Prussian Government to maintain and protect 
by legislation the peasants, who were considered the 
most important class in the State. Then the trade 
in Swedish wood threatened to interfere with the 
profits from the German forests, an industry so use- 
ful to the health of the country and the prosperity 
of the Government. But if Free Trade would in- 
jure the market for the natural products of the soil, 
it did not bring any compensating advantages by 
helping industry. Germany was flooded with Eng-, 
lish manufactures, so that even the home market 
was endangered, and every year it became more ap- 
parent that foreign markets were being closed. The 
sanguine expectations of the Free-Traders had not 
been realised ; America, France, Russia, had high 
tariffs; German manufactured goods were excluded 
from these countries. What could they look for- 
ward to in the future but a ruined peasantry and the 
crippling of the iron and weaving industries? "I 
had the impression," said Bismarck, "that under 
Free Trade we were gradually bleeding to death." 

He was probably much influenced in his new 
policy by Lothar Bucher, one of his private secre- 
taries, who was constantly with him at Varzin. 
Bucher, who had been an extreme Radical, had, in 



1887] Economic Reform. 421 

1849, been compelled to fly from the country and 
had lived many years in England. In 1865 he had 
entered Bismarck's service. He had acquired a pecul- 
iar enmity to the Cobden Club, and looked on that 
institution as the subtle instrument of a deep-laid 
plot to persuade other nations to adopt a policy 
which was entirely for the benefit of England. He 
drew attention to Cobden's words — " All we desire is 
the prosperity and greatness of England." We may 
in fact look on the Cobden Club and the principles 
it advocated from two points of view. Either they 
are, as Bucher maintained, simply English and their 
only result will be the prosperity of England, or 
they are merely one expression of a general form of 
thought which we know as Liberalism ; it was an 
attempt to create cosmopolitan institutions and to 
induce German politicians to take their economic 
doctrines from England, just as a few years before 
they had taken their political theories. In either 
case these doctrines would be very distasteful to 
Bismarck, who disliked internationalism in finance 
as much as he did in constitutional law or Socialist 
propaganda. 

Bismarck in adopting Protection was influenced, 
not by economic theory, but by the observation of 
facts. "All nations," he said, " which have Protective 
duties enjoy a certain prosperity; what great ad- 
vantages has America reached since it threatened 
to reduce duties twice, five times, ten times as high 
as ours ! " England alone clung to Free Trade, and 
why? Because she had grown so strong under the 
old system of Protection that she could now as a 



42 2 Bismarck. li878- 

Hercules step down into the arena and challenge 
everyone to come into the lists. In the arena of 
commerce England was the strongest. This was 
why she advocated Free Trade, for Free Trade was 
really the right of the most powerful. English 
interests were furthered under the veil of the magic 
word Freedom, and by it German enthusiasts for 
liberty were enticed to bring about the ruin and 
exploitation of their own country. 

If we look at the matter purely from the economic 
point of view, it is indeed difificult to see what 
benefits Germany would gain from a policy of Free 
Trade. It was a poor country ; if it was to maintain 
itself in the modern rivalry of nations, it must 
become rich. It could only become rich through 
manufactures, and manufactures had no opportunity 
of growing unless they had some moderate protec- 
tion from foreign competition. 

The effect of Bismarck's attention to finance was 
not limited to these great reforms ; he directed the 
whole power of the Government to the support of 
all forms of commercial enterprise and to the removal 
of all hindrances to the prosperity of the nation. 
To this task he devoted himself with the same 
courage and determination which he had formerly 
shewn in his diplomatic work. 

One essential element in the commercial reform 
was the improvement of the railways. Bismarck's 
attention had long been directed to the inconven- 
iences which arose from the number of private 
companies, whose duty it was to regard the dividends 
of the shareholders rather than the interests of the 



r887] Economic Reform. 423 

public. The existence of a monopoly of this kind 
in private hands seemed to him indefensible. His 
attention was especially directed to the injury done 
to trade by the differential rate imposed on goods 
traffic ; on many lines it was the custom to charge 
lower rates on imported than on exported goods, 
and this naturally had a very bad effect on German 
manufactures. He would have liked to remedy all 
these deficiencies by making all railways the prop- 
erty of the Empire (we see again his masterful mind, 
which dislikes all compromise) ; in this, however, he 
was prevented by the opposition of the other States, 
who would not surrender the control of their own 
lines. In Prussia he was able to carry out this policy 
of purchase of all private lines by the State ; by the 
time he laid down the Ministry of Commerce hardly 
any private companies remained. The acquisition 
of all the lines enabled the Government greatly to 
improve the communication, to lower fares, and to 
introduce through communications ; all this of course 
greatly added to the commercial enterprise and there- 
fore the wealth of the country. 

He was now also able to give his encouragement 
and support to those Germans who for many years 
in countries beyond the sea had been attempting to 
lay the foundations for German commerce and even 
to acquire German colonies. Bismarck's attitude in 
this matter deserves careful attention. As early as 
1874 he had been approached by German travellers 
to ask for the support of the Government in a plan 
for acquiring German colonies in South Africa. 
They pointed out that here was a country fitted by 



424 Bismarck. [1878- 

its climate for European occupation ; the present 
inhabitants of a large portion of it, the Boers, were 
anxious to establish their independence of England 
and would welcome German support. It was only- 
necessary to acquire a port, either at Santa Lucia or 
at Delagoa Bay, to receive a small subsidy from the 
Government, and then private enterprise would 
divert the stream of German emigration from North 
America to South Africa. Bismarck, though he 
gave a courteous hearing to this proposal, could not 
promise them assistance, for, as he said, the political 
situation was not favourable. He must foresee that 
an attempt to carry out this or similar plans would 
inevitably bring about very serious difificulties with 
England, and he had always been accustomed to 
attach much importance to his good understanding 
with the English Government. During the following 
years, however, the situation was much altered. 
First of all, great enterprise had been shewn by the 
German merchants and adventurers in different 
parts of the world, especially in Africa and in the 
Pacific. They, in those difficulties which will always 
occur when white traders settle in half-civilised lands, 
applied for support to the German Government. 
Bismarck, as he himself said, did not dare to refuse 
them this support. 

" I approached the matter with some reluctance ; I 
asked myself, how could I justify it, if I said to these 
enterprising men, over whose courage, enthusiasm, and 
vigour I have been heartily pleased : ' That is all very 
well, but the German Empire is not strong enough, it 
would attract the iU-will of other States,' I had not the 



1887] Econoniic Reform. 425 

courage as Chancellor to declare to them this bankruptcy 
of the German nation for transmarine enterprises." 

It must, however, happen that wherever these 
German settlers went, they would be in the neigh- 
bourhood of some English colony, and however 
friendly were the relations of the Governments of 
the two Powers, disputes must occur in the out- 
lying parts of the earth. In the first years of the 
Empire Bismarck had hoped that German traders 
would find sufficient protection from the English 
authorities, and anticipated their taking advantage of 
the full freedom of trade allowed in the British 
colonies ; they would get all the advantages which 
would arise from establishing their own colonies, 
while the Government would be spared any addi- 
tional responsibility. He professed, however, to 
have learnt by experience from the difficulties which 
came after the annexation of the Fiji Islands by 
Great Britain that this hope would not be fulfilled ; 
he acknowledged the great friendliness of the For- 
eign Office, but complained that the Colonial Office 
regarded exclusively British interests. As a com- 
plaint coming from his mouth this arouses some 
amusement ; the Colonial Office expressed itself 
satisfied to have received from so high an authority 
a testimonial to its efficiency which it had rarely 
gained from Englishmen. 

The real change in the policy of the Empire must, 
however, be attributed not to any imaginary short- 
comings of the English authorities; it was an inevit- 
able result of the abandonment of the policy of Free 



426 Bismarck. [1878- 

Trade, and of the active support which the Govern- 
ment was now giving to all forms of commercial en- 
terprise. It was shewn, first of all, in the grant of 
subsidies to mail steamers, which enabled German 
trade and German travellers henceforward to be car- 
ried by German ships ; before they had depended 
entirely on English and French lines. It was not 
till 1884 that the Government saw its way to under- 
take protection of German colonists. They were en- 
abled to do so by the great change which had taken 
place in the political situation. Up to this time 
Germany was powerless to help or to injure Eng- 
land, but, on the other hand, required English sup- 
port. All this was changed by the occupation of 
Egypt. Here England required a support on the 
Continent against the indignation of France and the 
jealousy of Russia. This could only be found in 
Germany, and therefore a close approximation be- 
tween the two countries was natural. Bismarck let 
it be known that England would find no support, 
but rather opposition, if she, on her side, attempted, 
as she so easily could have done, to impede German 
colonial enterprise. 

In his colonial policy Bismarck refused to take 
the initiative ; he refused, also, to undertake the 
direct responsibility for the government of their 
new possessions. He imitated the older English 
plan, and left the government in the hands of pri- 
vate companies, who received a charter of incorpora- 
tion ; he avowedly was imitating the East India 
Company and the Hudson's Bay Company. The 
responsibilities of the German Government were lim- 



1887] Economic Reform. 427 

ited to a protection of the companies against the 
attack or interference by any other Power, and a 
general control over their actions. In this way it 
was possible to avoid calling on the Reichstag for 
any large sum, or undertaking the responsibility of 
an extensive colonial establishment, for which at 
the time they had neither men nor experience. 
Another reason against the direct annexation of 
foreign countries lay in the Constitution of the Em- 
pire ; it would have been easier to annex fresh land 
to Prussia ; this could have been done by the au- 
thority of the King; there was, however, no provi- 
sion by which the Bundesrath could undertake this 
responsibility, and it probably could not be done 
even with the assent of the Reichstag unless some 
change were made in the Constitution. It was, how- 
ever, essential that the new acquisitions should be 
German and not Prussian. 

All these changes were not introduced without 
much opposition ; the Progressives especially distin- 
guished themselves by their prolonged refusal to 
assent even to the subsidies for German lines of 
steamers. In the Parliament of 1884 they were en- 
abled often to throw out the Government proposals. 
It was at this time that the conflict between Bismarck 
and Richter reached its height. He complained, 
and justly complained, that the policy of the Pro- 
gressives was then, as always, negative. It is indeed 
strange to notice how we find reproduced in Ger- 
many that same feeling which a few years before had 
in England nearly led to the loss of the colonies and 
the destruction of the Empire, 



428 Bismarck. [1878- 

It is too soon even now to consider fully the re- 
sult of this new policy ; the introduction of Protec- 
tion has indeed, if we are to judge by appearances, 
brought about a great increase in the prosperity of 
the country ; whether the scheme for old-age pensions 
will appease the discontent of the working man 
seems very doubtful. One thing, however, we must 
notice: the influence of the new policy is far greater 
than the immediate results of the actual laws passed. 
It has taught the Germans to look to the Govern- 
ment not only as a means of protecting them against 
the attacks of other States, but to see in it a thought- 
ful, and I think we may say kindly, guardian of 
their interests. They know that every attempt of 
each individual to gain wealth or power for his coun- 
try will be supported and protected by the Govern- 
ment ; they know that there is constant watchfulness 
as to the dangers to life and health which arise from 
the conditions of modern civilisation. In these laws, 
in fact, Bismarck, who deeply offended and irre- 
trievably alienated the survivors of his own genera- 
tion, won over and secured for himself and also for 
the Government the complete loyalty of the rising 
generation. It might be supposed that this power- 
ful action on the part of the State would interfere 
with private enterprise ; the result shews that this is 
not the case. A watchful and provident Government 
really acts as an incentive to each individual. Let 
us also recognise that Bismarck was acting exactly 
as in the old days every English Government acted, 
when the foreign policy was dictated by the interests 
of British trade and the home policy aimed at pre- 



1887] Economic Reform. 429 

serving, protecting, and assisting the different classes 
in the community. 

Bismarck has often been called a reactionary, and 
yet we find that by the social legislation he was the first 
statesman deliberately to apply himself to the prob- 
lem which had been created by the alteration in 
the structure of society. Even if the solutions which 
he proposed do not prove in every case to have been 
the best, he undoubtedly foresaw what would be the 
chief occupation for the statesmen of the future. In 
these reforms he had, however, little help from the 
Reichstag ; the Liberals were bitterly opposed, the 
Socialists sceptical and suspicious, the Catholics cool 
and unstable allies ; during these years the chronic 
quarrel between himself and Parliament broke out 
with renewed vigour. How bitterly did he deplore 
party spirit, the bane of German life, which seemed 
each year to gain ground ! 

" It has," he said, " transferred itself to our modern 
public life and the Parliaments ; the Governments, in- 
deed, stand together, but in the German Reichstag I do 
not find that guardian of liberty for which I had hoped. 
Party spirit has overrun us. This it is which I accuse 
before God and history, if the great work of our people 
achieved between 1866 and 1870 fall into decay, and in 
this House we destroy by the pen what has been created 
by the sword." 

In future years it will perhaps be regarded as one 
of his chief claims that he refused to become a party 
leader. He saved Germany from a serious danger 
to which almost every other country in Europe which 



430 Bismarck. [1878- 

has attempted to adopt English institutions has 
fallen a victim — the sacrifice of national welfare to 
the integrity and power of a Parliamentary fraction. 
His desire was a strong and determined Government, 
zealously working for the benefit of all classes, quick 
to see and foresee present and future evil ; he re- 
garded not the personal wishes of individuals, but 
looked only in each matter he undertook to its effect 
on the nation as a whole. " I will accept help," he 
said, " wherever I may get it. I care not to what 
party any man belongs. I have no intention of fol- 
lowing a party policy ; I used to do so when I was a 
young and angry member of a party, but it is impos- 
sible for a Prussian or German Minister." Though 
the Constitution had been granted, he did not wish 
to surrender the oldest and best traditions of the 
Prussian Monarchy ; and even if the power of the 
King and Emperor was limited and checked by two 
Parliaments it was still his duty, standing above all 
parties, to watch over the country as a hundred 
years before his ancestors had done. 

His power, however, was checked by the Parlia- 
ments. Bismarck often sighed for a free hand ; he 
longed to be able to carry out his reforms complete 
and rounded as they lay clear before him in his own 
brain ; how often did he groan under all the delay, 
the compromise, the surrender, which was imposed 
upon him when, conscious as he was that he was 
only striving for the welfare of his country, he had 
to win over not only the King, not only his colleagues 
in the Prussian Ministry, his subordinates, who had 
much power to check and impede his actions, but. 



1887] Economic Reform. 43 1 

above all, the Parliaments. It was inevitable that 
his relation to them should often be one of conflict ; 
it was their duty to submit to a searching criticism 
the proposals of the Government and to amend or 
reject them, and let us confess that it was better 
they were there. The modifications they introduced 
in the bills he proposed were often improvements; 
those they rejected were not always wise. The 
drafting of Government bills was often badly done ; 
the first proposals for the Socialistic law, the original 
drafts of many of his economic reforms, were all the 
better when they had been once rejected and were 
again brought forward in a modified form. More 
than this, we must confess that Bismarck did not 
possess that temperament which would make it wise 
to entrust him with absolute dictatorial power in in- 
ternal matters. He attempted to apply to legislation 
habits he had learnt in diplomacy. And it is curious 
to notice Bismarck's extrem,e caution in diplomacy, 
where he was a recognised master, and his rashness in 
legislation, where the ground was often new to him. 
In foreign affairs a false move may easily be with- 
drawn, a change of alliance quickly made; it often 
happens that speed is more important than wisdom. 
In internal affairs it is different ; there, delay is in 
itself of value; moreover, false legislation cannot be 
imposed with impunity, laws cannot be imposed and 
repealed. 

Bismarck often complained of the conduct of 
the Reichstag. There were in it two parties, the 
Socialists and the Centre, closely organised, admira- 
bly disciplined, obedient to leaders who were in op- 



432 Bismarck. [1878- 

position by principle ; they looked on the Parlia- 
mentary campaign as a struggle for power, and they 
maintained the struggle with a persistency and suc- 
cess which had not been surpassed by any Par- 
liamentary Opposition in any other country. Apart 
from them the attitude of all the parties was nor- 
mally that of moderate criticism directed to the 
matter of the Government proposals. There were, 
of course, often angry scenes ; Bismarck himself did 
not spare his enemies, but we find no events which 
shew violence beyond what is, if not legitimate, at 
least inevitable in all Parliamentary assemblies. The 
main objects of the Government were always at- 
tained ; the military Budgets were always passed, 
though once not until after a dissolution. In the 
contest with the Clerical party and the Socialists the 
Government had the full support of a large majority. 
Even in the hostile Reichstag of 1884, in which the 
Socialists, Clericals, and Progressives together com- 
manded a majority, a series of important laws were 
passed. Once, indeed, the majority in opposition to 
the Government went beyond the limits of reason and 
honour when they refused a vote of £\<X)0 for an 
additional director in the Foreign Office. It was 
the expression of a jealousy which had no justifica- 
tion in facts ; at the time the German-Foreign Office 
was the best managed department in Europe ; the 
labour imposed on the secretaries was excessive, and 
the nation could not help contrasting this vote with 
the fact that shortly before a large number of the 
members had voted that payments should be made 
to themselves. The nation could not help asking 



1887] Econo7nic Reform. 433 

whether it would not gain more benefit from another 
;i{J"iOOO a year expended on the Foreign Office than 
from ^50,000 a year for payment of members. Even 
this unfortunate action was remedied a few months 
later, when the vote was passed in the same Parlia- 
ment by a majority of twenty. 

Notwithstanding all their internal differences and 
the extreme party spirit which often prevailed, the 
Reichstag always shewed determination in defend- 
ing its own privileges. More than once Bismarck 
attacked them in the most tender points. At one 
time it was on the privileges of members and their 
freedom from arrest ; both during the struggle with 
the Clericals and with the Socialists the claim was 
made to arrest members during the session for polit- 
ical utterances. When Berlin was subject to a state 
of siege, the President of the Police claimed the 
right of expelling from the capital obnoxious Social- 
ist members. On these occasions the Government 
found itself confronted by the unanimous opposition 
of the whole House. In 1884, Bismarck proposed 
that the meetings of the Reichstag should be bien- 
nial and the Budget voted for two years ; the pro- 
posal was supported on the reasonable grounds that 
thereby inconvenience and press of work would be 
averted, which arose from the meeting of the Prus- 
sian and German Parliaments every winter. Few 
votes, however, could be obtained for a suggestion 
which seemed to cut away the most important privi- 
leges of Parliament. 

Another of the great causes of friction between 

Bismarck and the Parliament arose from the question 
28 



434 Bisinarck. [i878- 

as to freedom of debate. Both before 1866, and 
since that year, he made several attempts to intro- 
duce laws that members should be to some extent 
held responsible, and under certain circumstances be 
brought before a court of law, in consequence of what 
they had said from their places in Parliament. This 
was represented as an interference with freedom of 
speech, and was bitterly resented. Bismarck, how- 
ever, always professed, and I think truly, that he did 
not wish to control the members in their opposition 
to the Government, but to place some check on their 
personal attacks on individuals. A letter to one of 
his colleagues, written in 1883, is interesting: 

" I have," he says, " long learned the difficulties which 
educated people, who have been well brought up, have to 
overcome in order to meet the coarseness of our Parlia- 
mentary ^/(?/)/,?^/^/^r [pugilists] with the necessary amount 
of indifference, and to refuse them in one's own con- 
sciousness the undeserved honour of moral equality. 
The repeated and bitter struggles in which you have 
had to fight alone will have strengthened you in your 
feeling of contempt for opponents who are neither 
honourable enough nor deserve sufficient respect to be 
able to injure you." 

There was indeed a serious evil arising from the 
want of the feeling of responsibility in a Parliament- 
ary assembly which had no great and honourable 
traditions. He attempted to meet it by strengthen- 
ing the authority of the House over its own mem- 
bers ; the Chairman did not possess any power of 
punishing breaches of decorum. Bismarck often 



1887] Economic Reform. 435 

contrasted this with the very great powers over their 
own members possessed by the British Houses of 
Parliament. He drew attention to the procedure by 
which, for instance, Mr. Plimsoll could be compelled 
to apologise for hasty words spoken in a moment of 
passion. It is strange that neither the Prussian nor 
the German Parliament consented to adopt rules 
which are really the necessary complement for the 
privileges of Parliament. 

The Germans Avere much disappointed by the con- 
stant quarrels and disputes which were so frequent 
in public life ; they had hoped that with the unity of 
their country a new period would begin; they found 
that, as before, the management of public affairs was 
disfigured by constant personal enmities and the 
struggle of parties. We must not, however, look on 
this as a bad sign ; it is rather more profitable to ob- 
serve that the new institutions were not affected or 
weakened by this friction. It was a good sign for 
the future that the new State held together as firmly 
as any old-established monarchy, and that the most 
important questions of policy could be discussed and 
decided without even raising any point which might 
be a danger to the permanence of the Empire. 

Bismarck himself did much to put his relations 
with the Parliament on a new and better footing. 
Acting according to his general principle, he felt that 
the first thing to be done was to induce mutual con- 
fidence by unrestrained personal intercourse. The 
fact that he himself was not a member of the Parlia- 
ment deprived him of those opportunities which an 
English Minister enjoys. He therefore instituted, 



43^ Bismarck. [1878- 

in 1868, a Parliamentary reception. During the ses- 
sion, generally one day each week, his house was 
opened to all members of the House. The invita- 
tions were largely accepted, especially by the mem- 
bers of the National Liberal and Conservative parties. 
Those who were opponents on principle, the Cen- 
tre, the Progressives, and the Socialists, generally 
stayed away. These receptions became the most 
marked feature in the political life of the capital, 
and they enabled many members to come under the 
personal charm of the Chancellor. What an event 
was it in the life of the young and unknown Deputy 
from some obscure provincial town, when he found 
himself sitting, perhaps, at the same table as the 
Chancellor, drinking the beer which Bismarck had 
brought into honour at Berlin, and for which his 
house was celebrated, and listening while, with com- 
plete freedom from all arrogance or pomposity, his 
host talked as only he could ! 

The weakest side of his administration lay in the 
readiness with which he had recourse to the criminal 
law to defend himself against political adversaries. 
He was, indeed, constantly subjected to attacks in 
the Press, which were often unjust and sometimes 
unmeasured, but no man who takes part in public 
life is exempt from calumny. He was himself never 
slow to attack his opponents, both personally in 
the Parliament, and still more by the hired writers 
of the Press. None the less, to defend himself from 
attacks, he too often brought his opponents into the 
police court, and Bismarckbelcidigiing became a com- 
mon offence. Even the editor of Kladderadatsch was 



1887] Economic Reform. 437 

once imprisoned. He must be held personally re- 
sponsible, for no action could be instituted without 
his own signature to the charge. We see the same 
want of generosity in the use which he made of at- 
tempts, or reputed attempts, at assassination. In 
1875, while he was at Kissingen, a young man shot 
at him ; he stated that he had been led to do so ow- 
ing to the attacks made on the Chancellor by the 
Catholic party. No attempt, however, was made to 
prove that he had any accomplices ; it was not even 
suggested that he ivas carrying out the wishes of the 
party. It was one of those cases which will always 
occur in political struggles, when a young and inex- 
perienced man will be excited by political speeches 
to actions which no one would foresee, and which 
would not be the natural result of the words to 
which he had listened. Nevertheless, Bismarck was 
not ashamed publicly in the Reichstag to taunt his 
opponents with the action, and to declare that 
whether they would or not their party was Kuhl- 
mann's party ; " he clings to your coat-tails," he 
said. A similar event had happened a few years 
before, when a young man had been arrested on the 
charge that he intended to assassinate the Chancellor. 
No evidence in support of the charge was forthcom- 
ing, but the excuse was taken by the police for 
searching the house of one of the Catholic leaders 
with whom the accused had lived. No incriminating 
documents of any kind were found, but among the 
private papers was the correspondence between the 
leaders in the party of the Centre dealing with ques- 
tions of party organisation and political tactics. 



438 Bismarck. [1878- 

The Government used these private papers for po- 
litical purposes, and published one of them. The 
constant use of the police in political warfare be- 
longed, of course, to the system he had inherited, 
but none the less it was to have been hoped that he 
would have been strong enough to put it aside. 
The Government was now firmly established ; it 
could afford to be generous. Had he definitely cut 
himself off from these bad traditions he would have 
conferred on his country a blessing scarcely less than 
all the others. 

The opposition of the parties in the Reichstag to 
his policy and person did not represent the feelings 
of the country. As the years passed by and the 
new generation grew up, the admiration for his past 
achievements and for his character only increased. 
His seventieth birthday, which he celebrated in 1885, 
was made the occasion for a great demonstration of 
regard, in which the whole nation joined. A na- 
tional subscription was opened and a present of two 
million marks was made to him. More than half of 
this was devoted to repurchasing that part of the es- 
tate at Schoenhausen which had been sold when he 
was a young man. The rest he devoted to forming 
an institution for the help of teachers in higher 
schools. A few years before, the Emperor had pre- 
sented to him the Sachsen Wald, a large portion of 
the royal domains in the Duchy of Lauenburg. He 
now purchased the neighbouring estate of Fried- 
richsruh, so that he had a third country residence to 
which he could retire. It had a double advantage: 
its proximity to the great forest in which he loved 



1887] 



Economic Reform. 



439 



to wander, and also to a railway, making it little 
more than an hour distant from Berlin. He was 
able, therefore, at Friedrichsruh, to continue his 
management of affairs more easily than he could at 
Varzin. 



CHAPTER XVII. 



RETIREMENT AND DEATH. 



1 887- 1 898. 



WELL was it for Germany that Bismarck had 
not allowed her to fall into the weak and 
vacillating hands of a Parliamentary government. 
Peace has its dangers as well as war, and the rivalry 
of nations lays upon them a burden beneath which 
all but the strongest must succumb. The future 
was dark ; threatening clouds were gathering in the 
East and West ; the hostility of Russia increased, 
and in France the Republic was wavering ; a mili- 
tary adventurer had appeared, who threatened to 
use the desire for revenge as a means for his per- 
sonal advancement. Germany could no longer dis- 
regard French threats ; year by year the French 
army had been increased, and in 1886 General Bou- 
langer introduced a new law by which in time of 
peace over 500,000 men would be under arms. Rus- 
sia had nearly 550,000 soldiers on her peace estab- 
lishment, and, against this, Germany only 430,000. 
They were no longer safe; the duty of the Govern- 
ment was clear; in December, 1886, they brought 

440 



1887] Retirement and Death. 441 

forward a law to raise the army to 470,000 men and 
keep it at that figure for seven years. '' We have 
no desire for war," said Bismarck, in defending the 
proposal ; " we belong (to use an expression of Prince 
Metternich's) to the States whose appetite is satis- 
fied ; under no circumstances shall we attack France ; 
the stronger we are, the more improbable is war ; but 
if France has any reason to believe that she is more 
powerful than we, then war is certain." It was, he 
said, no good for the House to assure the Govern- 
ment of their patriotism and their readiness for sac- 
rifice when the hour of danger arrived ; they must 
be prepared beforehand. " Words are not soldiers 
and speeches not battalions." 

The House (there was a majority of Catholics, 
Socialists, and Progressives) threw out the bill, the 
Government dissolved, and the country showed 
its confidence in Bismarck and Moltke ; Conserva- 
tives and National Liberals made a coalition, the 
Pope himself ordered the Catholics not to oppose 
the Government (his support had been purchased by 
the partial repeal of a law expelling religious orders 
from Prussia), and the Emperor could celebrate his 
ninetieth birthday, which fell in March, 1887, hope- 
ful that the beneficent work of peaceful reform 
would continue. And yet never was Bismarck's 
resource so needed as during the last year in which 
he was to serve his old master. 

First, a French spy was arrested on German 
soil ; the French demanded his release, maintain- 
ing that German ofificers had violated the frontier. 
Unless one side gave way, war was inevitable ; 



442 Bismarck. [1887- 

the French Government, insecure as it was, could 
not venture to do so ; Bismarck was strong enough 
to be lenient : the spy was released and peace 
was preserved. Then, on the other side, the pas- 
sionate enmity of Russia burst out in language of 
unaccustomed violence ; the national Press de- 
manded the dismissal of Bismarck or war ; the Czar 
passed through Germany on his way to Copenhagen, 
but ostentatiously avoided meeting the Emperor ; 
the slight was so open that the worst predictions 
were justified. In November, on his return, he 
spent a few hours in Berlin. Bismarck asked for an 
audience, and then he found that despatches had 
been laid before the Czar which seemed to shew that 
he, while avowedly supporting Russia in Bulgarian 
affairs, had really been undermining her influence. 
The despatches were forged ; we do not yet know 
who it was that hoped to profit by stirring up a war 
between the two great nations. We can well be- 
lieve that Bismarck, in the excitement of the 
moment, spoke with an openness to which the Czar 
was not accustomed ; he succeeded, however, in 
bringing about a tolerable understanding. The 
Czar assured him that he had no intention of going 
to war, he only desired peace ; Bismarck did all that 
human ingenuity could to preserve it. By the Triple 
Alliance he had secured Germany against the attack 
of Russia. He now entered into a fresh and secret 
agreement with Russia by which Germany agreed 
to protect her against an attack from Austria ; he 
thereby hoped to be able to prevent the Czar from 
looking to France for support against the Triple 



18981 Retirement and Death. 443 

Alliance. It was a policy of singular daring to enter 
into a defensive alliance with Russia against Austria, 
at the same time that he had another defensive alli- 
ance with Austria against Russia.* To shew that he 
had no intention of deserting his older ally, he 
caused the text of the treaty with Austria to be 
published. This need no longer be interpreted as a 
threat to Russia. Then, that Germany, if all else 
failed, might be able to stand on her own resources, 
another increase of the army was asked for. By the 
reorganisation of the reserve, 500,000 men could be 
added to the army in time of war. This proposal 
was brought before the Reichstag, together with one 
for a loan of twenty-eight million marks to purchase 
the munitions of war which would be required, and 
in defence of this, Bismarck made the last of his 
great speeches. 

It was not necessary to plead for the bill. He 
was confident of the patriotism of the House ; his 
duty v/as to curb the nervous anxiety which recent 
events had produced. These proposals were not 
for war, but for peace; but they must indeed be 
prepared for war, for that was a danger that was 
never absent, and by a review of the last forty years 
he shewed that scarcely a single year had gone by 
in which there had not been the probability of a 
great European conflict, a war of coalitions in which 
all the great States of Europe would be ranged on 



* Our knowledge of this treaty is still very incomplete ; even the 
date is not certain, but it seems most probable that it was executed 
at this time. Neither Bismarck's own memoirs nor Busch's book 
throw any light upon it. 



444 Bismarck. 



[1887- 



one side or the other. This danger was still pre- 
sent, it would never cease; Germany, now, as before, 
must always be prepared ; for the strength of Ger- 
many was the security of Europe. 

" We must make greater exertions than other Powers 
on account of our geographical position. We lie in the 
middle of Europe ; we can be attacked on all sides. 
God has put us in a situation in which our neighbours 
will not allow us to fall into indolence or apathy. The 
pike in the European fish-pond prevent us from becom- 
ing carp," 

It was not their fault if the old alliance with 
Russia had broken down ; the alliance with Austria 
still continued. But, above all, Germany must de- 
pend on her army, and then they could look boldly 
into the future. " It will calm our citizens if they 
think that if we are attacked on two sides we can 
put a million good soldiers on the frontier, and in a 
few weeks support them by another million." But 
let them not think that this terrible engine of war 
was a danger to the peace of Europe. In words 
which represent a profound truth he said : " It is 
just the strength at which we aim that makes us 
peaceful. That sounds paradoxical, but it is so. 
With the powerful engine into which we are forming 
the German army one undertakes no ofTensive 
war." In truth, when the army was the nation, 
what statesman was there who would venture on 
war unless he were attacked ? " If I were to say to 
you, ' We are threatened by France and Russia ; it 
is better for us to fight at once ; an offensive war 



1898] Retirement and Death. 445 

is more advantageous for us,' and ask for a credit 
of a hundred millions, I do not know whether you 
would grant it, — I hope not." And he concluded ; 
" It is not fear which makes us lovers of peace, 
but the consciousness of our own strength. We can 
be won by love and good-will, but by them alone ; 
we Germans fear God and nothing etse in the world, 
and it is the fear of God which makes us seek peace 
a7id ensne it.'' 

These are words which will not be forgotten so 
long as the German tongue is spoken. Well will it 
be if they are remembered in their entirety. They 
were the last message of the older generation to the 
new Germany which had arisen since the war ; for 
already the shadow of death lay over the city; in 
the far South the Crown Prince was sinking to his 
grave, and but a few weeks were to pass before Bis- 
marck stood at the bedside of the dying Emperor. 
He died on March 9, 1888, a few days before his 
ninety-first birthday, and with him passed the sup- 
port on which Bismarck's power rested. 

He was not a great man, but he was an honour- 
able, loyal, and courteous gentleman; he had not 
always understood the course of Bismarck's policy 
or approved the views which his Minister adopted. 
The restraint he had imposed had often been incon- 
venient, and Bismarck had found much difficulty 
in overcoming the prejudices of his master; but 
it had none the less been a gain for Bismarck that 
he was compelled to explain and justify his action 
to a man whom he never ceased to love and respect. 
How beneficial had been the controlling influence 



446 Bismarck. [1887- 

of his presence the world was to learn by the events 
which followed his death. 

That had happened to which for five and twenty 
years all Bismarck's enemies had looked forward. 
The foundation on which his power rested was taken 
away ; men at once began to speculate on his fall. 
The noble presence of the Crown Prince, his cheer- 
ful and kindly manners, his known attachment to 
liberal ideas, his strong national feeling, the success 
with which he had borne himself on the uncongenial 
field of battle, all had made him the hope of the 
generation to which he belonged. Who was so well 
suited to solve the difficulties of internal policy with 
which Bismarck had struggled so long? Hopes 
never to be fulfilled ! Absent from his father's death- 
bed, he returned to Berlin a crippled and dying man, 
and when a few weeks later his body was lowered into 
the grave, there were buried with him the hopes and 
aspirations of a whole generation. 

His early death was indeed a great misfortune for 
his country. Not that he would have fulfilled all 
the hopes of the party that would have made him 
their leader. It is never wise to depend on the 
liberalism of a Crown Prince. When young and 
inexperienced he had been in opposition to his 
father's government — but his father before him had, 
while heir to the throne, also held a similar position to 
his own brother. As Crown Prince, he had desired and 
had won popularity ; he had been even too sensitive 
to public opinion. His, however, was a character 
that required only responsibility to strengthen it ; 
with the burden of sovereignty he would, we may 




EMPEROR FREDERICK. 



1898] Retirement and Death. 447 

suppose, have shewn a fixity of purpose which many 
of his admirers would hardly have expected of him, 
nor would he have been deficient in those qualities of 
a ruler which are the traditions of his family. He 
was not a man to surrender any of the prerogatives 
or authority of the Crown. He had a stronger will 
than his father, and he would have made his will 
felt. His old enmity to Bismarck had almost 
ceased. It is not probable that with the new Em- 
peror the Chancellor would long have held his posi- 
tion, but he would have been able to transfer the 
Crown to a man who had learnt wisdom by pro- 
longed disappointment. How he would have gov- 
erned is shewn by the only act of authority which 
he had time to carry out. He would have done 
what was more important than giving a little more 
power to the Parliament : he would at once have 
stopped that old and bad system by which the 
Prussian Government has always attempted to 
schoolmaster the people. During his short reign 
he dismissed Herr von Puttkammer, the Minister of 
the Interior, a relative of Bismarck's wife, for interfer- 
ing with the freedom of election ; we may be sure that 
he would have allowed full freedom of speech ; and 
that he would not have consented to govern by aid 
of the police. Under him there would not have been 
constant trials for Majestdtsbeleidigitng or Bismarck- 
beleidigung. This he could have done without weak- 
ening the power of the Crown or the authority of 
the Government ; those who know Germany will 
believe that it was the one reform which was still 
required. 



44^ Bismarck. [1887- 

The illness of the Emperor made it desirable to 
avoid points of conflict ; both he and Bismarck 
knew that it was impossible, during the few weeks 
that his life would be spared, to execute so important 
a change as the resignation of the Chancellor would 
have been. On many points there was a difference 
of opinion, but Bismarck did not unduly express his 
view, nor did he threaten to resign if his advice were 
not adopted. When, for instance, the Emperor 
hesitated to give his assent to a law prolonging the 
period of Parliament, Bismarck did not attempt to 
control his decision. When Herr Puttkammer was 
dismissed, Bismarck did not remonstrate against 
an act which was almost of the nature of a personal 
reprimand to himself. It was, however, different 
when the foreign policy of the Empire was affected, 
for here Bismarck, as before, considered himself the 
trustee and guarantor for the security of Germany. 
An old project was now revived for bringing about a 
marriage between the Princess Victoria of Prussia 
and Prince Alexander of Battenberg. This had been 
suggested some years before, while the Prince was 
still ruler of Bulgaria ; at Bismarck's advice, the Em- 
peror William had refused his consent to the mar- 
riage, partly for the reason that according to the 
family law of the Hohenzollerns a marriage with the 
Battenberger family would be a mesalliance. He was, 
however, even more strongly influenced by the effect 
this would have on the political situation of Europe. 

The foundation of Bismarck's policy was the main- 
tenance of friendship with Russia ; this old-estab- 
lished alliance depended, however, on the personal 



1898] Retirement and Death. 449 

good-will of the Czar, and not on the wishes of the 
Russian nation or any identity of interests between 
the two Empires. A marriage between a Prussian 
princess and a man who was so bitterly hated by the 
Czar as was Prince Alexander must have seriously in- 
jured the friendly relations which had existed between 
the two families since the year 1814. Bismarck 
believed that the happiness of the Princess must be 
sacrificed to the interests of Germany, and the Em- 
peror William, who, when a young man, had for 
similar reasons been required by his father to re- 
nounce the hand of the lady to whom he had been 
devotedly attached, agreed with him. Now, after 
the Emperor's death the project was revived ; the 
Emperor Frederick wavered between his feelings as 
a father and his duty as a king. Bismarck suspected 
that the strong interest which the Empress displayed 
in the project was due, not only to maternal affec- 
tion, but also to the desire, which in her would be 
natural enough, to bring over the German Empire to 
the side of England in the Eastern Question, so that 
England might have a stronger support in her peren- 
nial conflict with Russia. The matter, therefore, 
appeared to him as a conflict between the true inter- 
ests of Germany and those old Court influences which 
he so often had had to oppose, by which the family 
relationships of the reigning sovereign were made to 
divert his attention from the single interests of his 
own country. He made it a question of confidence ; 
he threatened to resign, as he so often did under 
similar circumstances ; he let it be known through 
the Press what was the cause, and, in his opinion, the 



450 Bismarck. [1887- 

true interpretation, of the conflict which influenced 
the Court. In order to support his view, he called 
in the help of the Grand Duke of Baden, who, as the 
Emperor's brother-in-law, and one of the most ex- 
perienced of the reigning Princes, was the proper 
person to interfere in a matter which concerned both 
the private and the public life of the sovereign. The 
struggle, which threatened to become serious, was, 
however, allayed by the visit of the Queen of Eng- 
land to Germany. She, acting in German affairs with 
that strict regard to constitutional principle and 
that dislike of Court intrigue that she had always 
observed in dealings with her own Ministers, gave 
her support to Bismarck. The marriage did not 
take place. 

Frederick's reign lasted but ninety days, and his 
son ruled in his place. The new Emperor belonged 
to the generation which had grown up since the 
war; he could not remember the old days of con- 
flict ; like all of his generation, from his earliest 
years he had been accustomed to look on Bismarck 
with gratitude and admiration. In him, warm per- 
sonal friendship was added to the general feeling of 
public regard ; he had himself learnt from Bismarck's 
own lips the principles of policy and the lessons of 
history. It might well seem that he would continue 
to lean for support on the old statesman. So he 
himself believed, but careful observers who saw his 
power of will and his restless activity foretold that 
he would not allow to Bismarck that complete free- 
dom of action and almost absolute power which he 
had obtained during the later years of the old 



1898] Retirement and Death. 45 1 

Emperor. They foretold also that Bismarck would 
not be content with a position of less power, and 
there were many ready to watch for and foment the 
differences which must arise. 

In the first months of the new reign, some of 
Bismarck's old enemies attempted to undermine his 
influence by spreading reports of his differences with 
the Emperor Frederick, and Professor Geffken even 
went so far as to publish from the manuscript some of 
the most confidential portions of the Emperor's diary 
in order to shew that but for him Bismarck would 
not have created the new Empire. The attempt 
failed, for, rightly read, the passages which were to 
injure Bismarck's reputation only served to shew 
how much greater than men thought had been the 
difificulties with which he had had to contend and 
the wisdom with which he had dealt with them. 

From the very beginning there were differences of 
opinion ; the old and the new did not think or feel 
alike. Bismarck looked with disapproval on the con- 
stant journeys of the Emperor ; he feared that he was 
compromising his dignity. Moltke and others of 
the older generation retired from the posts they 
filled ; Bismarck, with growing misgivings, stayed 
on. His promises to his old master, his love of 
power, his distrust of the capacity of others, all made 
it hard for him to withdraw when he still might 
have done so with dignity. We cannot doubt that 
his presence was irksome to his master ; his influence 
and authority were too great ; before them, even the 
majesty of the Throne was dimmed; the Minister 
was a crreater man than the Sovereig-n. 



452 Bismarck. [1887- 

If we are to understand what happened we must 
remember how exceptional was the position which 
Bismarck now occupied. He had repeatedly defied 
the power of Parliament and shewn that he was 
superior to the Reichstag ; there were none among 
his colleagues who could approach him in age or 
experience ; the Prussian Ministers were as much 
his nominees as were the officials of the Empire. He 
himself was Chancellor, Minister-President, Foreign 
Minister, and Minister of Trade; his son was at the 
head of the Foreign Office and was used for the 
more important diplomatic missions ; his cousin was 
Minister, of the Interior ; in the management of the 
most critical affairs, he depended upon the assistance 
of his own family and secretaries. He had twice 
been able against the will of his colleagues to reverse 
the whole policy of the State. The Government was 
in his hands and men had learnt to look to him 
rather than to the Emperor. Was it to be expected 
that a young man, ambitious, full of spirit and self- 
confidence, who had learnt from Bismarck himself a 
high regard for his monarchical duties, would acqui- 
esce in this system ? Nay, more ; was it right that 
he should ? 

It was a fitting conclusion to his career that the 
man who had restored the monarchical character of 
the Prussian State should himself shew that before 
the will of the King he, as every other subject, must 
bow. 

Bismarck had spent the winter of 1889 at Fried- 
richsruh. When he returned to Berlin at the end 
of January, he found that his influence and authority 



1898] 



Retirement and Death. 453 



had been undermined ; not only was the Emperor 
influenced by other advisers, but even the Ministry 
shewed an independence to which he was not accus- 
tomed. The chief causes of difference arose re- 
garding the prolongation of the law against the 
Socialists. This expired in 1890, and it was proposed 
to bring in a bill making it permanent. Bismarck 
wished even more than this to intensify the strin- 
gency of its provisions. Apparently the Emperor 
did not believe that this was necessary. He hoped 
that it would be possible to remove the disaffection 
of the working men by remedial measures, and, in 
order to discuss these, he summoned a European 
Congress which would meet in Berlin. 

Here, then, there was a fundamental difference of 
opinion between the King of Prussia and his Minister ; 
the result was that Bismarck did not consider himself 
able to defend the Socialist law before the Reich- 
stag, for he could not any longer give full expression 
to his own views ; the Parliament was left without 
direction from the Government, and eventually a 
coalition between the extreme Conservatives, the 
Radicals, and the Socialists rejected the bill alto- 
gether, A bitterly contested general election fol- 
lowed in which the name and the new policy of the 
Emperor were freely used, and it resulted in a ma- 
jority opposed to the parties who were accustomed 
to support Bismarck. These events made it obvious 
that on matters of internal policy a permanent 
agreement between the Emperor and the Chan- 
cellor was impossible. It seems that Bismarck 
therefore offered to resign his post as Minister, 



454 Bismarck. [i887- 

President, maintaining only the general control of 
foreign affairs. But this proposition did not meet 
with the approval of the Emperor. There were, 
however, other grounds of difference connected even 
with foreign affairs ; the Emperor was drawing 
closer to England and thereby separating from 
Russia. 

By the middle of March, matters had come to a 
crisis. The actual cause for the final difference was 
an important matter of constitutional principle. Bis- 
marck found that the Emperor had on several occa- 
sions discussed questions of administration with some 
of his colleagues without informing him ; moreover, 
important projects of law had been devised without 
his knowledge. He therefore drew the attention of 
the Emperor to the principle of the German and 
Prussian Constitutions. By the German Constitution, 
as we have seen, the Chancellor was responsible for 
all acts of the Ministers and Secretaries of State, who 
held ofifice as his deputies and subordinates. He 
therefore claimed that he could require to be con- 
sulted on every matter of any importance which con- 
cerned any of these departments. The same right 
as regards Prussian affairs had been explicitly secured 
to the Minister-President by a Cabinet order of 1852, 
which was passed in order to give to the President that 
complete control which was necessary if he was to 
be responsible for the whole policy of the Govern- 
ment. The Emperor answered by a command that 
he should' draw up anew order reversing this decree. 
This Bismarck refused to do ; the Emperor repeated 
his instructions, It was a fundamental point on 



1898] Retirement and Death. 455 

which no compromise was possible; the Emperor 
proposed to take away from the Chancellor that 
supreme position he had so long enjoyed ; to recall 
into his own hands that immediate control over all 
departments which in old days the Kings of Prussia 
had exercised and, as Bismarck said, to be his own 
Prime Minister. In this degradation of his position 
Bismarck would not acquiesce ; he had no alternative 
but to resign. 

The final separation between these two men, each 
so self-willed and confident in his own strength, was 
not to be completed by ceremonious discussions on 
constitutional forms. It was during an audience at 
the castle, that the Emperor had explained his views, 
Bismarck his objections ; the Emperor insisted that 
his will must be carried out, if not by Bismarck, then 
by another. "Then I am to understand, your 
Majesty," said Bismarck, speaking in English ; " that 
I am in your way?" "Yes," was the answer. This 
was enough ; he took his leave and returned home 
to draw up the formal document in which he ten- 
dered his resignation. This, which was to be the 
conclusion of his public life, had to be composed 
with care; he did not intend to be hurried; but the 
Emperor was impatient, and his impatience was in- 
creased when he was informed that Windthorst, the 
leader of the Centre, had called on Bismarck at his re- 
sidence. He feared lest there was some intrigue, and 
that Bismarck proposed to secure his position by an 
alliance with the Parliamentary opposition. He sent 
an urgent verbal message requiring the resignation 
immediately, a command with which Bismarck was 



456 Bismarck. [1887- 

not likely to comply. Early next morning, the Em- 
peror drove round himself to his house, and Bismarck 
was summoned from his bed to meet the angry 
sovereign. The Emperor asked what had taken 
place at the interview with Windthorst, and stated 
that Ministers were not to enter on political discus- 
sions with Parliamentary leaders without his per- 
mission. Bismarck denied that there had been any 
political discussion, and answered that he could not 
allow any supervision over the guests he chose to 
receive in his private house. 

" Not if I order it as your sovereign ? " asked the 
Emperor. 

" No. The commands of my King cease in my 
wife's drawing-room," answered Bismarck. The Em- 
peror had forgotten that Bismarck was a gentleman 
before he was a Minister, and that a Prussian noble- 
man could not be treated like a Russian boyar.^ 

No reconciliation or accommodation was now pos- 
sible. The Emperor did all he could to make it ap- 
pear that the resignation was voluntary and friendly. 
He conferred on the retiring Chancellor the highest 
honours : he raised him to the rank of Field Marshal 
and created him Duke of Lauenburg, and publicly 
stated his intention of presenting him with a copy 
of his own portrait. As a soldier, Bismarck obedi- 
ently accepted the military honour ; the new title he 
requested to be allowed not to use ; he had never 
been asked whether he desired it. 



* It must be remembered that our knowledge of these events is 
imperfect and probably inaccurate ; it is at least one-sided. It 
comes entirely from the published statements of those who gained 
their information directly or indirectly from Bismarck. 



1898] Retirement and Death. 45 7 

No outward honours could recompense him for 
the affront he had received. What profited it him 
that the Princes and people of Germany joined in 
unanimous expression of affection and esteem, that 
he could scarcely set foot outside his house for the 
enthusiastic crowd who cheered and followed him 
through the streets of Berlin ? For twenty-four 
years he had been Prussian Minister and now he was 
told he was in the way. His successor was already 
in office ; he was himself driven in haste from the 
house which so long had been his home. A final 
visit to the Princes of the Royal House, a last audi- 
ence with the Emperor, a hasty leave-taking from his 
friends and colleagues, and then the last farewell, 
when in the early morning he drove to Charlotten- 
burg and alone went down into the mausoleum 
where his old master slept, to lay a rose upon his 
tomb. 

The rest he had so often longed for had come, but 
it was too late. Forty years he had passed in public 
life and he could not now take up again the interests 
and occupations of his youth. Agriculture had no 
more charms for him ; he was too infirm for sport ; he 
could not, like his father, pass his old age in the busy 
indolence of a country gentleman's life, nor could he, 
as some statesmen have done, soothe his declining 
years by harmless and amiable literary dilettanteism. 
His religion was not of that complexion that he could 
find in contemplation, and in preparation for another 
life, consolation for the trials of this one. At seventy- 
five years of age, his intellect was as vigorous and his 
energy as unexhausted as they had been twenty years 



458 Bismarck. [1887- 

before ; his health was improved, for he had found 
in Dr. Schweninger a physician who was not only 
able to treat his complaints, but could also compel 
his patient to obey his orders. He still felt within 
himself full power to continue his public work, and 
now he was relegated to impotence and obscurity. 
Whether in Varzin or Friedrichsruh, his eyes were 
always fixed on Berlin. He saw the State which he 
had made, and which he loved as a father, subjected to 
the experiment of young and inexperienced control. 
He saw overthrown that carefully planned system by 
which the peace of Europe was made to depend upon 
the prosperity of Germany. Changes were made in 
the working of that Constitution which it seemed 
presumption for anyone but him to touch. His 
policy was deserted, his old enemies were taken into 
favour. Can we wonder that he could not restrain 
his impatience ? He felt like a man who sees his heir 
ruling in his own house during his lifetime, cutting 
down his woods and dismissing his old servants, or 
as if he saw a careless and clumsy rider mounted on 
his favourite horse. 

From all parts of Germany deputations from 
towns and newspaper writers came to visit him. He 
received them with his customary courtesy, and 
spoke with his usual frankness. He did not dis- 
guise his chagrin ; he had, he said, not been treated 
with the consideration which he deserved. He 
had never been accustomed to hide his feelings or 
to disguise his opinions. Nothing that his succes- 
sors did seemed to him good. They made a treaty 
with England for the arrangement of conflicting 



1898] Retirement and Death. 459 

questions in Africa ; men looked to Bismarck to 
hear what he would say before they formed their 
opinion ; " I would never have signed the treaty," 
he declared. He quickly drifted into formal op- 
position to the Government ; he even made arrange- 
ments with one of the Hamburg papers that it 
should represent his opinions. He seemed to have 
forgotten his own principle that, in foreign affairs 
at least, an opposition to the policy of the Govern- 
ment should not be permitted. He claimed a privi- 
lege which as Minister he would never have allowed 
to another. He defied the Government. " They 
shall not silence me," he said. It seemed as 
though he was determined to undo the work of his 
life. Under the pretext that he was attacking the 
policy of the Ministers, he was undermining the 
loyalty of the people, for few could doubt that it 
was the Emperor at whom the criticisms were aimed. 
In his isolation and retirement, the old uncompro- 
mising spirit of his ancestors once more awoke in 
him. He had been loyal^ to the Crown — -who more 
so? — but his loyalty had limits. His long service had 
been one of personal and voluntary affection ; he 
was not a valet, that his service could be handed 
on from generation to generation among the assets 
of the Crown. "After all," he would ask, "who are 
these Hohenzollerns ? My family is as good as theirs. 
We have been here longer than they have." Like 
his ancestors who stood out against the rule of the 
Great Elector, he was putting personal feeling above 
public duty. Even if the action of the new Govern- 
ment was not always wise, he himself had made 



460 Bismarck. [1887- 

Germany strong enough to support for a few years 
a weak Ministry. 

More than this, he was attempting to destroy the 
confidence of the people in the moral justice and ne- 
cessity of the measures by which he had founded the 
Empire. They had always been taught that in 1870 
their country had been the object of a treacherous 
and unprovoked attack. Bismarck, who was always 
living over again the great scenes in which he had 
been the leading actor, boasted that but for him 
there would never have been a war with France. 
He referred to the alteration in the Ems telegram, 
which we have already narrated, and the Government 
was forced to publish the original documents. The 
conclusions drawn from these disclosures and others 
which followed were exaggerated, but the naive and 
simple belief of the people was irretrievably de- 
stroyed. Where they had been taught to see the 
will of God, they found only the machinations of the 
Minister. In a country where patriotism had already 
taken the place of religion, the last illusion had been 
dispelled ; almost the last barrier was broken down 
which stood between the nation and moral scepticism. 

Bismarck's criticism was very embarrassing to the 
Government ; by injuring the reputation of the Min- 
istry he impaired the influence of the nation. It was 
dif^cult to keep silence and ignore the attack, but 
the attempts at defence were awkward and unwise. 
General Caprivi attempted to defend the treaty with 
England by reading out confidential minutes, ad- 
dressed by Bismarck to the Secretary of the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, in which he had written that the 



1898] Retirement and Death. 461 

friendship of England and the support of Lord 
Sahsbury were more important than Zanzibar or the 
whole of Africa, He addressed a circular despatch 
to Prussian envoys to inform them that the utter- 
ances of Prince Bismarck were without any actual 
importance, as he was now only a private man. This 
only made matters worse ; for the substance of the 
despatch quickly became known (another instance of 
the lax control over important State documents 
which we so often notice in dealing with German 
affairs), and only increased the bitterness of Bis- 
marck, which was shared by his friends and sup- 
porters. 

For more than two years the miserable quarrel 
continued ; Bismarck was now the public and avowed 
enemy of the Court and the Ministry. Moltke died, 
and he alone of the great men of the country was 
absent from the funeral ceremony, but in his very 
absence he overshadowed all who were there. His 
public popularity only increased. In 1892, he travelled 
across Germany to visit Vienna for his son's wed- 
ding. His journey was a triumphal progress, and the 
welcome was warmest in the States of the South, in 
Saxony and Bavaria. The German Government, 
however, found it necessary to instruct their ambas- 
sador not to be present at the wedding and to take 
no notice of the Prince ; he was not even granted an 
audience by the Austrian Emperor. It was held 
necessary also to publish the circular to which I 
have already referred, and thereby officially to recog- 
nise the enmity. 

The scandal of the quarrel became a grave injury 



462 Bismarck. [1887- 



to the Government of the country. A serious 
illness of Bismarck caused apprehension that he 
might die while still unreconciled. The Emperor 
took the opportunity, and by a kindly message 
opened the way to an apparent reconciliation. Then 
a change of Ministry took place : General Caprivi 
was m.ade the scapegoat for the failures of the new 
administration, and retired into private life, too loyal 
even to attempt to justify or defend the acts for 
which he had been made responsible. The new 
Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, was a friend and 
former colleague of Bismarck, and had in old days 
been leader of the National party in Bavaria. When 
Bismarck's eightieth birthday was celebrated, the 
Emperor was present, and once more Bismarck went 
to Berlin to visit his sovereign. We may be allowed 
to believe that the reconciliation was not deep. We 
know that he did not cease to contrast the new marks 
of Royal favour with the kindly courtesy of his old 
master, who had known so well how to allow the 
King to be forgotten in the friend. 

As the years went on, he became ever more lonely. 
His wife was dead, and his brother. Solitude, the 
curse of greatness, had fallen on him. He had no 
friends, for we cannot call by that name the men, so 
inferior to himself, by whom he was surrounded — 
men who did not scruple to betray his confidence 
and make a market of his infirmities. With dififi- 
culty could he bring himself even to systematic 
work on the memoirs he proposed to leave. Old 
age set its mark on him : his beard had become 
white ; he could no longer, as in former days, ride 



1898] 



Retii^ement and Death. 



46. 



and walk through the woods near his house. His 
interest in pubHc affairs never flagged, and especially 
he watched with unceasing vigilance every move in 
the diplomatic world ; his mind and spirit were still 
unbroken when a sudden return of his old malady 
overtook him, and on the last day of July, 1898, he 
died at Friedrichsruh. 

He lies buried, not among his ancestors and kins- 
folk near the old house at Schoenhausen, nor in the 
Imperial city where his work had been done ; but in 
a solitary tomb at Friedrichsruh to which, with 
scanty state and hasty ceremony, his body had been 
borne. 





MAP OF GERMANY SHOWING CHANGES MADE IN 1866. 




INDEX 



Alexander, Prince, of Batten- 
berg, 448-450 

Army, 295 

Arniin, Count, 19-21, 46 

Arnim, Oscar von, marries Mal- 
vina von Bismarck, 25 

Augustenburg, Frederick, Prince 
of, 202-209, 213-224, 227, 
228, 230-237, 246 



B 



Bazaine, Marshal, 361, 373 
Benedetti, Count Vincent, 270- 

272, 275, 277-282, 322, 330- 

333, 336-338, 340-342 
Bennigsen, 392, 394 
Berlin, its condition after the 

Revolution, 47, 50, 51 
Bismarck, the family of, its 

origin and history, 1-12 
Bismarck, August von, 5 
Bismarck, August von, the 

Landrath, 8 
Bismarck, August Friedrich 

von, 9 
Bismarck, Bernhard von, 11, 22, 

23 
Bismarck, Carl Alexander von, 9 
Bismarck, Friedrich von, the 

" Permutator," 5 
Bismarck, Friedrich Wilhelm 

von, 9 



Bismarck, Herbert von, 347 
Bismarck, Herbort von, 2 
Bismarck, Karl Wilhelm Frie- 
drich von, 10 ; his marriage, 
10 ; moves to Pomerania, 11, 

21 ; to Schoenhausen, 22, 25, 
26 

Bismarck, Malvina von, ir, 22 ; 
marries Oscar von Arnim, 25 

Bismarck, Nicolas (or Claus) 
von, 3 

Bismarck, Otto Eduard Leopold 
von, his birth, i ; ancestry, i- 
12 ; destined for Diplomatic 
Service, 14 ; at school in Ber- 
lin, 14, 15; enters at Gottingen, 
15 ; his personal appearance 
andcharacter, 16 ; enters Corps 
of Hanoverians, 16 ; his uni- 
versity career, 16-18 ; leaves 
Gottingen, 18 ; enters at Ber- 
lin, 18 ; takes degree of Doctor 
of Law, 19 ; early official life, 
19 ; appointed Auscultator at 
Berlin, 19 ; transferred to ad- 
ministrative side and to Aix- 
la-Chapelle, 19 ; his life at 
Aix, 20 ; transferred to Pots- 
dam, 21 ; begins army service 
in Jaeger at Potsdam, 21 ; 
transferred to Jaeger at Stet- 
tin, 21 ; settles in Pomerania, 

22 ; his attendance at lectures 
in agricultural college near 
Greifswald, 22 ; his successful 



465 



466 



Index. 



Bismarck — Con tin ued 

management of the Pomer- 
anian estates, 22, 23 ; takes 
Kniephof on division of estates, 
23 ; his wildness, 23 ; enters 
as lieutenant of Landwehr in 
cavalry, 23 ; saves groom from 
drowning, 23 ; his restlessness 
and discontent, 24 ; travels, to 
Paris, London, Hull, Scarbor- 
oitgh, York, Manchester, 24; 
his letters from Schoenhausen, 
25-27 ; member of Diets of 
Pomerania and of province 
containing Schoenhausen, 27 ; 
Referendar at Potsdam, re- 
signs, 28 ; his hatred of 
Prussian bureaucracy, 28, 61 ; 
his interest in his duties as 
landed proprietor, 28 ; In- 
spector of Dykes for Jerichovv, 

29 ; his intimacy with the re- 
ligious coterie at Triglaff, 29, 

30 ; his religious convictions 
and their effect oil his mo- 
narchical feeling, 31, 32 ; his 
engagement, 32 ; summoned to 
attend meeting of Estates Gen- 
eral in Berlin, 33 ; enters on 
his Parliamentary duties, 38 ; 
opposes action of Liberals, 
38-40 ; his remarks on Prussia 
and England, 4.1 ; on the Jews 
and the Christian State, 41, 
42 ; returns to Pomerania, 43 ; 
his marriage, 43 ; his wedding 
journey, meets the King of 
Prussia, returns to Schoen- 
hausen, 43, 44 ; his sentiments 
on the Revolution, writes to 
the King, hurries to Berlin, 
45, 46 ; collects signatures for 
address of loyalty, 46 ; atmeet- 
ing of Estates General, 46, 
47 ; writes articles, takes part 
in calling meeting, and in 
founding the Kreiiz Zntuna;, 
48, 49; his counsels and aid. 
to the King, 50, 51 ; takes 
seat in new Assembly, 52 ; 



opposes amnesty, 51, 52 ; in 
new Parliament, opposes Par- 
liamentary control of taxes, 
54, 55 ; opposes reference to 
foreign customs, 55-59 ; be- 
lieves in Parliament for 
Prussia, 60-62 ; his hatred of 
Liberalism, 60 ; on civil mar- 
riage and Christianity, 63, 64 ; 
on the Prussian nobility, 64 ; 
his geniality, 65 ; his Parlia- 
mentary speeches, 66, 67 ; his 
partial knowledge of the peo- 
ple, 68 ; sustains the King's 
refusal of the German crown, 
73, 74 ; advocates independ- 
ence of Prussia, 74-78 ; in 
Parliament of Erfurt, 79, 80 ; 
advises peace with Austria, Si ; 
defends the Ministry, 82-84 I 
Ambassador at Frankfort, 84, 
85 ; his characteristics, 86; at 
Frankfort, 86 ; letters to his 
wife, 88-91 ; his opinions of 
the diplomatists, 89-91; 
entrusted with management 
of the Press, 92 ; his idea 
of newspapers, 94 ; smoking in 
the military commission, 95, 
96 ; his defence of Prussian in- 
terests, 96, 97 ; home and social 
life in Frankfort, g8 ; his dis- 
taste for Parliamentary life, 

99 ; duel with Vincke, 99, 100 ; 
member of House of Lords, 

100 ; his power of work, his 
despatches, 100, loi ; on\ 
special mission to Vienna, loi; 
his policy of seeking allies for 
Prussia against Austria, 102, 
103 ; his policy as to Russia 
and the Western Powers, 104- 
iio ; his policy toward France, 
113-120; sent to Paris, meets 
Napoleon, 118; his ideal of 
foreign policy, 121-125 ; loss 
of popularity at Court, 125, 
126 ; his attitude toward the 
new Ministry, 128 ; recalled 
from Frankfort, 129 ; ap- 



Indi 



ex. 



467 



Bismarck — Contin tied 

pointed Minister to St. Peters- 
burg, 132 ; his advice as to 
Austria, 133, 134 ; his jour- 
neys, his prolonged illness, and 
its effect, 135 ; supports the 
Government, 136 ; his senti- 
ments as to France, 137, 138 ; 
returns to Russia, 138 ; inter- 
view with Prince Regent, 139; 
his friendship with Roon, 143 ; 
sent for by Roon, his reply, 
145-147 ; arrives in Berlin, in- 
terview with the King, 147 ; 
his memorandum and letter 
on German affairs, 148, 149 ; 
returns to St. Petersburg, 150; 
goes to Berlin, 153; offered 
post of Minister- President, 
appointed Minister to Paris, 
154 ; in Paris, 155 ; visits Lon- 
don, meets Disraeli, 156, 157 ; 
his advice to Roon, 158 ; leave 
of absence, 159 ; summoned to 
Berlin, 160 ; appointed Min- 
ister-President, 161 ; conversa- 
tion with the King, 163 ; his 
House speeches oii the Budget, 
their effect, 163-167 ; on the 
House address to the King. 
169 ; his course on the Polish 
question, 171-177 ; difficulties 
of his position, 177-179 ; con- 
ffict with Chairman of House, 
180 ; disliked by the Crown 
Prince, 184, 185 ; not respons- 
ible for conflict, rgo ; his 
foreign policy, 192 ; with the 
King at Gastein, 193 ; dis- 
suades the King from attending 
Congress at Frankfort, 193— 
195 ; his course as to Schleswig- 
Holstein, 195, 199-201, 203, 
206-224, 226-238 ; his satis- 
faction with Peace of Vienna, 
226 ; concludes treaty of Gas- 
tein, 238 ; created Count, 2^,9 ; 
visits France, 241 ; interview 
with Napoleon, 241-243 ; re- 
turns to Berlin, 243 ; concludes 



commercial treaty with Italy, 
245 ; adopts hostile attitude 
toward Austria, 246 ; prepares 
for war, 247, 248 ; fails in 
health, 249 ; concludes treaty 
with Italy, 250 ; influences the 
King toward war, 251 ; desires 
war in order to reform German 
Confederation, 252-256 ; at- 
tempt on his life, 257 ; takes 
no part in management of 
army, 259 ; leaves Berlin to 
join army, 259 ; at battle of 
Koniggratz, 260, 261 ; his life 
during the campaign, 261, 262; 
advises acceptance of French 
offer of mediation, 262, 263; 
considers terms of peace, 264 ; 
desires control of North Ger- 
many, 266 ; his policy and mo- 
tives, 267-273 ; his interview 
with Benedetti, 270-272 ; his 
terms of peace, 273-275 ; his 
management of peace pre- 
liminaries, his persuasion of 
the King, 275, 276 ; his treat- 
ment of demands of France, 
his interviews with Benedetti, 
277-286 ; his course toward 
Russia, 283, 284 ; has laid 
foundation for German union, 
284-286 ; begins to think and 
act as a German, 286 ; secures 
Parliamentary majority, 287 ; 
his moderation, 2S8 ; voted 
donation of money, 289, 290 ; 
his role of creative statesman, 
291 ; dictates outlines of new 
Federal Constitution, 292 ; iiis 
plan of Constitution, 293-307 ; 
supports Constitution before 
Assembly, 308-212; defends 
witholding of money from 
King of Hanover, 313, 314 ; 
summons Parliament to con- 
sider tariff, 316 ; refuses to 
admit (jrand Duke of Baden 
into Federation, 317 ; refuses 
to support Napoleon's acquire- 
ment of Luxemburg, 318 ; pre- 



468 



Index. 



Bismarck — Continued 

serves the peace, visits Paris, 
319; interview with Benedetti 
as to the Spanish Succession, 
322 ; his efforts to secure ac- 
ceptance of Spanisla throne by 
Prince Leopold of Hohen- 
zolhen, 322-327 ; his motives, 
328, 329; retires to Varzin, 
330 ; goes to Berlin, 333 ; his 
policy, 334 ; orders Werther 
from Paris, sees Lord Loftus, 
336 ; receives telegram from 
the King announcing the Bene- 
detti incident, 338 ; prepares 
statement and causes its pub- 
lication, 339 ; his purpose, 340 ; 
meets the King at Branden- 
burg, 342; announces to Parlia- 
ment France's declaration of 
war, 343 ; pardons the Hano- 
verian Legion, 345 ; leaves for ^ 
seat of war, 346 ; his health 
during the campaign, 346 ; at 
Gravelotte, 347 ; at Sedan, 
348 ; refuses to modify terms 
of surrender, 349 ; defers re- 
newal of hostilities, 350 ; meets 
Napoleon, their interview, 
351 ; accompanies Napoleon 
to Belle Vue, 352 ; willing to 
make peace, 352 ; his circular 
notes explaining the Cierman 
view, 353, 354 ; demands terri- 
tory, 354; his attitude toward 
the Provisional Government, 
355 ; his interviews with Jules 
Favre, 356-360 ; his person- 
ality, 357, 358 ; his offer of 
terms, 358-361 ; at Versailles, 
362 ; upholds Germany through 
the Press, 362, 363 ; indignant 
at France's use of irregular 
troops, 364 ; affected by delay 
before Paris, 364 ; his tact in 
German unification, 366 ; his 
interview with the Crown 
Prince, 366 ; proposes treaties 
with southern German States, 
367 ; his agreement with Ba- 



varia, 367, 368 ; drafts letter 
by which King of Bavaria re- 
quests King of Prussia to as- 
sume title of Emperor, 370 ; 
raised to rank of Prince, 370 ; 
interview with Favre on capit- 
ulation of Paris, 370, 371 ; in- 
terviev/ with Thiers, 371-374 ; 
his part in the negotiations, 

374 ; his views as to Strasburg 
and Metz, 374-376; at signa- 
ture of Peace of Frankfort, 
376 ; continues in power, 377 ; 
sole master in foreign policy, 

375 ; his success in peace, 379 ; 
refuses support to French mo- 
narchical party, 382 ; brings 
about reconciliation with 
Austria, 382, 3S3 ; indignant 
at report of warlike intentions 
toward France, 384 ; his posi- 
tion as to internal matters, 
385, 386 ; his party alliances, 
386-388 ; resigns as Minister- 
President, 389 ; his depression, 

389 ; his affection for Roon, 

390 ; resumes the Presidency, 

390 ; opposition to him, 390, 

391 ; his dependence on the 
National Liberals, 391-394 ; 
supported on army organisa- 
tion, 393, 394 ; his part in con- 
flict with Roman Catholic 
Church, 394-403 ; his resigna- 
tion refused by the Emperor, 
granted leave of absence, re- 
tires to Varzin, 404 ; presides 
over Congress of Berlin, 406 ; 
effects Triple Alliance, 407 ; his 
efiforts against Socialism, 407- 
411 ; his scheme of economic 
reform, 411-429 ; his dislike of 
direct taxation, 413, 414 ; his 
proposals for State monopolies, 
414-419 ; introduces system of 
Protection, 419-423 ; his co- 
lonial policy, 423-427 ; effects 
of his measures, 428 ; re- 
fuses to become a party 
leader, 429 ; his power 



Index. 



469 



Bismarck — Continued 

checked by Parliament, 430 ; 
complains of conduct of Reich- 
stag, 431 ; friction with Parlia- 
ment as to freedom of debate, 
434 ; his Parliamentary re- 
ceptions, 435, 436 ; his re- 
course to criminal law against 
his adversaries, 436 ; his lack 
of generosity in political strug- 
gles, 437 ; celebration of his 
seventieth, birthday, 438 ; pre- 
sented with two million marks, 
purchases Friedrichsruh, 438 ; 
defends bill for army increase, 
441 ; his release of French spy, 

441, 442 ; his interview with 
the Czar, 442 ; enters into 
secret agreement with Russia, 

442, 443 ; proposes army in- 
crease, 443 ; his speech, 443- 
445 ; foundation of his power 
removed by death of Emperor 
William, 445, 446; his pro- 
spects with Emperor Freder- 
ick, 447 ; opposes marriage of 
Princess Victoria of Prussia 
to Prince Alexander of Batten- 
berg, 448-450 ; his differences 
with Emperor William II., 
450, 451 ; his power, 452 ; 
finds his influence and author- 
ity undermined, 452, 453 ; 
chief causes of his differences 
with the Emperor, 453, 454; 
refuses to acquiesce in degrad- 
ation of his position, 455 ; his 
first separation from the Em- 
peror, 455 ; declines to justify 
interview with Windhorst, 

456 ; resigns, created Field 
Marshal and Duke of Lauen- 
burg, 456 ; his leave-takings, 

457 ; his restlessness in leisure, 
his energy, 457, 458 ; receives 
deputations, 45S ; opposes and 
defies the Government, 459 ; 
his disclosures, 460 ; the 
avowed enemy of Court and 
Ministry, 461 ; absents himself 



from Moltke's funeral, 461; his 
triumphal journey to Vienna, 
461 ; his reconciliations with 
the Emperor, 462 ; celebration 
of his eighty-fifth birthday, 
462; his loneliness and infirmi- 
ties, 462 ; his interest in pub- 
lic affairs, his unbroken mind 
and spirit, 463 ; his death, his 
burial at Friedrichsruh, 463 

Bismarck, Rudolph von, 5 

Bismarck-Bohlen, g, 19 

Blankenburg, Moritzvon, 30,144 

Bonin. 109, 140, 141 

Boulanger, General, 440 

Brandenburg, Count, 51, 81 

Brandenburg, the nobility of, 6-8 

Bucher, Lothar, 56, 325, 420, 421 

Bundesrath, 296 

Burnside, General, 361 



C 



Caprivi, General, 460, 462 
Castelnau, General, 349 
Cavour, 22, 129-132 
Charles Frederick, Prince, 60 
Crevisse, 5, 8 

D 

Delbriick, 365, 412 
Diebwitz, Fraulein von, 9 
Disraeli, 156, 157 

E 

Erfurt, Parliament of, 79, 80 

F 

Favre, Jules, 356-360, 370, 373, 
376 

Frankfort, 87 

Frankfort, Peace of, 376, 377 

Frederick, Crown Prince, after- 
ward Frederick III., 183, 1S4, 
207, 219, 220, 236, 260, 276, 
324, 325, 336, 342, 343, 366, 
369, 416, 445-450 



470 



Index. 



Frederick William, Elector of 

Brandenburg, 6 
Frederick William III., 36, 37 
Frederick William IV., 29, 30, 

37, 38. 44, 50-52, 54, 60, 72, 

73, 107-110, 127, 138 
Friedrichsruh, 438, 439, 463 



Gagern, Heinrich von, 72 

Gambetta, 364 

Garibaldi, 365 

Gastein, Treaty of, 238, 240 

Gerlach, Leopold von, 30, 49, 50 

Gortschakoff, 384, 385 

Grammont, Due de, 275, 330, 

331, 335 
Gravelotte, battle of, 347 
Greifswald, 22 
Guizot, 335 

H 

Herisson, Comte, 357, 358 

Hobel, 408, 411 

Hohenzollern, Leopold, Prince 

of, 321-326, 331-337 
Ilolstein, 195-238, 240, 246, 258, 

265 



K 



Katte, Fraulein von, 8 
Kleist, Hans von, 30, 43, 48, 400 
Koniggrjitz, battle of, 260, 261 
Kretiz Zeiiujig, 49, 107, 115, 
119, 126, 390, 391 



Lasker, 392 
Lauenburg, 238, 239 
Lhu3's, Drouyn de, 277, 278 
Loftus, Lord Augustus, 336, 342 

M 

MacMahon, 348 
Manteuffel, Otto von, 51 



Mars-la-Tour, 347, 348 
Mencken, Fraulein, afterward 

wife of Karl von Bismarck, 

10, 14, 21, 22 
Metternich, Prince, 36 
Metz, 354 360, 374-476 
Moltke, Helmuth Karl Bernard 

von, 247-249, 257, 259-261, 

338, 339, 348-352, 373, 441, 

451, 461 
Motley, John Lothop, 17, 19, 98, 

177 

N 

Napoleon III., 113-119, 125, 
129, 137, 138, 175, 176, 213, 
214, 228, 238, 241-245, 248, 
254, 257, ,262-264, 270-274, 
277-286, 294, 315, 318, 319, 

343, 344, 348-353, 361 
Navy, 295 

A^ew Prussian Gazette, 49 
Nobeling, 408, 411 

O 

Oldenburg, Duke of, 200, 222 
Olmutz, Convention of, 81, 82 



Pfortden, Baron von der, 284- 

286 
Poland, I 71-17 7 
Pomerania, 11-13, 21-24, 29 
Press, the, 182, 183, 185 
Prim, General, 320, 322, 326, 

331 
Prokesch-Osten, Herr von, 93, 

97 
Puttkammer, Fraulein von, after- 
ward wife of Otto von Bis- 
marck, 32 ; Herr v., 447 



R 



Radowitz, Herr von, 74, 75, 81 
Reichstag, 296, 298 
Richter, 427 



Index. 



471 



Roon, Albrecht Theodor Emil 
von, 31, 140, 141, 143-145, 
156, 158-161, 180, 181, 234, 
252, 256, 260, 261, 287, 304, 
324, 338, 339, 369, 387-390 



Schleinitz, Herr von, 133, 207 
Schleswig, 195-238, 246, 265 
Schoenhausen, i, 5, 8-11, 22, 25- 

27, 29, 44, 46, 438, 463 
Schweninger, Doctor, 458 
Sedan, 348-352 
Sheridan, General, 347 
Sourds", M. de, 330 
Stahl , 30, 49 

Slrasburg, 360, 361, 374-37^ 
Sybel, Heinrich von, 172, 323 



Thadden, Herr von, 29, 43, 47, 

391 
Thiele, Herr von, 330 
Thiers, M., 353, 362, 371 
Thun, 89, 91, 95-97 
Toul, 360 
Trigkff, 29, 30 
Triple Alliance, 405, 407, 442, 

443 



V 



Versailles, 362, 365 

Victor Emmanuel, 245, 248, 382 

Victoria, Princess, of Prussia, 

124, 206, 448-450 
Vienna, Congress of, 34-36 
Vienna, Peace of, 224-226 
Vincke, George von, 40, 47, 207 



W 

Welfenfond, 313 
Werther, Herr von, 323, 336 
William, Prince Regent, after- 
v/ard William I., 127, 131, 139 
-141, 145, 152-156, 160-163, 
169, 170, 177, 181, 184, 187- 
189, 192-194, 206, 207, 227, 
228, 234-239, 246, 248-251, 
258-263, 275, 276, 279, 324- 
326 331-334, 336-343. 346- 
349, 352, 369, 370, 384, 388- 
3QO, 404, 407-409, 416, 441, 

445, 446, 449 
William II., 450-462 
Wimpffen, 348, 350, 351, 353 
Windthorst, 396, 416, 455, 456 




Heroes of the Nations. 



EDITED BY 



EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., 

Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 



A Series of biographical studies of the Hves and work 
of a number of representative historical characters about 
whom have gathered the great traditions of the Nations 
to which they belonged, and who have been accepted, in 
many instances, as types of the several National ideals- 
With the life of each typical character will be presented 
a picture of the National conditions surrounding hin> 
during his career. 

The narratives are the work of writers who are recog- 
nized authorities on their several subjects, and, while 
thoroughly trustworthy as history, will present picturesque 
and dramatic " stories " of the Men and of the events con- 
nected with them. 

To the Life of each " Hero " will be given one duo- 
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HEROES OF THE NATIONS. 

Nelson, and the Naval Supremacy of England. By W. Clark Russell, author of 

" TheWrec': of the Grosvenor," etc. 
Gustavus Adolphus, and the Struggle of Protestantism for Existence. By C. R. 

L. Fletcher, M.A., late Fellow of All Souls' College. 
Pericles, and the Golden Age of Athens. By Evelyn Abbott, M. A, 
Theodoric the Goth, the Barbarian Champion of Civilisation. By Thomas 

HoDGKiN, author of " Italy and Her Invaders," etc. 
Sir Philip Sidney, and the Chivalry of England. By H. R. Fox-Bourne, author of 

" The Life of John Locke," etc. 
Julius Caesar, and the Organisation of the Roman Empire. By W, Ward 

Fowler, M.A., Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. 
John Wyclif, Last of the Schoolmen, and First of the English Reformers. By 

Lewis Sergeant, author of " New Greece," etc. 
Napoleon, Warrior and Ruler, and the Military Supremacy of Revolutionary 

France. By W. O'Connor Morris. 
Henry of Navarre, and the Huguenots of France. By P. F. Willert, M.A., Fel- 
low of Exeter College, Oxford. 
Cicero, and the Fall of the Roman Republic. By J. L. Strachan-Davidson, M.A., 

Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 
Abraham Lincoln, and the Downfall of American Slavery. By Noah Brooks. 
Prince Henry (of Portugal) the Navigator, and the Age of Discovery. By C. R. 

Beazley, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. 
Julian the Philosopher, and the Last Struggle of Paganism against Christianity. 

By Alice Gardner. 
Louis XIV., and the Zenith of the French Monarchy. By Arthur Hassall, 

M.A., Senior Student of Christ Church College, Oxford. 
Charles XII., and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire, 1682-1719. By R. Nisbet 

Bain. 
Lorenzo de' Medici, and Florence in the 15th Century. By Edward Armstrong, 

M.A., Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. 
Jeanne d'Arc. Her Life and Death. By Mrs. Oliphant. 
Christopher Columbus. His Life and Voyages. By Washington Irving. 
Robert the Bruce, and the Struggle for Scottish Independence. By Sir Herbert 

Maxwell, M.P. 
Hannibal, Soldier, Statesman, Patriot ; and the Crisis of the Struggle between 

Carthage and Rome. By W. O'Connor Morris, Sometime Scholar of Oriel 

College, Oxford. 
Ulysses S. Grant, and the Period of National Preservation and Reconstruction, 

1822-1885. By Lieut. -Col. William Conant Church. 
Robert E. Lee, and the Southern Confederacy, 1807-1870. By Prof. Henry 

Alexander White, of the Washington and Lee University. 
The Cid Campeador, and the Waning of the Crescent in the West. By K. 

Butler Clarke, Fellow of St. Jol>n's College, Oxford. 
Saladin, and the Fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. By Stanley Lane-Poole, 

author of " The Moors in Spain," etc. 
Bismarck, and the New German Empire. How it Arose and What it Displaced. 

By W. J. Headlam, M.A., Fellow of King's College. 
Charlemagne (Charles the Greatj. The Hero of Two Nations. By H. W. Car- 
less Davis, M.A., Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford, Sometime Scholar of Balliol. 
Alexander the Great, and the Extension of Greek Rule and Greek Ideas, 356-323 

B.C. By Benj.amin I. Wheeler, Prcsijent of the University of C.iifo-r.i 1. 
Daniel O'Connell, and the Revival of National Life in Ireland. By Robert Dun- 
lop, M.A. 



For further information and sitles, see descriptive circular. 



G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York and London. 



Messrs. G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS take pleasure in 
announcing that they have in course of publication, in 
co-operation with Mr. T. Fisher Unwin, of London, a 
series of historical studies, intended to present in a graphic 
manner the stories of the different nations that have 
attained prominence in history. 

In the story form the current of each national life is 
distinctly indicated, and its picturesque and noteworthy 
periods and episodes are presented for the reader in their 
philosophical relation to each other as well as to universal 
history. 

It is the plan of the writers of the different volumes to 
enter into the real life of the peoples, and to bring them 
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THE STORY OF THE NATIONS. 



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half morocco, gilt top, $1.75. 

The following are now ready : 

GREECE. Prof. Jas. A. Harrison. 
ROME. Arthur Gilman. 



THE JEWS. Prof. James K. Hosmer. 
CHALDEA. Z.A.Ragozin. 
GERMANY. S. Baring-Gould. 
NORWAY. Hjalmar H. Boyesen. 
SPAIN. Rev. E. E. and Susan Hale. 
HUNGARY. Prof. A. Vambery. 
CARTHAGE. Prof. Alfred J. Church. 
THE SARACENS. Arthur Gilman. 
THE MOORS IN SPAIN. Stanley 

Lane-Poole. 
THE NORMANS. Sarah Ornejewett. 
PERSIA. S. G, W. Benjamin. 
ANCIENT EGYPT. Prof. Geo. Raw- 

linson. 
ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE. Prof. J. 

P. MahafFy. 
ASSYRIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
THE GOTHS. Henry Bradley. 
IRELAND. Hon. Emily Lawless. 
TURKEY. Stanley Lane-Poole. 
MEDIA, BABYLON, AND PERSIA. 

Z. A. Ragozin. 
MEDIEVAL FRANCE. Prof. Gus- 

tave Masson. 
HOLLAND. Prof. J. Thorold Rogers. 
MEXICO. Susan Hale. 
PHOENICIA. Geo. Rawlinson. 
THE HANSATOW^NS. Helen Zim- 

mern. 
EARLY BRITAIN. Prof. Alfred J. 

Church. 
THE BARBARY CORSAIRS. Stan- 
ley Lane-Pool. 
RUSSIA. W. R. Morfill. 
THE JEWS UNDERROME. W^. D. 

Morrison. 
SCOTLAND. John Mackintosh. 
SV/ITZERLAND. R, Stead and Mrs. 

A. Hug. 
PORTUGAL. H. Morse-Stephens. 
THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE. C. W^. 

C. Oman. 
SICILY. E. A. Freeman. 
THE TUSCAN REPUBLICS- Bella 

Duffy. 
POLAND. W.R. Morfill. 
PARTHIA. Geo. Rawlinsoa 



JAPAN. David Murray. 

THE CHRISTIAN RECOVERY OF 

SPAIN. H. E. Watts. 
AUSTRALASIA. Greville Tregar- 

then. 
SOUTHERN AFRICA. Geo. M. 

Theal. 
VENICE. AletheaWiel. 
THE CRUSADES. T. S. Archer and 

C. L. Kingsford. 
VEDIC INDIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
BOHEMIA. C. E. Maurice. 
CANADA. J. G. Bourinot. 
THE BALKAN STATES. W^illiam 

Miller. 
BRITISH RULE IN INDIA. R. W^. 

Frazer. 
MODERN FRANCE. Andre Le Bon. 
THE BUILDINGOFTHE BRITISH 

EMPIRE. Alfred T. Story. Two 

vols. 
THE FRANKS. Lewis Sergeant. 
THE WEST INDIES. Amos K. 

Fiske. 
THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND IN 

THE 19TH CENTURY. Justin 

McCarthy, M. P. Two vols. 
AUSTRIA, THE HOME OF THE 

HAPSBURG DYNASTY, FROM 

1282 TO THE PRESENT DAY. 

Sidney Whitman. 
CHINA. Robt. K. Douglass. 
MODERN SPAIN. Major Martin A. 

S. Hume. 
Other volumes in preparation are : 

THE UNITED STATES, 1775-1897. 

A. C. McLaughlin, Professor o' 

American History, University of 

Michigan. In two vols. 
BUDDHIST INDIA. Prof. T. W. 

Rhys-Davids. 
MOHAMMEDAN INDIA. Stanley 

Lane-Poole. 
THE THIRTEEN COLONIES. 

Helen A. Smith. 
WALES AND CORNWALL, Owsn 

M. Edwards. 
THE ITALIAN KINGDOM. 



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